In Re Boot
Jerry Boot and Carlos Julian Cornejo are juveniles charged respectively with murder and kidnapping. Under an amendment to the Basic Juvenile Court Act,
Boot and Cornejo now argue
We hold
ISSUES
1. Does
2. Does
3. Does
4. Does
FACTS
A. FACTS RELATING TO BOOT
On December 27, 1994, Jerry Julius Boot and his brother Kevin forced a young woman into the back of their car at gunpoint, robbed her, and shot her in the head, killing her. Jerry Boot was 16 at the time of the offense. He is presently confined in the adult section of the Spokane County Jail with bond set at $1,000,000, awaiting trial on the charge of Premeditated Murder in the First Degree under
On February 14, 1995, Boot moved to have his case transferred to juvenile court for a hearing to determine whether he should be tried as a juvenile. The court denied the motion on May 5, 1995. Boot did not seek discretionary review of the trial court‘s decision, but filed a Personal Restraint Petition on September 11, 1995 with Division III of the Court of Appeals. He contended his “case should be remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to remand Mr. Boot‘s case to the Juvenile Division for a Declination Hearing.” Personal Restraint Petition at 6-7.2
B. FACTS RELATING TO CORNEJO
Carlos Julian Cornejo was arrested and charged for his alleged involvement in the robbery of two vehicles and the kidnapping of three men (Cruz, Mitchell, and Huston) on July 21, 23, and 28, 1994. On September 12, 1994, the State filed an amended information charging Cornejo with five crimes: First Degree Robbery (Count I) (for the theft on July 21), First Degree Kidnapping (of Cruz) (Count II), First Degree Robbery (for the theft on July 23) (Count III), First Degree Kidnapping (of Mitchell) (Count IV), and First Degree Kidnapping (of Huston) (Count V). The kidnapping counts are “serious violent
On October 7, 1994, Cornejo moved for dismissal of the two first degree robbery counts.3 The apparent reason for his motion was to allow for the trial in juvenile court of the robbery charges, insofar as they are not “serious violent offenses” requiring trial in superior court. On the same day, he moved to sever the first degree robbery and the kidnapping counts arising on July 21, 1994 from the other kidnapping and robbery counts arising on July 23 and 28, pursuant to CrR 4.4(b).
On November 29, 1994, the trial court entered two orders. The first order continued Cornejo‘s trial on the kidnapping charges until resolution of the robbery charges in juvenile court. The second order remanded to the juvenile court the question of whether the juvenile court should exercise jurisdiction over the first degree robbery counts. Subsequently, on May 31, 1995, the court commissioner for the juvenile division of the court entered an order extending jurisdiction over Cornejo for the first degree robbery charges until Cornejo‘s twenty-first birthday. Thus, Cornejo is presently awaiting trial on the kidnapping charges in superior court and trial on the robbery charges in juvenile court.
On February 3, 1995, Cornejo filed in the Court of Appeals a Motion for Discretionary Review, which was granted on May 18, 1995. On October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals consolidated Boot‘s Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) with Cornejo‘s appeal. We granted direct review of Cornejo‘s appeal and Boot‘s PRP upon the transfer of the cases by the Court of Appeals. RAP 4.3.
ANALYSIS
A. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT PERMIT A HEARING ON JUVENILE JURISDICTION
In 1994, the Legislature enacted comprehensive changes to state law for the express purpose of deterring violent conduct. One of the areas addressed was the Basic Juvenile Court Act,
In the ordinary case, a juvenile who is arrested for a crime comes under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court for all proceedings enumerated in
After the 1994 amendment to
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the juvenile courts in the several counties of this state, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings:
. . . . .
(e) Relating to juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic infractions, or violations as provided in
RCW 13.40.020 through13.40.230 , unless:
. . . .
(iv) The juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and the alleged offense is: (A) A serious violent offense as defined in
If the juvenile challenges the state‘s determination of the juvenile‘s criminal history, the state may establish the offender‘s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence. If the criminal history consists of adjudications entered upon a plea of guilty, the state shall not bear a burden of establishing the knowing and voluntariness of the plea[.]
(Emphasis added.) This addition to the Basic Juvenile Court Act is a reflection of the Legislature‘s expressed intent to address youth violence by increasing the “severity and certainty of punishment for youth and adults who commit violent acts.” Laws of 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 101. The Legislature here clearly determined to increase the punishment for youthful offenders for the most serious violent crimes by statutorily expanding the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court over 16- and 17-year-olds who commit such crimes without a hearing in juvenile court under
Although the specific language of
To accept such a reading, we would have to disregard the simple, unmistakable, imperative language of the statute, as well as the Legislature‘s express intent to increase the severity and certainty of punishment for youth who commit violent acts. The statute vests exclusive original jurisdiction with the adult criminal court, and gives us no latitude to vest jurisdiction elsewhere. The statute does not contemplate declination hearings, and they would serve no purpose in light of the legislative decision to vest exclusive original jurisdiction in the adult criminal court.
Moreover, once an adult court exercises jurisdiction over a youthful offender, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over that youth.
“Juvenile,” “youth,” and “child” mean any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court pursuant to
RCW 13.40.110 or who is otherwise under adult court jurisdiction[.]
This Court said in State v. Sharon, 100 Wash.2d 230, 231, 668 P.2d 584 (1983): “Once a juvenile offender has been transferred to adult court, that person no longer meets the definition of a `juvenile’ over which the juvenile court has jurisdiction.” See also State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash.App. 499, 500, 648 P.2d 456 (1982).
Moreover, the statute unambiguously places the qualifying “and” clause squarely and only in subsection (B). The statute provides two ways to trigger adult court jurisdiction: either the youth commits a serious violent offense (subsection (A)), or the youth commits a violent offense and has a defined criminal history (subsection (B)). Boot‘s reading would collapse (B) into (A) and render meaningless the statute‘s distinction between serious violent offenses and violent offenses. Because Boot is charged with a serious violent offense, he falls under adult court jurisdiction automatically.
Finally, Cornejo (but not Boot) argues the new statute is in conflict with
“Juvenile,” “youth,” and “child” mean any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court pursuant to
RCW 13.40.110 or who is otherwise under adult court jurisdiction [.]
(Emphasis ours.) The italicized phrase defeats Cornejo‘s argument. Cornejo is “otherwise under adult court jurisdiction” pursuant to the 1994 changes to the statute.
B. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. II, § 19 OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
Both Cornejo and Boot argue
In our recent decision in Washington Fed‘n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995), we observed the constitutional provision “is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislation.” Id. at 555, 901 P.2d 1028. With respect to the title of the law, “this court has long recognized that a general title consisting of a few well-chosen words, suggesting the general subject stated, is all that is necessary to comply with the constitutional provision.” Id. at 554, 901 P.2d 1028. “Where the title is general, `any subject reasonably germane to such title may be embraced within the body of the bill.‘” Id. at 555-56, 901 P.2d 1028, citing De Cano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 627, 110 P.2d 627 (1941).
Although this omnibus law covers a variety of subjects, they are all related to its stated purposes, which are to:
(1) Prevent acts of violence by encouraging change in social norms and individual behaviors that have been shown to increase the risk of violence; (2) reduce the rate of at-risk children and youth, as defined in
RCW 70.190.010 ; (3) increase the severity and certainty of punishment for youth and adults who commit violent acts; (4) reduce the severity of harm to individuals when violence occurs; (5) empower communities to focus their concerns and allow them to control the funds dedicated to empirically supported preventive efforts in their region; and (6) reduce the fiscal and social impact of violence on our society.
Laws of 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 101, at 2197-98. The title, “AN ACT Relating to violence prevention,” embraces all these purposes. “[A] title complies with the constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law.” Young Men‘s Christian Ass‘n v. State, 62 Wash.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963). The title of this bill meets the constitutional test.
Cornejo and Boot also argue that because the Act covers so many wide-ranging subjects, it violates the constitutional directive forbidding bills containing more than a “single subject.”
The principal allegedly “non-germane” sections of the Act cited by Cornejo and Boot are sections other than the amendments to
The Legislature said in the intent section of the 1994 Act:
The legislature finds that violence is abhorrent to the aims of a free society and that it can not be tolerated. State efforts at reducing violence must include changes in criminal penalties, reducing the unlawful use of and access to firearms, increasing educational efforts to encourage nonviolent means for resolving conflicts, and allowing communities to design their prevention efforts.
The legislature finds that the problem of violence can be addressed with many of the same approaches that public health programs have used to control other problems such as infectious disease, tobacco use, and traffic fatalities.
Laws of 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 101, at 2197. The Legislature found it necessary to combine diverse provisions into a single omnibus act to address a single problem in a comprehensive way.
Although the civil and criminal provisions within the act cover a broad range of activities, each of those provisions furthers the legislative purpose of counteracting drug problems which are prevalent within our society. Thus, we conclude that the act does not violate the single subject requirement of the constitution.
State v. Jenkins, 68 Wash.App. 897, 901, 847 P.2d 488, review denied, 121 Wash.2d 1032 (1993). See also State v. Acevedo, 78 Wash.App. 886, 887-91, 899 P.2d 31 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1014 (1996); State v. Knight, 79 Wash.App. 670, 676-77, 904 P.2d 1159 (1995), review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1005 (1996). “[I]f the legislation is an omnibus bill designed by the Legislature or the people to address a larger subject area, the wishes of the Legislature or the people in addressing an issue comprehensively in a single bill may be respected.” Washington Fed‘n, 127 Wash.2d at 575-76, 901 P.2d 1028 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part).
Here, the 1994 Act is an omnibus bill, the stated purpose of which is to address a single problem, violence prevention, in a comprehensive manner. The Act meets the rational unity test of art. II, § 19 of our constitution as a legitimate expression of the legislative purpose.
C. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Cornejo (but not Boot) argues the Eighth Amendment is violated if he is committed to the adult criminal court without the benefit of a hearing.8 Cornejo makes no argument relying specifically on article I, section 14, of the Washington Constitution, prohibiting “cruel punishment,” so we will consider only federal constitutional law. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 176-77, 795 P.2d 693 (1990).
“The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits `cruel and unusual punishments‘, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).” State v. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 13 n. 2, 838 P.2d 86 (1992). Before any scrutiny of a punishment under Eighth Amendment standards can occur, however, there must be a punishment. Neither Cornejo nor Boot has even stood trial yet, let alone been sentenced. Thus, neither one has been punished. The Eighth Amendment question will not ordinarily be ripe for adjudication until Cornejo and Boot are actually sentenced. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 399-400, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990). Cornejo does not argue and offers no authority for the proposition that either vesting adult court jurisdiction over him without a hearing or trying him as an adult amounts to an unconstitutional punishment.
The only possible Eighth Amendment issue before the court now is the claim adult court jurisdiction in and of itself is punishment. Neither Boot nor Cornejo has asserted as much, but, plainly, while the juvenile court‘s ability to punish them will end at their twenty-first birthdays, the adult criminal court is capable of assessing much longer sentences. Yet, the parties advance no support for such an assertion. Should they, they would have to contend with the contrary holding of State v. Massey, 60 Wash.App. 131, 803 P.2d 340, review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1021 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960, 111 S.Ct. 1584, 113 L.Ed.2d 648 (1991), where the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of life imprisonment without parole, applied to a 13-year-old, against an Eighth Amendment challenge.
We hold, therefore, the Eighth Amendment is not violated if a youthful offender is tried as an adult or receives a sentence in
D. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Both Cornejo and Boot claim their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process is violated when they are assigned to adult court without a hearing.9 Boot argues the new statute deprives him of procedural due process (notice and opportunity to be heard why he should be tried as a juvenile). Cornejo also argues the new statute deprives him of procedural due process as well as substantive due process.
1. Procedural Due Process
Juveniles charged with crimes have a right to procedural due process. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). This right does not translate necessarily into a right to a hearing on juvenile court jurisdiction. Only when the courts have discretion by statute to assign juvenile or adult court jurisdiction for a particular juvenile does the right to such a hearing attach. State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).
Implicit in their argument they have a constitutionally protected right to a hearing is the assumption Boot and Cornejo have a right to be tried as juveniles. But: “[T]here is no constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile court.” State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 860, 792 P.2d 137 (1990); State v. Oreiro, 73 Wash.App. 868, 871 P.2d 666 (1994); State v. Sandomingo, 39 Wash. App. 709, 695 P.2d 592 (1985); State v. Sharon, 33 Wash.App. 491, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982) (Andersen, J.), affirmed, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983); State v. Hodges, 28 Wash.App. 902, 626 P.2d 1025 (1981). Thus, the new statute does not deprive Cornejo and Boot of any constitutionally protected right merely by conferring adult criminal court jurisdiction over them without a hearing.
2. Substantive Due Process
Cornejo argues the new statute deprives him of substantive due process by taking away his “substantive constitutional right to punishment in accordance with one‘s culpability, which in turn, depends, in part, on one‘s ability to make reasoned adult judgments about the consequences of one‘s acts.” Cornejo‘s Reply Br. of Appellant at 1. Relying chiefly on Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), he asserts the Legislature does not have an unfettered right to impose adult criminal court jurisdiction on juveniles.
In Thompson, the Supreme Court held “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.” Id. at 838, 108 S.Ct. at 2700. The following term, however, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) the Eighth Amendment did not preclude the death penalty against 16- or 17-year-old defendants. Furman, 122 Wash.2d at 456, 858 P.2d 1092. Thompson involved a 15-year-old sentenced to death. Neither Cornejo nor Boot has been sentenced to death, and both were 16 when the crimes for which they are accused occurred. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Stanford, decided the year after Thompson, upheld the imposition of a death penalty on a 16-year-old.
Although the Thompson Court enunciated the principle, “less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult,” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835, 108 S.Ct. at 2698, Cornejo has cited no authority for the proposition the reasoning in Thompson, a capital case, applies to crimes not calling for the death penalty. We said in Grisby, 97 Wash.2d at 498, 647 P.2d 6: “There is no analogy between the death penalty and life imprisonment without parole. As the Supreme Court has observed, `the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.‘” Accord, State v. Stevenson, 55 Wash.App. 725, 737, 780 P.2d 873 (1989) (“The Thompson Court prohibited no punishment except the death penalty, and there is absolutely nothing in that decision that supports a broader restriction.“), review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1040 (1990).
We hold trial in adult court does not violate the substantive due process rights of the petitioners. Sixteen and seventeen-year-old violent offenders can be tried as adults in noncapital cases without a prior determination of their ability to make judgments about the consequences of their acts. See
E. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS
Cornejo argues that because the 1994 amendment to
Juveniles are neither a suspect class nor a semi-suspect class. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 19, 743 P.2d 240 (1987). Thus, the rational relationship test applies here to the analysis of the challenged statute. As we said in State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d 553, 561, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993) (holding the mandatory revocation of driving privileges, which applies only to minor teenagers who are determined to have violated the minor possessing/consuming alcohol law, does not violate equal protection): “The rational relationship test is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Under this test, the legislative classification will be upheld unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of legitimate state objectives.”
Cornejo argues it is impermissible for the Legislature to draw a distinction between a young person who commits a crime one second before his sixteenth birthday, and one who commits a crime one second after his sixteenth birthday. This is precisely the distinction the Legislature has made, however, in declaring those under 18 to be juveniles, and it is precisely the kind of distinction the Legislature is empowered to make. In re Burtts’ Welfare, 12 Wash.App. 564, 574, 530 P.2d 709, review denied, 85 Wash.2d 1014 (1975) (Horowitz, J.).
The Legislature stated one of its objectives in adopting the Act was to “increase the severity and certainty of punishment for youth and adults who commit violent acts.”10 Laws of 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 101. Trying 16- and 17-year-olds who commit certain crimes as adults is likely to increase the severity of punishment, and is thus relevant to a legitimate state objective. There is a rational basis for
Finally, Cornejo expresses a concern regarding prosecutor charging decisions, arguing violation of equal protection for a prosecutor to have the discretion to set the punishment for a juvenile offender by charging him or her with a crime that would be triable in adult criminal court rather than juvenile court. He cites a 1970 case, State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 21, 475 P.2d 109 (1970), as support. This Court noted in City of Kennewick v. Fountain, 116 Wash.2d 189, 192-93, 802 P.2d 1371 (1991), however, “the later case of United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) overrules Zornes as to analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Moreover, Cornejo is not without recourse. If a prosecutor overcharges a young person in the hope of securing adult court jurisdiction over that youth pursuant to the statute,
In summary,
F. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS
The trial court bifurcated the kidnapping and robbery charges against Cornejo, allocating the charges between the adult and juvenile courts. Cornejo argues double jeopardy12 is violated because the two charges are being tried in separate jurisdictions, and there can be no merger of the charges, even if the evidence shows the robbery was incidental to the kidnapping. See State v. Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d 413, 417-21, 662 P.2d 853 (1983) (discussing merger doctrine). Although Cornejo is correct, he contrived this situation by moving to sever the kidnapping from the robbery charges. We hold in any event both charges must be tried in adult criminal court.
The key jurisdictional issue was decided at the time the charges were first instituted against Cornejo. “[J]urisdiction over offenses committed by a juvenile is to be determined at the time proceedings are instituted against the offender.” State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 351-52, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). By virtue of the kidnapping charges, which conferred adult court jurisdiction over him, Cornejo is automatically under adult court jurisdiction.
The trial court erred in bifurcating the robbery charges and assigning them to juvenile court because the juvenile court could not have jurisdiction over Cornejo once he came under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court. We vacate the trial court‘s order severing the charges, so as to permit the filing of a proper information against Cornejo on all charges in adult criminal court.
CONCLUSION
The 1994 Legislature attempted in the Act to address the prevalence of violence in our society, particularly the violent tendencies of certain young people.
DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
MADSEN, J., concurs in result only.
ALEXANDER, Justice (concurring).
I concur with the majority insofar as it determines that
Fundamentally, persons who are similarly situated must receive like treatment from the government. State v. Phelan, 100 Wash.2d 508, 512, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983). Stated another way, when members of the same class are accorded different treatment under a statute, there is an equal protection violation unless there is a rational basis for the disparate treatment.1Forbes v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash.2d 929, 943, 785 P.2d 431 (1990). Conversely, “[w]here persons of different classes are treated differently, there is no equal protection violation.” Forbes, 113 Wash.2d at 943, 785 P.2d 431.
In determining if there is a danger of unequal application of the statute we are reviewing in this case, it is important to define the class that should receive equal treatment under it. If the class is viewed as 16- or 17-year-old juveniles who are alleged to have committed serious violent offenses, there is no potential for unequal treatment because all within that class are treated the same—they will be charged and dealt with in adult court. On the other hand, if the class is viewed as all 16- or 17-year-old juveniles convicted of nonenumerated offenses,2 it can readily be seen that application of the statute may result in disparate treatment of some members of the class.
A hypothetical scenario helps make the point that, under the pertinent statutory scheme, a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile could receive treatment that is substantially different than the treatment afforded a similarly situated juvenile of that age and for reasons that may not be rational. In the example, two 17-year-old juveniles, A and B, are arrested as accomplices to the same assault. If the prosecutor should choose to charge A with the offense of second degree assault for his conduct, the charge would have to be leveled in juvenile court unless the prosecutor should seek an order remanding him to adult court. Upon conviction, A would remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. On the other hand, if the prosecutor should choose, for whatever reason, to charge B with first degree assault for his part in the criminal enterprise, B would be charged in superior court because first degree assault is a serious violent offense.
In our hypothetical case, if B is found guilty, based on a guilty plea or a finding of guilt of the lesser degree of the charged crime, second degree assault, that defendant would be convicted of the same offense as the first offender, A. However, the penalty meted out to B would be significantly greater than that received by A, who was originally charged with second degree assault. This inequity would occur because B was found guilty in superior court. Furthermore, B, unlike his counterpart, A, would suffer the increased stigma that is associated with a conviction for an adult crime and would not
I must concede that there might be a rational basis for B to be in adult court. Indeed, many juveniles who are originally charged with an offense in juvenile court are transferred to adult court pursuant to the decline process provided in
The majority suggests that protection against inequitable application of the statute is provided by the constitutional restraints on the prosecutor‘s charging decision.4 While in the abstract such restraints exist, there is no provision in this statute for a judicial proceeding where the prosecutor‘s discretion is tested. Although I will presume good faith on the part of the charging authority, that is not sufficient to protect a child‘s constitutional rights. Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del.Supr.1994).
The inequity I have focused on here could be easily cured by the Legislature. Indeed, one state, Georgia, has done so by giving the superior court of that state statutory authority to transfer to juvenile court any juvenile who initially fell under the superior court‘s jurisdiction by being charged with an enumerated offense, if the juvenile is subsequently convicted of a lesser included offense that was not an enumerated offense.
I recognize that a case with facts like those set forth in my hypothetical example may never arise. Perhaps all juvenile offenders who are charged with an enumerated offense will, like the defendants here, be found guilty of the charged offense or will be acquitted. In either event, there would be no equal protection or due process issue. I find that prospect unlikely, however, and suggest that we may soon be confronted with the issue in a case in which a 16- or 17-year-old finds himself or herself in superior court convicted of a nonenumerated offense without having been afforded a hearing to determine if adult
SANDERS, J., concurs.