George M. Hayden v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources
No. 2434
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September 3, 2019
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
September Term, 2017; REPORTED; Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County, Case No. C-18-CV-17-000046; Wright, Kehoe, Leahy, JJ.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
In order to revoke the person‘s authorization to engage in oystering activities, the administrative law judge must find that that the person “knowingly” committed one of the enumerated offenses in
Maryland has regulated the harvesting of oysters in the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries since 1868. The era when the law was enforced by Maryland‘s “Oyster Navy“—ships armed with cannon and, later, machine guns, and crewed by men more than willing to use them—has
In this appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County, George M. Hayden challenges a decision of an administrative law judge that permanently revoked his ability to harvest oysters in Maryland‘s tidal waters. The administrative law judge did so pursuant to
- In a revocation of authorization action brought pursuant to
Nat. Res. § 4-1210 , is the Department required to prove that the licensee knew that he or she was violating the law when committing the predicate offense? - Was the administrative law judge‘s finding that Mr. Hayden “willfully disregarded and failed to learn the laws and requirements of oyster harvesting” supported by substantial evidence?
Because our answer is “no” to the first question, and “yes” to the second, we will affirm the decision of the administrative law judge.
Background
A Regulatory Overview
The Department of Natural Resources (the “Department“) regulates and enforces Maryland‘s fishing laws, which includes the authority to grant or deny tidal fish licenses. A tidal fish license authorizes the licensee “to guide fishing parties, catch fish for commercial purposes and buy, sell, process, transport, export or otherwise deal in fish which were caught in the tidal waters of Maryland.”
Possession of a tidal fish license does not, by itself, permit a licensee to harvest oysters. In order to engage in the commercial harvesting of oysters, an individual must also pay an annual surcharge of $300 and, what is significant to the issues raised in this appeal, certify to the Department that he or she has received certain publications that we will now describe.
The Department is required by law to prepare maps and coordinates showing the locations of areas that are off-limits to oyster harvesting and to distribute copies of those maps to licensees on an annual basis.
I hereby acknowledge my responsibility as a licensed shellfish harvester to know and comply with all laws governing shellfish including harvesting, reporting requirements, and restrictions relating to shellfish harvesting gear.
I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that I have received from the Department of Natural Resources maps and coordinates of . . . areas closed to shellfish harvest by the Department of the Environment[.]
There is another layer of regulations pertaining to oyster harvesting. The Maryland Department of the Environment (the “MDE“) administers programs concerning the public health of the Chesapeake Bay. Specifically, the MDE is authorized to close areas of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries to oyster harvesting when the MDE determines that those areas are polluted and that the shellfish from the polluted areas are hazardous to public health.
There is an exception to the rule that an individual cannot remove oysters from a closed area. The Department and the MDE allow individuals to remove oysters from a closed area to a personal aquaculture lease, a process known as “relaying.” A term of art, relaying occurs when a person harvests oysters from a polluted area and moves them to a non-polluted area so that the oysters can filter out toxins until they are marketable for sale and consumption. In order to relay oysters, a licensee must obtain a permit to do so from the MDE.
A person violating any provision of either Title 4 of the Natural Resources Article or a regulation of the Department regarding oyster harvesting may face criminal penalties, including fines and incarceration. See
(a)(1) In addition to any other penalty or fine provided in this title, a person who holds an authorization to catch oysters under
§ 4-701 of this title and receives a citation for an offense listed under paragraph (2) of this subsection may have the authorization revoked in accordance with this section.(2) The following offenses, committed in violation of this title or of any regulation adopted under this title, are grounds for revocation of an authorization to catch oysters under this section:
(i) Taking oysters located more than 200 feet within a closed or prohibited area;
(ii) Taking oysters with gear that is prohibited in that area;
(iii) Taking oysters outside of a time restriction for the harvest of oysters by more than 1 hour;
(iv) Taking oysters during closed seasons; and
(v) Taking oysters from a leased area by a person other than the leaseholder or the leaseholder‘s designee.
(b)(1)(i) Before the revocation of an authorization to catch oysters under this section, the Department shall hold a hearing on the matter in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act under Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article.
(2) After a hearing is conducted under paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the presiding officer finds or concludes that the person knowingly has committed an offense listed under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Department shall revoke the person‘s authorization to catch oysters.
* * *
(Emphasis added).
It is the meaning of the word “knowingly” in subsection (b)(2) that is the primary focus of this appeal.
Facts
Mr. Hayden has been a waterman for over twenty years. In the early morning of February 25, 2017, he began harvesting5 oysters in Whites Neck Creek, a tributary of the Wicomico River in southern Maryland. He positioned his boat, equipped with a hydraulic dredge,6 over an oyster bed adjacent to real property owned by his parents. His intended purpose was to relay the oysters from that location, transport them to an area of Saint Catherine‘s Sound which was subject to his private aquaculture
Natural Resources Police Officer Jason Kreider was present on the shore of the Creek with a clear line of sight into the closed area. Officer Kreider witnessed Mr. Hayden pull oysters from the closed area using his hydraulic dredge, haul them into his boat, proceed down Whites Neck Creek, and deposit the oysters in his aquaculture lease site.
When Mr. Hayden returned to the closed area, Officer Kreider signaled for him to come to shore. Mr. Hayden complied, and the two engaged in conversation about Mr. Hayden‘s activities. Mr. Hayden admitted that he was relaying oysters from Whites Neck Creek to his private aquaculture lease in Saint Catherine‘s Sound. A few days later, Officer Kreider issued Mr. Hayden three citations for: (1) using a hydraulic dredge to harvest oysters in a non-designated area;7 (2) harvesting oysters during a closed season;8 and (3) harvesting oysters from an area closed by the MDE due to pollution.9
The Administrative Hearing
Although the State did not pursue the criminal charges against Mr. Hayden, the Department, as required by
On June 19, 2017, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge. As to the issues relevant in this appeal, the parties made the same arguments at the hearing as they do on appeal. We will discuss those arguments in more detail in our analysis, and so we provide only an abbreviated summary of them here.
The Department‘s theory of the case was that “knowingly,” as used in
As a preliminary matter, the parties stipulated to the following facts: that on February 25, 2017, Mr. Hayden pulled oysters from a closed area of Whites Neck Creek; that Mr. Hayden was in excess of 1,198 feet inside the closed area; that the area had been closed due to pollution; that Mr. Hayden relayed oysters from the closed area to his private aquaculture lease; that Mr. Hayden did not have a relay permit; that Mr. Hayden signed a copy of the Oyster Surcharge Sheet on November 9, 2016, acknowledging that he would know and comply with all laws governing shellfish, and certified, under penalty of perjury, that he received the Department‘s
The Department called Louis C. Wright as its only witness. Mr. Wright has been a hydrographer with the Department for about thirty-five years. As a hydrographer, Mr. Wright surveys areas of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, prepares maps and coordinates of areas closed to oyster harvesting, and drafts textual descriptions of those areas for the use of the Department and the public. He testified that the area from which Mr. Hayden was relaying oysters had been designated as a closed area by the MDE, and clarified that a “closed area” was an area, determined by the MDE through water sampling, to have shellfish contamination, and so closed for shellfish harvesting. However, Mr. Wright noted that an individual could relay oysters from a closed area if he or she obtained a relay permit from the Department.
Mr. Hayden called Jane Louis Hayden, his mother, as a witness in support of his argument that he believed he could relay oysters from the closed area because his parents had a riparian right to harvest oysters in Whites Neck Creek. She testified that her family had owned the property since the 1930s, and read a portion of their deed, which provided that the property included the riparian right to use the bottom of Whites Neck Creek adjacent to the property from the shoreline to the center of the Creek “for oyster planting and cultivation.”
Mr. Hayden also called his wife, Ernestine Hayden, to testify about a conversation she previously had with Mr. Wright. Mrs. Hayden, who works with her husband in their oyster business, testified that she spoke with Mr. Wright in May 2016 while he was surveying a lease that the couple had applied for. She stated that she asked Mr. Wright about needing a lease to oyster the portion of Whites Neck Creek subject to the family‘s riparian rights. According to Mrs. Hayden, Mr. Wright replied that the Department “probably would like for you to so that they can regulate oysters,” but that “as far as I know, technically you do not need a lease there.” Mrs. Hayden recorded what Mr. Wright told her on a small piece of paper shortly thereafter, and this note was entered into evidence.10
Finally, Mr. Hayden himself testified. First, he testified that he relayed the oysters he had harvested from Whites Neck Creek to the site of his aquaculture lease. Mr. Hayden added that his family had harvested oysters from that area since 1925, and that he hadn‘t realized the law regarding harvesting oysters from a riparian bed had changed.
Mr. Hayden then testified about the conversations he had had with Kathy Bohan, an MDE employee. Ms. Bohan had previously taken samples from Whites Neck Creek and tested those samples for pollution.11 Sometime after those samples had been tested but before February 25, Mr. Hayden called Ms. Bohan to ask if the water quality of the Creek had improved. When she told Mr. Hayden that it had not, Mr. Hayden asked Ms. Bohan to take new samples from that portion of the closed area adjacent to his parents’ property. In doing so, Mr. Hayden hoped that if the MDE could get a better reading, he would gain a “small window” of opportunity to
Based on what Ms. Bohan told him about the legal change in riparian rights law, Mr. Hayden called Mr. Wright to discuss the matter. According to Mr. Hayden, Mr. Wright told him that he “technically” did not need a lease to harvest oysters from an area subject to his riparian rights.
Mr. Hayden was then cross-examined by counsel for the Department. Mr. Hayden admitted that he relayed oysters from a closed area, that he knew the area was polluted, that he knew that area had been closed due to pollution since the 1990s, that he planned to sell the oysters he took from the closed area after they “filtered out” for several weeks on his personal aquaculture lease, and that an adjoining aquaculture lease area was also closed as a result of his activities.
Mr. Hayden was also cross-examined about the Department‘s licensing procedures. He testified that he was given a packet of information when his tidal fish license was renewed by the Department in 2016. He signed an acknowledgement that he had received this information. The receipt was entered into evidence. It stated in pertinent part: I hereby acknowledge my responsibility as a licensed shellfish harvester to know and comply with all laws governing shellfish including harvesting, reporting requirements, and restrictions relating to shellfish harvesting gear. I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that I have received from the Department of Natural Resources maps and coordinates of . . . areas closed to shellfish harvest by the Department of the Environment[.]
Mr. Hayden also testified that he had received a copy of the Shellfish Closure Manual, which includes maps of the closed areas of the Chesapeake Bay (including those in Whites Neck Creek), and contained additional information on shellfish closures. However, Mr. Hayden also testified that he read “very poorly” and that the receipt was “hard to understand.” He explained that his wife handled the business transactions for their oystering business.
On June 27, 2017, the administrative law judge issued her decision. The administrative law judge revoked Mr. Hayden‘s authorization to engage in commercial oyster activity under
As to the scienter issue, the administrative law judge concluded that “[t]he plain language of [
As an alternative basis for her decision, the administrative law judge concluded that, “even if the law requires that I find that [Mr. Hayden] knew he was breaking the law when he took the oysters,” Mr. Hayden “willfully disregarded and failed to learn the laws and requirements of oyster harvesting.” The administrative law judge concluded that knowledge of the applicable statutes and regulations was imputed to Mr. Hayden by his receipt of the Department‘s Shellfish Closure Manual, which he received from the Department when he renewed his authorization to harvest oysters in 2016. The administrative law judge pointed out that this material “clearly explain[ed]” the applicable regulations and restrictions and that “[t]here is nothing in that manual that states there is an exception to any of these requirements for relaying oysters” from an area subject to riparian rights. The administrative law judge concluded:
The evidence proves that the laws and requirements applicable to shellfish harvesting, and specifically applicable to this case, were placed by the [Department] directly in [Mr. Hayden‘s] hands. [His] failure to read and digest these laws and requirements is no excuse for violating the requirements. See Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194, 197 (1969) (a person may be found to have knowledge when the person deliberately shuts his/her eyes to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view).
I understand that [Mr. Hayden] is limited in his literacy; however, [he] testified that he never asked anyone to read the applicable laws and/or the Shellfish Closure Area manual to him, despite signing a certification that he understood [that] he was required to know what was contained in those documents.
Additionally, the administrative law judge concluded that Mr. Hayden‘s riparian rights defense was irrelevant, because, Mr. Hayden‘s actions were illegal even if he had a riparian right to harvest oysters.
The administrative law judge noted that to conclude otherwise in this case would allow Mr. Hayden “to avoid sanction due to his lack of due diligence,” as well as encourage other licensees “to disregard their obligation to learn, know and understand the requirements of their industry so as to avoid sanctions.” Further, the administrative law judge emphasized how Mr. Hayden‘s actions affected others. At the hearing, Mr. Hayden conceded he caused the waters and oysters surrounding his aquaculture lease to become polluted by relaying oysters from a polluted area to his own lease bed.
Mr. Hayden filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County. That court upheld the administrative law judge‘s decision. Mr. Hayden filed a timely appeal to this court.
The Standard of Review
When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, we “look through” the circuit court‘s decision and “evaluate the decision of the agency.” Kor-Ko Ltd. v. Maryland Department of the Environment, 451 Md. 401, 409 (2017) (internal quotations omitted). “Our primary goal is to determine whether the agency‘s decision is in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Long Green Valley Association v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md. App. 264, 274 (2012) (quoting Maryland Department of the Environment v. Ives, 136 Md. App. 581, 585 (2001)). We conduct a “two-fold
Analysis
Mr. Hayden argues that, in order for the Department to revoke his commercial oystering authorization, the Department must prove that he knew that he was violating the law when he took oysters located more than 200 feet within a closed area, and did so with equipment that is prohibited in the area. He concedes that his actions did in fact violate the law but asserts that he was unaware of the law‘s requirements. Phrased differently, Mr. Hayden imputes what he calls a “specific intent” requirement into
To support the plain language part of his argument, Mr. Hayden relies on the definition of “knowingly” in Black‘s Law Dictionary 784 (5th ed. 1979):
with knowledge, consciously; intelligently; willfully; or intentionally.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist, and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. Model Penal Code § 2.202.
If there is any ambiguity to “knowingly” in
Mr. Hayden contends that “[w]hen the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to the intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act.” Mr. Hayden relies on several cases in which the court reviewed criminal statutes for a specific intent element for his contention, specifically Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (interpreting the federal statute prohibiting food stamp fraud to require proof that the defendant know that his actions violated the law); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 473 (2006) (holding that a defendant “must know that the activity [he is] engaging in is illegal” in order to be convicting of illegally transferring a regulated firearm); and Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194 (1969) (holding that a defendant‘s knowledge or criminal conduct may be inferred from circumstantial evidence).
Finally, Mr. Hayden contends that the penalty sections in
The Department does not agree. It asserts that “knowingly” in
1.
Deciding what “knowingly” means in
an examination of the statutory text in context, a review of legislative history to confirm conclusions or resolve questions from that examination, and a consideration of the consequences of alternative readings. “Text is the plain language of the relevant provision, typically given its ordinary meaning, viewed in context, considered in light of the whole statute, and generally evaluated for ambiguity. Legislative purpose, either apparent from the text or gathered from external sources, often informs, if not controls, our reading of the statute. An examination of interpretive consequences, either as a comparison of the results of each proffered construction, or as a principle of avoidance of an absurd or unreasonable reading, grounds the court‘s interpretation in reality.”
Blue v. Prince George‘s County, 434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) (quoting Town of Oxford v. Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 585–86 (2012), aff‘d, 431 Md. 14 (2013)).
A.
The first step is to look at the plain language of the statute in context. “Knowingly” is defined neither in
The 2009 edition of Black‘s Law Dictionary defined “knowing” as:
1. Having or showing awareness or understanding; well-informed <a knowing waiver of the right to counsel>. 2. Deliberate, conscious <a knowing attempt to commit fraud>. — knowingly, adv.
B. GARNER, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed. 2009).
Oran‘s Dictionary of the Law defined “knowingly” as “[w]ith full knowledge and intentionally; willfully.” D. Oran, ORAN‘S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 292 (4th ed. 2009).
Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary defined “knowingly” as “with awareness, deliberateness, or with intention.” WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1252 (1986).
As mentioned earlier, Mr. Hayden places great reliance upon the definition of “knowingly” contained in an earlier edition of Black‘s Law Dictionary (emphasis added):
with knowledge, consciously; intelligently; willfully; or intentionally.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist, and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. Model Penal Code § 2.202.
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (5th ed. 1979).
We do not believe that Mr. Hayden‘s reliance on this definition is particularly persuasive. The italicized portion of this definition was derived verbatim from the American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE (“MPC“) § 2.02(2)(b) (1962). Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code, titled “General Requirements of Culpability,” defines the mental state(s) necessary for a finding of guilt under various standards found in criminal statutes. Maryland has not
Taken as a whole, these definitions provide, at best, meager support for Mr. Hayden‘s interpretation of “knowingly” in
The relevant statutory scheme is Title 4 of the Natural Resources Article. In deciding what the General Assembly intended when it used “knowingly” in
In our view,
Moreover, the way in which “knowingly” is used elsewhere in Title 4 is not consistent with Mr. Hayden‘s argument.
For example,
In the same vein,
Finally, we consider
In addition to any other applicable penalty set forth in this title, a person who unlawfully takes oysters from a leased oyster bottom, an oyster sanctuary, an oyster reserve, or an area closed to shellfish harvest by the Department of the Environment, when the area is designated and marked by buoys or other signage or the person knew or should have known that taking the oysters from the area was unlawful, is subject to a fine not exceeding $3,000.
In our view,
B.
We turn to the legislative history of
The Fiscal and Policy Note for Senate Bill 159 observed that oyster levels in the Chesapeake Bay had been at 1% of historic levels since 1994, and that oyster bars had decreased by 80%. In response to these historic lows, the Department, in 2009, established a restoration plan that called for a substantial increase oyster sanctuaries in the Bay, establishing oyster aquaculture leasing opportunities, and maintaining the majority of the Bay‘s oyster habitat for public oyster harvesting. In conjunction with the restoration plan, the Department focused not only on preserving and promoting healthy aquaculture activity, but also on “strengthening enforcement of commercial fisheries laws.” See S.B. 159, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, (February 3, 2011). Like the floor reports, the fiscal and policy note used the language of the bill itself in summarizing it, and so provided no particular insight of what the
The current system of fines and suspensions does not deter offending commercial fisherman who violate the law and is simply accepted as the cost of doing business. This is evident from the estimate of illegal oysters harvested from restored oyster bars, both commercial bars and sanctuaries. The University of Maryland Horn Point Laboratory in Cambridge is the leading oyster agriculture hatchery in the Chesapeake Bay, producing over 1 billion oyster spat . . . within the past decade. At our November 2009 meeting, the Director of Horn Point‘s oyster hatchery estimated that nearly 80% of oysters produced at the hatchery and returned to sanctuary reefs had been poached illegally.
Illegal harvesting of oysters is an offense against public taxpayer investment and the public trust. The State of Maryland has spent $40 million on oyster restoration since 1996. A knowing violation of the laws meant to protect our public investment warrants severe repercussions.
Statement of the Chesapeake Bay Commission concerning House Bill 27321 (February 16, 2011).
For its part, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation stated:
Oyster poaching is a rampant problem in Maryland. Nearly all of the State‘s existing sanctuaries have been victimized by poachers. . . .
* * *[W]e believe that the strongest part of SB 159 is the requirement that the DNR hold hearings for oyster-related offenses, and revoke an individual‘s license if he or she is found culpable. This will ensure that poachers will no longer be allowed to harvest alongside their law-abiding peers. To a commercial fisherman, the clear and realistic threat of losing a license is a strong deterrent to stealing oysters.
Statement of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation concerning Senate bill 159 (February 8, 2011).
There is nothing in the legislative history that challenges the validity of these observations.22
To be sure, position statements by state agencies and interest groups are not infallible guides to the intent of the Legislature.
In response to these concerns, S.B. 159 authorized permanent revocation, and not merely temporary suspension, of a licensee‘s authorization to engage in commercial oyster harvesting. S.B. 159 also required the Department to initiate revocation proceedings whenever a licensee was charged with committing one or more of the predicate offenses, and required the Department to revoke the license if an administrative law judge finds that the licensee “knowingly” committed a predicate offense. Although the sanction imposed by
We conclude that the legislative history of
C.
In his brief, Mr. Hayden points to the holdings and analyses in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 (2006); and Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194 (1969), to support his argument that
These decisions are not particularly relevant because in none of them was the government required to provide notice of the applicable legal requirements to the defendant, nor did the defendant affirmatively represent to the government under penalty of perjury that he was aware of his obligation to “know and comply with” the relevant statute.24
2.
Our next step is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative law judge‘s conclusion that Mr. Hayden acted deliberately or intentionally on the morning of February 25, 2017. We conclude that there is.
At the administrative hearing, there was no dispute that Mr. Hayden intentionally harvested oysters from a location more than 200 feet within a closed area, a violation of
First, knowledge of the law was imputed onto Mr. Hayden by virtue of his signature on the receipt, by which he acknowledged that he knew or was required to know the law, as well as his acceptance of the Shellfish Closure Manual, detailing the areas of the Chesapeake Bay closed to oyster harvesting.
Second, the issue of whether Mr. Hayden needed “a riparian lease” is separate from and irrelevant to the issue on appeal. As the administrative law judge noted, the answers provided by Mr. Wright to Mr. Hayden and Mrs. Hayden regarding needing a lease were not false, as there is no requirement that a property owner obtain
Third, Mr. Hayden‘s conversation with Ms. Bohan, the MDE employee, demonstrates that he was aware that White Hall Creek was closed to oyster harvesting because of pollution.
Finally, this same evidence supports the alternative basis for the administrative law judge‘s decision, namely, that Mr. Hayden deliberately ignored information at his disposal when he chose to relay oysters from a closed area. “Deliberate ignorance . . . exists when a person ‘believes it is probable that something is a fact but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.‘” Steward v. State, 218 Md. App. 550, 560 (2014) (quoting Rice v. State, 136 Md. App. 593, 601 (2001)). As the administrative law judge observed, Mr. Hayden‘s “failure to read and digest these laws and requirements is no excuse for violating the requirements.”
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ST. MARY‘S COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
Notes
(a) The Department annually shall publish maps and coordinates of oyster sanctuaries, closed oyster harvest reserve areas, and areas closed to shellfish harvest by the Department of the Environment.
(b)(1) The Department shall provide the publications required under this section to each tidal fish licensee who pays the oyster surcharges required under
(2) Before a person may catch oysters under a tidal fish license that has an oyster authorization and for which the oyster surcharges have been paid, the person shall certify to the Department on a form the Department prescribes that the person received the publications required under this section.
307 Md. 46, 62–63 (1986) (quoting Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 305 (1979)).A specific intent is not simply the intent to do the immediate act but embraces the requirement that the mind be conscious of a more remote purpose or design which shall eventuate from the doing of the immediate act. Though assault implies only the general intent to strike the blow, assault with intent to murder, rob, rape or maim requires a fully formed and conscious purpose that those further consequences shall flow from the doing of the immediate act.
(a) The Department annually shall publish maps and coordinates of oyster sanctuaries, closed oyster harvest reserve areas, and areas closed to shellfish harvest by the Department of the Environment.
(b)(1) The Department shall provide the publications required under this section to each tidal fish licensee who pays the oyster surcharges required under
(2) Before a person may catch oysters under a tidal fish license that has an oyster authorization and for which the oyster surcharges have been paid, the person shall certify to the Department on a form the Department prescribes that the person received the publications required under this section.
(a) In addition to any other penalty provided by the provisions of this title, the Secretary may revoke or suspend any recreational license issued to any person under this title.
* * *(c)(2) The following are grounds for an immediate suspension of a license issued under this title:
(i) Knowingly making a false statement in an application[.]
In Liparota, the Supreme Court held that a statute (
In Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 (2006), the Court of Appeals reviewed the meaning of “knowingly” as used in the statute penalizing a person who “knowingly participates in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm[.]” 393 Md. at 434 n.3 (emphasis added). The Court read a ”mens rea requirement of specific intent” into the statute and held that “in order to be in violation of [the statute], a person . . . must know that the activity they are engaging in is illegal.” Id. at 473.
The statute at issue in Greenway was former Article 66 1/2 § 73, which stated in pertinent part (emphasis added):
Any person who knowingly . . . has in his possession . . . [an] engine removed from a motor vehicle, from which the manufacturer‘s serial or engine number or other distinguishing number or identification mark or number . . . has been removed, defaced, . . . or destroyed for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the identity of said . . . engine . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
We concluded that the statute did not require proof that the defendant knew the conduct was unlawful but rather that the defendant “had actual or direct knowledge, as, for example, that he defaced the [vehicle identification] number himself, or admitted that he knew it had been defaced, and had no reasonable non-culpable explanation as to why it had been defaced.” Id. at 196.