In re Brian P.
The respondent parents appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor child, B. They claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that they had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as required by the applicable statute (
1. The trial court properly found that the respondent parents had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that they could assume a responsible position in the life of B within a reasonable time: although the parents claimed that the court erred in terminating their parental rights solely on the basis of their drug use and addiction, even though their drug use never caused them to provide inadequate care for B and they had stopped using drugs, the court based its finding that the parents failed to rehabilitate on multiple factors, which this court could not conclude were clearly erroneous, including the parents’ drug related arrests, their limited engagement in сounseling and treatment, their lack of financial and housing independence, that their progress in addressing their addiction was outweighed by their prior pattern of drug use and other instances of bad parental judgment, and its determination that the parents were not fully credible because their testimony conflicted with testimony presented by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families; furthermore, even though the parents claimed that drug use was an insufficient basis to terminate parental rights, B was adjudicated neglected after the parents filed pleas of nolo contendere to allegations that B was permitted to live under conditions injurious to well-being, leaving the court at the adjudicatory phase only to determine whether the parents failed to rehabilitate.
2. The respondent parents could not prevail on their claim that the trial court failed to determine the needs of B before deciding whether they had failed to rehabilitate: the court correctly noted that, under
3. The respondent parents’ claim that the trial court improperly found that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of B was unavailing: the court made required findings under the factors set forth in
ALVORD, J. As the trial court aptly observed, “[t]his is another sad case involving opiates and their invidious harm to parents’ lives and families.” The respondents, Jennifer L. (mother) and Brian P. (father), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating their parental rights with respect to the minor child, Brian P.1 On appeal, the respondents claim that the court improperly (1) found that they had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, (2) failed to determine the needs of Brian P. before deciding whether they had failed to rehabilitate, and (3) found that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of Brian P.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the court found by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history, are relevant to this appeal. Brian P. was born to the respondents in February, 2016. The respоndents have been in a relationship with one another since 2012, and were engaged to be married at the time of Brian P.‘s birth. Prior to Brian P.‘s birth, the father, a college graduate with honors, decided against pursuing graduate school to work, instead, full-time at a casino restaurant in New London county. The father‘s career initially was financially rewarding, enabling the respondents to purchase a home in Rhode Island, two cars, and an engagement ring for the mother. The father‘s employment also provided him with access to illicit drugs, a feature of what he labelled “the casino lifestyle.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The father began with what he described as recreational use of opiates, which led to an addiction. The mother also became addicted to opiates. The respondents’ addictions caused them to lose their home, a car, and the mother‘s engagement ring. Together, they moved into the paternal grandmother‘s home while the father continued to work in casino restaurants. Neither of the respondents sought treatment for their addictions prior to Brian P.‘s birth.
During her pregnancy with Brian P., the mother tested positive for benzodiazepines, opiates, and marijuana. Upon his birth, Brian P.‘s meconium tested positive for opiates, but no symptoms of withdrawal were noted. The Department of Children and Families (department) became involved on the day following Brian P.‘s birth. The mother admitted her addiction to the department, but the respondents did not admit to the department that the father had substance abuse issues as well. The department, the respondents, and the paternal grandmother, collectively, entered into a voluntary service agreement. All parties agreed that Brian P. would remain in the respondents’ custody while they resided at the paternal grandmother‘s home, that the mother was not permitted to have any unsupervised contact
The mother‘s participation in substance abuse treatment was minimal and, after September, 2016, she received no counseling and refused all urine screens. On January 18, 2017, the department filed a neglect petition on behalf of Brian P. The respondents appeared in court on February 21, 2017, where they were advised of their rights and appointed counsel. Following their court appearance, between March and April, 2017, the respondents had no contact with the department. On April 25, 2017, the respondents entered pleas of nolo contendere, and Brian P. was adjudicated neglected. For the next six months, Brian P. remained in the respondents’ custody under court-ordered protective supervision. The respondents were given specific steps to follow, including, inter alia, “that they engage in a substance abuse evaluation, cooperate with any recommended treatment, obtain and maintain sobriety, obey the law, maintain an adequate income, and, in the mother‘s case, cooperate with counseling.”
Between May and early June, 2017, the respondents were unresponsive to the overtures of the department. On June 9, 2017,3 Brian P.‘s disposition was modified, and he was committed to the custody of the petitioner. Brian P. has been in the care and custody of the petitioner since then, living in the home of a nonrelative. The respondents consistently and appropriately have visited with Brian P. since his commitment to the custody of the petitioner. On June 14, 2017, the father admitted to the department and his family that he had been addicted to opiates for three years. At this time, the respondents’ specific steps for reunification remained as set.
The mother was referred to the Connection Counseling Center (CCC) for regular, individual counseling in February, 2017. The mother fаiled to attend her intake appointment scheduled for March 7, 2017, and never engaged in counseling at CCC. The department unsuccessfully encouraged the mother to engage in individual counseling between August, 2017 and January, 2018. On January 19, 2018, the department referred the mother to Sound Community Services (SCS) for counseling. The mother did not schedule an intake appointment until February 27, 2018, and she failed to appear at the March 6, 2018 appointment that she had scheduled.
The mother did engage in limited treatment at The Journey to Hope, Health and Healing, Inc. (The Journey) in Rhode Island. The mother‘s therapist at The Journey provided a letter that reported that the mother was open and honest and committed to recovery, but the letter did not indicate that the mother was addressing
From August, 2017 to January, 2018, the department recommended to the father, as it had to the mother, that he attend regular, individual counseling. The father agreed with the department‘s recommendation and was provided with referrals to area providers, but he did not schedule an intake appointment. On January 19, 2018, the department referred the father to SCS for counseling. The father, like the mother, did not schedule an appointment until February 27, 2018, and failed to appear at his appointment scheduled for March 6, 2018.
The father eventually began individual counseling on May 22, 2018. The father‘s therapist, Timothy Cormier, testified at trial that the father was making great progress on his substance abuse issues and that he was testing negative for drugs. The father reported to Cormier that he was overcoming his cravings. The father, however, misrepresented to Cormier that that he was working as a waiter. In actuality, in Nоvember, 2017, the father had been terminated from his restaurant employment due to substance abuse issues. After his firing, the father began working at another casino restaurant where he remained until he voluntarily left that employment in June, 2018. The father insisted that he could return to his previous employer if he so wished, but his employer testified that, while he would readily consider hiring the father again, there was no guarantee of employment. The father‘s employer provided a positive review of the father‘s work skills and motivation.
Between June 19, 2017 and February 23, 2018,4 the father submitted to thirty-one drug screens. Sixteen of those screens were positive for illicit substances, including many for fentanyl. The father had multiple negative drug tests after he began individual counseling in May, 2018. The father, however, did test positive for marijuana in an August, 2018 drug screen. When explaining the positive drug test, the father claimed that he had last used marijuana in late April or on May 1, 2018. The father‘s own expert, however, cast doubt on that claim by opining that, on the basis of thе hair test, the father had last ingested marijuana no earlier than late June, 2018.
On September 25, 2017, the mother was arrested and charged with possession of heroin after a police officer in an unmarked police vehicle observed her engaging in a drug transaction in a commercial parking lot. The mother told police that she was buying the drugs for the father. The drugs purchased by the mother tested positive for fentanyl. As a resolution to the charges, the
On March 29, 2018, the respondents were stopped by the police while driving the mother‘s car in Rhode Island because the father was not wearing a seatbelt. The respondents consented to a search of the vehicle, which led to the discovery of marijuana and prescription medicine for which neither of the respondents possessed a prescription. Narcotics also were discovered hidden on the mother‘s person. The father testified that he had told the police that all of the drugs found were his in an effort to protect the mother and because they had advised him that he would not be arrested if he agreed to assist them as a confidential informant. The respondents did not report the matter to the department for approximately one month, and, when the incident was reported to the department, the father stated that he had received a ticket for possession of marijuana but did not disclosе that the mother was present and that narcotics were found on her person. As of the date of the trial in this matter, felony drug charges were still pending against the father in Rhode Island.
On May 22, 2018, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondents’ parental rights pursuant to
On May 3, 2019, the court, Driscoll, J., issued a memorandum of decision terminating the respondents’ parental rights. In the adjudicatory phase,5 the court found by clear and convincing evidence that “the department ha[d] proven . . . that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the [respondents], that the [respondents] [we]re unwilling or unable to benefit from those efforts, and [that] the [respondents] ha[d] failed to rеhabilitate as alleged.” Though the court found “laudatory the [respondents‘] recent efforts to address their addiction, and their expressed desire to beat their addiction,” it also found that those efforts were “too little and too late, and [that it could not] conclude that their most recent sobriety [was] long-term.”
In the dispositional phase; see footnote 5 of this opin
I
The respondents first claim that the court improperly concluded that they had failed to rehabilitate. Specifically, the respondents argue that it was error for the court “to terminate [their] parental rights based solely on their drug use and addiction where, as here, their drug use has never caused [them] to providе inadequate care for [Brian P.], [Brian P.] has never suffered any harm, and [they] have stopped using drugs altogether.” We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the established principles of law and the standard of review. “The trial court is required, pursuant to
“[The] completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps], however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . . Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a department claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 587. Whereas, during the adjudicatory phase of a termination
“A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court‘s factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
The court, in its memorandum of decision, based its finding that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate on multiple factors and not, as the respondents argue, solely on the basis of their drug use and addiction. The court found relevant the respondents’ drug related arrests, their limited engagement in counseling and treatment, their insufficient independence in their finances and housing, and their lack of credibility.
To be sure, the respondents’ drug use was a primary focus of the court‘s analysis. The court detailed the respondents’ many positive drug tests between June, 2017 and February, 2018. The court alsо noted the father‘s August, 2018 hair test that was positive for marijuana.7 The respondents argue that despite testimony of the mother and the father that they stopped all drug use as of April, 2018, and June, 2018, respectively, the court, instead, “relie[d] heavily upon unconfirmed urine screens submitted by the [respondents] between June, 2017 and February, 2018.”8 Relatedly, the respondents argue that the court “entirely ignore[d] all of the [respondents‘] drug test results since Febru
As stated previously, the court also relied on the respondents’ drug related arrests to find that they had failed to rehabilitate. The court found that the mother was arrested for possession of heroin on September, 25, 2017, and that the father faced felony drug charges as a result of the March 29, 2018 traffic stop. Not only did both of these incidents violate the respondents’ specific step to “[n]ot get involved with the criminal justice system,” but they both also involved illegal drugs, which the respondents were forbidden from using. Moreover, the court found that the respondents were not forthright with the department about these incidents and that, at trial, they “professed ignorance” or testified in “conflicting and implausible ways” that “cast grave doubts on their credibility.”
The respondents argue that, “[i]f the law in this jurisdiction provides that the courts cannot terminate the respondents’ parental right on the basis of incarceration, then the trial court may not do so on the basis of arrests where, as in this case, they have never been
The court also cited the respondents’ limited engagement in regular, individual counseling and in treatment, and their lack of financial and housing indepеndence to support its finding that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate. The court found that the mother had no counseling after September, 2016, and that her participation in treatment was limited. The court found that the father was slow to engage in individual counseling—not doing so until May 22, 2018—despite the department‘s encouragement to seek counseling since at least August, 2017. Furthermore, the court found that, due to the father‘s decision to leave work, the respondents lacked “adequate, independent, legal income.” The court found that the respondents’ housing was through the “good graces” of the paternal grandmother, where the respondents had lived for years while drug addicted, and that the respondents were contributing only some money toward that housing from an employment settlement received by the father.9 These findings were not clearly erroneous.
Lastly, the court stated that its “conclusion is based in part upon the court‘s observation of the demeanor of the [respondents] while testifying. As notеd, the court did not find them fully credible. They were evasive, or attempted to rationalize, or minimize their drug arrests, and any perceived negative behaviors.” We do not disturb the court‘s credibility determinations on appeal. See, e.g., In re Baciany R., 169 Conn. App. 212, 225, 150 A.3d 744 (2016) (“[w]e defer to the trier of fact‘s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude” [internal quotation marks omitted]). At oral argument before this court, counsel for the respondents argued that their credibility was not relevant to their failure to rehabilitate. There was nothing improper about the court factoring the respondents’ credibility into its analysis because the respondents testified on their own behalf and did so in ways that conflicted with testimony presented by the petitioner. See In re Santiago G., 154 Conn. App. 835, 857, 108 A.3d 1184 (“the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony” [internal quotation marks omitted]), aff‘d, 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708 (2015).
The respondents argue that “evidence that [they]
We recognize, as did the trial court, that the respondents made efforts to address their addictions. We cannot, however, conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the court‘s finding that they had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that the respondents could assume a responsible position in the life of Brian P. within a reasonable time.10
II
The respondents next claim that the “court erred as a matter of law because its memorandum of decision failed to make a finding regarding the particular needs of the child in this case, Brian P., before it found that [the respondents] failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of . . . § 17a-112 (j).” (Emphasis in original.) We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review. “The interpretation of a trial court‘s judgment presents а question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . If there is ambiguity in a court‘s memorandum of decision, we look to the articulations that the court provides.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re James O., 322 Conn. 636, 649, 142 A.3d 1147 (2016).
First, the court correctly cited to In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 585–86, for the standard relevant to a termination of parental rights petition, stating that, under
The court‘s findings that Brian P. is a “happy, healthy child with no special needs or issues” and that he has a “need for a secure, permanent placement” were expressed in the dispositional phase of its analysis, which would support the respondents’ contention that the court did not consider the needs of Brian P. before concluding that they had failed to rehabilitate. While we acknowledge it may be more clear for a trial court to explicitly state the needs of the minоr child at the outset of the adjudicatory phase of its analysis, we do not agree that the order of the court‘s findings in this case suggests that the court had failed to determine Brian P.‘s needs before concluding that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate. It cannot be disputed that, at times, some of the findings relevant to the analysis in the adjudicatory phase will also be relevant to and
III
Lastly, the respondents claim that the court erroneously found that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of Brian P. We disagree.
We first set forth the relevant principles and the standard of review. “In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn the trial court‘s decision that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the court‘s findings аre clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the child include the child‘s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents‘] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven statutory factors delineated in [
The court considered and made findings under each of the seven statutory factors of
The respondents argue that the court‘s finding that they “did not provide Brian [P.] with a ‘safe, supportive, nurturing home’ ” was clearly erroneous because “the petitioner admitted at trial that there was never any concern that the [respondents] were unable to provide adequate care for their child.” The respondents further contend that the court‘s finding that Brian P. “requires a ‘permanent’ home, and that denying him ‘the permanency to which he is entitled would not be in his best interests,’ ” was clearly erroneous because the court “cite[d] to no evidence to show that the child felt that his current situation lacked permanency, or that the child would suffer adverse results should he remain in foster care for some additional period prior to reunification.” The trial court found that “Brian [P.] is a happy, healthy child with no special needs or issues, other than those shared by all children, that is, the need for a permanent, safe supportive, nurturing home.” The court also found that Brian P. had “been in foster care for over half his life, while [the respondents] struggled greatly with their addiction, and there is no reasonable foreseeability that their addiction will be addressed permanently.” Given Brian P.‘s age, the amount of time he has spent in foster care—more than one-half of his life—and the court‘s findings as to the respondents’ failure to rehabilitate—as detailed in part I of this opinion—we cannot conclude that the court‘s findings as to Brian P.‘s need for a “permanent, safe, supportive, nurturing home” and the respondents’ inability to meet that need were clearly erroneous. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn. App. 744, 767, 936 A.2d 638 (2007) (“[o]ur appellate courts have recognized that long-term stability is critical to a child‘s future health and development” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008); In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 263, 829 A.2d 855 (2003) (trial court‘s findings as to best interest of child were not clearly erroneous when much of child‘s short life had been spent in custody of commissioner and child needed stability and permanency in her life).
The respondents contend that, because there is no evidence that Brian P.‘s needs are not being met, the court‘s findings are clearly erroneous. This argument ignores the court‘s findings that Brian P. has lived more than one-half of his life in foster care and that “[Brian P.] looks to [his] foster mother to meet his needs . . . .” If there is no evidence that Brian P.‘s needs are not being met, credit belongs to the foster mother who has been primarily responsible for meeting those needs. The court‘s finding that Brian P.‘s needs are being met by his foster mother is consistent with both its finding
The respondents also argue that the court “completely failed to consider the detrimental effect of removing [Brian P.] from his parents and grаndparents, with whom he shares a close bond.” The court did not overlook the bond between Brian P. and the respondents. Rather, the court stated that Brian P. “knows and loves [the respondents], and is loved by them. Parental love does not equate with parental competence, which in this case requires complete sobriety.” This statement reflects that the court appreciated the bond between Brian P. and the respondents but, nevertheless, concluded that it was in his best interest to terminate the respondents’ parental rights. See In re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn. App. 765–66 (“[o]ur courts consistently have held that even when there is a finding of a bond between [a] parent and a child, it still may be in the child‘s best interest to terminate parental rights” [internal quotation marks omitted]).12 We cannot conclude from our review of the record that this finding was clearly erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
With respect to the alleged first additional step, given that the respondents were addicted to opiates while residing at the paternal grandmother‘s home, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that the respondents were not maintaining adequate housing, which was a previously ordered step for them to follow.
We do not agree that the court added an alleged second additional step when it stated that they had not contested the reduction of their visitation with Brian P. We read the court‘s statement as an explanation that, in light of the respondents’ failure to challenge the department‘s decision to reduce their visitation, it could base its own findings on the department‘s underlying justification for that decision, namely, that Brian P. displayed adverse behavioral effects when the respondents’ visits with him were more frequent.
Turning to the third specific step allegedly added, we do not agree that the court required the respondents to enter a methadone program selected