Proctor v. KardassilarisProctor v. Kardassilaris
Lead Opinion
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This appeal presents the issue of whether
{¶ 2} In 2001, appellee, Director of Transportation Gordon Proctor, initiated separate appropriation actions against appellants Kathy Kardassilaris and others (“Kardassilaris”) and Richard Blank and others (“Blank”) in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Proctor sought to take parts of the Kardassilaris and Blank parcels to make improvements to State Route 5 in Cortland, Ohio. The trial
{¶ 3} In 2004, Kardassilaris and Blank were granted leave of court to file inverse-condemnation counterclaims in mandamus in their respective appropriation actions. Each alleged that ODOT went beyond the boundaries of the appropriations and damaged their properties when it made the improvements. They requested writs of mandamus compelling Proctor to appropriate the additional parts of their properties that they alleged were taken during this process. Further, they sought jury awards for the value of the additional property seized and related damages.
{¶ 4} Proctor moved to dismiss these counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
{¶ 5} On appeal, Kardassilaris and Blank argued that their counterclaims arose from the same transactions and occurrences as the appropriation proceedings, and thus
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction on the Kardassilaris and Blank appeals (2006-1242 and 2006-1243 respectively) and consolidated them for review. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} It is well-settled law that a state is not subject to suit in its own courts unless it expressly consents to be sued. See Manning v. Ohio State Library Bd. (1991),
{¶ 8} However, this provision did not provide specific consent for every state entity to be sued in every state court. See Conley v. Shearer (1992),
{¶ 10} While there are exceptions for actions brought by railroad companies, those brought by property owners to prevent due process violations, and those brought pursuant to certain enumerated chapters of the Revised Code, id., Kardassilaris and Blank do not claim that any of these exceptions apply to them. Instead, they offer three arguments for the contention that this statute does not apply to the inverse-condemnation counterclaims they asserted in the trial court.
A.
{¶ 11} Kardassilaris and Blank first take issue with the use of the word “suable” in
{¶ 12} When analyzing a statute, our primary goal is to apply the legislative intent manifested in the words of the statute. See State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995),
{¶ 13} The only ambiguity alleged here is with the meaning of the word “suable.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “suable” means “[c]apable of being sued.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1464. To sue is to institute a lawsuit against another party. Id. at 1473. A “suit” is defined as “[a]ny proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court of law.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1475. Conversely, “counter-suable” appears to be the creation of counsel for Kardassilaris and Blank; we are unable to find a definition for the
{¶ 14} According to the plain meaning of the term “suable” and that of the related terms arising from its definition,
{¶ 15} The plain language of
B. Interplay of Civil Rules and Statutory Law
{¶ 16} Kardassilaris and Blank next argue that even if
{¶ 17} The Modern Courts Amendment empowers this court to create rules of practice and procedure for the courts of this state, including the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. However, it expressly states that rules created in this manner “shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” Id. Thus, if a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for matters of substantive law. See Boyer v. Boyer (1976),
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Because
C. Public Policy
{¶ 20} Finally, Kardassilaris and Blank argue that “there is no logical or practical reason to conduct two separate lawsuits in two separate counties,” especially when a trial court has already established jurisdiction over the same parties, and the counterclaim arises from the same transaction and occurrence as the original claim. Further, they argue that combining the complaint and counterclaim conserves legal resources and promotes judicial economy.
{¶ 21} Proctor takes issue with this argument, suggesting that the counterclaims here did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the original appropriation actions, but rather are claims for later-arising damages that have no bearing to the original cases. Thus, he argues that Kardassilaris and Blank exaggerate the legal resources that could be saved and the judicial economy that could be obtained by prosecuting these counterclaims in Trumbull County.
{¶ 22} However, even if we were to assume that appellants’ counterclaims actually arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the appropriation actions and that time and effort could be saved by joining them to the pending actions in Trumbull County, we would be unable to order such a result here. “When this court has been called upon to give effect to an Act of the General Assembly, a standard of judicial restraint has developed when the wording of the enactment is clear and unambiguous. For example, a statute that is free from ambiguity and doubt is not subject to judicial modification under the guise of interpretation.” Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979),
{¶23} Having concluded that
III. Conclusion
{¶ 24} The use of the term “suable” of
{¶ 25} The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 26} I would concur in the majority opinion but for the fact that there has not been a trial on the original appropriation action. Given that,