IN RE: B.H., A MINOR CHILD
Case No. 17 CA 0005
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
July 24, 2017
2017-Ohio-6966
Hоn. W. Scott Gwin, P. J.; Hon. John W. Wise, J.; Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. A2007-0523; JUDGMENT: Vacated
For Plaintiff-Appellee State
WILLIAM C. HAYES PROSECUTING ATTORNEY KARRIE PRATT KUNKEL ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR 20 South Second Street, Fourth Floor Newark, Ohio 43055
For Defendant-Appellant
VICTORIA BADER 250 East Broad Street Suite 1400 Columbus, Ohio 43215
Wise, John, J.
{¶1} Appellant B.H. appeals the December 28, 2016, Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling his objections and approving and adopting the Magistrate’s Decision denying his Motion to Vacate his Juvenile Sex Offender Classification pursuant to Megan’s Law.
{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶3} On July 20, 2007, the State filed a complaint with the Licking County Juvenile Court allеging that B.H. (d.o.b. 02/13/91), was delinquent for committing one count of rape, in violation of
{¶4} On October 2, 2007, the State filed a Motion to Amend and an Amended Complaint for the purposes of corrеcting the spelling of the victims’ names and to change the date range of these events from “April 1, 2006, through November 1, 2006” to “May 1, 2006, through November 1, 2006“.
{¶5} On October 16, 2007, the State moved to amend the rape count to gross sexual imposition, and Appellant entered plеas of admit to two counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of
{¶7} After a non-oral hearing held on December 4, 2007, the court filed an Order stating that the issue of sex offender registration should have been addressed at the dispositional hearing, and ordered that a new dispositional hearing be scheduled.
{¶8} On January 8, 2008, the court designated Appellant as a Tier II sex offender registrant pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act (Senate Bill 10).
{¶9} On July 13, 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Williams in which Senate Bill 10 was determined to be unconstitutional as it violated
{¶10} On January 9, 2012, Appellant was successfully released from probation.
{¶11} On January 26, 2012, Appellant filed a Petition to Rescind Application of the Adam Walsh Act and Request for Oral Hearing. On that date, the court held a dispositional review hearing for the purpose of addressing Appellant‘s status as a registered sex offender.
{¶12} By Judgment Entry filed February 6, 2012, the trial court explained that it did order Appellant to register on January 8, 2008, pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act; however, the court noted that pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in Williams, that Order needed to be vacated due to such classification being void as it violated the
{¶13} On June 27, 2016, the Office of the Ohio Public Defender filed a Noticе of Limited Appearance and Motion to Vacate Classification on behalf of Appellant.
{¶14} On July 14, 2016, the State filed its response to that motion.
{¶15} On September 6, 2016, the trial court denied Appellant‘s motion stating that Appellant was never “reclassified” and that the use of such language was a “syntactical error by [the Magistrate] in choosing a word without considering its full connotation in this area of law.” The court went on to explain that pursuant to Williams, the court applied the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, and that Appellant was therefore automatically subject to registration as a sexually oriented offender according to Hayden. As such, Appellant‘s motion was denied.
{¶16} On September 19, 2016, Appellant filed an objection to the Magistrate‘s Decision, asserting that the Magistrate erred in failing to vacate his void classification and erred in applying Hayden to his case.
{¶17} The State filed its response to the objections on October 10, 2016.
{¶18} By Judgment Entry filed December 28, 2016, the trial court overruled Appellant‘s objections and affirmed the September 6, 2016, Mаgistrate‘s Decision, noting in its Judgment Entry that “[n]o authority has been cited by the juvenile to support the non-application of Hayden, which was decided in 2002.”
{¶19} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
{¶20} “I. THE LICKING COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED B.H.‘S MOTION TO VACATE HIS VOID JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION, BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE WILLIAMS REMEDY TO HIM BEFORE HE COMPLETED HIS DISPOSITIONAL ORDERS. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 16.”
I.
{¶21} In his sole Assignment of Error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his juvenile sex offender registration. We agree.
{¶22} In 1963, the General Assembly created a designation of “habitual sexual offender” for individuals convicted two or more times of specified crimes and imposed registration and change of address notification duties on those individuals. Am. S.B. No. 160, 130 Ohio Laws 669–71. In 1996, the General Assembly enacted Ohio‘s version of the federal “Megan‘s Law” legislation, which created a comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 6–7. Under Megan‘s Law, a sentencing court was required to determine whether a sex offender fell into one of three classifications: (1) sexually oriented offender, (2) habitual sex offender, or (3) sexual predator. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Megan‘s Law also included registration and address verification рrovisions, as well as community notification provisions. Id. at 408–09, 700 N.E.2d 570. In 2007, the General Assembly further amended the law, enacting Senate Bill No. 10 (“S.B. No. 10“), the Ohio version of the federal “Adam Walsh Act.”
{¶23} The Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently found several portions of the sex offender classification system under S.B. No. 10 to be unconstitutional, either on their face or as applied to certain defendants. In Bodyke, the court held unconstitutional provisions requiring the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders under S.B. No. 10 whosе classifications had already been adjudicated by a court and made the subject of a final order under Megan‘s Law. Id. at ¶ 60.
{¶24} In July 2011, the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3372, which held that applying the sex offender classification system under S.B. No. 10 to individuals who committed their crimes prior to enactment of that law violated the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws. Williams at ¶ 20. It is within this context of the development and evolution of sex offender classification laws that we consider the particular details of appellee‘s classification.
{¶25} The Williams decision held that “S.B. 10, as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, violates
{¶26} In the case sub judice, the State agrees that the trial court was correct in holding that that the original Tier II classification was void because the оffenses in this case were committed prior to the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act. As the statute was void from its inception, Appellant was never classified as a “tier offender“.
{¶28} The State relies on the case of State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, in support of its argument. In Hayden, the Court held that the classification of a defendant as a sexually oriented offender does not require a hearing. Once an individual is convicted of a sexually oriented offense, he is automatically classified as a sexually oriented offender and must comply with the registration requirements of
{¶29} Appellant argues that Hayden applies only to adult offenders and not juvеnile offenders. Appellant further argues that the juvenile court was without authority to classify him after he had completed all dispositional orders.
{¶30} Appellant relies on the cases of two Ohio Supreme Court cases: In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183 and State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697. In Cross, the Supreme Court held that the tеrmination of a juvenile‘s probation resulted in a loss of jurisdiction by the juvenile court to impose suspended commitments.
{¶31} In Jean-Baptiste, the Supreme Court found that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to classify a child as a juvenile sex offender registrant once his or her dispоsition has been fully satisfied or when the child attains the age of 21 years.
{¶33}
{¶34} Based on the foregoing rationale, we find that Hayden, supra, does not apply to juveniles as the juvenile court is required to conduct a hearing, engage in the two-step process as set forth above, and exercise its discretion.
{¶35} We would further clarify that the original judgment in this case was void, not voidable. “A void judgment is one rendered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction
{¶36} As such, the trial court herein was without authority to correct or clarify or amend Appellant‘s classification as such original classification was a mere nullity. Any classification imposed after such was a new classification.
{¶37} In applying the facts of this case to the law, we find that B.H. successfully completed his disposition of January 9, 2012, when he was discharged from probation. Accordingly, the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to impose a new classification after that dаte. Nevertheless, January 26, 2012, the juvenile court held a hearing to impose the new classification. Based on the above cases, we find that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over B.H., and the juvenile court acted outside its jurisdiction in imposing the new clаssification. We therefore find that the classification issued on January 26, 2012 is void.
{¶39} Based on the foregoing, we find the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Licking County, Ohio, is void and hereby vacate same.
By: Wise, John, J.
Gwin, P. J., and
Baldwin, J., concur.
JWW/d 0629