IN RE DYNASTIE D.
AC 48218
Appellate Court of Connecticut
July 10, 2025
Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
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In re Dynastie D.
IN RE DYNASTIE D.*
(AC 48218)
Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The minor child, who had been adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, appealed from the trial court‘s judgment granting the petitioner‘s motion for the out-of-state placement of the child. The child claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to follow the requirements of the statute ((Rev. to 2023)
This court concluded that, in determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated good cause for the out-of-state placement of a child pursuant to
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the petitioner demonstrated good cause pursuant to
The trial court properly placed the burden of proof for good cause on the petitioner as, despite the court‘s isolated use of imprecise language in its oral decision, the challenged language merely reflected the court‘s assessment of the evidence offered by the child to the court as part of its determination of whether the petitioner had met its burden with respect to good cause, and the single challenged sentence was not enough to overcome the presumption that the court knows and has applied the law correctly.
The trial court‘s factual findings challenged by the child were not clearly erroneous, as they were supported by evidence in the record, and there was ample evidence in the record, not challenged by the child, supporting the court‘s ultimate conclusion that there was good cause to place the child outside the state.
Argued April 14—officially released July 10, 2025**
In re Dynastie D.
Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to adjudicate the respondent parents’ minor child neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Juvenile Matters, and transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Matters, where the respondent parents were defaulted; thereafter, the court, Skyers, J., rendered judgment adjudicating the minor child neglected and committing the minor child to the custody of the petitioner; subsequently, the court granted the petitioner‘s motion for the out-of-state placement of the minor child, and the minor child appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Karen Oliver Damboise, assistant public defender, for the appellant (minor child).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom were Patrick Kelly-Hauser, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
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state was not supported by the evidence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The child was born in February, 2023. On the same day, the Department of Children and Families (department), which had a prior history with the respondent mother (mother), invoked a ninety-six hour hold on behalf of the child. Soon after, the petitioner filed a neglect petition, as well as a motion for an ex parte order of temporary custody, which was granted by the court, Maronich, J., and the child was placed with maternal relative foster parents (foster parents). The court, McLaughlin, J., sustained the order of temporary custody on February 24, 2023.
Paternity was established on April 20, 2023. Following the establishment of paternity, in October, 2023, the petitioner submitted an application pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (compact)3 and
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child‘s paternal
On December 8, 2023, the petitioner filed a permanency plan recommending termination of parental rights and adoption or permanent transfer of guardianship to the paternal grandparents. In the study in support of the permanency plan,6 the petitioner represented
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that both parents agreed to the child being placed in Florida with the paternal grandparents and stated that they will eventually relocate to Florida. On December 21, 2023, the child filed an objection to the permanency plan. At a case status conference held on January 23, 2024, the attorney for the minor child advocated that the child remain in her current placement. On January 30, 2024, the child withdrew her objection to the permanency plan. On February 6, 2024, the attorney for the minor child submitted a position letter in which she represented that “an agreement has been reached in that [the department] will amend the permanency plan to reflect a [termination of parental rights] and an adoption with no placement source identified in the plan.” Thereafter, on February 7, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion to amend the permanency plan to reflect termination of parental rights and adoption.
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On April 30, 2024, the petitioner, pursuant to
A hearing on the motion for out-of-state placement was held over three days: June 7 and September 13 and 20, 2024. Both the petitioner and the child introduced several exhibits that were admitted into evidence, and the court heard testimony from Tania Mayen, the family‘s social worker; the child‘s paternal grandmother; the child‘s foster mother; and the child‘s foster father.
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On October 18, 2024, the court, Skyers, J., granted the motion for out-of-state placement. In its oral decision, the court made the following relevant findings: “[The mother] has not addressed her mental health needs, her physical health, [intimate partner violence] and parenting needs, all factors that contributed to her inability to parent the [child]. [The father] reportedly was unemployed and transient between New York and Connecticut. He further reported that he was not in a position to care for his child. [The father] identified [the paternal grandmother] as a potential placement resource for [the child]. At the beginning of this case, paternity had not yet been established. Therefore, any assessment as to the suitability of [the] paternal grandparents as a resource was deferred until after paternity had been confirmed. As stated above, paternity was confirmed April 20th, 2023. . . .
“During the trial, [Mayen] testified that early in the process the case plan was for [the child] to be placed with the paternal grandparents in Florida. The parents
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“[The paternal grandmother] testified that her main concern would be to provide a stable home for [the child‘s] safety and well-being. She testified that [she is] willing to have [the child] get to know [the father], but [the father] would not be living with them. [The paternal grandmother] had regular and consistent weekly video calls with [the child] that were facilitated by [the father] during his visitation time. [The paternal grandmother] and [the paternal grandfather], along with [the paternal grandmother‘s] two sons, her sister-in-law and [the father] visited with [the child] in Connecticut in July, 2023. Her last visit with [the child] was in September, 2024, with [the paternal grandfather], her sons and other extended family in New York. She clearly loves [the child] and wishes to assume care for her in her home. [The paternal grandmother] had planned to take [the child] for a visit in Florida in July . . . 2024. However, that visit did not take place due to the [court‘s] procedural process.
“[The foster mother] credibly testified that she and her family love [the child]. They have a clear bond with her. And she and [the foster father] would be willing to adopt [the child]. The [compact] process began in July, 2023, and ended April, 2024. The court recognizes the length of time in the approval process. In addition, the lengthy court procedural process added to the delay in decisions regarding [the child‘s] permanency.
“[The child] is very fortunate to have two possible placements. Generally, questions of custodial placement are resolved by determination of what is in the best interest of the child as shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . To determine whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will foster the child‘s best interest and sustain growth, development, well-being, and the continuity and stability of his environment. . . .
In re Dynastie D.
“The court finds that placement with [the] paternal grandparents is in [the child‘s] best interest and will allow [the child] to maintain a connection with her paternal family while still hav[ing] the opportunity to maintain a connection with her [father] and [mother]. [The child] has offered insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the decision to place [the child] with her [paternal] grandparents in Florida is inconsistent with her best interests, nor to conclude that to do so would be detrimental to her best interest.
“The court would be remiss in not acknowledging the care the foster parents had given to [the child]. . . . foster parents have a loving bond with [the child] and [it] is clear from the testimony that they have nurtured and cared for her during the time of her placement. Indeed, the court notes that it is this loving and
On November 13, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion requesting the trial court to articulate whether it made a finding, when it granted the motion for out-of-state placement, that there was good cause to place the child
In re Dynastie D.
outside the state, as required by
I
The child first claims that the court failed to follow the statutory requirements of
In re Dynastie D.
A
We
As this involves an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary. See Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Widow(er), Heir(s) and/or Creditors of the Estate of Beryl E. Rowland, 231 Conn. App. 761, 770, 334 A.3d 1054 (2025). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
Our analysis begins with the text of
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may place any child or youth so committed to the commissioner in a suitable foster home or in the home of a fictive kin caregiver, relative caregiver, or in a licensed child-caring institution or in the care and custody of any accredited, licensed or approved child-caring agency, within or without the state, provided a child shall not be placed outside the state except for good cause and unless the parents or guardian of such child are notified in advance of such placement and given an opportunity to be heard, or in a receiving home maintained and operated by the commissioner. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The phrase “good cause” is not defined in
In seeking to clarify what may constitute good cause as the term is used in
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App. 534, 552, 330 A.3d 912 (2025). In so concluding, this court observed that “child custody determination[s] [are] dependent on the factual circumstances of a given case” as well as the established principle that “decision-making in family disputes requires flexible, individualized adjudication of the particular facts of each case without the constraint of objective guidelines.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 551-52. Likewise, whether to place a child outside the state is a fact intensive inquiry for the trial court, “which has the parties before it and is in the best position to analyze all of the factors which go into the ultimate conclusion that [there is good cause to support the out-of-state placement].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 589, 248 A.3d 675 (2020); see id. (discussing posttermination visitation orders). Thus, we conclude that the lack of a specific statutory definition of “good cause” here suggests that the legislature intended for the court to exercise its broad discretion in determining, when considering the particular factual circumstances of each case, what “[l]egally sufficient ground or reason” or good cause warrants the out-of-state placement of a child.10 See, e.g., Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 711, 723, 189 A.3d 578 (2018) (in context of habeas proceeding, concluding that lack of specific statutory contours as to statutory phrase suggests that legislature intended for court to exercise its discretion).
The discretion of the trial court, however, must be exercised within the context of the applicable statutory provision. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 202 Conn. App. 21, 33, 244 A.3d 171 (2020) (“[i]n attempting to synthesize a more fulsome definition of
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good cause as that term is used [in the statute], we are mindful that the statute itself provides some interpretive guidance“), aff‘d, 343 Conn. 424, 274 A.3d 85 (2022).
The parties agree, as do we, that good cause and best interest of the child are not synonymous. See Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008) (“[t]he use of the different terms . . . within the same statute suggests that the legislature acted with complete awareness of their different meanings . . . and that it intended the terms to have different meanings” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the factual basis of a good cause determination may overlap with that of the best interest determination, we recommend that trial courts evaluate these issues independently. See, e.g., In re Joel H., Docket No. CP-18-023577-A, 2024 WL 575942, *12 (Conn. Super. January 24, 2024). By requiring a showing of a good cause for justification of an out-of-state placement, which is distinct from the typical best interest of the child determination associated with custody placements, the legislative intent behind the words “good cause” suggests that such a
In re Dynastie D.
determination would involve a weighing of the well-being of the child if placed outside the state with that of the child if she remained in Connecticut.
Several trial courts have had occasion to make a good cause determination in this context, which we find instructive. In In re Joel H., supra, 2024 WL 575942, the trial court considered the petitioner‘s petitions for termination of parental rights for two children, Saria and her half-sibling Joel, as well as the petitioner‘s motion for out-of-state placement of Saria. Id., *1. In that case, Joel had been adjudicated neglected in 2018 and removed from his mother‘s care in 2019. Id. Saria, who shared the same mother as Joel, was born in 2021. Id. Soon after her birth, an order of temporary custody was granted, and she was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the petitioner. Id. In 2023, Joel moved to a new, out-of-state placement in Florida, with his paternal half-sibling‘s mother, S. Id., *5. The trial court granted the termination of the parental rights of the children‘s mother, as well as the parental rights of the children‘s respective fathers. Id., *1. The court then addressed the petitioner‘s motion for out-of-state placement, which sought to place Saria with S in Florida. Id., *12. The court observed that this placement would permit Joel and Saria to be together. Id. In concluding that the petitioner had shown good cause for the out-of-state placement, the court considered whether S was a suitable and worthy guardian, that Saria had visited with and was comfortable with S, that Saria would be placed with Joel and his half-siblings, and that S was willing to foster bonds between the children and their biological and prior foster families. Id. The court also acknowledged the position of the nonparty foster parents, who submitted a letter in opposition to the motion for out-of-state placement and expressed their wish for Saria to remain in their care, but concluded that “[t]heir love and care for Saria, however,
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do not override the statutory analysis set forth above.” Id., *12 n.3.
In In re Caydence B., Docket No. CP-16-011676-A, 2016 WL 7975675 (Conn. Super. November 28, 2016), the court considered, in addition to the petitioner‘s neglect petition, a motion for out-of-state placement filed by the intervening paternal aunt. Id., *2. In considering the motion, the court evaluated the quality of the child‘s relationships in Connecticut as well as in the proposed placement state, finding that “[p]lacing the child with [the paternal aunt], however, would make contact with her parents and all of her Connecticut relatives more difficult. The child has lived all her life in Connecticut and in the home of maternal grandparents from birth until the [order of temporary custody]. She has many paternal and maternal relatives in this state, and the connectivity of family and kin would thus seem to be strongest in this state.” Id., *6. This was outweighed, however, by the suitability of the paternal aunt, who had “consistently shown herself to be ready to care for the child and committed to providing her with permanency if necessary” and had a strong bond with the child. Id., *7. The court weighed the suitability of the paternal aunt against that of the only possible Connecticut placement option, the maternal great-grandmother, who “show[ed] significantly less commitment to the child in comparison to the [paternal aunt], as well as raising substantial doubt about her readiness, willingness, and desire to provide a permanent
Finally, in In re Christopher C., Docket No. CP-23-013514-A, 2024 WL 3665347 (Conn. Super. July 2, 2024), aff‘d, 232 Conn. App. 104, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 903
In re Dynastie D.
(2025), the trial court denied a father‘s motion for out-of-state placement of his child with the child‘s paternal grandmother. The court found that no good cause existed to place the child outside the state nor was the placement in the child‘s best interest. Id., *3. In reaching its conclusion as to good cause, the court weighed the testimony and evidence presented before it, which demonstrated several concerns raised as to the suitability of the proposed placement, such as the paternal grandmother‘s judgment, level of collaboration with the department, and ability to protect the child, and that the placement would separate the child from his half-sibling. Id., *2-3.
In each of these cases, the court balanced the well-being of the child if placed outside the state with that of the child if the child were to have remained in Connecticut.11 In doing so, the court appropriately considered different, case specific facts. Essential to the court‘s good cause analysis in each case were the court‘s own assessments of the child‘s current and/or proposed placements, which required credibility determinations and a weighing of the evidence before it.
On the basis of the authorities we have discussed and the legal principles arising therefrom, we conclude that, in determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated good cause pursuant to
In re Dynastie D.
a number of factors in determining whether a petitioner has met its evidentiary burden of establishing good cause to place the child outside the state. As examples, which are neither exclusive nor all-inclusive, a trial court may wish to consider the suitability of the proposed out-of-state placement; the quality of the child‘s relationships with individuals in Connecticut or geographically close to Connecticut and within the proposed out-of-state placement; the child‘s or the parent‘s preferences where appropriate; the strength of the emotional bond between the child and the current in-state placement; the opportunity for the child to form a bond with the proposed placement; and the impact the out-of-state placement may have on the child. Trial courts should, of course, evaluate these considerations independently from their best interest of the child determination.12
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Having addressed the parties’ arguments as to the good cause standard, we now address the merits of the child‘s claim that the court improperly applied the good cause standard under
We begin with our standard of review. This claim challenges a trial court‘s determination of whether the petitioner has satisfied good cause which, as discussed previously, requires a weighing of various facts and circumstances offered to justify the out-of-state placement, including an evaluation of any witness testimony. Because such determination invokes the discretion of the trial court, it is reversible only for an abuse of discretion. “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court‘s] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . [Appellate courts] are not in a position to second-guess the opinions of witnesses, professional or otherwise, nor the observations and conclusions of the [trial court] when they are based on reliable evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marie J., 219 Conn. App. 792, 820, 296 A.3d 308 (2023).
We first address the child‘s interpretation of the court‘s judgment; namely, that in determining good
consideration in accordance with the potential considerations we set forth herein.
cause, the court solely relied on the fact that placing the child outside the state would provide her with the opportunity to know her parents.13 We disagree.
Further, to the extent that the child argues that it was improper for the court to consider whether the out-of-state placement would afford the child the opportunity to maintain a connection with her parents, we disagree. In arguing such, the child asserts that the “[t]ermination of parental rights is the complete severance by the court of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child‘s parent[s].” Indeed, our Supreme Court has held such in the context of ascertaining the standing of a respondent parent appealing from a posttermination visitation order. See In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 558 (concluding that respondent mother whose parental rights had been terminated and who filed request for posttermination visitation during course of termination proceeding did have standing to challenge court‘s posttermination visitation order). The court‘s consideration of the child‘s opportunity to maintain a connection with her parents here, however, was “not premised on an individual‘s constitutional or statutory rights as a parent“; id., 565; but, rather, focused on “the child‘s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support” as part of its determination of good cause. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 564. Although the petitioner sought to end the legal relationship between the child and her parents, as demonstrated by the permanency plan and the recent filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, the record indicates that both the parents and the petitioner expect supervised visitation to occur, following the child‘s placement with the paternal grandparents. See part II of this opinion. Thus, where the termination of parental rights has not yet occurred, or the issue of posttermination visitation has not yet been reached, we cannot conclude that the court erred in considering the opportunity for the child to maintain a connection with her parents.
Moreover, the court found that the foster parents’ “lov-ing and sustaining care . . . will help [the child] transition more easily to her paternal . . . grandparents in Florida,” implicitly considering the impact the out-of-state placement would have on the child. In sum, it is evident from the court‘s findings that it carefully weighed the relevant characteristics of each placement option, thereby balancing the well-being of the child if placed outside the state with that of the child if she remained in Connecticut.
Having concluded that the court properly weighed relevant factors in its determination, and given our declination to set forth mandatory factors herein; see footnote 10 of this opinion; we construe the child‘s remaining claim as a claim that the court abused its discretion when making its good cause determination by failing to credit certain evidence over other evidence it did credit in making its good cause determination.14 Specifically, the child claims that the trial court “utiliz[ed] the factor of establishing and maintaining
“It is well established that a decision to credit certain evidence over other evidence is exclusively within the province of the trial court. . . .” Weaver v. Sena, 199 Conn. App. 852, 860, 238 A.3d 103 (2020); see also Woodbridge Crossing Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Ferguson, 229 Conn. App. 99, 104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024) ([i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony . . . ); M. C. v. A. W., 226 Conn. App. 444, 466, 319 A.3d 183 (2024) (Insofar as the defendant invites us to reconsider the evidence that was before the court, [w]e note that it is not the function of this court to review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention.). Likewise, it is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence before the court or to substitute our judgment in this matter. F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024); see also In re Blake P., 222 Conn. App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023) ([a]lthough there may be evidence in the record that would support the [plaintiff‘s] position, it is not the role of [an appellate] court to examine that evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardona v. Padilla, supra, 230 Conn. App. 547-48.
We, therefore, will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court relating to its good cause determination in this matter.
In the present case, we conclude from our review of the record that the trial court properly weighed relevant factors in reaching its good cause determination. We recognize that the trial court‘s explanation of that finding was somewhat abbreviated in comparison with its best interest finding. When ruling on a motion for out-of-state placement, the better practice is for the trial court to make specific and independent findings related to best interest and good cause respectively. Here, in making its good cause finding, the court referred to findings it had made in connection with the issue of best interest, which, as we stated previously in this opinion, may involve similar subordinate findings, but are nonetheless legally distinct. We are satisfied that the findings set forth in the court‘s oral ruling and its articulation of that ruling not only find support in the record but adequately support a determination that there was good cause for granting the motion. See part II of this opinion. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by concluding that the petitioner demonstrated good cause.
C
We next address the child‘s claim that the court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of good cause from the petitioner to her. In support of this claim, the child relies on an isolated sentence in the court‘s oral decision: “[The child] has offered insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the decision to place [the child] with her [paternal] grandparents in Florida is inconsistent with her best interests.” The child argues that this one sentence, coupled with the court‘s failure to explicitly state that the burden of proof rested on the petitioner, demonstrates that the court improperly shifted
We begin our analysis with the standard of review for claims that the court has misallocated the burden of proof. “The question of whether a trial court has held a party to a less exacting standard of proof than the law requires is a legal one. . . . Accordingly, our review is plenary. . . . Similarly, plenary review applies to a question of misallocation of a burden of proof. . . . Furthermore, if it is not otherwise clear from the record that an improper standard was applied, the appellant‘s claim will fail on the basis of inadequate support in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.R., 161 Conn. App. 563, 569-70, 127 A.3d 1155 (2015).
We are mindful that “an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding. . . . Furthermore, [w]e read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).
The following details, as set forth in the court‘s oral decision and articulation, inform our resolution of the child‘s claim. At the outset of its oral decision, the court stated that “[b]efore the court is the [petitioner‘s] motion pursuant to
After referencing the relevant statute, the court made several findings relating to its determination of the best interest of the child. These findings primarily referred to evidence offered by the petitioner, including testimony from Mayen and the paternal grandmother; exhibit C, the unified home study prepared by the state of Florida evaluating the paternal grandparents’ home; and information reflected in both exhibit A, the social study in support of the neglect petition, and exhibit B, the social study in support of the permanency plan. The court then acknowledged the appropriate standard of proof that applies to determinations of the best interest of the child and concluded that the child‘s out-of-state placement with the paternal grandparents was in her best interest. In concluding such, the court considered that the out-of-state placement “will allow [the child] to maintain a connection with her paternal family while still hav[ing] the opportunity to maintain a connection with her [parents].” Here, the court referenced the petitioner‘s theory of good cause that it sought to establish at the hearing on the motion for out-of-state placement.16 Thus, “[t]he court‘s decision relate[d] the petitioner‘s evidence to the legal grounds that the petitioner sought to establish, implying that it was the petitioner who bore the burden of establishing those grounds.” See In re J.R., supra, 161 Conn. App. 570. The court then stated: “The minor child has offered insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the decision to place [the child] with her [paternal] grandparents in Florida is inconsistent with her best interests, nor to conclude that to do so would be detrimental to her best interest.” (Emphasis added.) In its subsequent articulation addressing whether it made a good cause finding in accordance with
After our careful review of the record, we are satisfied that, despite the court‘s isolated use of the imprecise language that forms the basis for the child‘s claim, the court properly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner. The challenged language merely reflects the court‘s assessment of the evidence offered by the child to the court as part of its determination of whether the petitioner had met its burden with respect to good cause. See In re Denzel W., supra, 225 Conn. App. 378 (“[t]he challenged language reflects the trial court‘s rejection of the respondent‘s evidence of personal rehabilitation after it had determined that the petitioner had met her burden with respect to this
II
The child also claims that the court‘s determination of good cause was not supported by the evidence.17 We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and relevant legal principles. It is well established that appellate review of a trial court‘s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. See In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 488, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). “A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .”
“On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial court‘s conclusion was factually supported and legally correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court‘s] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court‘s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
We refer to the factual findings made by the trial court discussed previously in this opinion. In support of its findings, the court had before it the following testimony and documentary evidence relevant to our resolution of this appeal. At the hearing on the petitioner‘s motion for out-of-state placement, Mayen testified as to the child‘s relationship with her paternal grandparents. She testified that the paternal grandparents had been in “consistent communication” with the department, had visited the child in person three times, and had maintained weekly virtual visits. Mayen testified that, when visiting in person with the paternal grandmother, the child was
The paternal grandmother similarly testified as to the visits between her and the child, both virtually and in person in Connecticut. The paternal grandmother testified to her parenting plan for the child, childcare arrangements, and her intention regarding contact with the child‘s parents. The paternal grandmother stated that, if it was permitted, she would consent to the parents having supervised visits with the child. The paternal grandmother also testified that she had been in communication with the foster mother about the child and had received photos of her. The paternal grandmother indicated a willingness to continue communication with the foster parents, testifying that she would be open to staying in communication with the foster parents to learn things about the child, such as her favorite foods, that may be useful to know if the child is placed with her.
Mayen testified that the department believed that it was in the child‘s best interest to be placed with the paternal grandparents because they have “been nothing but forthcoming, very consistent with providing documentation, anything we need they‘ve gone above and beyond, even to the point where if I can‘t give [the paternal grandmother] information, she will go out of her way to look for that with higher ups. Also to maintain the relationship between the parents, [the paternal grandmother] would like for [the child] to get to know her biological parents, and both parents have notified the department that they are willing to move to Florida, obtain jobs, and be a part of their family, of course, while [the paternal grandmother] is always supervising their visits and interactions.” Exhibit C, the unified home study prepared by the Florida Department of Children and Families, provides that the paternal grandparents “anticipate [that] [the child‘s] father may also move down to Florida once the baby is placed down here, giving them the support of the biological father as well.” Exhibit D, the running narrative document, includes Mayen‘s observations during a supervised visit between the child, the father, the paternal grandmother, and her two sons. The document provides that, during the visit, the paternal grandmother inquired about a program to assist the father in securing a job, to which the father agreed and would “start making calls to see about an apprentice job that can lead to bigger and better and ultimately transfer [and/or] do that job in Florida and be closer to [the child] and his family.”
The court also heard testimony regarding the current foster parents, with whom the child had been living since shortly after her birth. Mayen testified that, from her visits with the child in her current foster placement, she has assessed that there were no concerns with the placement, that the child was thriving, and that all her needs were being met. The foster mother testified to her daily routine with the child and the quality time that the child spends with the foster parents. Exhibit A, the study in support of the neglect petition prepared by the department and
The foster mother testified to her history of interactions with the parents, based on her having had the child in her care since birth. She described her relationship with the father as “a little tense” and the circumstances generally as “a tense situation.” The foster mother stated that there was “a lot of miscommunication back and forth” between her and the father. The foster mother testified that the father questioned her about whether she and the foster father were taking care of the child and doing the right thing for her. When asked what her plan would be regarding maintaining a relationship with the parents and extended families if she continued to be a long-term resource for the child, the foster mother testified that she thinks “we need to . . . sit down and come to an agreement. I have no problem with them. [The child] deserves to know all her family. . . . We wouldn‘t even mind . . . taking a trip down to Florida so that she can spend time with her [paternal] grandmother.”
The foster mother further testified that she communicated with the paternal grandmother on occasion and had spoken to Mayen about “trying to build that relationship so that [the paternal grandmother] can get to know [the child].” The foster mother stated that she had previously had FaceTime calls with the paternal grandmother and would send her pictures from various events in the child‘s life, such as birthdays and holidays.
When asked why, if the child is stable and thriving in her current placement, the child needs to be moved, Mayen testified that “[t]he department would like for [the child] to maintain a relationship with her biological parents, and [the paternal grandmother] wants that for [the child]. The parents want that for [the child]. And it would just be a lot easier if, when [the parents] move, that [the child] is already placed with . . . [the] paternal grandparents and be able to carry on that relationship. As of right now, [the parents] do not feel comfortable with the current foster parent, which creates a barrier between their relationships.” When asked what her concerns are regarding the child remaining with the foster parents, Mayen testified that “[m]y only concern is [that] she will not be able to have the same relationship with her biological parents as she would if she was with [the paternal grandmother].”
Notwithstanding all of that evidence, the child challenges two subsidiary findings of fact made by the court as clearly erroneous and contends that these erroneous findings undermine its ultimate conclusion that there was good cause to place the child outside the state. We address each of the child‘s contentions in turn.
First, the child argues that the court‘s finding that the foster parents’ “loving and sustaining care . . . will help [the child] transition more easily to her paternal . . . grandparents in Florida” is clearly erroneous as “[t]here [is] no evidence in the record, either elicited through testimony or in the exhibits entered at trial, that because of the care [the child] had received, it would be an easy transition to the paternal grandparents.” We disagree with the child‘s interpretation of the court‘s finding. The court did not find that the transition would be easy but rather
Second, the child argues that the court‘s finding “that the parents would actually move to Florida and/or would maintain a relationship with [the child]” is clearly erroneous as it was not based on any evidence in the record but rather was “pure speculation.” We again disagree with the child‘s interpretation of the court‘s finding. Specifically, the court found that the parents “indicated that they eventually intended to relocate to Florida to be closer to [the child] and the paternal family.” The court‘s finding was confined to the parents’ intentions to move to Florida. There was ample evidence in the record supporting this finding. At trial, Mayen testified that “both parents have notified the department that they are willing to move to Florida, obtain jobs, and be a part of their family, of course, while [the paternal grandmother] is always supervising their visits and interactions.” Similarly, when asked whether her son would move to Florida with the intention of being closer to the child, the paternal grandmother testified, “[p]ossibly. Yes.” Much of the documentary evidence before the court reflects that same intention. Exhibit B, the study in support of the permanency plan, and similar language in exhibit D, the running narrative document, provides that the parents “are both in agreement with [the child] being placed in Florida with her paternal grandparents.” Exhibit B further states that the parents “continue to state [that] they will eventually relocate to Florida and would like to be closer to [the child] and [the paternal] family.” Exhibit C, the unified home study prepared by the Florida Department of Children and Families, similarly states that “[the] father has stated [that] he will move down to Florida once the child is placed with his parents, in order to get his life together” and that the paternal grandparents “anticipate [that] [the child‘s] father may also move down to Florida once the baby is placed down there, giving them the support of the biological father as well.” Without engaging in speculation, the court was free to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence and facts proven. In light of the ample evidence supporting the court‘s finding that the parents have “indicated that they eventually intended” to move to Florida, we cannot conclude that the court‘s finding is clearly erroneous.
In sum, we conclude that the specific factual findings challenged by the child are not clearly erroneous. Further, as discussed previously, there was ample evidence in the record, unchallenged by the
Although, as we have stated previously in this opinion, the child also challenges the court‘s good cause finding because it was made in the absence of expert testimony, we are not persuaded that expert testimony was necessary. See footnote 9 of this opinion. The trial court would have been been free to accept, reject, or partially rely on any relevant expert testimony had it been offered and admitted; see In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 497, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024); however, such expert testimony is not a precondition to the court‘s own evaluation of the factual record before it.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The legislature has amended
“(b) Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state. The notice shall contain:
“(1) The name, date and place of birth of the child.
“(2) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
“(3) The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
“(4) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
“(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency‘s state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
“(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child.”