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State v. Furman
858 P.2d 1092
Wash.
1993
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*1 Given this it is for us to consider two holding, unnecessary additional contentions raised by Tollycraft. Tollycraft argues that, if "deemed McCoy's grant- even is application reopen ed", may nonetheless its RCW 51.52- Department employ to reconsider such a "deemed deci- authority granted" .060 it has a either under the due argues right, sion. It also of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the clause process on a "deemed decision as it Act, hearing granted" just to a to an decision to respect explicit departmental would with issues are moot because McCoy's appli- a claim. These reopen was not "deemed We therefore correctly granted". cation of whether "deemed decisions granted" reserve questions and the rights be reconsidered under RCW 51.52.060 may such decisions for challenge appropriate self-insurers future cases. and the case

The order of is reversed summary judgment this for further consistent with proceedings is remanded opinion.

Andersen, C.J., and Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Durham, JJ., concur. Johnson, Madsen, Smith, Guy, September 1993.] [No. En Banc. 57003-5. Washington, Michael The State of Respondent, Furman, Appellant. Monroe *3 pro Gombiner, Furman, se, Robert H. Monroe Michael appel- laña, Nance, Gombiner, for laña & Michael R lant. Attorney, Danny Prosecuting B. Clem, and Michael

C. respondent. Loginsky, Deputies, Savage B. and Pamela Amnesty Miller on behalf M. Andrus and Alice Beth appellant. curiae for International, amicus *4 Andersen, C.J. degree aggravated appeals mur- Furman his

Michael conviction, the We affirm and death sentence. der conviction resentencing. sentence, and remand vacate the death Case Facts brutally Eighty-five-year-old murdered Ann Presler was . body April her the home on 1989. A friend found her neigh- morning. spoke Mrs. Presler's next Detectives with they Furman bors, of whom said had seen Michael several walking looking day the murder. door to door for work the initially visiting Appellant house, denied Mrs. Presler's but eventually raped, murdered admitted that he robbed and her. appellant

According confession, entered Mrs. Pres- to his him she offered to wash her windows. $10 ler's house when glass cleaner, he went into the kitchen he ran out of When suggested She for more. he use dish and asked Mrs. Presler soap. punched angry her in the head three He became rag, He covered his hand with a fell to the floor. times. She pot. grabbed pot He a hit her with the went to a coffee got her the vase until vase, returned, and hit with bedroom, a got bedroom, vase, another to the it broke. He then went back raped He then it too broke. and hit her with it until returned money. He house for found then around the her and looked any purse. not so he would leave his hand covered her fingerprints, With purse He and removed $30. he searched the heavy returned with a into the bedroom and then went back crystal alive, and he did not He realized she was still vase. crystal vase witness, her to be a so he hit her with want Appellant also mentioned he certain she was dead. until was marijuana morning murder, and he of the he smoked pipe. they marijuana police would find his where told taking appellant's confession, obtained a the officers After During search, the officers his home. search warrant for wearing clothing appellant on said he had been found pipe. marijuana day They murder. also found pipe, photographed which was and seized The officers pipe placed police was later evidence room. then in the inadvertently lost. April

Appellant before 30,1989, 2 months arrested on initially charged age, birthday. his of his he was 18th Because *5 with murder court. a declination juvenile Following case hearing, was transferred to court for superior appel- lant's as an adult. The State then filed a notice of prosecution intent to seek the death penalty.

After the filed, contacted the in- charges appellant detective vestigating several times and made additional in- statements. He criminating moved to subsequently suppress those statements as well as the statements he made before the charges were filed. He also moved to dismiss the pre- meditation element of the aggravated degree murder on the charge ground that the State's loss of the marijuana denied pipe appellant opportunity have it tested. The trial court denied both motions.

Trial began of 1990. The January only issue at disputed trial was whether appellant premeditated the murder. He testified that he smoked one or two of marijuana bowls and two bowls of marijuana with sprinkled methamphetamine 30 to 45 minutes before going to Mrs. Presler's house. The made him drugs which "high", he described as a condition in on, which he knows what is but feels going different and acts without To thinking. claims of support diminished capacity intoxication, and defense counsel called two wit- expert nesses: Dr. Lloyd a Cripe, neuropsychologist, and Dr. Law- rence a Halpem, neuropharmacologist. Defense had counsel also arranged appellant to be examined a clinical psychologist, Dr. Bruce Olson. Dr. Olson did not testify be- fore the jury, but did prepare which was then report pro- vided to Drs. That Halpem Cripe. report contains detailed which description provided of his sexual appellant Dr. history. Cripe testified that has a appellant severe perso- nality disorder. In Dr. because Gripe's opinion, of this dis- order use, and appellant's it is drug very improbable that the murder was a deliberate, reflected action.

Dr. Halpern testified the effect of regarding methamphe- tamine on the mind and expressed opinion appel- lant's use of him made methamphetamine unable to reflect or deliberate about the mechanics or consequences of his Halpem appellant probably Dr. also said suffers actions. syndrome, person to Cluver-Busi which can cause a from any attempt person ob- sex with almost or even inanimate Halpem, methamphetamine jects. According to Dr. use impulse sexuality tend to increase decrease con- would objection, defense counsel's asked Dr. trol. Over Halpem history the sexual in Dr. about material contained report. Olson's jury capacity,

The trial court instructed the on diminished give appellant's proposed declined to instruction on vol- but jury appellant guilty aggra- untary found intoxication. *6 unanimously degree agreeing murder, that all five vated proved. Following aggravating alleged had the factors been jury proved phase, had found the State there the mitigating leniency. circumstances merit insufficient Appellant sentenced to death. was therefore

Issues jurisdic- juvenile declining in the court err Did One. Issue tion? of the marijuana pipe appel- Two. Did loss violate

Issue process rights? due lant’s ruling the trial in chal- Three. Did court err on

Issue jurors' regarding lenges on the for based the views cause penalty? death admitting appel- the trial court err in Four. Did

Issue police? to the lant’s statements admitting "in life" trial court err in an

Issue Five. Did the photo of the victim? allowing prosecu- court err in trial the Did the Six.

Issue appellant's expert appellant's about tor to cross-examine history? sexual failing give in trial err Seven. Did the court Issue voluntary proposed

appellant's instruction on intoxication? Eight. misconduct prosecutorial deny appellant Did Issue fair trial? a May appellant he executed for a crime be Nine.

Issue juvenile? while a committed

Decision One. Issue in court did not err declining The juvenile

Conclusion. jurisdiction. may court be transferred for juvenile

A case filed in the declina finding prosecution upon adult criminal the inter would be in best jurisdiction court juvenile tion of 13.40.110(2). In mak RCW the or the juvenile public. est of (1) is to consider: determination, the court juvenile this ing the pro and whether of the offense alleged the seriousness (2) declination; whether tection of the community requires violent, pre aggressive, the offense was committed an (3) manner; the offense meditated or willful whether (4) merit of or the persons only property; prosecutive against (5) and disposition the of trial complaint; desirability court, alleged the entire case one where defendant's (6) adults; sophistication maturity are accomplices (8) criminal juvenile's history; of the juvenile; of the and rehabili adequate protection public prospects services available in the juvenile through juve tation nile All factors need not be system.1 eight proven; these their is to focus and court's disc purpose guide juvenile retion.2 The be reversed if there only court's decision will has an been abuse that discretion.3

We find no such court consid juvenile expressly abuse. *7 (Kent States, ered each of the Kent v. United 383 U.S. eight (1966)) 541, 16 84, L. Ed. 2d factors and quite 86 S. Ct. 1045 an adult would reasonably concluded that as trying appellant 1 (1983) Holland, 507, 515, (citing v. 98 1056 Kent v. State Wn.2d 656 P.2d (1966)); States, 541, 566-67, 84, 383 U.S. 16 L. Ed. 2d 86 S. Ct. 1045 State United 131, 340, (1990), Massey, App. denied, v. 60 Wn. 803 P.2d review 115 Wn.2d 1021 (1991). denied, cert. 499 U.S. 960 831, 833-34, (1984), Toomey, App. 2State 38 690 P.2d 1175 review v. Wn. denied, (1985); Hernandez, denied, 1012, 15 103 Wn.2d cert. 471 U.S. 1067 In re 205, (1976); Burtts, App. App. Wn. 548 P.2d 340 In re 12 Wn. 530 P.2d (1975). 709, denied, review 85 Wn.2d 1014 Harbert, 719, (1975); Toomey, App. at 3In re Wn.2d P.2d 1212 38 Wn. 85 538 834. 448 the public. Appellant charged interests of

be in the best murder, most serious offense which can aggravated with confession, In view of appellant's in this state. be committed most Perhaps merit. prosecutorial had obvious charge less than 2 crime occurred months before importantly, tried a juvenile, If he had been as birthday. 18th appellant's for the 3 only years remaining been confined he could have not, therefore, He could have served birthday.4 21st until his offense. range penalty standard juvenile even clearly that time are during inadequate available services the public. protect

Issue Two. of the did not violate marijuana pipe

Conclusion. Loss due process rights. appellant's him the pipe precluded contends that loss of

Appellant he used tested, it have shown having might from which meth He claims the loss marijuana. as well as amphetamine his diminished capacity/intoxication of evidence to support in under the analysis due process rights defense violated his (1976) v. 783, P.2d 1 and State 87 Wn.2d State v. Wright, (1983). in As we 44, explained 659 P.2d 528 Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 859, (1991), Straka, 883, cases is no longer in those analysis federal constitutional Court's decisions light Supreme valid California 413, 104 S. 479, 488-89, 81 L. Ed. 2d Trombetta, 467 U.S. v. 57-58, 488 U.S. Youngblood, and Arizona v. Ct. 2528 (1988). 281, 109 yet We have not L. Ed. 2d S. Ct. 333 adherence to the requires state decided if the constitution consider whether We will in Vaster analysis Wright.5 than more strictly constitutional provisions our state apply so,6 are asked to do when we only federal provisions parallel analy- includes proper if the only argument "and even then 13.40.300(1). 4RCW Ortiz, 831 P.2d

5SeeState v.

6 n.8, Yates,

449 v. in State outlined principles' six 'interpretive sis of the (1986)."7 Appellant 808 54, 720 P.2d Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d analysis our confine therefore We argument. no such offers constitution. to the federal the States on imposes the Constitution duty

"Whatever limited to evidence must be evidence, that duty to preserve role in the sus a significant to play be might expected that constitutional this standard of "To meet defense."8 pect's that an value possess exculpatory must materiality, evidence destroyed, was be the evidence before apparent unable to obtain the defendant would be a nature that such available means." reasonably other evidence comparable (Citation omitted.)9 exculpa no apparent The pipe possessed men had Although appellant when it was lost. tory value not claim he did to smoke marijuana, tioned using pipe he mention use, nor did that impaired by to have been Moreover, descrip his detailed use at all. methamphetamine impairment.10 indicated no mental tions of the murder value exculpatory not an possess apparent If evidence did "poten nevertheless destroyed, lost or but was when it was that evidence constitutes useftd", failure to tially preserve can show if "a criminal defendant of due process violation at conceded on the part police".11Appellant bad faith of bad faith. that there is no evidence trial (1990); accord, Motherwell, v. 7State Wethered, (1988); 537, n.1, Worrell, v. (1988). 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 488, 413, Trombetta, 479, Ct. 2528 L. 2d 104 S. 81 Ed. v. 467 U.S. 8California 9Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. pipe appellant 10Also, police, he used the said one statement to the at least Thus, pipe had been tested marijuana even if the the murder.

to smoke after nothing appellant's proved drug, about would have it shown to contain time of the offense. mental state at the 109 S. Ct. 333 L. Ed. 2d Youngblood, U.S. 11Arizona

Issue Three. death sentence Our vacation appellant's

Conclusion. *9 on rulings his the trial court's argument regarding moots challenges for cause.12 jurors' on the challenged rulings All of the were based challenges on rulings on the death Erroneous penalty. views bearing have "no on for cause related to such views of conviction."13 validity [the] Four.

Issue court did not err admitting The trial appel- Conclusion. to the police. lant's statements the voluntariness of a confes determining juvenile's

In of the circum sion, totality court must consider experience, capac stances, including juvenile's age, to the According him.14 warnings given understand ity to was to iree unchallenged findings, appellant trial court's not, there his first statement.15 It was leave when he made at fore, rights inform him of his constitutional necessary to informed of his constitutional that time.16 Appellant Miranda,17 initial state- following his by as rights, required involving penalty phase eviden 12Appellant issues raises several additional jury tiary rulings statute. These issues instructions and the death appellant's death sentence. mooted our vacation of are also 492, n.11, Illinois, _U.S._, 2222 112 S. Ct. 13Morgan 119 L. Ed. 2d 509 v. (1992). 510, n.21, 776, Illinois, Accord, Witherspoon 2d v. 391 U.S. 522 20 L. Ed. (1968). 162, McCree, L. Ed. 2d also Lockhart v. 476 U.S. 90 1770 See 88 S. Ct. (1986) jury (process qualifying of death does not result Ct. 1758 106 S. 591, 596, Irizarry, panel); 111 conviction-prone State v. Wn.2d (1988) (same). 707, 712-13, C., 2560 61 L. Ed. 2d 99 S. Ct. Michael 442 U.S. 14Fare v. (1980). 84, 87, (1979); State, 269 606 P.2d Dutil 3.5(c) findings unchallenged and there- of fact are 15A11 the trial court's CrR of Christian, P.2d appeal. 806 fore verities on States, 341, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96 S. Ct. v. United 425 U.S. 16Beckwith (Miranda custody deprived suspect his warnings required into or if is taken way). any significant action in freedom of 694, 86 1602, 10 436, 16 Arizona, A.L.R.3d L. Ed. 2d S. 384 U.S. 17Miranda v. Ct. incriminating any he made additional ment and before point Appellant Fifth Amend at no asserted his statements. right right his to remain counsel.18Nor did he assert ment appellant's after the were made Some of statements silent.19 right counsel filed, after his information was and thus §1, art. Sixth Amendment and Const. attached under the (amend. 10).20 appellant repeatedly advised The detectives attorney. Against right, the advice however, as did his appellant repeatedly the detectives and counsel, contacted incriminating This evidence made additional statements. finding clearly supports that the statements the trial court's voluntary.21 Appellant are involun contends that his confessions falsely tary, him that however, told because the detective linking police and, murder him to the had found evidence gave him is later, and food. This contention with Coca-Cola *10 strength Misleading merit. statements about the out confession State's evidence dó not render an otherwise valid involuntary.22 involuntary A if the inter confession can be rogating suspect, or officers food or from withhold water confess.23There is no offer food or water as an inducement to 378, Arizona, 477, 2d 101 S. Ct. 1880 18See v. 451 68 L. Ed. Edwards U.S. 489, (1981); 146, Mississippi, 112 L. Ed. 2d S. Ct. 486 Minnich v. 498 U.S. (1990) (police may interrogate suspect has asserted Fifth Amendment not who counsel, suspect right present initiated the communi to unless counsel is or the cation). 313, (1975); 96, Mosley, Michigan Ed. 2d 96 S. Ct. 19See v. 423 U.S. 46 L. (1987) Wheeler, 230, 238, (police scrupu must State v. 737 P.2d silent). lously suspect's right remain honor to (1972); Illinois, 682, 411, 20Kirby 92 S. Ct. 1877 v. 406 U.S. 32 L. Ed. 2d (1991). Earls, 364, 373, v. Petitclerc, 419, 425, App. 768 P.2d 516 21State v. 53 Wn. (false (1969) 684, Cupp, Ct. 1420 22 Ed. 2d 89 S. 22Frazier 394 U.S. L. suspect defendant insufficient to make

statement that fellow had incriminated Braun, inadmissible); voluntary otherwise confession (same admissibility codefendant's where misstated of officer confession). Florida, 19 L. Ed. 2d 88 S. Ct. 541 23Brooksv. 389 U.S. appellant deprived food evidence that was ever or drink or to that either was offered as an inducement confess. Accord- unchallenged findings ing fact, the trial court's appellant an detective offered food and drink as act of cour- tesy.

Issue Five. admitting Conclusion. The trial court did not err an picture "in life" of the victim. pictures inherently prejudicial, par

"In life" are not ticularly jury pic as here the has seen "after death" where body.24 ruling admitting trial of the victim's The court's tures photograph showing a will not be reversed absent a such a of discretion.25We find no such abuse manifest abuse here. present trial court did not allow the State to the in-life The simply picture until it could be tied to some issue other than identity, challenged. picture the victim's which was not ultimately identify eyeglasses admitted to the broken death, which were found in the victim's sink after her wearing picture. which she was in the The trial court reasonably picture's concluded that the relevance for that purpose outweighed any possible prejudicial effect.26 Issue Six. did The trial not commit reversible court Conclusion. allowing prosecutor to cross-examine Dr. Hal- error history. pem appellant's sexual about provided by history information The sexual had been report appellant prepared Olson, who which himself to Dr. given Halpem reaching was then to Dr. assist him in presented Halpem at trial. Dr. testified that conclusions he history, report relied on the sexual at least he read the *11 reaching An extent, some of his conclusions. to some underly expert may required to disclose the facts or data be ing opinions. ER 705. Otherwise inadmissible evidence his denied, 577, 599-600, (1988), Rice, cert. v. 110 Wn.2d 24State (1989). U.S. 910 25Rice,110 Wn.2d at 599-600. 600; Rice, 110 Wn.2d at ER 403.

26See per expert's opinion explain may or to to be admissible given.27 weight jury be what it should to determine mit the ex- Appellant have been that the evidence should contends by outweighed was ER 403 because its relevance cluded under Appellant prejudicial relevance of understates the effect. its appellant's history. Halpem use of that Dr. testified his sexual methamphetamine drive and diminished increased his sexual validity capacity premeditate of that the murder. The his sexually appellant vio- if committed is undermined conclusion began using methamphetamine, as his sex- he lent acts before history indicated. ual vacating appellant's death sentence

Moreover, we are grounds, any possible error in the admission on other history the convic harmless as to the sexual evidence was is of "bad acts" evidence tion itself. The erroneous admission requires reversal dimension, and thus not of constitutional only probability the error affected if there is a reasonable only disputed guilt phase was issue the verdict.28 appellant premeditated clearest the murder. The whether appellant's question He confession. evidence on leaving getting weapons, repeatedly room, new described using returning attack. He also related to continue the Finally, leaving fingerprints. prevent he said he hit cloths to crystal alive she was still the victim with the vase because Particularly in view a and he did not want her to be witness. clearly premeditated a confession, which describes of this fully person of the conse aware mturder, committed probability quences is no reasonable actions, of his there history affected of the sexual evidence that admission guilt phase verdict.29 Seven.

Issue give failing err in The trial court did not Conclusion. voluntary proposed appellant's intoxication. instruction on 27 Sound, Rev., Department 106 Wn.2d Coop. Puget Group Inc. Health 391, 400, 722 P.2d 787 Robtoy,

28State v.

29Robtoy, at 44.

454 substantially overlapping offered two

Appellant — intoxication. voluntary capacity defenses diminished to amounting is a mental condition not capacity Diminished the from possessing which defendant insanity prevents the crime to commit necessary mental state requisite the defense, such, not a as intoxication is Voluntary charged.30 if the determining consider jury may but a factor mental state necessary with the specific defendant acted evi If there is substantial charged.31 the crime to commit theories, should be jury either of these dence to support argue the defendant to which allow instructions given is capacity premised If the claim of diminished defense.32 voluntary consumption on the defendant's or wholly partly however, can be ade alcohol, one instruction or drugs theory to defendant's argue to the defendant quate permit 292, 730 P.2d Hansen, 46 App. of the case. State v. Wn. (1987). Hansen, of Appeals In the Court 706, 737 P.2d 670 was ade intoxication voluntary held that an instruction on dimin the claim of the defendant to argue to allow quate In much the intoxication. drug on ished based capacity which instruction manner, capacity the diminished same him to permit to adequate received was jury appellant's to made him unable and other factors drug that use argue failure to give The trial court's the murder. premeditate did not im intoxication voluntary instruction on separate of the case. theory his ability argue appellant's pair Eight. Issue guilt phase prosecu- of the claimed

Conclusion. None trial, fair to a right appellant's torial misconduct prejudiced penalty phase the prosecutor's challenge and appellant's death sentence. of the is mooted our vacation conduct denied, 942, 944, Ferrick, 414 U.S. P.2d cert. 506 v. 81 Wn.2d 30State 98, 103-04, Edmon, App. review (1973); 621 P.2d 28 Wn. (1981). denied, Coates, 9A.16.090; 31RCW Griffin, 670 P.2d

32State v. both establishing burden bears Appellant prejudicial and its conduct of the prosecutor's impropriety sentence, appellant the death vacating we áre Since effect.33 which misconduct by any he was prejudiced cannot show case. of the phase during have occurred may occurred claimed misconduct acts of majority vast improper allegedly The prosecutor's of the trial. phase *13 to have appears expert of appellant's guilt phase questioning an overall claim of only support appellant's raised been misconduct. prosecutorial of pattern the ques of transcript entire We have reviewed that ques the nature of Both expert. tioning appellant's are quite State's evidence the strength tioning 699 140, 684 P.2d Reed, 102 Wn.2d in v. than State different cases are similar relies. The two (1984), appellant on which to support witnesses defendant called expert in that the only in Reed diminished undisputed It was capacity. a claim of he killed intoxicated when extremely defendant was that the saw who Here, contrast, neighbors several his wife.34 noticed no impairment, the murder shortly before appellant the victim that he killed in his confession and he admitted Additionally, her to be a witness. he did not want because to believe not jury in Reed asked the prosecutor from out doctors" "city were they because experts defense can clearly argument That improper community.35 side the exami cross to the prosecutor's be realistically compared not jury not suggesting prosecutor nation here. of who he was because expert appellant's should disbelieve not his were from, opinions but because he came or where in drawing latitude A has wide credible. prosecutor (1991); Hughes, 51, 93, v. State Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 33State v. 692, 726, Mak, (1986); 718 176, 195, v. 105 Wn.2d 721 106 (1986), writ habeas denied, vacated on sentence 479 U.S. P.2d cert. (W.D. 1991), aff'd, Supp. Wash. Blodgett, corpus 754 F. sub nom. Mak v. (1993). (9th denied, 1992), S. Ct. 1363 cert. Cir. 970 F.2d Reed, 684 P.2d 34State v.

35Reed, at 143. expressing inferences from the evidence.36While reasonable prosecutor expressed infer in those the manner which commended, themselves here cannot be the inferences ences they improper. is the were not Nor manner which deprive appel prejudicial as to affect the verdict or drawn so a fair trial.37 lant of Nine. Issue the death Neither the declination statute nor Conclusion. imposition penalty of the death statute authorizes by juveniles.

for crimes committed upheld imposition Supreme Court The United States has penalty against defendants who were 16 or 17 when the death Kentucky, 361, 106 492 U.S. their crimes occurred. Stanford Ct. 2969 The issue L. Ed. 2d 109 S. Stanford penalty, authorized that how was not whether a state statute applied Kentucky their state courts had ever. and Missouri upheld the defendants' in that manner and had state statutes Supreme Court was The issue before the death sentences. application in that manner violated ofthose statutes whether any Eighth issue is Before constitutional Amendment. Washington statutes here, conclude that raised we must first *14 imposition appellant's death sentence.38 authorize sentencing authority limited is

The "trial court's expressly laws Our criminal found in the statutes."39 to that young years apply 9A.04.050; as 8 old. RCW to children as (1984). juve- The 19, P.2d 557 102 Wn.2d 685 Q.D., State v. 36Hoffman, 116 at 94-95. Wn.2d (defendant is a substantial 37Hughes, must show there Wn.2d at 195 thereby depriving of a defendant affected the verdict likelihood the misconduct 726). trial) Mak, (quoting 105 Wn.2d at

fair Maxwell, (1991); 595, 599, v. Tingdale, 817 P.2d 850 117 Wn.2d 38State 32, 36-37, 750 (1990); 761, 771, 791 Ng, P.2d 110 Wn.2d 114Wn.2d (constitutional (1988) absolutely neces unless should not be reached issues sary). denied, 741, 744, App. Theroff, 657 P.2d review 33 Wn. 39Statev. Accord, Carle, In re case for any and transfer decline may jurisdiction nile court criteria court, legal if the appropriate to adult prosecution RCW juvenile. of the satisfied, regardless age are 13.40.110(2). murder, in cases for aggravated The penalty court, either death or life imprison in adult is prosecuted RCW of release or parole. the possibility ment without of all Thus, authorize imposition if these statutes 10.95.080. court, adult transferred to juveniles adult penalties against child be tried as an adult theoretically as 8 could young a as aggravated life without parole to death or sentenced that offense in fact been convicted of has youth murder. One he for a crime parole to fife without prison and sentenced If the State there had sought at 13.40 age committed 10.95.070(7) allowed the would have death RCW penalty, factor, mitigating the defendant's as a youth to consider jury does not require jury the death statute penalty but merit lenie factor alone as sufficient to any mitigating treat ncy.41 seek, jury or the .unlikely it is the State would

Admittedly, an return, extremely young would a death sentence against factor, however, is that such ver- defendant. The significant were interpreted dicts would be if our statutes possible for crimes commit- penalty authorize of the death imposition v. Okla- 4-justice Thompson ted by juveniles. plurality 702, 108 S. Ct. 2687 homa, 815, 101 L. Ed. 2d 487 U.S. imposed that the death cannot be penalty concluded when the crime younger defendants who were 15 or against valid retribu- the death serves no occurred because concurrence, In her in such cases. tive or deterrent purpose concluded, that defendants narrowly, Justice O'Connor more be "may committed not under 16 when their crimes were statute authority capital punishment executed under the minimum of a at which the commission age no specifies denied, Massey, review App. 40State v. P.2d 60 Wn. *15 denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1990), cert. 10.95.060(4). 41See RCW crime

capital can lead to the offender's execution."42 Under view, either our statutes would clearly be unconstitutional as if applied defendants 15 or to author younger interpreted ize of the death imposition penalty juris decline following diction in court. juvenile RCW 13.40.110 authorizes juveniles adults, to be tried as but does not mention the death penalty. RCW 10.95 authorizes of the death imposition but penalty, does not refer to crimes committed by juveniles. Most criti cally, neither statute sets minimum any age imposition penalty. the death " '[Wjherever possible, it is the of this court to con duty "43 strue a statute so as to its uphold constitutionality.' We cannot rewrite the court juvenile statute or death pen- statute to ally of the death expressly preclude imposition for crimes committed who are under penally by persons age 16 and thus from the death under exempt penalty Thomps on.44 there Nor is in either statute that could any provision be severed order to achieve that result. The statutes there fore cannot be construed to authorize of the death imposition for crimes committed Absent such juveniles. authorization, death sentence cannot stand.45 appellant's

Appellant's aggravated degree murder conviction is vacated, affirmed. The death sentence is the case is remanded for of a sentence of imposition life with- prison out the of release or possibility parole.

Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Durham, Smith, Guy, and John- son, JJ., concur. Oklahoma,

42Thompson v. 487 U.S. at 857-58. Video, 382, 392, Tukwila, 43WorldWide Inc. v. Browet, Inc., 215, 219, (1984)), (quoting cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1672 Paroles, 44Addleman v. Board Prison Terms & 730 P.2d (1986) (court may things not "read into a statute those which it conceives may unintentionally"). Legislature have left out 45Carle, 33; Theroff, App. 93 Wn.2d at 33 Wn. at 744. *16 — hold- I in the majority's J. concur (concurring)

Utter, statute to exe- under the authority there exists no ing that, in compari- and hold juveniles. go cute I would further 10.95.130, pen- RCW son to other cases as mandated to that of other alty of death is excessive or disproportionate murder. juveniles degree convicted of aggravated treatment First, in our state receive different juveniles is, in It range legal categories. than adults across a broad of view, treatment for my wholly to this inappropriate suspend of the most severe available purpose imposing of Second, under our criminal there is no evidence system. execution standards in our state to community support of a who was a at the time of the offense. person juvenile join emerging I believe should Finally, Washington recognizing national trend of that it is legislatures improper to execute who at the time the crime persons juveniles were I was committed. write also to indicate that the prosecutor's

misconduct in this case was and would constitute egregious an Furman's sentence independent ground reversing of death on even if we were not his sentence invalidating another ground.

I Washington The Status of Minors Under Law different, Juveniles in receive indeed Washington protec- tive, treatment as to adults across a wide compared range vote, a minor's to legal categories. right State restricts consent, marry to serve on a to without even jury, parental See, to alcohol and RCW 26.28- purchase cigarettes. e.g., .015(3) State Con- Washington and article section vote); a to RCW 2.36- right stitution (restricting juvenile's to on a RCW jury); .070 a serve (restricting juvenile's right 26.28.015(1) a (restricting juvenile's 26.04.210 and RCW 26.28.080(1) a juvenile's right marry); (restricting to RCW are intoxicating liquors to right present places be 26.28.080(4) to sold); (restricting juvenile's right pur- a RCW (restrict- 26.28.070 chase or tobacco RCW possess products); RCW a to certain ing juvenile's right types employment); 26.28.080(2) a (restricting juvenile's right to be in a present 26.28.080(3) hall); or billiard RCW public pool a (restricting to or be juvenile's right gamble houses of present prostitu- 26.28.080(5) use); tion or RCW drug a (restricting juvenile's (restrict- or right a purchase possess handgun); RCW 9.68 or ing juvenile's right purchase, possess sexually explicit materials).

These a recognition by laws reflect courts and commenta tors alike that minors have less in the way of developed See, faculties than responsible decision-making adults. e.g., J.R., Parham v. 442 U.S. 61 L. Ed. 2d 99 S. (1979) ("[m]ost children, adolescence, Ct. 2493 even in sim are not able to make sound ply judgments concerning many *17 decisions"); Baird, Bellotti v. 443 U.S. 61 L. Ed. 2d (1979) 797, 99 S. Ct. 3035 the formative ("during years of adolescence, childhood and minors often lack the experience, and avoid perspective, judgment recognize choices that could them"); York, be detrimental v. New Ginsberg (1968) 629, 649-50, 195, 390 U.S. 20 L. Ed. 2d 88 S. Ct. 1274 ("a J., (Stewart, child ... is not concurring) possessed of that full for individual choice capacity which is the presupposi (citation tion of First Amendment guarantees") omitted); see Servs., Int'l, 678, n.15, also v. 431 U.S. 693 Carey Population ("the (1977) 52 L. Ed. 2d 97 S. Ct. 2010 law has gener minors as a lesser for ally regarded having capability mak decisions"). Streib, ing generally See The important Eighth Juveniles, Amendment and Punishment 34 Clev. Capital of Comment, (1985-1986); St. L. Rev. 363 Punishment Capital J. & Eighth Analysis, Minors: An Amendment 74 Crim. for Note, (1983); 1471 Pun Criminology Decency Capital of and the Contemporary Dig ishment Minors: Standards for Juveniles, 61 Ind. L.J. 757 nity anomalous, It but in view only my grossly inap- is not to our to create an otherwise propriate, exception protective treatment of minors for the whether considering purpose their acts should be death. punishable by

Moreover, I it time the state Washington joined think executing persons legislatures recognizing impropriety

461 In the several past years for crimes committed as juveniles. issue, and have ex- at five states have examined this least crime: juvenile cluded the of the death imposition (N.J. (West 1993), Supp. New Ann. Jersey 2C:ll-3(g) Stat. § (Or. A:4A-22(a) (West 2 Rev. 1993)); Oregon 1987 & Supp. § (Colo. 419.476(1) 161.620, (1991)); Rev. Stat. Colorado §§ (Neb. 16-ll-103(l)(a) (1986 1992)); & Nebraska Supp. Stat. § (Ohio (1989)); and Rev. Code Rev. Stat. 28-105.01 Ohio § 2929.02(A) (Anderson 1993)). Note, The Juvenile Ann. See § a Miti- Death Counsel’s Role in Penalty: Development of (1987-1988). 53 L. Rev. 776 n.78 gation Brook. Defense, II Proportionality I already explained length have at reservations about my our v. proportionality analysis Camp under statute. State (1984) bell, 41-49, (Utter, J., 691 P.2d 103 Wn.2d 929 denied, 471 U.S. concurring part, dissenting part), cert. 398, 431-40, (1985); 1094 State 717 Jeffries, v. (Utter, J., denied, (Jeffries I), cert. 479 dissenting) (1986); Harris, 784, 802-06, v. 106 725 U.S. State Wn.2d (1986) denied, (Utter, J., P.2d U.S. dissenting), cert. Lord, 829, 939-45, 822 P.2d (1987); (1991) (Utter, J., denied, cert. 113 S. Ct. 164 dissenting), 631, 697-709, ; Benn, (1993) (Utter, J., here, I shall them repeat not dissenting). iri the statu other than to note there are serious problems *18 in the manner tory methodological flaws design serious in our review. which we have structured aside, 10.95.130 requires these RCW

Putting reservations us death is excessive or to evaluate whether the sentence of cases. We as other similar compared disproportionate in which defend- should therefore consider similar cases murder, degree ant found first guilty aggravated was or actually imposed or not the death penalty whether 10.95.130(2)(b). As I have else- emphasized carried out. RCW is is the death where, penalty the relevant whether inquiry cases, it ever whether has in similar not generally imposed 462

been such cases. See imposed Lord, State v. 117 Wn.2d at (Utter, J., In re dissenting); Jeffries, (1990) II). 789 P.2d 731 (Jeffries

To make determination, this we must compare facts and circumstances of Furman's crime with those of others who have committed aggravated first degree murder while still juveniles. This involves taking into account the presence or absence Lord, of aggravating factors. See 117 Wn.2d at 490). 940 (citing II, 114 Wn.2d at Yet must do we Jeffries more than compare numbers victims or cir aggravating cumstances. We must in a "careful engage examination of the circumstances of the crimes and the defendants' per sonal II, characteristics." 114 Wn.2d at 490 (citing Jeffries 734, State v. Rupe, 768-70, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), denied, cert. (1988)); 486 U.S. 1061 State Rice, 577, 625-28, (1988), denied, cert. U.S.

An examination of similar crimes committed by juveniles clearly reveals visiting death on penalty juveniles aggravated for first degree murder is disproportionate. Since 1981, under eight people of 18 have age been convicted of aggravated first degree murder. In none was the death penalty Indeed, no imposed. juvenile has been executed in our Brown, state since 1932. See The Juvenile Death Penalty A Washington: State Constitutional Analysis, 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. Streib, V. Death Pen- (citing (1987)). Juveniles 207-08 alty It cannot then be said death is on generally imposed juveniles for aggra- fact, vated first murder. degree Given this the death penalty fails pass muster under the proportionality review man- dated RCWby 10.95.130. Furman,

Besides seven under the of 18 have people age been convicted of aggravated degree murder since 1981. The circumstances of their crimes and the sentences they are ultimately received set forth below. 50): (Questionnaire of the Trial

Report Judge No. (Sean Allen), Stevenson Wn. 780 P.2d App. denied, review 113 Wn.2d 1040 *19 date offense: 16 at of

Age of first aggravated Allen convicted Sean Stevenson was of the of his sister and two counts degree murder for death of his and stepfather first murder for the deaths degree Stevenson, 727. 55 Wn. at App. mother. of a vic- rape was found: the

One circumstance aggravating (Stevenson), Clark/ tim, of the Trial Judge his sister. Report 87-1-00011-5, The evi- at 5. court cited Cy. Skamania cause (1) of circumstances: age of four statutory mitigating dence (4) (3) disturbed; and defendant; mentally prior histoiy; no find to and mother. stepfather failure to murder as aggravated (Stevenson), at The also of the Trial 6. court Report Judge nonstatutory cited evidence of one circumstance: mitigating (Stevenson), his of the Trial by stepfather. Report Judge abuse at 7. but death prosecutor originally sought his on the basis of a evaluation psychiatric withdrew request life jury of to the defendant. Stevenson sentenced (Stevenson), Trial at 7. Report Judge without of the parole. 61): (Questionnaire Trial No. Report Judge (Russell Duane), Wn. App. McNeil at date of offense: 17 Age (No. (codefendant McNeil of Herbert Rice

Russell Duane aggravated trial two counts of guilty prior to 70)).pleaded and first for death of Nickoloff degree Dorothy murder (as McNeil, death Mike Nickoloff. accomplice) an of elderly were (ages at 478-79. Both victims App. Wn. 82) death, badly muti- and and stabbed to their bodies (McNeil), 8, 9. the Trial at Judge lated. Report (by found circumstances were aggravating The following admission): and degree burglary concealment of crimes; common of those who committed identities victim; than murder scheme or with more one plan first degree in furtherance of committed the coruse of and (McNeil), at 5. mit- the Trial Two Report Judge burglary. age cited: the defendant's circumstances were igating lack of significant criminal history. of the Trial Report Judge (McNeil), at 6.

The prosecution gave notice it intended to seek the death penalty. trial, Before the State agreed withdraw its request *20 for the death in for exchange guilty McNeil. pleas by McNeil was sentenced to two consecutive life sen- exceptional tences without parole. of Report (McNeil), the Trial Judge at 13; McNeil, 59 478, Wn. at App. 479. 67):

Report of the Trial Judge (Questionnaire No. State v. Cummings (Susan), 44 146, Wn. App. 545, P.2d review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1017

Age at date of offense: 16

Susan was convicted Cummings of aggravated first degree murder. Cummings, Wn. at 148. App. The following aggra- vating circumstances were found: murder in of, the course furtherance of or flight from robbery, first degree, and rape, first degree; intent to conceal commission of or of identity persons the committing crime of and rape murder. of Report the Trial Judge Walla (Cummings), Walla Cy. cause 85-1- 00044-4, at 5. Another factor aggravating cited was the vic- tim's advanced years. Report of the Trial Judge (Cummings), at 13.

The trial judge there reported was no credible evidence of statutory mitigating circumstances, Report of the Trial Judge at (Cummings), and two nonstatutory mitigating circum- stances: the defendant's and age; the fact the defendant did not use the that weapon caused death. of the Trial Report Judge (Cummings), at 7.

The trial judge noted in the posttrial questionnaire there were at least four other teenagers involved in the kill- No other ing. cofelon, however, received a sentence of life without release. this Despite acknowledged disproportional- of ity sentence, the trial judge had no alternative but to impose sentence of life imprisonment without release. Report Trial Judge at (Cummings), 13. 70): of the Trial

Report (Questionnaire Judge No. (Herbert Rice, A.), Jr. date of offense: at

Age (No. 61) (codefendant McNeil of Russell Rice Herbert A. 43)) (No. was con- Rice confused with David and not to be murder for degree aggravated counts of victed of two (as accomplice) an of Mike Nickoloff and the death The trial at 553. Rice, 120 Wn.2d Nickoloff. Dorothy death of aware of torture and were victims suffered found both judge murdered with brutally suffering; other's both were each victim minutes for wounds; many it took dozens of stab Trial Judge elderly. Report victims were die; both 88-1-00427-2, at 8. (Rice), Yakima cause Cy. circumstances trial, following aggravating At identity persons committed to conceal found: murder scheme victims; common crimes; committing multiplicity burglary course of first degree or committed plan; (Rice), at 5. of the Trial Judge robbery. Report mitigating claimed a list of long the defendant Although history limited criminal his including youth, circumstances *21 disturbance, the trial judge reported emotional and extreme was no credible evidence of that in the court's there opinion the Trial Judge circumstances. of statutory mitigating Report (Rice), at 6-7. was but the jury

The the death sought penalty, prosecutor (11 unanimous verdict as to its imposition unable to reach a to two Rice was sentenced death, 1 for life in prison). release the of possibility of life without consecutive sentences in the questionnaire The trial commented judge or parole. inappropriate. life sentence was given that he the thought (Rice), at Judge the Trial Rice, 555; at of Report 13. 110): No. (Questionnaire Judge of the Trial

Report (Michael 58 Wn. noted at E.), unpublished opinion Harris App. offense: 15 at date of

Age 111)) (No. (cofelon Massey of C. Barry E. Harris Michael murder. first degree of aggravated was convicted murder was found: circumstance trial, At one aggravating (Har- Judge the Trial of robbery. Report a during committed ris), 87-1-01354-7, Cy. Pierce cause at 5. The trial judge in made no notation the posttrial questionnaire regarding circumstances. The not mitigating prosecutor did seek the death Harris penalty. was sentenced to life in without prison possibility release or parole. Ill): of the Trial

Report (Questionnaire No. State v. Judge C.), Massey (1990), 60 Wn. (Barry App. P.2d denied, cert. 499 U.S. 960

Age at date offense: 13 (cofelon (No. 110)) Barry C. of Michael Massey E. Harris was of aggravated convicted first murder for the degree death of Paul Wang. Massey, 60 Wn. at 134. App. trial,

At two circumstances found: aggravating murder was committed and was during robbery; commit- ted to conceal commission of a crime and perpetrator. its of the Trial Pierce Report Judge (Massey), cause 87-1- Cy. 01354-7, The in at 5. trial made no judge post- notation trial circumstances. about questionnaire mitigating prosecutor did not seek penalty. Massey the death was sen- tenced to in prison life without of release or possibility parole. 122): Trial

Report Judge (Questionnaire No. (Ansel Court of 15786-1- Wolfgang) cause Appeals Hofstetter II; 15471-4-II (disposition pending).

Age at date offense: 16 Ansel Wolfgang aggravated Hofstetter convicted of trial, murder. At one circumstance degree aggravating of, was found: murder committed in the in course further- of, from, ance or in immediate first or flight robbery second Report (Hofstetter), of the Trial at 5. degree. Judge The trial made no notation judge posttrial question- *22 naire about circumstances. The did mitigating prosecutor not seek penalty. the death Hofstetter was sentenced to fife without the of release or prison possibility parole.

As the indicates, the death is not foregoing penalty gener- juvéniles on for murder. ally imposed degree first aggravated Further, the death is not for penalty generally imposed aggra-

467 the de rape when degree murder accompanied vated Lord, crime. v. is an at the time of the See State fendant adult 829, 942-46, 822 (Utter, J., dissent P.2d Thus, were authorization express legislative even if there ing). crime, at the juveniles were time of the persons to execute who fail to be and would disproportionate, such would punishment 10.95.130. under RCW scrutiny pass

m During Misconduct Prosecutorial Closing Argument argu- I also out that the prosecutor's closing write to point be improper ment at the was so it would phase if upholding for reversal even we were otherwise grounds the sentence of death. the charged, gener-

Where is defense improper argument the as well ally establishing impropriety bears burden from it. See State prejudice flowing Hoffman, as 93, are on the 51, Both patent Wn.2d on at least objected record before us. Moreover defendant Phase) vol. occasion, see Report Proceedings (Penalty one instruction, at and a which requested limiting Phase) vol. court denied. See Report Proceedings (Penalty 22, at 3523-28. if no conduct prosecutor's

Even there had been objection, no is so ill that flagrant is reviewable if it intentioned it curative instruction could eliminated the prejudice have 93; v. Belgarde, Wn.2d at engendered. Hoffman, a case. 507, 755 P.2d 174 This is such not- mistrial closing arguments compelled We have held far facts object counsel's failure on withstanding defense Reeder, 46 In State v. than those here. egregious present less (1955), held that 888, 893-94, P.2d this court homicide, misconduct prejudicial in a for it was prosecution three to state deputy prosecutor mistrial requiring his with had first wife times that the defendant threatened effect, testimony where there had been no a gun, com- a divorce allegations statements based on *23 plaint not admitted into evidence. The statement we consid- ered prejudicial misconduct also included the following: defendant], himself, [the "He was married before and divorced

by a says wife who he gun threatened her with a in '36. The little then, gun man with a gun September 26, little man with a on gun 1953. The little man with a big out at the resort when the got in fellow this man. He was the a ruckus with him. any There hasn't been change in yesterday, today, same and he will be to- morrow." Reeder, State v. 46 Wn.2d at Likewise, 891. in State v. Case, 49 66, 73-74, 298 P.2d 500 (1956), a prosecution carnal knowledge, this court held the deputy prosecuting attorney's closing argument mistrial, a compelled even absent a defense haye objection, because no instruction could cured the preju dice created. In Case the deputy he prosecutor suggested be lieved in the personally defendant's guilt, referred to the defendant's character herd", witnesses as "his entire Case, 49 Wn.2d at and stated further: "Is it uncommon person charged for a with a sex crime to be pillar society? a You can't pigeonhole [sic] characterise or this sort of top any segment crime in society. You can have the man, nation, the top man of the happened, even. It hasn't I sure, am but it could be. We have had men in the State

Department that have been accused of things of that nature. my In experience own it has occurred in the Seattle School District, principals convicted of sex deviations. It knows no difference. It is like a accused, of schools have been charged and disease. It polio, over, is like it hits all pay any it doesn't is, person you attention to who the whether had measles as a child, you whether had rickets or something. something It is in the brain and mind goes and all over the area." Case, 49 Wn.2d at 69.

More in recently, State v. we Belgarde, supra, reversed the defendants' conviction because the made prosecutor prejudi- cial comments to the jury about defendants' ties alleged to the (AIM), American Indian Movement a he charac- group terized as a "deadly of madmen" and group "butchers". Bel- garde, Wn.2d at 506-08. We reasoned: inflammatory These comments appeal deliberate to the jury's passion prejudice and encouraged it to render a verdict Belgarde's based on associations with AIM rather than properly flagrant, highly admitted evidence. The remarks were prejudicial and introduced "facts" not in evidence. at Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 507-08. " reaffirmed our in reasoning We Case that miscon- '[i]f it, is, duct is so that no instruction flagrant can cure there effect, trial a mistrial a new is the and the manda- only tory 110 Wn.2d at 508 remedy'". Belgarde, (quoting 74). Case, at If that supra was true Reeder and Belgarde, Case, here, it is true certainly where the substance of the *24 remarks was far more and far less to be prejudicial, likely cured an instruction. At least three times during closing argument, prosecutor referred to Furman his lit- raping brother, tle an alleged act for which he was never convicted. He closing also used to argument make reference to Fur- man's other alleged misconduct, acts of sexual including bes- tiality, also an act for which he was never convicted. Report Phase) of Proceedings. (Penalty 22, vol. at 3579. Or the raped brothers, time that he one his I don't if it know was Mark Paul or stepbrother here in Port Orchard. He admitted that to his doctor. (Italics mine.) Phase) Report of Proceedings (Penalty 22, vol. at 3535. And again, Think about all the presented case, evidence that's been in this in the phase and phase. this The defendant would have

you believe that his drug activity was part of the root of this problem. yet And juvenile California, when he's in detention in exposed not any drugs, what's he do. He exposes himself Well, he doesn’t have drugs as an excuse there. What excuse does he does he have having have when he's dog? sex with the What excuse brother, raping when he's his little or his sister? Or fantasizing about his grandma, having sex with her? (Italics mine.) Phase) Report Proceedings (Penalty vol. at 3540-41. In rebuttal closing argument he stated: brother,

How he treats his rapes anally. him he treats How people, burgles houses, other steals, [sic] their dope, smokes drops out of school. That's what we have here. We have a sitting right crimewave there. (Italics mine.) Phase) Report vol. Proceedings (Penalty at 3579.

References to Furman's acts of sexual alleged deviancy fatally are far more than the remarks we held damaging in the cases discussed above. They repug- prejudicial extreme, in the and at best would have distracted the nant its mandate to focus on the crime its jury statutory from decide whether there were sufficient miti- circumstances leniency. circumstances to warrant See RCW 10.95- gating .060(4). contends the trial court had admitted already

The State so phase, at the these references could guilt this evidence because the heard them prejudicial jury not have been maintains the statements had earlier. The State also some correct, value. Even the State is assuming arguendo rebuttal would still be closing argument improper the prosecutor's for reversal. grounds We sexual acts resulted convictions. alleged None Bartholomew, held in State v. factors that evidence of nonstatutory aggravating convictions, evi limited to the defendant's record of

must be admissible at the guilt dence that woúld have been properly to rebut the defendant's and evidence phase, designed Bartholomew, See 101 Wn.2d at 642-43 evidence. mitigating 173, 197-98, Bartholomew, (quoting *25 remanded, (1982), State's cert. granted (1983)). denied, 463 U.S. 1212 U.S. cert. defendant's misconstruing holding our against We warned specifically matters of highly prejudicial introduction of sanction the do not intend . .. the prosecu relevance: "We tangential it cares to so long evidence any tion be permitted produce matter how slight element of rebuttal no as it to some points Bartholomew, at 643 Bar (quoting or incidental." 101 Wn.2d 197-98). tholomew, 98 Wn.2d at be carefiil to apply principles We should especially a death penalty case law in the context of articulated our harshest penalty where the defendant faces the proceeding, be- sentencing system. prosecutor's under our available we have repeatedly the more because reprehensible havior is excess, this °f type State about precisely admonished the See, even outside the context of a death penalty proceeding. 504, 507-09, State v. e.g., Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 755 P.2d 174 (1988); Reed, 140, 145-48, State v. 684 P.2d 699 (1984); Case, 74-75, therein. and cases cited Smith, J., J. Utter, concurs with September 30,

[No. 1993.] 60036-8. En Banc. Respondent, Jones, Walter Stebbins, v. Arlen

et al, Petitioners.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Furman
Court Name: Washington Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 30, 1993
Citation: 858 P.2d 1092
Docket Number: 57003-5
Court Abbreviation: Wash.
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