Thе ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE. Jeffrey Thomas v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence.
Nos. 2014-174-Appeal, 2014-175-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
June 22, 2016.
139 A.3d 452
The trial justice determined that the jury was justified in concluding that, although the accelerant-sniffing dog did not detect an accelerant anywhere other than in the gym, that “did not exonerate the [d]efendant or diminish a strong case against him.” The judge found that the burns discovered on his legs “and [d]efendant‘s ludicrous explanation of how he sustained them may have been some of the strongest items of evidence against the [d]efendant.” Finally, the trial justice found that defendant lied on the stand, that his financial position was not what he explained it to be, as evidenced by the large mortgage on his modest house, and that he must have decided that as he aged, he needed financial security, which he tried to achieve by “sell[ing] his business to the insurance company for a hefty sum of $125,000 * * *.” She concluded that, if she had been sitting without a jury, she would have found defendant guilty of first-degree arson.
In our opinion, the trial justice more than met her obligations to consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, independently assess the credibility of the witnesses, and determine that she agreed with the jury‘s ultimate verdict. As we have said,
“when a defendant elects to testify, he runs the very real risk that if disbelieved, the trier of fact may conclude that the opposite of his testimony is the truth. * * * ‘A trier of fact is not compelled to accept and believe the self serving stories of vitally interested defendants. Their evidence may not only be disbelieved, but from the totality of the circumstances, including the manner in which they testify, a contrary conclusion may be properly drawn.‘” State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1109 (R.I.1992) (quoting United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 305 (9th Cir.1971)).
That is apparently exactly what happened when the trial justice concluded that the defendant‘s explanations for how he got burned, why he was driving in the middle of a snowstorm, and how his fanny pack was stolen, were “ludicrous” and quite a “coincidence.” We cannot fault the trial justice‘s difficulty in believing the defendant‘s explanation of such exceptional coincidences, and hold that the trial justice acted well within her discretion to reject the defendant‘s testimony as incredible. Thus, we cannot determine that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence and discern no error in the denial of the motion for a new trial.
3
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record is remanded to that tribunal.
Helen L. HYDE
v.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
OPINION
Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.
The plaintiffs, Helen L. Hyde and Jeffrey Thomas, brought suit against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, seeking damages arising from their alleged sexual abuse at the hands of Father Brendan Smyth more than four decades ago. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred when she decided that the statute of limitations barred their claims because, they argue, their inability to recall the abuse tolled the statute of limitations until such time as they became aware of their claims against the institutional, nonperpеtrator defendant. Moreover, the plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred when she denied their request to seek discovery on the alternate tolling theory that the defendant fraudulently concealed their causes of action from them. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
The plaintiffs filed complaints in Providence County Superior Court against the
According to Hyde, Smyth began abusing her in 1967, when she was six years old and a student at Our Lady of Mercy School. Hyde maintained that Smyth sexually abused her in a classroom, in the schoolyard, in church, in her home, and in the woods outside her house.
Hyde was not the only victim of Smyth‘s claimed sexual abuse to come forward. Thomas alleged in his complaint that, soon after Smyth began to abuse Hyde, he also raped and molested him in the church‘s rectory and in Hyde‘s backyard.
In their respective complaints, plaintiffs claim that defendant and his predecessors knew that Smyth was a pedophile by the late 1940s, but that they nonetheless continued to allow him to serve as a priest under their suрervision. They maintain that defendant not only knew of Smyth‘s pedophilia, but also that Smyth‘s level of sexual abuse caused him to be sent away for treatment before he was eventually allowed to return to Our Lady of Mercy. Relying on their claim that defendant knew Smyth was a pedophile, plaintiffs filed their complaints, in which they alleged numerous counts of negligence, negligent supervision, vicarious liability, fraud, intentional nondisclosure, and intentional failure to supervise. The plaintiffs also asserted that each of them had repressed recollection of the crimes perpetrated against them and that they did not recover their memories of the abuse until within three years of the filing of the lawsuit.
In response, defendant filed motions to dismiss the complaints. First, defendant argued that, because the statute extending the time for childhood victims of sexual abuse who suffered from repressed memory apрlied only in the case of perpetrator defendants, the action was time-barred. Second, he argued that plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts that would support tolling of the statute under the “unsound mind” provision found at
At the hearing on the motions to dismiss, defendant argued that this Court has never held that repressed and subsequently recovered memories, standing alone, without any other indicia, could constitute an unsound mind. The defendant also argued that
The trial justice denied defendant‘s motion, without prejudice, pending an evidentiary hearing to “receive scientific and other data to assess whether repressed recollection ha[d] been established * * * “. The trial justice agreed that Kelly had definitively held that suits against nonperpetrator defendants could not be tolled under
More than a year later, defendant filed a motion for entry of a scheduling order, attaching a proposed schedule.2 The plaintiffs’ counsel objected to the proposed order, not on the grounds that it was inadequate for discovery on plaintiffs’ repressed-memory claims, but because plaintiffs’ counsel asserted the right to conduct discovery on an intentional concealment tolling theory pursuant to
The plaintiffs responded with a scheduling order of their own; theirs included a provision for discovery based on fraudulent concealment. They argued that they intended to introduce evidence of defendant‘s fraudulent concealment at the evidentiary hearing on the repressed-memory issue, claiming that, because they had pled fraud and intentional nondisclosure in their complaints, they should be allowed to con-
The plaintiffs acted on the hearing justice‘s suggestion and moved to reargue their opposition to defendant‘s motions to dismiss—this time including their fraudulent concealment claim. The defendant filed an objection and a hearing was held. In deciding the motion, the trial justice began by observing that, to demonstrate fraudulent concealment for the purpоse of tolling the statute of limitations, a “plaintiff must show * * * that the defendant made an actual misrepresentation of fact,” and “that in making such misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently concealed the existence of plaintiffs’ causes of action.” The defendant argued that plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the facts they contended were the foundation of their causes of action, but that fraudulent concealment “requires an action by a defendant to a plaintiff that conceals the cause of action itself,” i.e., a type of “affirmative misrepresentation of fact related to their injury.” The defendant asserted that plaintiffs’ “[a]ctual knowledge negates fraudulent concealment.” The plaintiffs responded that there could not be actual knowledge by a minor child who repressed the memory of the injury before reaching the age of majority. Thе plaintiffs argued that, among other things, a former bishop of Providence had “state[d] under the penalty of perjury that his job was to * * * conceal the information of abuse * * * [and] sanctify the priests * * * [and] return them to minister,” and that this constituted “an actual admission by defendants of fraudulent concealment immediately post-abuse.”
The trial justice said that the Supreme Court “ha[d] been very, very strict about fraudulent concealment as it relate[d] to cases such as this.” Regarding plaintiff Hyde, defendant argued that she would have to show that defendant “misled her into believing that the assault did not occur, [and] that Brendon [sic] Smyth did not commit the assault or that she did not suffer any injuries as a result of the assault.” The hearing justice said that none of Hyde‘s allegations had constituted fraudulent concealment.4
When asked by the trial justice what actual misrepresentation defendant made to plaintiff, plaintiff Hyde indicated that, with аdditional discovery, perhaps such a fact might be uncovered. She also suggested that if evidence were to be produced that would show that her mother went to defendant and reported plaintiff‘s abuse by Smyth, and if defendant told her mother that her suspicions were unfounded or if he threatened to excommunicate her, those facts would support their theory. The trial justice did not agree; she ruled that she would not allow plaintiffs to combine the claims of fraudulent conceal-
At a later continuation of the hearing, defendant argued that documents that plaintiff Hyde had produсed, including her own journal entries from 2005, indicated that she “was actively investigating a cause of action against Brendon [sic] Smyth as early as June of 2005.” With respect to Thomas, defendant argued that “Mr. Thomas never allege[d] any misrepresentation by anyone at any time on any matter.”
The trial justice found that there was no evidence of actual misrepresentations made by defendant to plaintiffs regarding their civil claims that could have tolled the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, she said, “[t]here [wa]sn‘t an iota of evidence * * * that between the ages of [eighteen] and [twenty-one] there were any misrepresentations made to Ms. Hyde, [or] to Mr. Thomas.” She further found that any misrepresentations defendant may have made to plaintiff Hyde‘s mother were only applicable to plaintiff‘s mother until plaintiff reached the age of eighteen, because her mоther‘s ability to bring a lawsuit on her behalf came to an end at that time.
She further concluded that plaintiffs had “attempted to circumvent the well-established case law, that [§] 9-1-51 does not apply to non-perpetrator [d]efendants by drafting an argument under [§] 9-1-20.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial justice denied plaintiffs’ motion for limited discovery as to fraudulent concealment. In so doing, she said that she could “conceive of no set of facts that [p]laintiffs could develop through discovery that would permit them to defeat the motion to dismiss based upon the Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment.”
The Parties Stipulate as to the Need for an Evidentiary Hearing
During the course of these hearings, the trial justice discussed her understanding of Rhode Island law on repressed recollections:
“THE COURT: * * * It is quite clear that the Rhode Island Supreme Court provided guidance on a definition of unsound mind. The whole issue before this [c]ourt, at this moment, is whether our Court in Kelly v. Marcantonio and in Roe v. Gelineau, was stating that even if the trial justice * * * is sufficiently satisfied * * * that the [p]laintiff did indeed suffer from a traumatic repressed recollection as the result of the conduct of the actual perpetrator, that such repressed recollection in and of itself constitutes a condition tantamount to the unsound mind referred to in [§] 9-1-19, or whether the [c]ourt must * * * then determine not only whether the [p]laintiff had a repressed recollection caused by the trauma of the perpetrator‘s conduct, but whether this repressed recollection met the standard of unsound mind as defined in the Gelineau case. * * *
“What is a little troubling to me is that the Rhode Island Supreme Court stopped short of saying that. * * * [T]hey showed two cases not that many years apart that, together, really don‘t answer the question before the [c]ourt today. * * *
“I‘m going to take those two cases and say that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not specifically stated that where the trial justice has a hearing on whether the evidence advanced on re-
pressed memory is scientifically valid and relevant to the case, that the [C]ourt cannot permit repressed memory to toll the [s]tatute of [l]imitations unless the [c]ourt also finds that the [p]laintiff was unable to conduct his or her day-to-day activities.”
An order entered directing the parties to proceed with the previously scheduled evidentiary hearing on whether plaintiffs had repressed recollections and whether those repressed recollections, in and of them-selves, could qualify as “unsound mind” for the purposes of tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to
However, before the hearing took place, the parties filed a stipulation agreeing to waive the requirement of an evidentiary hearing and suggesting that defendant‘s motion to dismiss be convеrted into a motion for summary judgment. For the purposes of that motion only, the stipulation also set forth thirteen agreed factual statements, including that Smyth sexually abused plaintiffs, that they experienced repressed recollections of the abuse until 2005, and that plaintiffs had been able to manage their day-to-day affairs. When the parties appeared before the trial justice, defendant argued that, assuming that (1) the abuse of plaintiffs occurred as set forth in their complaints, and (2) their memories of the abuse were repressed and later recovered, plaintiffs’ claims were nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations, which it asserted had expired in 1985, three years after plaintiffs reached the age of majority. Thus, according to defendant, the only remaining issue was whether repressed memory itself qualified as “unsound mind” for purposes of
The plaintiffs conceded that they were able to pursue their day-to-day affairs and agreed that “[t]hat‘s off the table.” The trial justice concurred, finding that “[n]either of these [p]laintiffs ha[d] suffered periods of time as adults where they were unable to manage their own affairs” and that “[t]hey [we]re both impressive and productive individuals.” She concluded that it was “quite clear that [these plaintiffs] do not meet the definition of unsound mind stated in [§] 9-1-19.”
In a bench decision, the trial justice explained that this Court already had grappled with the issue of the tolling of the statute of limitations based on repressed memory in cases such as these, and that this Court had “determined that the cause of action accrues at the time of the offense, not when the [p]laintiff becomes aware through a recovered memory that it occurred.” She next delineated the two means by which a plaintiff might toll the statute of limitations. The trial justice addressed
“[a]ll claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for recovery of damages for injuries suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within (7) seven years of the act alleged to have сaused the injury or condition, or (7)
seven years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act, whichever period expires later.”
The trial justice observed that the General Assembly had not chosen to include nonperpetrator defendants within the purview of
The trial justice then turned to the unsound-mind provision contained in
Standards of Review
This Court reviews a trial justice‘s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 809 (R.I.2014). In undertaking that review, we use the same standards and rules that the trial justice used. IDC Properties, Inc. v. Goat Island South Condominium Association, Inc., 128 A.3d 383, 388 (R.I.2015). Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favor-able to the nonmoving party, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact that must be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Peerless Insurance Co. v. Luppe, 118 A.3d 500, 505 (R.I.2015). Because the parties stipulated that there were no disputed facts, the only issue addressed by the trial justice was the applicability of the statute of limitations. “[W]hether a statute of limitations has run against a plaintiff‘s claim is * * * a question of law” that we likewise review de novo. Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, 115 A.3d 938, 942–43 (R.I.2015).
But, unlike our nondeferential review of a trial justice‘s decision to grant summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds, we accord a trial justice‘s rulings concerning discovery matters considerable deference, reversing those rulings only for an abuse of discretion. Shelter Harbor Conservation Society, Inc. v. Rogers, 21 A.3d 337, 343 (R.I.2011) (“[t]he Superior Court has broad discretion to regulate how and when discovery occurs“); see also Colvin v. Lekas, 731 A.2d 718, 720 (R.I.1999) (“[T]his Court will not disturb a decision by a Superior Court justice relating to discovery save for an abuse of that discretion.“).
Analysis
A
Repressed Recollection
1
A Review of “Unsound Mind” and the Statute of Limitations
The first question we must answer is whether plaintiffs’ repressed recollection, standing alone, satisfies the disability condition of “unsound mind” sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under
Another instance that tolls the statute of limitations is an equitable tolling feature known as the “discovery rule.” Under that rule, “the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the [defendant].‘” Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I.2003) (quoting Supreme Bakery, Inc. v. Bagley, 742 A.2d 1202, 1204 (R.I.2000)).
The main purpose of the discovery rule is “to protect individuals suffering from latent or undiscoverable injuries who then seek legal redress after the statute of limitations has expired for a particular clаim.” Sharkey v. Prescott, 19 A.3d 62, 66 (R.I.2011) (quoting Canavan v. Lovett, Schefrin and Harnett, 862 A.2d 778, 783 (R.I.2004)). Over the years, this Court has applied the discovery rule to a limited class of cases, including medical malpractice cases, Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968), products liability for damage to personal property, Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 336 A.2d 555 (1975), damage to real property, Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d 358 (R.I.1983), and in products liability actions against drug manufacturers, Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I.1985).
In one case, we were asked to determine whether the discovery rule should apply in cases of repressed recollection in childhood sexual abuse cases against perpetrator defendants. In Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605, 607 (R.I.1991) (LaBrosse I), we granted certiorari after the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment in a civil sexual assault lawsuit was denied. The plaintiffs, the adult daughters of the defendant, had sued their father well after the three-year statute of limitations period expired. Id. at 606. However, the plaintiffs claimed that the discovery rule was available to them based on their repressed memories of the childhood sexual abuse. Id. Without answering that question, we remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing so that the trial justice could “determine the date the plaintiffs discovered, or with all due diligence should have reasonably have discovered, the causal connection between the defendant‘s alleged acts and the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.” Id. at 607. Only then would we “determine the propriety of applying the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this case.” Id. In the meantime, however, the General Assembly enacted
We have also addressed the issue of repressed recollection in the criminal context. In State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 879-80 (R.I.1996), the perpetrator defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The victim al-
As to the discovery rule‘s application to nonperpetrator defendants, that question remained unanswered until our decision in Kelly. In several certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and the Superior Court, we were asked to determine whether
If the plaintiff is able to make that threshold showing, then a procedural mechanism is triggered whereby the trial justice would be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to reach one of four outcomes. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 879. First, the trial justice might decide that, based upon the facts of the specific case, repressed recollection is a scientifically and validly accepted theory that qualifies as a disability under
Absent from that analysis, however, was exactly what the General Assembly meant when it employed the term “unsound mind.” We answered that question in Roe. There, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered sexual abuse at the hands of several abusers while residing in a church-run orphanage. Roe, 794 A.2d at 479-80. In a complaint filed against the nonperpetrator defendant, the plaintiff alleged that the three-year statute of limitations on his рer-
We affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff was unable to establish that he suffered from “the type of repressed recollection discussed in Kelly and Quattrocchi.” Roe, 794 A.2d at 484. Specifically, we rejected the plaintiff‘s contention that “his inability to recall or to deal with his abuse and his concomitant inability to file suit for these specific claims [were] conditions that should be included within the ambit of the term unsound mind * * *.” Id. at 482. Because the plaintiff‘s allegations were limited to “memory lapses and the inability to deal with his abuse in therapy,” we held that he “did not trigger Kelly‘s procedural mechanism, requiring an evidentiary hearing on whether his alleged repressed recollection constituted an unsound mind for tolling purposes.” Id. at 484.
The plaintiff in Roe alternatively argued that he was of unsound mind for reasons other than repressed recollection, asserting that he suffered from substance abuse, psychiatric disorders, and a below average intelligence. Roe, 794 A.2d at 487-88. We determined that, although we had not defined “unsound mind” for the purposes of
After reviewing the historical context of the term, we held that, for the purposes of
2
Application to Plaintiffs’ Claims
For the purposes of summary judgment, the parties stipulated that, among other things, plaintiffs were sexually abused by Smyth, plaintiffs suffered repressed recollection of that abuse until 2005, and that plaintiffs were able to manage their day-to-day affairs. Based upon those agreed-
Because of the ambiguity that remained after our decision in Roe, our earlier cases dо not answer the precise question that we must address in this case. Although we left open the possibility in Kelly that repressed recollection of past sexual abuse by nonperpetrator defendants, standing alone, could qualify as an unsound mind disability under
Without question, repressed recollections have engendered much debate and controversy, and have required legislatures to make, and courts to consider, difficult policy decisions. See Kelly, 678 A.2d at 879; Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 881. Inherent in this debate is the concern over prejudicial delay to defendants because of a plaintiffs repressed recollections. Statutes of limitations “are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 181 (R.I.2008) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). We appreciate the sage logic of the late Chief Justice Joseph R. Weisberger that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46 (Weisberger, J. dissenting). And indeed, the allegations giving rise to plaintiffs’ complaints are nearly a half-century old. Counterbalancing the purpose behind statutes of limitations, however, is the state‘s interest in providing a remedy for rights claimed by its citizenry. See, e.g.,
In enacting
In Kelly, 678 A.2d at 878, we deferred to the General Assembly‘s judgment and refused to adopt a judicially created discovery rule that is broader than what the legislature intended. In holding that
“We perceive no persuasive policy considerations that the General Assembly failed to consider when enacting
§ 9-1-51 that would support judicial application of a discovery rule to claims made against nonperpetrator-defendants. * * * The General Assembly when it enacted§ 9-1-51 * * * is presumed to have known that it limited the discovery rule provided therein to only those claims of alleged sexual abuse made against the actual perpetrators of the abuse.” Kelly, 678 A.2d at 878, 878-79.
We embrace that reasoning today. When it enacted
We acknowledge plaintiffs’ argument that an incongruity occurs when the requirement that a plaintiff be unable to conduct his day-to-day affairs is combined with an inability to recollect past abuse. In other words, a plaintiff would be hard-pressed to establish that he or she suffered repressed recollection while simultaneously suffering from a disability that rendered him unable to manage his day-to-day affairs. Indeed, the phenomenon of losing conscious awareness of abuse becomes irrelevant because the inability to manage one‘s day-to-day affairs would toll the statute of limitations irrespective of a plaintiff‘s loss of memory. However, to the extent that Kelly left open the option that repressed recollection, standing alone, could toll the statute of limitations with respect to nonperpetrator defendants, we now foreclose it and hold that, under
B
Fraudulent Concealment
The plaintiffs next contend that the trial justice wrongly denied them the opportunity to seek discovery on their alternative tolling theory that defendant fraudulently concealed their causes of action. The fraudulent concealment provision found in
“If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence.”
In Ryan, this Court observed that “[i]n order to demonstrate that there has been fraudulent concealment on the part of a defendant, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made an actual misrepresentation of fact; and (2) that, in making
The plaintiffs allege that defendant made an array of misrepresentations: that defendant knew of Smyth‘s abuse and failed to disclose or report it; that the parish where he worked held him out to the community as in good standing; that plaintiff Hyde told her mother of the abuse and that, when either her mother or her grandmother attempted to complain, they were threatened with excommunication; that a prior Providence bishop had made a sworn statement in an unrelated case that he was tasked with protecting priests accused of abuse and returning them to the ministry; and finally that, when plaintiff Hyde recovered her memories in 2005 and cоnfronted defendant, they attempted to deflect and conceal the fact of Smyth‘s abuse.
However, none of these allegations, even if true, would toll the running of plaintiffs’ claims under
In sum, we fail to see how any of the alleged conduct by the defendant could have misled these plaintiffs “into believing that the sexual assault did not occur.” Ryan, 941 A.2d at 183. For that reason, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err when she denied the plaintiffs’ request to seek discovery on their alternate tolling theory.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
Nos. 2015-22-Appeal, 2015-146-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
June 22, 2016.