Lead Opinion
Ernie Banks, the always cheerful Hall of Fame shortstop and first baseman for the Chicago Cubs, used a baseball bat to hit home runs out of what he referred to as the “friendly confines” of Wrigley Field.
Maryland law regulating a modern weapon of choice also makes reference to the “confines” of an establishment. In 1972, the General Assembly enacted emergency legislation to limit the “widespread carrying of handguns on streets and in vehicles.... ” An exception to that law allows a supervisory employee of a business to carry a handgun without a permit “within the confines of the business establishment in which” the employee works.
Although the Legislature likely had no thought of Ernie Banks or Shakespeare when it used the term “confines” in the handgun law, in this case we must decidе whether it used the word in the same sense as they did — i.e., the interior of an enclosed or walled space. Petitioner Roguell Blue, the head of security for a nightclub, was arrested by the Prince George’s County Police for carrying a handgun without a permit on the open parking lot of the nightclub. Mr. Blue brought suit against the County, contending at trial that his arrest was illegal because the parking lot should be considered to be “within the confines” of the nightclub.
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that there is no reason to believe that the Legislature used the term “confines” with respect to a “business establishment” other than in its ordinary sense,
Background
Handgun Permit Requirement and Exceptions
Under Maryland law, an individual may not “wеar, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person[.]” Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“CR”), § 4 — 203(a) (1) (i) ,
(i) in the course of employment;
(ii) within the confínes of the business establishment in which the supervisory employee is employed; and
(iii) when so authorized by the owner or manager of the business establishment^]
CR § 4-203(b)(7). Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor that carries maximum penalties that vary depending on the circumstances and location of the offense, as well as whether the defendant has prior firearms-related convictions. CR § 4-203(c).
Mr. Blue’s Arrest
On the night of June 17, 2008, Mr. Blue was working as the head of security for Irving’s Nightclub,
As it turned out, however, officers from the Police Department were already on their way to the nightclub in response to a report of gunshots. Upon arrival, the officers learned that Mr. Blue was carrying a handgun and asked him to produce a valid permit for it. Instead, Mr. Blue showed them a laminated copy of CR § 4-203 and
Mr. Blue's Lawsuit
On September 14, 2009, Mr. Blue filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the County and three of the police officers involved in his arrest.
A trial was held from December 13 to December 15, 2010. At the trial, Mr. Blue asserted that hе was legally permitted to carry the handgun under CR § 4 — 203(b)(7) as a “supervisory employee,” and that the officers therefore did not have probable cause to arrest him. The nightclub owner testified that Mr. Blue’s position required him “to have a weapon on [the] premises” in order to ensure “that everything was safe around the club,” including “[i]nside and around the parking lot.” At the close of Mr. Blue’s case, the Circuit Court, finding that Mr. Blue had failed to prove that the arrest was motivated by “ill will ... or contempt or with the intent to injure,” granted the County’s motion for judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. The remaining two claims were eventually sent to the jury.
The jury found in favor of Mr. Blue on his State constitutional claim and on the false arrest and imprisonment claim. He was awarded $106,100 in damages, comprised of $29,350 for lost wages, $1,750 for mediсal expenses, and $75,000 in other non-economic damages. The trial court denied the County’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Both Mr. Blue and the County appealed. On August 30, 2012, the Court of Special Appeals, in a reported decision, upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, but reversed the judgment based on the jury verdict.
Mr. Blue subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted on November 16, 2012, to determine whether the supervisory employee
Discussion
The parties apparently agree that, if the exception for a supervisory employee in the Maryland handgun law did not apply, the officers had legal justification to arrest Mr. Blue under CR § 4-203(a). Thus, resolution of this appeal turns on whether CR § 4-203(b)(7) authorized Mr. Blue to carry a handgun without a permit on the parking lot of Irving’s Nightclub.
Standard of Review
The crux of this case is the construction of CR § 4-203(b)(7) — in particular, whether the phrase “within the confines of the business establishment” includes an open parking lot associated with a business conducted inside a building. This is a question of law on which we owe no deference to the Circuit Court or the Court of Special Appеals. See Jones v. State,
The goal of statutory construction is to discern and carry out the intent of the Legislature. Our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals have aptly summarized this quest, based on this Court’s past decisions, as one that requires an examination of the statutory text in context, a review of legislative history to confirm conclusions or resolve questions from that examination, and a consideration of the consequences of alternative readings. “Text is the plain language of the relevant provision, typically given its ordinary meaning, viewed in context, considered in light of the whole statute, and generally evaluated for ambiguity. Legislative purpose, either apparent from the text or gathered from external sources, often informs, if not controls, our reading of the statute. An examination of interpretive consequences, either as a comparison of the results of each proffered construction, or as a principle of avoidance of an absurd or unreasonable reading, grounds the court’s interpretation in reality.” Town of Oxford v. Koste,
Supervisory Employee Exception
The elements of the supervisory employee exception in CR § 4 — 203(b)(7) are clear. A supervisory employee may possess a handgun (1) “in the course of employment”; (2) “within the confines of the business establishment in which the supervisory employee is employed”; and (3) “when so authorized by the owner or manager of the business establishment.” The County does not dispute that Mr. Blue possessed the handgun in the course of his employment and was authorized by the owner of the club to carry it. The only element of the exception in disputе is whether Mr.
Statutory Text
The statute itself does not provide a specific definition for the phrase “within the confines of the business establishment.” Common dictionary definitions provide some direction.
Putting these definitions together, “within the confines of the business establishment” appears to mean the interior space of a commercial enterprise, where one may find its furnishings and staff, enclosed by walls or similar bounds. With application to this case, the business of a strip club occurs inside the building that houses its “furnishings and staff.” The business of such an establishment is not conducted in an open parking lot.
The use of the term “confines” in the statute apparently denotes some area distinct from the entire area owned by or associated with the business.
Statutory Context
The supervisory employee exception is not the only part of the handgun law that refers to the “confines” of a “business establishment.” Another exception in the statute permits “the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person on real estate that the person owns or leases or where the person resides or within the confines of a business establishment that the person owns or leases.” CR § 4 — 203(b)(6) (emphasis added). This exception allows an individual to carry a handgun without a permit in three places:
1— on real estate that the person owns or leases
2— on real estate where the person resides
3— within the confines of a business establishment that the persоn owns or leases
The reference to “real estate” in this exception obviously encompasses buildings and other improvements on that real estate, as it presumably is not limited to people who reside on bare land. It is evident that “within the confines of the business establishment” can refer to something less than the “real estate” on which the business sits. Cf. Marshall v. Walker,
Legislative History ofCR § h-203(b)(7)
It appears that the State’s initial effort to regulate handgun possession was enacted in 1886. Chapter 375, Laws of Maryland 1886. That law flatly prohibited the wearing or carrying of concealed pistols by an individual who was not a “conservator of the peace,” as well as thе open wearing or carrying of pistols with the intent to cause injury.
That proviso persisted throughout the statute’s various iterations until 1972. In the early 1970s, handgun use resulting in death and serious injuries had risen to troubling levels in the State. In January 1972, the Governor submitted emergency legislatiоn to curb “the widespread carrying of handguns on the streets and in vehicles by persons who have no legitimate reason to carry them.”
As to the exception for residences and places of business, the bills аs originally introduced provided: “Nothing in this section shall prevent a person from having in his presence any handgun within the confines of any dwelling, business establishment, or real estate owned or leased by him.” Senate Bill 205 (1972), § 3 (first reader); House Bill 277 (1972), § 3 (first
Some legislators, however, argued that the proposed exception for residences and businesses was inadequate in that it pertained only to the owner or lessor of the premises. Senator Newton I. Steers complained that “it was legal for anybody to have one, or indeed, 50 pistols in his dwelling or his place of business. However, nobody could pick up one of these pistols ... unless he was a building owner or tenant; thus, when the homeowner leaves his house or the store оwner leaves his store, any guns in the building are immobilized.” Statement on Gun Control, Senator Newton I. Steers, Jr. (February 25, 1972), available in Legislative Reference Bill File for Handgun Control Bill (the “Bill File”) (1972).
Ultimately, a compromise was reached. An owner’s or lessor’s ability to carry a handgun without a permit on owned or leased real estate was retained. The owner’s or lessor’s ability to endow others with that right was limited to “supervisory employees” of a business and restricted to the “confines of the business establishment,” but not real estate generally. The provision ultimately adopted by the General Assembly read:
Nothing in this section shall prevent a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the confines of real estate owned or leased by him or upon which he resides or within the confines of a business establishment owned or leased by him. Nothing in this section shall prevent a supervisory employee from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the confines of a business establishment in which he is employed during such time as he is acting in the course of hisemployment and has been authorized to wear, carry, or transport the handgun by the owner or manager of the business establishment.
Chapter 13, Laws of Maryland 1972 then codified at Maryland Code, Article 27, § 36B(c)(4).
Under the canons of statutory construction, “[w]hen a general provision in a statute has certain limited exceptions, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.” Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction (2013), § 47:11 (internal footnote omitted). Thus, the supervisory employee exception should not be construed in a way that would defeat the purpose of the prohibition in the law. A contemporaneous interpretation by the Attorney General of this exception construed it narrowly and concluded that a suрervisory employee was not entitled to transport a handgun between the business establishment and the employee’s home. See 57 Opinions of the Attorney General 502, 506 (1972). And this Court later confirmed that the purpose of the exception was for self-defense. Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc.,
In 2002, the law was recodified as part of the new Criminal Law Article with new language, but without substantive change, at its current codification. Chapter 26, Laws of Maryland 2002. As part of the recodification, the exception was split into two — one pertaining to owners and lessors (current CR § 4-203(b)(6)) and one pertaining to supervisory employees (current CR § 4-203(b)(7)).
Consequences of Alternative Construction
Mr. Blue argues that “logic and common sense” compel a different result, because if he “were trying to apprehend someone who had just committed a violent crime inside the building, and the suspect was able to escape to the outside,” he would be “required to either drop his gun at the door before continuing the chase outside, risking his own personal safety, or allow the suspect to escape.”
As Judgе Cole of this Court noted, “[i]t is clear that the 1972 handgun control legislation is designed to discourage and punish the possession of handguns on the streets and public ways.” State v. Crawford,
The supervisory exception in the handgun law was not meant to confer on a business the power to deputize a private
Mr. Blue asserts that, because the owner required the club’s security guards to have a weapon, his job necessitated that he carry a handgun on the parking lot to be “a deterrent to likely criminal elements” and to halt “illicit activities on the premises.” To the extent that an individual employed as a private security guard believes that possession of a handgun is essential to carrying out his duties on the parking lot of his employer’s business, that individual may apply for a handgun permit pursuant to Maryland Code, Public Safety Article, § 5-304. Indeed, if Mr. Blue had been certified under State law as a private security guard, he would have been required to obtain a handgun permit in order to be armed while performing that job. See COMAR 29.04.01.12D. Mr. Blue did not have a handgun permit and his right to carry a handgun was limited to the breadth of the supervisory employee exception. Application of Similar Exceptions in other Jurisdictions
Similar exceptions in handgun laws of other states are likewise not given an expansive construction. See generally Annotation, Scope and effect of exception, in statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to person on his own premises or at his place of business,
Conclusion
The supervisory employee exception to the handgun law allows such an employee to carry a handgun, with the employer’s
Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals Affirmed. Costs to be Paid by Petitioner.
GREENE and ADKINS, JJ., and BELL, C.J., dissent.
Notes
. See Peter V. Bella, Ernie Banks to Receive Presidential Medal of Freedom, Chicago Now (August 9, 2013); Jack Curry, A Chat with Ernie Banks, the Classy Cub, New York Times (April 27, 2008).
. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act III, scene i, line 6.
. Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, § 4-203(b)(7) (emphasis added).
. The statute defines "handgun” as follows:
(1) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed on the person.
(2) “Handgun” includes a short-barreled shotgun and short-barreled rifle.
(3) "Handgun” does not include a shotgun, rifle, or antique firearm. CR § 4-201(c).
. The constitutionality of the State handgun law and the permitting scheme have been upheld by this Court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Williams v. State,
. The name of the nightclub appears as both "Irvin’s” and "Irving's” in the record. When called as a witness at trial, the owner spelled his last name as "Irving.” We will adopt the latter spelling in this opinion.
. Mr. Blue was dressed in a uniform similar to that of a special unit police officer, although he was not a police officer. Nor was he certified as a security guard under Maryland Code, Business Occupations & Professions Article, § 19-401 et seq. State regulations governing certified security guards require an armed security guard to have a handgun permit. COMAR 29.04.01.12D.
. Mr. Blue also attempted to have the officers review other documents related to his work duties and firearms training, but the officers did not consider these materials relevant to whether he could legally carry the gun. In particular, Mr. Blue displayed to the officers a card identifying himself as a “Spеcial Agent” of the “United States Fugitive Enforcement Agency” with a legend stating that he was “authorized to arrest ... by Federal Law and U.S. Supreme Court.” He later testified that the "United States Fugitive Enforcement Agency” was a private business that he owned.
. All defendants are represented by the County Attorney and have presented a joint defense. For ease of reference we will refer to the defendants collectively as “the County."
. That provision reads:
That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.
Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 24.
. In order to succeed on a claim for false arrest and imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of liberty without cоnsent or legal justification. State v. Dett,
. A dictionary definition may provide a "useful starting point,” though not a dispositive answer, in determining a statute’s meaning. Marriott Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin.,
. One might imagine various types of business establishments in which the "business" of the establishment is conducted in the open air, although in a space clearly bounded by walls or fences. The “confines” of such a business establishment might well extend outside of a building. But that is not this case.
. The concept of confinement, as well as the term “confines," appears elsewhere in the Maryland Code. One obvious example involves prisons — places of confinement. When the General Assembly refers to the "confines of the correctional facility," it seems quite clear that the Legislature means an enclosed area of the facility. See Maryland Code, Correctional Services Article, § 7 — 308(b)(2).
. The statute read:
Every person not being a conservator of the peace entitled or required to carry such weapon as part of his official equipment, who shall wear or carry any pistol ... concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall carry or wear any such weаpon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than six months in jail or the House of Correction.
Chapter 375, Laws of Maryland 1886.
. Letter from Governor Marvin Mandel to Delegate Donald B. Robertson (December 21, 1971).
. Proponents of the handgun law related this exception to a recommendation of the 1969 “Statement on Firearms & Violence” issued by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, an entity established by a presidential executive order following the assassinations of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The Commission found that "[b]urglars and robbers ... threaten businesses, and firearms are frequently kept in places of business for protection. Such firearms are useful primarily against robbers, since burglars usually break and enter after the business has closed.” National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Commission Statement on Firearms & Violence (July 28, 1969) at 4. Therefore, because "firearms in business establishments may sometimes be effective in defending against robberies,” id. at 3, the Commission recommended that handgun licenses be available to "small businesses in high crime areas” because of their "special need for self-protection,” id. at 8.
. It is typically difficult to locate legislative history in Maryland for bills enacted prior to 1976, when the Department of Legislative Reference began to systematically preserve bill files for each session. The Department did, however, compile a special bound volume of the bill files for the 1972 handgun legislation, which has been retained in the State Law Library.
. Under Mr. Blue’s preferred construction of the statute, he would still be required to "drop his gun” if the disturbance he joined happened to spill over the perimeter of the parking lot. The "illogic” in either scenario would be avoided if the security guard has a permit for the handgun, as is required for licensed security guards under State law.
. We express no opinion on the wisdom of the police exercising their discretion to arrest Mr. Blue in these circumstances.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, which ADKINS, J., and BELL,
C.J. (ret.) join.
I dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that the phrase “confines of the business establishment” in Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 4-203(b)(7) of the Criminal Law Article, limits a supervisory employee’s right to carry a handgun to the interior walls of a building. That interpretation is too narrow. This Court has stated:
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.... [T]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent. ... We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. (Quotations omitted.) (Citations omitted.)
Walzer v. Osborne,
I. Plain Meaning
It is quite common, as the Majority did, to look to dictionary definitions in order to ascertain the meaning behind statutory language. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler,
To this end, consultation of several dictionaries in use at the time this Legislation was enacted in 1972 provided useful direction. Notably, “confine” was defined as “a limit, end or boundary,” Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 244 (3d ed. 1969), and as “a boundary or bounded region; border; limit,” Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language 307-08 (Encyclopedia ed. 1951). There was no mention of “walls” or “building” in either definition. Current dictionаry editions should also be consulted.
The next logical inquiry is the plain meaning of “business establishment.” Again to reference dictionaries in use at the time the legislation was enacted, “establishment” has been defined as “[t]he place in which one is permanently fixed for residence or business; ... any office or place of business, with its fixtures,” Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 418 (3d ed. 1969), and “place of business and fixtures; residence with grounds, furnishings, equipage, etc.” Black’s Law Dictionary 643 (4th ed. 1951). More recently, “establishment” has been defined as “[a] place of business, including its possessions and employees.” Websters II New College Dictionary 392 (3d ed. 2005). Because it is unclear whether “establishment” includes the real estate a business sits on, resort to the use of the phrase in Maryland law provides further guidance. Maryland’s use of the phrase in its regulations of business signs is most enlightening. There, “business establishments” include gas stations, restaurants with drive-in outdoor stalls, and campgrounds, all of which are establishments that are not limited to a single building with four walls.
Based on the plain meaning of the term “within the confines of a business establishment,” in the context of § 4-203(b)(7) of the Criminal Law Article, reason supports the conclusion that an adjacent private parking lot is within the boundaries in which a supervisory employee may carry а handgun. Delving further into our precepts of statutory construction, consideration of the legislative purpose, legislation that was not adopted by the General Assembly, and the adverse consequences of any other construction are particularly helpful tools to elucidate this point.
The Majority reads a limitation into the statute that does not exist, a conclusion that is strengthened by an inquiry into the legislative purpose behind Md. Code (1972, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 36B(c)(4) (now §§ 4-203(b)(6)-(7) of the Criminal Law Article). As the Majority articulates in its opinion, §§ 4-203(b)(6) and (b)(7) of the Criminal Law Article were initially codified as one provision under Art. 27, § 36B(c)(4)
Nothing in this section shall prevent a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the confines of real estate owned or lеased by him or upon which he resides or within the confines of a business establishment owned or leased by him. Nothing in this section shall prevent a supervisory employee from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun within the confines of a business establishment in which he is employed during such time as he is acting in the course of his employment and has been authorized to wear, carry or transport the handgun by the owner or manager of the business establishment.
The General Assembly made clear that the purpose underlying the enactment of this regulatory scheme was to curb “the [high] number of violent crimes perpetrated in Maryland,” a “substantial increase ... which is traceable, in large part, to the carrying of handguns on the streets and public ways by persons inclined to use them in criminal activity.” Art. 27, § 36B (a). “To effectuate that pоlicy, the Legislature generally made it unlawful for persons to wear, carry or transport handguns ... [but] also provide[d] certain limited exceptions to the prohibition.” Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,
The Majority cites Montgomery Cnty. v. Atlantic Guns, Inc.,
Additionally, it is not unusual for this Court to consider legislation that was not adopted in order to confirm legislative intent. See, e.g., Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
Moreover, this Court has previously charged that in interpreting a statute we should “avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.” Blake,
Chief Judge BELL (ret.) and Judge ADKINS join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.
. The Majority cites Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1355 (1987), which defines "confines” as "something (as borders or walls) that encloses.”
. The Majority draws a distinction between enclosed business establishments and “open air” business establishments. In doing so, the Majority reads into the statute its own limitation on the application of the supervisory employee exception.
. Majority Op. at 695-96,
. The generally-accеpted definition of premises is "a house or building, along with its grounds.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1219 (8th ed. 2004); see Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation,
. Also included in the Bill File is an additional proposal by Senator Steers, which was likewise not adopted by the General Assembly. That amendment read: "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the placing, wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun anywhere within the confines of any building by a person who is the owner ... or by a tenant within that portion of the building of which he is the tenant, or by a person left in charge of part or all of a building by the owner or tenant, in that portion of the building of which he is left in charge.” (Emphasis added.) Again, Senator Steers advocated for the terms, "confines,” to a "building” or "portion of a building” (much more narrow language than "confines of a business establishment”) to be included in the statute. Senator Steers’s more narrow language was not adopted.