I.S. v. I.S.S.I.S. v. I.S.S.
On brief: [I.S.S.], pro se.1 Argued: [I.S.S.].
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations
MENTEL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, I.S.S., pro se, appeals from a November 1, 2023 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order (“DVCPO“) filed by petitioner-appellee, I.S. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On April 14, 2023, appellee filed a DVCPO against appellant. That same day, the trial court granted appellee‘s ex parte temporary DVCPO against appellant and set the matter for a full hearing. On April 24, 2023, the trial court continued the scheduled full hearing because appellant had not yet been served with the petition and notice of thе hearing. (May 1, 2023 Order & Entry.) On May 25, 2023, the trial court continued the full hearing a second time citing other good cause, to wit: “ongoing trial.” (May 25, 2023 Order & Entry.) On September 15, 2023, the trial court continued the full hearing a third time
{¶ 3} Appellant filed a timely appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 4} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
[I.] Appellant, having been served with a protection order, was directed to attend court on May 25th, 2023. On the designated date and time, Appellant diligently appeared, only to be unjustly denied the opportunity to address the accusations and alleviate the court‘s concerns. Furthermore, Appellant was wrongly deprived of the right tо present their case or engage with the appointed judge regarding the matter.
[II.] Appellant‘s entitlement to have their case heard and adjudicated within 30 days, as mandated by
Ohio Revised Code 3113.31 , was unjustly denied. The prescribed procedure was not adhere to, resulting in a violation of Appellant‘s rights.[III.] Despite the Appellant issuing nearly 30 subpoenas, the court failed to summon all availаble individuals, neglecting to assess their knowledge of the case or determine the materiality of their testimony to the Appellant‘s case.
[IV.] The Appellant, having obtained evidence pertaining to the mental stability of the Appellee, was unjustly denied the right to present this crucial evidence. In contrast, during opening statements, the Appellee was permitted to spеak unchecked for over twenty minutes, delving into matters unrelated to the complaint. However, when it came time to present evidence, the Appellant was unduly restricted being informed that only evidence directly correlating to the Appellee‘s written statements would be admissible.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Appellant‘s First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, he alleges that the trial court deprived him of his right to present his case at the May 25, 2023 hearing. In appellant‘s second assignment of error, he alleges that the trial court erred by failing to hold a full hearing
{¶ 6} Pursuant to
{¶ 7} While questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review de novo, see, e.g., State v. Taylor, 163 Ohio St.3d 508, 2020-Ohio-6786, ¶ 15, citing State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 8, a trial court‘s determination whether to grant or deny a motion to continue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion analysis. S.D. v. S.L, 6th Dist. No. WD-23-006, 2023-Ohio-4575, ¶ 14, citing R.H. v. J.H., 9th Dist. No. 18CA0115-M, 2020-Ohio-3402, ¶ 6, citing State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981). An abuse of discretion connotes that thе trial court‘s determination was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). As appellate courts have long noted that when vesting the trial court with discretionary determinations, it is inevitable two trial court judges could have different conclusions on what constitutes “good cause.” Diverging discretionary determinations, however, do not necessarily mean that either decision amounts to an abuse of discretion. Waterford Tower Condominium Assn. v. TransAmerica Real Estate Group., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-593, 2006-Ohio-508, ¶ 19 (concluding that different discretionary determinations by
{¶ 8} Appellant first claims that the trial court failed to hold a hearing within the requisite statutory period.
{¶ 9} Preliminarily, we must resolve whether appellant waived his right to contest the grounds for the various continuances of the full hearing. On September 15, 2023, the trial court continued the full hearing until October 26, 2023 based on an “ongoing 30+ day trial.” (Capitalization omitted.) (Sept. 20, 2023 Order & Entry.) The parties, including appellant, signed the September 20 order and continuance entry, which noted “[e]ach party waives the requirement for this matter to be concluded within thirty (30) days.” (Sept. 20, 2023 Order & Entry.) Similarly, after the parties were not аble to complete the full hearing on October 26, 2023, the trial court continued the case to resume the following day. The parties signed a final continuance entry that acknowledged they waived the requirement that this matter be concluded within 30 days. (Nov. 2, 2023 Order & Entry.) Furthermore, appellant failed to raise this issue with the trial court at any point during the full hearing. “It is axiomatic that a litigant‘s failurе to raise an issue at the trial court level waives the litigant‘s right to raise that issue on appeal.” S.H. v. S.P., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-70, 2013-Ohio-3833, ¶ 22, citing Shover v. Cordis Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 220 (1991), overruled on other grounds in Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506 (1998). Thus, appellant has waived the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the full hearing.
{¶ 10} Arguendo, even if the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the full hearing was preserved, we still find appellant‘s second assignment of error unavailing. As set forth prеviously,
{¶ 11} The trial court first continued the April 24, 2023 full hearing as appellant had not yet been served with the petition and notice of the full hearing. (May 1, 2023 Order & Entry.)
{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, we find that appellant waived the statutory requirements as evidenced by his signature on the two continuance entries and failure to raise the issue prior to the full hearing. Alternatively, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the full hearing as the cited justifications for the continuances fall under the statute‘s available exceptions.
{¶ 13} Appellant next claims that he was denied his right to be present during the May 25, 2023 hearing. Appellant argues that he never signed the May 25, 2023 order and entry and did not consent to the continuance. Appellant contends that he appeared for the May 25 hearing only to be informed that the matter was continued.
{¶ 14} The record indicates that appellee filed her ex parte order on April 14, 2023 and the original full hearing was scheduled for April 24, 2023. The trial court continued the April 24, 2023 hearing until May 25, 2023 due to the lack of service of the petition and
{¶ 15} Appellant‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
B. Appellant‘s Third and Fourth Assignments of Error
{¶ 16} In appellant‘s third assignment of error, he contends that the trial court failed to summon all available individuals to testify at the full hearing. Similarly, appellant‘s final assignment of error argues the trial court erred by not allowing him to question appellee as to her mental stability but allowed appellee to testify on matters unrelated to the complaint without objection. As these assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them together.
{¶ 17} The heart of appellant‘s contention is that hе was deprived of the ability to present his case during the hearing. Stated another way, appellant contends he was denied a “full hearing” under the statute. In cases where an appeal requires an analysis of
{¶ 18} While
{¶ 19} Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly restricted his witnesses to those that were “directly relevant to the accusation.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 6.) Upon review of the hearing transcript, the trial court patiently waded through the many witnesses that appeared, in person and over Zoom, in compliance with the subpoenas issued by the parties. The trial court worked with the parties, both pro se litigations, to determine if each witness had relevant information to provide as to the allegations in appellee‘s affidavit.
{¶ 20} At the start of the hearing, the trial court informed the parties that it was going to first inquire of each witness their name, relationship to the parties, and information they may have in the case. (Oct. 26, 2023 Tr. at 4.) The trial court noted that the case is limited to the events in the allegation, and he would dismiss witnesses that were not relevant to the claims at issue. During the initial vetting of the subpoenaed individuals, the parties conferred with the trial court whether they believed a particular witness was relevant. If the witness was deemed irrelevant to the case, the trial court, upon consent of the parties, would then dismiss the witness. In cases where either parties, or the witnesses
{¶ 21} Next, appellant claims that the trial court refused to allow a witness to testify despite its knowledge that they were outside the courtroom. However, appellant fails to identify in his brief the name of the witness or identify in the transcript where this issue arose. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court permitted the parties to present any and all witnesses that were relevant to the allegations in the case.
{¶ 22} Next, appellant clаims that the trial court impermissibly restricted the presentation of his case regarding appellee‘s mental stability while it let appellee offer evidence without interruption. We disagree. While questions as to a witness‘s mental health or stability are occasionally relevant, courts typically require expert testimony to connect how a witness‘s purported mental health diagnosis could affect their credibility. See, e.g., State v. Carson, 1st Dist. No. C-180336, 2019-Ohio-4550, ¶ 26, citing State v. Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 11 (1st Dist.1954);
{¶ 23} Finally, appellant argues that the trial court made no effort to hold the witnesses that failed to appear at the full hearing in contempt. (Appellant‘s Brief at 7.) “This court has generally defined ‘contempt’ as a ‘disregard of, or disobedience to, an order or command of judicial authority.‘” Boyd v. Boyd, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-474, 2022-Ohio-4775, ¶ 9, quoting Craig v. Gilchrist, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-804, 2021-Ohio-2199, ¶ 2. Pursuant to
[I.S.S.]: But the people that didn‘t show up, say they‘re just, like, ignoring the subpoena, thеy probably would be found in contempt of court or what?
The Court: There‘s a process. You can ask the court to find them in contempt of the subpoena. You probably want to read up on that process. I can‘t give you legal advice.
(Oct. 26, 2023 Tr. at 52-53.)
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} Taking into consideration all the issues identified by appellant, we are not persuaded that the various restrictions imposed by the trial court‘s deprived appellant of a “full hearing” under the statute.
{¶ 26} Appellant‘s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 27} Having overruled appellant‘s four assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.
Judgment affirmed.
JAMISON and BOGGS, JJ., concur.