Harris v. Super. Ct.Harris v. Super. Ct.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for writ of prohibition from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Henry J. Hall, Judge. Petition denied.
As part of a plea agreement, defendant Morris Glen Harris, Jr. (defendant) pled guilty to a felony charge of grand theft from a person and agreed to admit a prior strike and receive a six-year prison sentence, in exchange for dismissal of the more serious felony charge of robbery. More than a year later, California voters passed Proposition 47, which allowed defendant to petition for reduction of his felony grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor. The issue presented is whether the People may withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the original charges where the plea-bargained felony charge becomes a misdemeanor as a result of Proposition 47.
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that reduction of the plea-bargained felony charge to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 deprives the People of the benefit of the bargain of its plea agreement. Therefore, the People are entitled to withdraw from the plea and reinstate the previously-dismissed charges, thus returning the parties to the status quo ante.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2013, Francisco Pascual Diego was walking down the street when a person he later identified as defendant approached him from behind, hit him on the face, and took his cell phone. Diego chased defendant and flagged down two police officers. Diego pointed out defendant, who was running down the street, and told the officers that defendant had stolen his cell phone. There was no one else running down the street. The officers chased defendant and detained him. Diego‘s cell phone was found on the ground about one foot away from defendant‘s left foot.
The People filed an information charging defendant with one count of robbery in violation of
Defendant then sought to resolve the case for a “non-strike” offense. On April 17, 2013, the parties entered into a plea agreement, by which defendant
On November 4, 2014, California voters passed Proposition 47, “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” Its goal was to “ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.) To that end, a number of felony offenses were redefined as misdemeanors, including thefts of property valued at less than $950. (See
Proposition 47 also enacted
On its face, therefore, Proposition 47 was intended to apply to prisoners who pled to felonies covered by the law, as well as those convicted following trial. (See also T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646, 653 [petitioner entitled to Proposition 47 relief even though his conviction was obtained by plea agreement].)
The People did not contest defendant‘s claim that he was entitled to relief under Proposition 47. Instead, it filed a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the previously-dismissed charges. The People argued that defendant was entitled to reclassification of his conviction, but the result would deny the People the benefit of the bargain of the negotiated plea agreement, thus entitling it to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court then ordered defendant to personally appear so that he could decide, with the advice of counsel, whether to proceed with his petition, or to withdraw it in light of the People‘s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement.
After defendant elected to proceed with his petition for relief under Proposition 47, the trial court issued an order granting both defendant‘s petition for recall of sentence and the People‘s motion to withdraw from the plea and reinstate the original charges. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking review of the trial court‘s order granting the People‘s motion to withdraw the plea agreement and reinstate the previously dismissed charges. After we summarily denied the petition, the Supreme Court granted a petition for review and directed us to issue an order to show cause. On October 7, 2015, we issued an order to show cause why the court should not grant the relief sought by defendant. We now deny the petition.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
“We traditionally review findings of fact under a deferential standard of substantial evidence, and findings of law under a de novo standard.” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 442.) “A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles.” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) “‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (
B. Benefit of the People‘s Bargain
The Supreme Court has explained the nature of plea bargaining as follows: “‘The process of plea bargaining which has received statutory and
“‘“A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.”‘” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931.) The trial court may decide not to approve the terms of a plea agreement if it does not believe the agreed-upon disposition is fair. (Ibid.) However, once the trial court accepts the agreement, then it, like the parties, are bound by its terms. (Id. at p. 930.)
In Collins, the Supreme Court addressed head on the question of what happens when a change in law deprives either the People or the defendant of the benefit of the bargain of the plea agreement. The defendant in Collins was charged with fifteen felony counts. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 211.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled to one count of non-forcible oral copulation in exchange for dismissal of the other fourteen charges. (Ibid.) Before judgment was entered, the court found the defendant to be a mentally disordered sex offender and ordered him committed for an indefinite period. (Ibid.) While defendant was committed, the Legislature decriminalized non-forcible oral copulation. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held the defendant could not be convicted and sentenced as contemplated by the plea agreement, as the pled-to offense was no longer a punishable crime. (Id. at p. 213.) At the same time, the Court held, the People were entitled to restore the dismissed counts. (Id. at p. 215.) This was because the change in law had “destroy[ed] a fundamental assumption underlying the plea bargain — that defendant would be vulnerable to a term of imprisonment” — thus depriving the People of the benefit of its bargain. (Id. at pp. 215-216.)
The People argue, and we agree, that Collins controls the outcome in this case. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that defendant would serve a six-year prison term in exchange for dismissal of the robbery charge and related allegations. This prison term was a “fundamental assumption” of the plea bargain. (See Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215 [“The state, in entering a plea bargain, generally contemplates a certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the defendant‘s vulnerability to a term of punishment“].) At the time of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47, defendant had served just over two years in prison, including his pre-sentencing custody credits. Because misdemeanors are punishable by a
As in Collins, defendant is unquestionably entitled to a reduction in his sentence under Proposition 47, if he seeks it. The result, however, is a windfall to defendant that neither party contemplated at the time they entered their plea agreement. As the Collins court stated: “Defendant seeks to gain relief from the sentence imposed but otherwise leave the plea bargain intact. This is bounty in excess of that to which he is entitled.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215 [footnote omitted].) The People‘s remedy is to seek restoration of the dismissed charges and allegations. (Ibid.)
We are not persuaded by defendant‘s argument that Collins is distinguishable because that case involved a statute defining a crime that was repealed entirely. Collins applies the unremarkable principle that plea agreements are contracts entered into between the People and the defendant for reciprocal benefits. (Id. at p. 214.) “When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.” (Ibid.) The People are surely deprived of the benefit of its bargain whether the bargain-for term of imprisonment is entirely eliminated (as in Collins) or drastically reduced (as in this case). (See In re Blessing (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1031 [prosecution permitted to withdraw from plea where change in law reduced the defendant‘s negotiated sentence of 16 1/3 years to 12 1/3 years].)
The defendant also argues that Collins was impliedly overruled by Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 (Doe). Again, we disagree. Doe does not address Collins, and the holding in Doe does not repudiate the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Collins in a way that renders the two decisions irreconciliable. (See Richmond Ramblers Motorcycle Club v. Western Title Guaranty Co. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 747, 758 [“‘[O]verruling by implication is no more favored than repealing by implication, and important cases of record of recent origin are not ordinarily to be considered as overruled by implication‘“]; Meskell v. Culver City Unified School Dist. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 815, 824 [“‘[A] subsequent decision cannot, by mere implication, be held to overrule a prior case unless the principle is directly involved and the inference is clear and impelling‘“].)
The defendant in Doe was charged with six counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under 14. (Id. at p. 66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled to one of the counts in exchange for dismissal of the
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal certified a question to the Supreme Court, which rephrased the inquiry as follows: “‘Under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the interpretation of plea agreements, does the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement bind the parties or can the terms of a plea agreement be affected by changes in the law?‘” (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 66.) After reviewing a series of relevant cases, the Court responded: “the general rule in California is that the plea agreement will be ‘“deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy . . . .”‘” (Id. at p. 73.) Concomitantly, “requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction.” (Id. at pp. 73-74.)
Doe did not involve a negotiated term of a plea agreement, but rather, a “statutory consequence” of conviction. The sex offender registration requirement at section 290 is “a statutorily mandated element of punishment for the underlying offense.” (People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 380.) It “is not a permissible subject of plea agreement negotiation” and neither the prosecutor nor the court has authority to exempt a defendant from mandatory sex offender registration. (Ibid.) Precisely because the requirement of sex offender registration was not bargained-for (and could not have been bargained-for) between the parties, a
The notion that Doe referred to unbargained-for “statutory consequences” of a conviction, rather than a negotiated term of the plea agreement, is reinforced by the cases examined and relied upon by the Doe Court. The holding in Doe — that a plea agreement is “‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. . . .‘” (See Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 66, 73; People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070 (Gipson).)
The defendant in Gipson pled guilty in 1992, when
Three other cases discussed in the Doe opinion also relate to the statutory consequences of a conviction, rather than negotiated terms of the plea agreements. In re Lowe (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1405, addressed the Governor‘s authority to review parole decisions — an authority that did not exist at the time of the defendant‘s plea agreement. The court noted that the parties’ plea agreement did not contemplate who would make defendant‘s parole decision, and concluded that the Governor‘s review of the defendant‘s parole determination did not violate his plea agreement. (Id. at 1426.)
People v. Acuna (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1056 and People v. Arata (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 778 both involved defendants who pled to committing a lewd act upon a child under
Notably, in discussing Arata, the Doe Court observed that the Arata court “did not find that as a general rule any law in effect at the time of a plea agreement becomes a term of the agreement.” (Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 73.) In other words, the Doe Court understood the Arata decision in light of the court‘s factual conclusion that expungement was a “term of the agreement” at issue in that case. The suggestion, of course, is that the result would have been different if expungement were simply a consequence that attached to the defendants’ convictions, rather than a negotiated term. This distinction is consistent with Doe‘s statement that “it is not impossible the parties to a particular plea bargain might affirmatively agree or implicitly understand the consequences of a plea will remain fixed despite amendments to the relevant law.” (Id. at p. 71.)
In this case, there can be no question that Proposition 47 changes material and negotiated terms of the plea agreement, rather than the “statutory consequences” attached to defendant‘s conviction. Defendant was on felony probation at the time of the crime charged in this case. He had six alleged prior felonies, including a serious felony that counts as a first “strike” under the three strikes law. He was charged with robbery, a violent felony that would have counted as a second “strike” against him. There was no doubt that the crime he committed was a robbery, and his counsel never argued otherwise. Nor does there appear to have been any weaknesses in the prosecution‘s case against him. He was arrested as he fled the scene with the victim‘s cell phone, which was found on the ground about a foot away from his left foot. The victim positively identified him at the scene. His maximum exposure was fifteen years. As the trial court observed, a plea to a misdemeanor and a short county jail sentence was ”not a viable and just resolution” of the case and it would not have approved the plea if that, in fact, had been the proposed disposition.
Rather, the People agreed to a six-year prison term and a felony disposition in exchange for a quick and certain resolution. Those were unquestionably “integral” and negotiated terms in the plea agreement (as in
We are not persuaded by defendant‘s argument that our holding would “gut” Proposition 47 because the vast majority of all criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains. Although the interpretation of a ballot initiative turns on the voters’ intent, the issue raised by defendant does not involve an interpretation of Proposition 47. On its face, Proposition 47 permits inmates to petition for resentencing and reclassification of their crimes even if their conviction resulted from a plea. However, Proposition 47 never addresses the issue presented here, i.e., whether the reclassification and resentencing deprives the People of the benefit of its bargain. That is a contract issue, and its resolution is not controlled by the statutes enacted by Proposition 47, but rather by the laws governing contract interpretation. After all, “voters are presumed to have been aware of existing laws at the time the initiative was enacted.” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1048.) In the face of the voters’ silence on the matter, the traditional rules of contract govern.
Nor do we believe the voters’ intent is contrary to our holding in this case. Proposition 47 was intended to reduce penalties for certain defendants who have committed nonserious and nonviolent crimes. At the same time, its intent was not to reduce penalties for those who have committed serious crimes. To that end, the initiative states: “The people enact the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act to ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, [and] to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.)
Under our holding today, defendants who committed serious crimes but pled down to a less serious felony may choose to keep the benefit of that
C. Benefit of the Defendant‘s Bargain
Having concluded that the People may reinstate the original robbery charge and related allegations against defendant, the next question that arises is whether any sentencing restrictions will apply if defendant is later convicted of the previously dismissed charges. Citing Collins and double jeopardy principles, the trial court held that defendant‘s exposure was limited to the six years that he agreed to as part of his plea agreement. In its return to the order to show cause, the People argue this decision was erroneous, and that the parties must be returned to the status quo ante.
Because the People did not file a petition for writ of mandate challenging this decision, the matter is not squarely before this court. (See Campbell v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904, 922 [court may not grant writ relief to respondent based on arguments raised in opposition, unless the respondent has filed her own petition for writ of mandate].) Nonetheless, because this matter may arise upon subsequent proceedings, we provide the following guidance to the trial court.
In concluding that the defendant in Collins was entitled to preserve the benefit of his bargain, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the plea agreement in that case was undermined by “external events and not defendant‘s repudiation” of the agreement. (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216.) It cited to double jeopardy cases, where the Court‘s concern “was specifically to preclude vindictiveness and more generally to avoid penalizing a defendant for pursuing a successful appeal.” (Ibid.) Given that the defendant in Collins was merely exercising his right to overturn an erroneous conviction, he should not be “penalized . . . by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain.” (Id. at p. 217.) In other words, the plea agreement in Collins was voided by external events, and not through the repudiation of the defendant. As a result, he was permitted to keep the benefit of his bargain and his sentence was capped at his maximum exposure under the plea agreement.
In this case, however, Proposition 47 does not void defendant‘s plea agreement, but only renders it voidable at defendant‘s option. He may elect to
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCHNER, J. *
I concur:
TURNER, P.J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
I respectfully dissent.
Petitioner originally was charged with robbery (
A majority of this court denied petitioner‘s petition for a writ to set aside the respondent court‘s order. I dissented and said we should issue an order to show cause. The Supreme Court granted a petition for review and transferred the case back to this court with directions to vacate the order denying mandate and to issue an order directing the respondent court to show cause why the relief sought by petitioner should not be granted.
I agree with petitioner‘s position that when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser felony charge pursuant to a plea bargain, and that charge is later reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the trial court cannot rescind the plea, recall the sentence, and reinstate the original charge or charges.
The issue here is one of law, and therefore the review is de novo. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894.)
B. Section 1170.18
Proposition 47 enacted
C. Analysis
As petitioner satisfied the criteria set forth in
A change in the law does not affect a plea agreement. In Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 (Doe), the defendant entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead nolo contendere to one of six counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 (former
The following language
Both a defendant, as in Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, and the People, as here, are bound by a plea agreement despite a later change in the law. There is no meaningful distinction in the context of this case between the “statutory consequences” of a plea agreed conviction as in Doe and a negotiated term of a plea agreement. Both involve the consequences of the plea agreement and the conviction resulting from it.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that plea agreements are not subject to changes in the law in Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 889, footnote 10 when it said, “As for [sex] offenders who entered plea agreements, ‘the general rule in California is that a plea agreement is “‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy.‘”’ (Doe[, supra,] 57 Cal.4th [at p.] 73.) It therefore follows that ‘requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction.’ (Id. at pp. 73-74.)”
Other cases have followed Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64. For example, the court in People v. Smith (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 717, 730, which considered how an amendment to
The court in T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646 (T.W.) applied Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64 in a Proposition 47 case to permit a plea bargained disposition to be reduced to a misdemeanor. In that case, the juvenile court had refused to reduce the minor‘s adjudication to a misdemeanor because it concluded that Proposition 47 did not apply to plea bargains. The juvenile had admitted the truth of the allegation that he received stolen property in violation of
Also persuasive is the United State Supreme Court case of Freeman v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 522, 131 S.Ct. 2685, in which a plurality decision held that federal defendants who enter into plea agreements that specify a particular sentence as a condition for a guilty plea are eligible for a sentence reduction under
People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208 (Collins), cited by the real party in interest, does not govern. That case involved a fully repealed statute defining a crime. The court said, “When a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain.” (Id. at p. 215, italics added.) In Collins, the defendant was indicted in 1974 on 15 separate felony counts, including six counts of burglary, two counts of forcible rape, three counts of forcible oral copulation, and other charges. Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of non-forcible oral copulation, and all other charges were dismissed. Between the time that he pleaded and was sentenced, the Legislature completely repealed the statute that was the basis of his conviction. Thus, the defendant had been sentenced on a charge that had been repealed. Our Supreme Court agreed that the defendant could not be sentenced on the repealed crime, and reversed the conviction. The court held that the prosecution was deprived of the benefit of its bargain by the relief the court was granting (reversing the sole conviction), and concluded that the dismissed counts could be restored. (Ibid.) Unlike in Collins, petitioner here does not “escape from vulnerability to sentence” (ibid.), for he remains convicted and his punishment is simply reduced.
Even if Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d 208 is not distinguishable from the instant case, it cannot be reconciled with Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, which did not mention Collins, and thus Collins, to the extent applicable, must be deemed impliedly overruled. (See Everett v. Everett (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 65, 71 [“If Stevens v. Kelly [(1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 318] ever correctly stated California law, it surely did not survive Berry v. Chaplin [(1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 652], which simply ignored it. The two cases cannot coexist in a jurisdiction which purports to decide disputes on a rational basis“].) As stated in 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, section 541, page 612, “Overruling may also occur in two stages: (1) A prior authority may be first overlooked, ignored, or purportedly distinguished on untenable grounds. (2) Then, in a later decision, it may be recognized that the early case was ‘impliedly overruled’ by the later one.”
People v. Collins (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 849, cited by real party in interest is not applicable. That case involved a plea agreement conditioned on the juvenile‘s truthfulness. The trial court found that the juvenile gave false testimony and thus set aside the plea bargain and reinstated the original petition. That case had nothing to do with a change in the law, but rather with the failure of the juvenile to comply with his express obligation to be truthful. To the extent that case and In re Blessing (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1026, another case cited by real party in interest, support real party in interest‘s position, in view of Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, they are no longer good law.
In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, also was cited by real party in interest. The court held that a juvenile court‘s dispositional order was unlawful when it ordered a minor placed in a facility other than the Youth Offender Program to which the parties had agreed as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The court in what appears to be dicta said that the juvenile court should have set aside the plea and reinstated all the allegations of the petitions filed against minor. Thus, this case involving a juvenile proceeding (see Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209 [Proposition 47 applies to juvenile proceedings]) concerned the trial court‘s decision—not a change of law. To the extent applicable here, it would be inconsistent with existing law as set forth in Doe, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64. In People v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 567, referred to by real party in interest, the trial court imposed a sentence less than agreed to in the plea bargain. Under those circumstances, the court said the People were entitled to reinstatement of all counts against the defendant. Here, in contrast, the sentence under the plea agreement was consistent with the plea agreement and authorized by law. Thus, People v. Superior Court (Sanchez) is distinguishable.
If applying Proposition 47 to plea agreements can result in vacating the plea and reinstating the original changes, such application would lead to absurd results and would be contrary to the intent of the voters. Plea agreements resolve a vast majority of criminal cases. (See Recent Cases, 121 Harv. L.Rev. (2008) 2230.) If a reduction of a sentence under Proposition 47 results in the reinstatement of the original charges and elimination of the plea agreement, the financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be realized, and the voters’ intent and expectations would be frustrated. Plea agreements would be subject to nullification depending on later enacted provisions. The District Attorney conceded at oral argument that if her position prevailed “quite a few cases” would be affected. Presumably,
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for writ of mandate.
MOSK, J.