THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN JOSEPH SHELTON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S124503
Supreme Court of California
Jan. 5, 2006.
759
Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Madeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G. Herndon, Maggy Krell and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KENNARD, J.--In this case we granted review on two issues concerning a negotiated plea agreement that includes a sentence “lid” constraining the maximum sentence that the trial court may impose: (1) Must the defendant obtain a certificate of probable cause to challenge on appeal the trial court‘s legal authority to impose the maximum or “lid” sentence? (2) Is a challenge that is based on the multiple punishment prohibition of
On the first issue, we conclude that inclusion of a sentence lid implies a mutual understanding and agreement that the trial court has authority to impose the specified maximum sentence and preserves only the defendant‘s right to urge that the trial court should or must exercise its discretion in favor of a shorter term. Accordingly, a challenge to the trial court‘s authority to impose the lid sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a certificate of probable cause. In view of this conclusion, the second issue is moot in this case, and we do not decide it here.
Because the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, we reverse its judgment.
I
On February 4, 2003, the District Attorney of Sacramento County filed a complaint charging defendant Jonathan Joseph Shelton with six felony counts: one count of stalking in violation of a protective order (
On May 30, 2003, the parties appeared in superior court and announced a plea agreement under which defendant would plead no contest to two counts--stalking in violation of a protective order (
The trial court advised defendant of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering the pleas of no contest. The prosecutor then recited the factual basis for the pleas: “On and between January 7th of 2003 and February 2nd of 2003, in Sacramento County, the defendant maliciously and repeatedly followed and harassed Dawn Acerbis and made a credible threat with the intent she be placed in reasonable fear for her safety and the safety of her immediate family. The above conduct occurred while the restraining order was in place in Case Number 02M12679. [][] And on or about January 15th of 2003 in Sacramento County the defendant willfully and unlawfully threatened to kill Dawn Acerbis with the specific intent that she take that as a threat. Further, the threatened crime on its face and the way it was made conveyed an immediate and specific gravity of purpose to Dawn Acerbis and further Dawn Acerbis was reasonably in sustained fear of her safety and the safety of her family based on that.” Defendant then formally entered his no contest plea to the two counts. The remaining three counts of the information were “taken under submission for dismissal at the time of Judgment and Sentence.”
On July 17, 2003, the parties appeared before the trial court for judgment and sentence. Defendant‘s attorney argued that the multiple punishment prohibition of
The trial court asked: “It wasn‘t a stipulated sentence, it was a lid; is that right?” The prosecutor replied: “Correct.” The victim, defendant‘s former wife Dawn Acerbis, addressed the court. The court then pronounced sentence, imposing the middle term of three years on count one (stalking as defined in
On July 25, 2003, defendant filed a notice of appeal stating that the only issue to be raised was that “[t]he sentencing [sic] for the violation of
The Court of Appeal concluded, first, that by entering into a plea agreement with a sentence lid defendant had not waived the right to raise
Justice Vance Raye dissented. In his view, by agreeing to a plea bargain with a sentence lid, defendant “presumably reserved the right to attempt to persuade the [trial] court to exercise its discretion and impose a lower sentence,” but he “did not reserve the right to assert the court was without authority, by virtue of
We granted the Attorney General‘s petition for review, which framed these two issues:
“Did the appellate court have jurisdiction to address the merits of appellant‘s appeal where he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause and in his appeal challenged the imposition of the sentence lid to which he had agreed pursuant to his plea bargain?”
II
Did defendant need to apply for and obtain a certificate of probable cause before he could raise on appeal his claim of trial court sentencing error under
The statutory requirement and its exceptions are embodied in rule 30(b)(4) of the California Rules of Court, which provides that on appeal in a criminal case from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant must apply for and obtain a certificate of probable cause as required by
The crucial question here, disputed by the parties, is whether defendant‘s sentence challenge based on
Defendant insists that, by challenging the lid sentence under
A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles. (People v. Toscano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 340, 344 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 923]; People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 478]; People v. Haney (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1037 [255 Cal.Rptr. 276]; People v. Alvarez (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 629, 633 [198 Cal.Rptr. 167].) “The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (
Applying these principles, we begin with the language of the plea agreement concerning sentencing, as the trial court recited it on the record. The agreement‘s terms regarding sentencing were, first, that the court could not impose a prison sentence longer than three years and eight months; second, that defendant could “argue for something less than three years and eight months“; and, third, that defendant would be sentenced to state prison rather than be granted probation. The second term, permitting defendant to “argue for” a lesser term, is ambiguous because it could mean either, as defendant argues, that he was permitted to argue on any ground for a lesser term or, as the Attorney General argues, that he was permitted to argue for a lesser term only by urging the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in favor of a lesser term.
To resolve the ambiguity, we consider the circumstances under which this term of the plea agreement was made, and the matter to which it relates (
From a defendant‘s point of view, the purpose of a sentence lid is to protect the defendant from a greater sentence. Thus, a sentence lid provision in a plea agreement necessarily implies the defendant‘s understanding and belief that in its absence the trial court might lawfully have imposed a greater sentence. If the maximum sentence authorized by law were at or below the specified sentence lid, the lid provision would be superfluous and of no benefit to the defendant.
From a prosecutor‘s point of view, a sentence lid necessarily implies an understanding and belief that the sentence lid is itself a sentence that the trial court may lawfully impose. If the prosecutor understood or believed that the trial court lacked authority to impose the lid sentence, there would be no utility or benefit to specifying that particular length of time as the maximum sentence.
Thus, the specification of a maximum sentence or lid in a plea agreement normally implies a mutual understanding of the defendant and the prosecutor that the specified maximum term is one that the trial court may lawfully impose and also a mutual understanding that, absent the agreement for the lid, the trial court might lawfully impose an even longer term.
Viewed in this light, when a plea agreement includes a specified maximum sentence, a provision recognizing the defendant‘s right to “argue for a lesser term” is generally understood to mean only that the defendant may urge the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in favor of imposing a punishment that is less severe than the maximum punishment authorized by law. In this case, it is reasonable to conclude that both the prosecutor and the trial court believed, when the plea bargain was made and accepted by the court, that defendant understood it in the same manner, as reserving to him a right to argue for a sentence less than the specified maximum of three years and eight months only on the ground that the trial court should impose a lesser sentence in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, and not on the ground that the trial court lacked authority to impose the specified maximum sentence.
This understanding of the provision giving defendant a right to “argue for” a lesser sentence is reinforced by the prosecutor‘s remarks at the sentencing hearing that he did not know defendant intended to raise a challenge to the court‘s sentencing authority under
Of course, a prosecutor and a defendant may enter into a negotiated disposition that expressly recognizes a dispute or uncertainty about the trial court‘s authority to impose a specified maximum sentence--because of
Here, however, defendant did not reserve, either expressly or impliedly, a right to challenge the trial court‘s authority to impose the lid sentence. Because the plea agreement was based on a mutual understanding (as determined according to principles of contract interpretation) that the court had authority to impose the lid sentence, defendant‘s contention that the lid sentence violated the multiple punishment prohibition of
People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th 773, on which defendant relies, is distinguishable. There, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two felony counts “with an indicated maximum term of six years.” (Id. at p. 777.) The trial court imposed a six-year state prison sentence. (Id. at p. 779.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in imposing that sentence. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for failure to secure a certificate of probable cause. (Id. at p. 780.)
In Buttram, we expressly distinguished the situation, present here, in which a defendant on appeal challenges the trial court‘s authority to impose the lid sentence: “Defendant here does not argue that the maximum sentence provided in his plea bargain was invalid because it exceeded the legally authorized sentence for his convictions. He simply seeks to implement the full terms of the bargain by raising appellate challenges to the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within the agreed maximum that were reserved by the agreement itself. In doing so, we conclude, he need not obtain a certificate of probable cause.” (People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 790.) Our carefully circumscribed holding was that “absent contrary provisions in the plea agreement itself, a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed maximum sentence.” (Ibid.)
Because in this case defendant does not contend that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, but instead that the trial court lacked authority to impose the lid sentence, Buttram is not controlling here. More on point is People v. Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 827, a Court of Appeal decision that this court discussed and distinguished in Buttram. (People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 789-790.) In Young, the defendant pled no contest to all charges and admitted “strike” allegations in return for a sentence lid of 25 years to life and reservation of the right to ask the trial court to dismiss one or more of the “strikes.” When the trial court declined to dismiss any of the “strikes” and imposed the lid sentence, the defendant argued on appeal that the sentence violated constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because defendant had not secured a certificate of probable cause. The court explained: “By arguing that the maximum sentence is unconstitutional, [the defendant] is arguing that part of his plea bargain is illegal and is thus attacking the validity of the plea.” (People v. Young, supra, at p. 832.)
In light of this conclusion, the other issue on which we granted review--whether defendant‘s sentence challenge under
DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal‘s judgment is reversed with directions to dismiss defendant‘s appeal.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Armstrong J.,* concurred.
WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.--I respectfully dissent. In exchange for his agreement to plead no contest to two of the five felony counts charged, defendant was promised a sentence maximum, or “lid,” of three years and eight months. As memorialized by the trial court, the plea agreement expressly reserved defendant‘s right to “argue for something less than three years and eight months.” Nothing in the agreement limited the grounds upon which defendant could argue for a lesser prison sentence, nor did the agreement include any determination that imposition of the lid sentence (or any longer sentence) was authorized under
The majority holds that a plea agreement with a sentence lid “implies a mutual understanding” that the lid is a sentence the court could legally impose. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 768.) I disagree such an agreement carries with it any such necessary implication, in particular that it does so as to the defense‘s understanding of the agreement. The specification of a maximum sentence in a plea agreement is consideration provided to, not by, the defendant, the defendant‘s proffered consideration being his agreement to plead guilty or no contest. Thus in entering such a plea agreement the defendant makes no implied promise or representation as to the legality of the lid sentence.
The majority‘s reasoning rests on a false premise. A defendant agreeing to plead to a sentence lid does not necessarily believe that a greater sentence is legally possible. Advised by counsel, he may believe, for example, that
Additionally, the plea agreement might have other provisions--such as the prosecutor‘s promise to dismiss some of the charges--that are of greater importance to the defense than the sentence lid. That a lid in a given case may prove of little or no value would not necessarily preclude a defendant‘s agreement to a deal that included such a lid.
Finally, in some cases--and this is one--a sentence higher than the lid may be permitted even if under
*Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.