I
{¶ 1} In 1985, Willa Loyd gave birth to D.L. In November 1995, appellant, Cuyahoga Child Support Enforcement Agency, filed an action on behalf of Loyd and D.L. against appellee, Gregory Lovelady, to establish paternity. Upon Lovelady’s failure to plead or enter an appearance, the court entered a default judgment in 1996 finding that Lovelady was D.L.’s fаther and ordering him to pay child support. More than seven years later, in February 2003, Lovelady filed a motion for rеlief from the 1996 order under R.C. 3119.961 et seq., asserting that recent DNA testing proved that he is not D.L.’s biological father.
{¶ 2} The trial court denied Lovelady’s motion for relief, citing Van Dusen v. Van Dusen,
{¶ 3} Lovelady appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause. The court of apрeals held that R.C. 3119.961 et seq. do not violate the constitutional separation of powers, because those sections establish a substantive right, not a procedural right.
{¶ 4} The cause is before this court upon the accеptance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 5} The issue is whether the enactment of R.C. 3119.961 et seq. violates thе separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches. We conclude that R.C. 3119.961 et seq. are constitutional because they do not conflict with this court’s exclusive authority to prescribe rules governing procedure in the courts of this state granted by Section 5(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.
II
{¶ 6} Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution stаtes that the Supreme Court is vested with exclusive authority to “prescribe rules governing practice and proсedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the сourt has adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure, which “prescribe the procedure to be followed in all courts of this state in the
{¶ 7} In 2000, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3119.961 et seq., effective March 22, 2001. 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 10123. These statutes are expressly intended to operate “[notwithstanding the provisions to thе contrary in Civil Rule 60(B).” R.C. 3119.961(A). R.C. 3119.962 provides:
{¶ 8} “Upon the filing of a motion for relief under section 3119.961 of the Revised Code, a court shаll grant relief from * * * a child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor if all of the following aрply:
{¶ 9} “(a) The court receives genetic test results from a genetic test administered no more than six months prior tо the filing of the motion for relief that finds that there is a zero per cent probability that the person or male minor is the father of the child.
{¶ 10} “(b) The person or male minor has not adopted the child.
{¶ 11} “(c) The child was not concеived as a result of artificial insemination in compliance with sections 3111.88 to 3111.96 of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 12} Appellant argues that R.C. 3119.961(A) conflicts with Civ.R. 60(B) by expressly overriding the rule and that R.C. 3119.961 et seq. are therefore an intrusion on this court’s authority grаnted under Section 5(B), Article IV.
Ill
{¶ 13} “An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before а court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955),
{¶ 14} Fortunately, we have a clear and unambiguous statеment from the General Assembly that is directly on point. The relevant portions of R.C. 3119.961 and 3119.962 are a composite оf former R.C. 3113.2111(A), (B), and (C). See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 242, 148 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1819, effective October 27, 2000. Section 3 of H.B. No. 242, in enacting former R.C. 3113.2111, provided that “[t]hе General Assembly hereby declares that it is a person’s * * * substantive right to obtain relief from a final judgment, court order, оr administrative determination or order that * * * requires the person * * * to pay child support for a child.” R.C. 3119.961 et seq. werе enacted to make it less likely that a person would be forced to support a child that is not his. Thus, although R.C. 3119.961 and 3119.962 аre necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that the General Assembly intended tо create a substantive right to address potential injustice. The recodification of R.C. 3113.2111 as R.C. 3119.961 et seq. does not alter the General Assembly’s original intent to create a substantive right. See Spring v. Bevard,
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we conclude that R.C. 3119.961 et seq. do not conflict with Civ.R. 60(B) in such a way as to violate the separation of powers required by Section 5(B), Article IV of thе Ohio Constitution. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to determine whether Lovelady should be granted relief pursuant to R.C. 3119.962.
Judgment affirmed.