State v. LawsonState v. Lawson
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Sylvester Lawson appeals from the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court‘s judgment overruling his “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment, and for a New Sentencing Hearing.” We affirm the judgment overruling the motion, but we vacate Lawson‘s sex-offender classification and remand for resentencing under the sex-offender-classification law in effect when Lawson committed his offenses.
{¶2} In January 2008, Lawson was indicted for rape in violation of
{¶3} In Novembеr 2011, Lawson again collaterally challenged his convictions, this time in a “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment, and for a New Sentencing Hearing.” The common pleas court overruled the motion, and this appeal followed.
{¶4} On appeal, Lawson presents four assignments of error. The assignments of error essentially restate the claims advanced in his motion and may thus fairly be read together to prеsent a challenge to the overruling of his motion. We overrule the assignments of error.
{¶6} Postconviction relief was properly denied. A рostconviction petition must be filed with the common pleas court within 180 days after the transcript of the proceedings is filed in the direct appeal.
{¶7} Lawson‘s claims were filed well after the expiration of the time prescribed by
{¶8} S.B. 10 sex-offender classification was void. But a trial court retains jurisdiction to correct a void judgment. State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-19. And Lawson‘s convictions were void to the extent that the trial court applied S.B. 10 to classify him as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶9} We do not reach the issue, presented by Lawson‘s allied-offenses claim, of whether a sentence imposed in contravention of
{¶10} But the court should have vacated as void Lawson‘s sex-offender classification. In 2005, when Lawson committed his offenses, the sex-offender classification and registration scheme in place was Ohio‘s version of the federal Megan‘s Law,
{¶11} By August 2008, when Lawson was convicted of his sex offenses and classified as a Tier III sex offender, Megan‘s Law had been replaced by S.B. 10. Under S.B. 10, effective January 1, 2008, a sex offender is classified under a three-tiered structure automatically, based upon his offense. His classification dеtermines his registration requirements, and those requirements are more onerous than those provided for under Megan‘s law. See State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 24-28.
{¶12} By 2010, Lawson had exhausted his direct appeals. In July 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court deсided State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. The supreme court in Williams held that S.B. 10‘s registration requirements are part of the offender‘s punishment for his conduct, id. at ¶ 10-20, and that S.B. 10, “as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates
{¶14} In doing so, the court in Eads declined to follow the general rule that “[a] new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases that are pending on the announcement date.” Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186, 291 N.E.2d 466 [1972]). The court reasoned that, just as Ohio‘s Retroactivity Clause effectively “nullifies,” and thus renders “void,” an unconstitutionally retroactive law, a judicial ruling that the law is unconstitutionally retroactive “likewise applies retroactively to any person to whom the law was retroactively applied.” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 352-353, 721 N.E.2d 28 [2000], Miller v. Hixson, 64 Ohio St. 39, 51, 59 N.E. 749 [1901], and State v. Pritchett, 2d Dist. No. 24183, 2011-Ohio-5978, ¶ 26).
{¶15} The court also found support for its retrospective application of Williams in the supreme court‘s expression of its holding in that case. The suрreme court in Williams held that S.B. 10 was unconstitutionally retroactive “as applied to Williams and any other sex offender who committed an offense prior to the enactment of S.B. 10.” Williams at ¶ 22 (emphasis added). That holding, the Eads court noted, was as “expansive” as the holding in Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, that S.B. 10‘s reclassificatiоn provisions “may not be applied to offenders previously adjudicated by judges under Megan‘s Law.” Eads at ¶ 19 and 23 (quoting Bodyke at ¶ 66). And the supreme court has not limited Bodyke to pending reclassification challenges, but has extended its holding to all unconstitutional reclassificаtions. See Eads at ¶ 19-23 (citing State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 N.E.2d 192).
{¶16} The decision in Eads has since been reaffirmed by the Second District. See, e.g., State v. Dudley, 2d Dist. No. 24408, 2012-Ohio-3844, ¶ 14-15; State v. Knowles, 2d Dist. No. 2011-CA-17, 2012-Ohio-2543, ¶ 6-12; State v. Alredge, 2d Dist. No. 24755, 2012-Ohio-414, ¶ 6-13. And other appellate districts have followed Eads to retroactively vacate as “void” S.B. 10 sex-offender classifications based on conduct before S.B. 10 became effective. See State v. Vertock, 8th Dist. No. 97888, 2012-Ohio-4283, ¶ 6-14; State v. Dillon, 5th Dist. No. CT11-0062, 2012 Ohio 773, ¶ 7-19; see also State v. Stewart, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-787, 2012-Ohio-4500, ¶ 21 (citing Eads in holding that Bodyke applies retroactively). We also find Eads persuasive.
{¶17} Moreover, Eads squares with our understanding of the effect of imposing a sentence that is not authorized by law. The Ohio Supreme Court has long held, and has continued to reaffirm, the principle that an unlawful sentence is “void.” State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 7 (citing Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 438, 195 N.E.2d 811 [1964]; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 [1984], and State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 8). A void sentence “may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.” Fischer, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, regardless of a case‘s procedural posture, when a trial court has imposed a sentence that it had no authority to impose, and the matter has come to a
{¶18} S.B. 10‘s sex-offender registration requirements are part of a sex offender‘s sentеnce. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 10-20. And the imposition of S.B. 10‘s registration requirements on sex offenders who committed their offenses before the effective date of S.B. 10 runs afoul of Ohio‘s Retroactivity Clause. Id. at syllabus. Because Lawson committed his offenses before the effective date of S.B. 10, the trial court could not lawfully impose upon him S.B. 10‘s registration requirements. Therefore, Lawson‘s classification under S.B. 10 as a Tier III sex offеnder is void.
{¶19} We affirm, but remand for resentencing. The postconviction statutes did not confer upon the common pleas court jurisdiction to entertain Lawson‘s claims. Therefore, his postconviction motion was subject to dismissal. See
{¶20} But the trial court‘s classification of Lawson under S.B. 10 as a Tier III sex offender is void. We, therefore, vacate the classification and remand this case to the common pleas court for resentencing under Megan‘s Law. See State v. Brumbach, 1st Dist. No. C-100792, 2011-Ohio-6635, ¶ 31.
Judgment accordingly.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.