Guerra v. CastilloGuerra v. Castillo
Rodney Guerra, formerly a patrol sergeant in the Alamo, Texas police department, brought a
I.
In reciting the following allegations from Guerra‘s complaint, we “accept all facts as pleaded and construe them in the light most favorable to [Guerra].” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2022); Vardeman v. City of Hous., 55 F.4th 1045, 1049 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The Rule 12(c) standard is the same as that applied to
Guerra was promoted to sergeant in the patrol department of the City‘s police department in the first half of 2018. In July of 2018, a subordinate patrol officer arrested a suspect for driving while intoxicated and the suspect spat on the officer‘s face. But the suspect was a strong political supporter of the City‘s mayor (the “Mayor“) who called then-police chief Castillo, Guerra‘s direct superior, and urged that the charges be dropped. Castillo proceeded to call Guerra and urged Guerra to tell the officer to drop the charges. But Guerra, “[i]n support of his officer,” refused and, in Guerra‘s words, “unwittingly stoked the maliciousness, vengefulness, and ire of Defendant Castillo who was furious at Plaintiff [Guerra] for making him appear ‘worthless’ in the eyes of [the] Mayor.”
During the same period, a probationary patrol officer (the “Probationary Officer“) was released for failure to meet her probationary goals and “accidentally forgot a pair of prescription rayban (reading) glasses in her patrol unit.” The glasses were found by an officer who turned them over to former defendant Sergeant Xavier Martinez. Martinez did not place the glasses in the lost and found or the evidence room, but rather on his own desk, in the same area where Guerra‘s desk was located. As the complaint then describes:
After Martinez placed the reading eyeglasses on his own desk, Plaintiff Guerra sаw the reading glasses on Defendant Martinez‘s desk, tried them on, and placed them on his own desk. For about the next month, with the knowledge of the other supervisory officer and Sergeants, Srgt. Martinez and Srgt. Guerra played “tug of war” with the reading eyeglasses, as each would playfully take the reading eyeglasses from the other‘s desk and place them on his own desk for use.
Soon after, Castillo enlisted an investigator and directed him “to ‘find a way to get rid of‘” Guerra. The investigator homed in on the glasses, but at least one officer told the investigator, “we really don‘t have anything” on Guerra for merely using the glasses. The investigator informed Castillo that the investigation “conclusively established that no crime had been committed” by Guerra, but Castillo allegedly responded, “I don‘t care. He can beat the charge, but he can‘t beat the ride. Get me enough to file a warrant!”
Castillo then enlisted an “Internal Affairs Officer” to conduct “an administrative investigation” regarding the glasses, and the Internal Affairs Officer attempted to enlist the assistance of the Probationary Officer, the former owner of the glasses, in filing criminal charges. The Probationary Officer initially еxpressed no interest, saying, “Throw the glasses away.” However, “[a]fter a significant amount of cajoling and pressuring, [the Officer] agreed to provide a statement that she had not authorized anyone to use her glasses.”
Subsequently, on October 19, 2018, the Internal Affairs Officer notified Guerra that “he was being investigated for ‘property that was checked out from the evidence room’ and allegedly ‘appropriated by [Guerra] without cause or justification,‘” months earlier. Castillo immediately placed Guerra on administrative leave and informed him he was
Soon after, on October 24, Castillo “resorted to ‘blackmail’ against [Guerra] by expressly informing him that if he did not resign by 5:00 p.m. on that day, he was going to terminate him and file a criminal prosecution.” This was despite the fact Castillo “actually [k]new that no probable cause existed.” Guerra refused to resign.
On October 25, Castillo “officially suspended [Guerra], recommended his termination, and ordered him to surrender his weapon and badge,” and an arrest warrant was issued against Guerra for Class B misdemeanor theft. Guerra‘s counsel arranged to voluntarily present Guerra for arraignment at an agreed time and hour on October 26, but when Castillo learned of the timing, he contacted “all of the local television and print media to be present at the arraignment,” “parad[ing]” Guerra beforе the local media and “effectively destroying Plaintiff‘s future credibility and career as a law enforcement officer.” Guerra immediately posted his bond.
On November 2, 2018, Guerra was officially terminated in a letter from former defendant Luciano Ozuna. Plaintiff‘s counsel requested an administrative hearing from Ozuna on November 7, “to discuss the false allegations against Plaintiff that had wrongfully resulted in his dismissal[,] but the hearing was never provided.”
A few months later, the complaint claims, “Defendant Castillo was completely incensed and enraged” when he learned the district attorney was about to dismiss the theft charge against Guerra because the district attorney had found “no evidence of a theft having been committed.” Castillo,
Guerra‘s counsel again arranged for Guerra to appear at a specific time when a judge was ready and able to set his bond. Guerra appeared on January 8, 2019. The media was again present because Castillo “had advised [them] that he would be having a press conference.” Castillo then “stopped” his staff from taking Guerra to the courthouse because “Castillo decided he was going to make Plaintiff Guerra sit in a jail cell ovеrnight.” The complaint alleges Guerra‘s cell was cold, he was denied a blanket, and Guerra‘s counsel was not allowed to see him.
All charges against Guerra were dismissed on May 2, 2019, based on insufficient evidence.
Guerra timely filed suit under
The other officers filed a motion to dismiss under
The City also filed a motion to dismiss under
Later, Castillo moved to dismiss under
II.
Guerra timely appeals the City‘s dismissal under
We review a district court‘s grant of a
A 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is also reviewed de novo, and the 12(c) standard “is the same as that applied to
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‘” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
We undertake a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, inquiring:
(1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant‘s alleged misconduct.
“[A] clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must plead “facts which, if proved, would defeat [the] claim оf immunity.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2018)). The pleading standards remain “the same when a motion to dismiss is based on qualified immunity. The crucial question is whether the complaint pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are liable under
A. False Arrest
We begin with Guerra‘s false arrest claim and whether the facts alleged overcome Castillo‘s qualified immunity defense.3
The Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause is clearly established. Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 285. Guerra‘s argument that Castillo violated his Fourth Amendment right against false arrest is based on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Franks liability “addresses the distinct issue of false information in a warrant application.” Melton, 875 F.3d at 264. Clearly established law at the time of Castillo‘s actions laid out that under Franks,
The court below thought Castillo‘s alleged actions were relevantly like the actions of Sheriff Dolph Bryan in Hampton v. Oktibbeha County Sheriff Department, 480 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2007). In that case, an officer went to a
Hampton brought a
We disagree that Castillo‘s alleged actions are relevantly like Sheriff Bryan‘s.4 Guerra‘s complaint presents Castillo as the sole moving force behind a deliberate, long-term conspiracy to create and file affidavits Castillo knew to be false, with the purpose of exploiting the criminal justice system to arrest, detain, and torment Guerra for crimes Castillo knew he did not commit. Castillo, moreover, ordered the sham investigations that served as
Instead, we hold that Terwilliger v. Reyna controls here. 4 F.4th 270. In that case, 177 people were arrested using a form affidavit after a shooting had left 9 dead and at least 20 injured at a May 2015 gathering of motorcycle clubs. Id. at 277-78. After the state failed to convict anyone, 31 of the arresteеs filed
In a
We then proceeded to our qualified immunity analysis and asked whether, treating the facts in plaintiffs’ complaint as true, Reyna‘s actions fell within the ambit of Franks liability. We said,
Reyna . . . neither signеd nor swore to the affidavit. Thus, Franks liability can only attach if he provided material information for use in the affidavit. The Plaintiffs plead generally that Reyna, among others, “caused an affidavit against each plaintiff to be presented.” Such conclusory language is insufficient standing alone. In more detail, the Plaintiffs plead that Reyna was provided with evidence both from the scene and interviews of attendees. But, acting contrary to the information provided to him, he stated that “all bikers wearing colors” should be arrested. Accordingly, and treating his function as that of an investigator [subject to qualified immunity, rather than a prosecutor who would be entitled to absolute immunity], Reyna generated the basic facts set out in the probable cause affidavit. Thus, the Plaintiffs allege that Reyna “knew the exact wording of the affidavit” and knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that, based on the exculpatory evidence he had learned, probable cause did not exist to arrest some individuals potentially fitting the warrant‘s criteria. These allegations are sufficient to tie him to potential Franks liability.
Notably, our analysis made no mention of any рarticular false information Reyna provided for use in the affidavits. Instead, we emphasized Reyna‘s causal role as the driving force behind the false affidavits and arrests, alongside the fact he was presented with evidence that at least some bikers
Our court then made clear that we wеre deciding both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis against Reyna. Id. at 285. Referring back to the analysis quoted above, we found that Reyna‘s alleged actions violated the “clearly established right to be free from arrest without a good faith showing of probable cause.” Id. Importantly, this holding addresses the state of the law when Reyna acted in 2015.
Turning back to the case at bar, we hold that Castillo‘s alleged actions are relevantly like Reyna‘s for purposes of evaluating his potential Franks liability at the
To the extent our analysis of Reyna‘s alleged actions applies imperfectly to Castillo‘s, that is because Castillo‘s alleged actions are more outrageous. We note, in particular, that Reyna faced a responsibility to seek justice in the immediate aftermath of enormous tragedy and wrongdoing. Castillo, in contrast, acted on a personal vendetta, and he exploited the
In sum, because Reyna “generated” the basic facts in the probable cause affidavits, such that the district court was correct to deny his
B. Malicious Prosecution
Separately, Guerra argues that Castillo is liable under
Guerra argues that the district court erred in light of Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022), which presupposes the possibility of a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution. Id. at 1341 (“[A] Fourth
But Fifth Circuit case law between 2003 (Castellano) and 2021 (Anokwuru) explicitly denied the possibility of a constitutional malicious prosecution claim. When evaluating whether Castillo violated clearly established law for purposes of our qualified immunity analysis, we consider whether the law was clearly established “at the time of the defendant‘s alleged misconduct.” Jennings, 644 F.3d at 300 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). We AFFIRM the district court‘s
IV.
Guerra also raises a First Amendment retaliation claim against Castillo on the theory that Castillo retaliated against Guerra for protected political speech.
The district court found that Guerra failed to allege sufficient facts to support this theory, which would require that Guerra engaged in First Amendment protected speech and that the protected speech motivated Castillo‘s retaliatory acts. See Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2005); Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 640-41 (5th Cir. 2018). We agree with the district court.
Guerra plausibly alleges that his refusal to direct his subordinate to drop the DWI charges, despite Castillo‘s urging, was a but-for cause and substantial motivation for Castillo‘s retaliatory acts. But Guerra has failed to put forward any law that suggests Guerra‘s refusal to do as his direct superior asked, in the context of his employment as a patrol sergeant, constitutes First Amendment protected speech, let alone that it is First Amendment protected speeсh under clearly established law. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19, 424 (2006).
Given that this is a qualified immunity context, “[i]t is the plaintiff‘s burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate,” even at the motion to dismiss stage. Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 280. We conclude that Guerra has failed to overcome Castillo‘s qualified immunity because he has put forward no authority relevant to the question whether his refusal was protected speech.7
We AFFIRM the district court‘s dismissal of Guerra‘s First Amendment claim against Castillo.
Finally, Guerra raises a
Guerra‘s complaint alleges that both Castillo and the City Manager, Ozuna, were policymakers. We begin with Castillo.
Guerra‘s complaint states that the City “permit[ed] its Chief of Police unrestricted control of the police Department. . . . This abdication of authority as expressly set forth in their city charter and as customarily[] practiced by the city and its agents, has resulted in a сonsistent abuse of due process to aggrieved individuals such as plaintiff and a deprivation of his right to due process under the 4th Amendment . . . and under the Monell [s]tandards set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.” No citation is made to a particular part of the city charter.
In its motion to dismiss below, the City produced parts of the city charter to argue that “all powers of the City of Alamo [are] vested in [its] Board of Commissioners” and that neither the Chief of Police nor the City Manager has policymaking authority. It also argued, in further briefing, that Guerra failed to “identify any facts to establish the City ever delegated рolicymaking authority to Castillo.”
In reply, Guerra reproduced the same parts of the city charter, bolding the phrase “[The Board] may pass any ordinances they may desire delegating any part of their authority and duties to any other person, offices or
The above does not allow this court to plausibly infer that Castillo had “more” than either “complete discretionary authority []or the unreviewability of such authority,” as Zarnow requires. 614 F.3d at 168.
Next, Guerra argues that Ozuna, the City Manager, had policymaking authority under Monell.8 Guerra‘s complaint noted that he was terminated in a letter from Ozuna. The complaint also claims that Guerra‘s counsel had requested an administrative hearing from Ozuna “to discuss the false allegations against Plaintiff that had wrongfully resulted in his dismissal[,] but the hearing was never provided.”
Once again, Guerra‘s complaint does not identify facts that allow this court to plausibly infer that Ozuna had both complete or unreviewable discretionary authority and also “more.” See id. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court‘s dismissal of the City under
VI.
We REVERSE the district court‘s dismissal of Guerra‘s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Castillo and REMAND for further