Helen L. Hyde v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence Jeffrey Thomas v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452

Plaintiffs Helen Hyde and Jeffrey Thomas sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence alleging childhood sexual abuse by Father Brendan Smyth in the late 1960s and that their memories were repressed until ~2005.
Plaintiffs alleged the Diocese knew Smyth was a pedophile and negligently supervised him; claims included negligence, negligent supervision, vicarious liability, fraud, and intentional nondisclosure.
Defendant moved to dismiss/for summary judgment arguing statutes of limitations barred the claims: § 9-1-51 (tolling for repressed memory) applies only to perpetrators and § 9-1-19’s “unsound mind” requires inability to manage day-to-day affairs.
The trial justice initially ordered an evidentiary hearing on repressed-memory tolling but the parties later stipulated facts (including that plaintiffs managed day-to-day affairs) and converted the matter to summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding repressed recollection alone does not satisfy the § 9-1-19 “unsound mind” disability against nonperpetrator defendants and denying discovery on a fraudulent-concealment tolling theory.
Plaintiffs appealed; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding legislative scheme provides the exclusive repressed-memory tolling mechanism (§ 9-1-51) for perpetrators and that plaintiffs had not shown actionable fraudulent concealment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether repressed recollection alone constitutes "unsound mind" under § 9-1-19 to toll the statute of limitations against a nonperpetrator (the Diocese)	Repressed memory by itself is a disability that tolls the statute until memories are recovered	§ 9-1-51 shows legislature limited repressed-memory tolling to perpetrators; Roe’s definition of "unsound mind" requires inability to manage day-to-day affairs	Repressed recollection alone does not toll § 9-1-14 time against nonperpetrator defendants; § 9-1-51 is the exclusive repressed-memory tolling mechanism for perpetrators
Whether plaintiffs were entitled to discovery on an alternative tolling theory of fraudulent concealment under § 9-1-20	Plaintiffs alleged affirmative misrepresentations and concealment by Diocese (threats to family, holding Smyth in good standing, prior bishop’s statement) that prevented discovery of claims	Allegations are at most silence/inaction or public concealment; no specific misrepresentations to plaintiffs that induced reliance; plaintiffs had actual knowledge or were investigating by 2005	Court denied discovery and rejected fraudulent-concealment tolling because plaintiffs failed to show defendant made an actual misrepresentation that concealed the existence of their causes of action

Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996) (trial court must assess validity of repressed-recollection claims and may hold evidentiary hearing to determine tolling under § 9-1-19)
Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2002) ("unsound mind" under § 9-1-19 means inability to manage day-to-day affairs)
Doe v. LaBrossee, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on discovery date of causal connection in repressed-memory context)
Doe v. LaBrossee, 625 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1993) (Legislature enacted § 9-1-51 applying delayed discovery to perpetrators)
State v. Quattrochi, 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing controversy over reliability and admissibility of recovered/repressed memories)
Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174 (R.I. 2008) (fraudulent concealment requires affirmative misrepresentation that conceals the cause of action)