Hanners v. Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable SDN BHDHanners v. Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable SDN BHD
Rendered on December 10, 2009
Cooper & Elliott, Rex H. Elliott, Charles H. Cooper, Jr., and John C. Camillus; Bryan K. Harris, P.C., and Bryan K. Harris; Watts Law Firm, L.L.P., and Mikal C. Watts, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Davis & Young, and Richard M. Garner, for defendants-appellants.
Jacob H. Huebert, Amicus Curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
I. Introduction
{¶1} This appeal presents the issue of whether a trial court‘s entry denying a defendant‘s motion to bifurcate the plaintiff‘s claims for compensatory damages from the plaintiff‘s claims for punitive damages in a tort action is a final, appealable order pursuant to
A. Background
{¶2} Defendants-appellants, Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable SDN BHD, Ho Wah Genting SDN BHD, Ho Wah Genting International Limited, Ho Wah Genting Trading SDN BHD, Ho Wah Genting Berhad, and Pt. Ho Wah Genting (“appellants“), appeal the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which, among other things, denied in part their motion for bifurcation. The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants.
{¶3} On October 27, 2006, Mindy S. Hanners and her three children, Katelynn, Nevaeh, and Austin, died in a house fire. Kathy S. Hanners, individually, and as administrator of the estate of Katelynn and Mindy, and Harry F. Gillespie, III, individually, and as administrator of the estate of Nevaeh and Austin, plaintiffs-appellees (“appellees“), filed a wrongful death action against, among others, appellants, whom appellees
{¶4} On December 12, 2008, appellants filed a motion to bifurcate the punitive damages proceedings pursuant to
B. Assignments of Error
{¶5} Appellants appeal the journal entry of the trial court. They assert the following assignments of error:
- THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DECLARING
R.C. 2315.21(B) TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY VIOLATING OHIO‘S SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY
R.C. 2315.21(B) IN THIS CASE.
II. Analysis
A. Final, Appealable Order
{¶6} As an initial matter, we must address whether the journal entry appealed from is a final, appealable order. On May 6, 2009, this court issued a show cause order requesting that appellants show cause as to why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order, and appellees filed a memorandum in response. It is well-established that a trial court‘s bifurcation determination under
{¶7} Appellants contend, however, that the trial court‘s journal entry was a final, appealable order, pursuant to
{¶8} In their complaint, as their thirteenth cause of action, appellees sought a declaration that “current enactments” of SB 80 are unconstitutional. Appellants denied the claim and thereafter moved to dismiss this request for declaratory relief.
{¶9} Appellants also moved to bifurcate appellees’ punitive damage claims based on
{¶10} The trial court‘s March 12, 2009 entry denied appellants’ motion to dismiss appellees’ constitutional claims. The court expressed “doubt that the proper procedure”
{¶11} In the same order, the court addressed and denied appellants’ motion to bifurcate the trial. The court found, first, that
{¶12}
{¶13} Here, the trial court concluded that a conflict exists between
B. R.C. 2315.21(B) and Civ.R. 42(B)
{¶14} In their first and second assignments of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred by declaring
{¶15} As we noted, the Modern Courts Amendment grants to the Supreme Court of Ohio the exclusive authority to prescribe rules for court practice and procedure. To determine whether a statute enacted by the General Assembly infringes on this exclusive
{¶16}
(B)(1) In a tort action that is tried to a jury and in which a plaintiff makes a claim for compensatory damages and a claim for punitive or exemplary damages, upon the motion of any party, the trial of the tort action shall be bifurcated as follows:
(a) The initial stage of the trial shall relate only to the presentation of evidence, and a determination by the jury, with respect to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant. During this stage, no party to the tort action shall present, and the court shall not permit a party to present, evidence that relates solely to the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant.
(b) If the jury determines in the initial stage of the trial that the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant, evidence may be presented in the second stage of the trial, and a determination by that jury shall be made, with respect to whether the plaintiff additionally is entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant.
(2) In a tort action that is tried to a jury and in which a plaintiff makes a claim for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages, the court shall instruct the jury to return, and the jury shall return, a general verdict and, if that verdict is in favor of the plaintiff, answers to an interrogatory that specifies the total compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff from each defendant.
(3) In a tort action that is tried to a court and in which a plaintiff makes a claim for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages, the court shall make its determination with respect to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant and, if that determination is in favor of the plaintiff, shall make findings of fact that specify the total compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff from each defendant.
{¶17} We begin with the principle that, “[w]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312, paragraph five of the syllabus. Thus, “[i]t is only where the words of a statute are ambiguous or are based upon an uncertain meaning or there is an apparent conflict of some provisions that a court has the right to interpret a statute.” Drake-Lassie v. State Farm Ins. Cos. (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 781, 788, citing Kroff v. Amrhein (1916), 94 Ohio St. 282.
{¶18} Here, there is no ambiguity.
{¶19}
(B) Separate trials
The court, after a hearing, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right to trial by jury.
{¶21} Appellants contend that
{¶22} Admittedly,
{¶23} The Supreme Court has defined “substantive” for these purposes as the body of law that ” ‘creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties.’ ” Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, ¶17, quoting Krause v. State (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 132, overruled on other grounds,
{¶24} At first blush,
{¶25} In uncodified section 3 of SB 80, the General Assembly made a “statement of findings and intent.” That statement included the General Assembly‘s findings that the “current civil litigation system represents a challenge to the economy of the state of Ohio,” and “that a fair system of civil justice strikes an essential balance between the rights of those who have been legitimately harmed and the rights of those who have been unfairly sued.” Id. at section 3(A)(1) and (2). The General Assembly also found that “[r]eform to the punitive damages law in Ohio is urgently needed to restore balance, fairness, and predictability to the civil justice system.” Id. at section 3(A)(4)(a).
{¶26} Most important for our purposes here, the General Assembly distinguished between non-economic damages, which compensate a plaintiff, and punitive damages, which punish a defendant. The General Assembly expressed its belief that “inflation of noneconomic damages is partially due to the improper consideration of evidence of wrongdoing in assessing pain and suffering damages.” Id. at section 3(A)(6)(d). And it also found that “[i]nflated damage awards create an improper resolution of civil justice claims. The increased and improper cost of litigation and resulting rise in insurance premiums is passed on to the general public through higher prices for products and services.” Id. at section 3(A)(6)(e).
{¶28} From these expressions of legislative intent, we conclude that
{¶29} The Supreme Court of Ohio reached a similar conclusion in Loyd. In that case, the court considered whether a statute creating a method for obtaining relief from a child support order conflicts with
{¶30} Based on this precedent, we must similarly conclude that
III. Conclusion
{¶31} For all these reasons, we sustain appellants’ assignments of error. We reverse the trial court‘s denial of appellants’ motion to bifurcate pursuant to
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SADLER, J., concurs.
BROWN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
{¶32} I concur with the majority‘s determination that the trial court‘s entry was a final appealable order under
{¶33} The crux of the majority‘s decision is that, although
{¶34} As this court has noted before, “[w]hile these general rules are easily stated, they are not so easily applied.” State v. Weber (1997), 125 Ohio App.3d 120, 130. The Supreme Court has commented on several occasions that it is sometimes difficult to draw a distinction between substantive and procedural law. See, e.g., Gregory v. Flowers (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 56, citing Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence (1911), 217 (“[t]he distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory“); French v. Dwiggins (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 32, 33-34 (“[t]he remedial-procedural versus substantive dichotomy is seldom an easy distinction to make“); Cook v. Matvejs (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 234, 237 (conceding there is a “somewhat muddled distinction” between procedural and substantive rights). Nevertheless, courts continue to be called upon to draw such a distinction.
{¶35} Here, the majority concludes that, despite the appearance that the statute addresses a procedural issue, the uncodified language associated with
{¶36} However, I would find that
{¶37} Notwithstanding the above authorities, the majority finds
{¶38} Accordingly, I would overrule appellants’ assignments of error.