CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. OHIO EDISON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
Nos. 96-38, 96-39, 96-40, 96-41, 96-42 and 96-43
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
January 7, 1998
80 Ohio St.3d 591 | 1998-Ohio-179
Taxation—Electric utilities—Real property valuation—Requirements of R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19 substantially complied with in complaint to county board of revision seeking decrease in valuation of property, when.
(Nos. 96-38, 96-39, 96-40, 96-41, 96-42 and 96-43—Submitted March 19, 1997—Decided January 7, 1998.)
APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 95-K-849, 95-K-848, 95-K-843, 95-K-842, 95-K-841 and 95-K-840.
{¶ 1} On March 31, 1995, appellants, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (case No. 96-38) and the Duquesne Light Company (case No. 96-39), each filed a real property valuation complaint with the Lake County Board of Revision (“BOR“) for tax year 1994. The complaints involved the real property
{¶ 2} Also on March 31, 1995, appellants, the Toledo Edison Company (case No. 96-40), the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (case No. 96-41), the Pennsylvania Power Company (case No. 96-42), and the Ohio Edison Company (case No. 96-43), each filed two real property valuation complaints with the BOR for tax year 1994. One complaint from each company related to real property in the North Perry Village taxing district, while the other complaint related to adjoining real property in the Perry Township taxing district. All of these complaints concerned real property associated with a nuclear-powered generating plant known as the Perry Plant, which is located in the Perry Local School District.
{¶ 3} The local school districts filed countercomplaints against each complaint. The Willoughby-Eastlake School Board sought no increase in the county auditor‘s value for the Eastlake Plant. However, the Perry Local School District sought an increase in the tax value for all the real property of the Perry Plant. All the foregoing cases have been consolidated for a hearing and decision by this court.
{¶ 4} The issues raised by these cases relate to the manner in which the appellants (collectively referred to as “CEI“) answered the questions set forth on the form entitled “Complaint on the Assessment of Real Property” (the “complaint” or “DTE Form 1“). Questions 7 and 8 on DTE Form 1 are the questions at issue in this case.
{¶ 5} The preface to Question 7 on DTE Form 1 reads as follows: “Statement of Value: The complainant must set forth the amount of increase or decrease in taxable value that is sought.” Question 7(A) asks the complainant to set forth its opinion of the true value (fair market value) of its real property. Question 7(B) asks the complainant for its opinion of the taxable value of the real property (thirty-five percent of true value). In response to both questions 7(A) and
{¶ 6} Question 8 on DTE Form 1 asks the complainant to state that “the increase or decrease in taxable value requested is justified for the following reasons.” CEI‘s response to that question was “To be determined.”
{¶ 7} The school boards filed motions with the BOR seeking to have the complaints dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The school boards alleged that CEI‘s responses on the DTE 1 form were insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the board of revision.
{¶ 8} After both parties had filed briefs, but without a hearing, the BOR dismissed the complaints for want of jurisdiction. CEI appealed the dismissals to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“). At the BTA, the BOR moved to dismiss the appeals, stating that at the BOR, CEI had failed to state “the amount at which Taxpayers believed the property should be valued” and “the reasons supporting such a reduction.” The BTA affirmed the BOR‘s dismissal of the complaints. The BTA relied on this court‘s decision in Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 67 O.O.2d 296, 313 N.E.2d 14, which held that the information solicited on the DTE Form 1 is required by statute to be provided and that a taxpayer‘s failure to provide the information leaves the local board of revision without jurisdiction to consider the complaint. CEI filed these appeals as of right.
{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court upon appeals as of right.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Brown, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Lake County Auditor and Lake County Board of Revision.
George R. Hicks, Jr.; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Robin G. Weaver, Bebe A. Fairchild and Ted B. Clevenger, for appellants Toledo Edison Company,
Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellees Perry Local Schools Board of Education and Willoughby Eastlake Board of Education.
PFEIFER, J.
{¶ 10} We find that the appellants in these cases substantially complied with the requirements of
{¶ 11} The BTA based its decision against CEI on Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 236, 67 O.O.2d 296, 298, 313 N.E.2d 14, 16, wherein this court found that the DTE Form 1 in use at that time was “clearly designed to elicit information required by
{¶ 12} In Stanjim, the taxpayer had left a large portion of the form, entitled “Pertinent Facts,” completely blank. That portion of the form was designed to elicit the information required by
“The county board of revision shall not decrease any valuation complained of unless the party affected thereby or his agent makes and files with the board a written application therefor, verified by oath, showing the facts upon which it is claimed such decrease should be made.”
{¶ 13} Instead of providing information, the Stanjim taxpayers had typewritten, “All other pertinent data substantiating this complaint of over valuation will be presented at requested hearing.” The BOR in Stanjim dismissed the complaints because they did not comply with the requirements for filing, and that decision was affirmed by the BTA and this court.
{¶ 15} The data kept on the property record card includes such information as the size of the parcel, utilities, building details, the date and price of any transfers, and rental income. Today, if the auditor complies with the property record card requirements, most of the relevant data requested by the Pertinent Facts section of the Stanjim form is now recorded on the property record card in his or her possession.
{¶ 16} In addition, the second page of the current DTE Form 1 sets forth that if the property owner is seeking a decrease for income-producing, commercial, or industrial property, he must submit additional information “no later than at the time of the hearing,” relating to physical data for the property, income data for rental property, and other data such as zoning and a floor plan.
{¶ 17} Stanjim hinged on the taxpayer‘s failure to fill out the “Pertinent Facts” portion of the DTE Form 1. That section is missing from the current form, and only a few questions remain that are similar to those on the Stanjim form. Question 9, for instance, asks whether the property had been sold in the last three
{¶ 18} The BTA found CEI to be in noncompliance with
{¶ 19} No specific, verifiable information is requested in Question 8. It seeks not so much fact as opinion or theory. In this case, appellants fully answered the factual questions that remained from the Stanjim form; much of the other information sought by the Stanjim form is now contained in the property record held by the auditor.
{¶ 20} We find that Question 8 of the DTE Form 1 used in this case does not elicit information required by
{¶ 21} The BTA also found that CEI did not meet jurisdictional requirements of
{¶ 22} Question 7 of the DTE Form 1 concerns valuation. Part (A) of that question requests the complainant‘s opinion of true value (fair market value) of the property. CEI responded “unknown at present.” Question 7(B) requests the complainant‘s opinion of total taxable value, which is simply thirty-five percent of true value. Having answered “unknown” as to part A, CEI left Question 7(B) blank.
{¶ 23} CEI‘s responses to Question 7 were somewhat vague, but were not a complete omission. For example, by demanding a decrease of at least $50,000 in total taxable value, and given the property‘s current taxable value (thirty-five percent of true value) of $49,725,150 (parcel No. 05A-888-0-00-100-0), CEI opines that the taxable value of the property is no more than $49,675,180. Since the taxable value is thirty-five percent of true value, CEI‘s opinion of the maximum true value of the property therefore would be $141,929,086. Thus, save a few simple mathematic computations, CEI‘s opinion of true value was contained in its complaint. The question remains, however, whether giving a “ceiling” figure is enough to satisfy the requirements of
{¶ 24} There is no requirement that the value of the property, as determined by the board of revision, must match the opinion of value set forth in the complaint. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 61, 69 O.O.2d 353, 320 N.E.2d 658, this court considered whether in an appeal to a court of common pleas (in lieu of an appeal to the BTA) from a decision of the board of revision, the court could find a value which was lower than that claimed by the taxpayer in its complaint filed with the board of revision. The argument raised in Jones & Laughlin was that by setting a value in the complaint filed with the board of revision, the taxpayer made an admission that the real estate in question had the value stated in the complaint. This court rejected that argument and stated that in determining value the complaint “places neither minimum nor maximum limitations on the court‘s determination of value, and there are none save the judicial requirement that the determination be supported by the evidence.” Id. at 63, 69 O.O.2d at 354, 320 N.E.2d at 660.
{¶ 26} In Akron Std. Div. v. Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10, 11 OBR 9, 462 N.E.2d 419, this court enunciated a “core of procedural efficiency” standard regarding substantial compliance with a tax statute as it related to the requirements of a reassessment petition. In Akron Standard, this court held that lack of a statutorily mandated verified signature was not a basis for dismissing a reassessment petition:
“The lack of a verified signature in a reassessment petition does not prevent the attachment of jurisdiction by an otherwise satisfactory filing, since substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute has taken place. The verification requirement is to be distinguished from the requirement that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of assessment, and also from the requirement that the order of the commissioner be included in the notice of appeal. The latter two requirements are essential in that they run to the core of procedural efficiency.” Akron Standard, 11 Ohio St.3d at 12, 11 OBR at 10, 462 N.E.2d at 420.
{¶ 27} In Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 572 N.E.2d 56, a property valuation case, this court explained the Akron Standard decision:
“If the omitted requirement runs to the core of procedural efficiency, then the requirement is essential, the omission is not substantial compliance with the statute, and the appeal is to be dismissed.” Renner, 59 Ohio St.3d at 144, 572 N.E.2d at 57.
{¶ 28} Where an insufficient opinion of valuation might adversely affect procedural efficiency is in regard to the operation of
“(B) Within thirty days after the last date such complaints may be filed, the auditor shall give notice of each complaint in which the stated amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred dollars to each property owner whose property is the subject of the complaint, if the complaint was not filed by such owner, and to each board of education whose school district may be affected by the complaint. Within thirty days after receiving such notice, a board of education or a property owner may file a complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current valuation. Upon the filing of a complaint under this division, the board of education or the property owner shall be made a party to the action.”
{¶ 29}
{¶ 30} In this case, however, the information given was sufficient to trigger notice to the school board. CEI claimed overvaluation of “at least $50,000,” well over the amount necessary for notice to be given. The local school board responded within the statutorily mandated thirty days.
{¶ 31} To comply with the core of procedural efficiency does not require that a complainant prove his case within the complaint. Indeed,
{¶ 32} The determination of a claim is to be made in an efficient manner. The statute is clear on the earmarks of that efficiency—a filing by March 31, a statement of whether the claimed valuation is at least $17,500, notice to school boards if the amount is at least $17,500, a thirty-day response time by the objecting party, and a ninety-day time limit to determine the claim. This court has also determined that the questions on the Stanjim form also go to the core of procedural efficiency; this court said that the form “is meant to expedite orderly administrative process.” Stanjim, 38 Ohio St.2d at 236, 67 O.O.2d at 298, 313 N.E.2d at 16. As stated above, CEI responded satisfactorily to the questions remaining from that form.
{¶ 33} We find that any omissions CEI made on its DTE Form 1 complaint did not go to the core of procedural efficiency and that its responses met the requirements of
Decisions reversed.
DOUGLAS, DICKINSON and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, J., not participating.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J.
Moyer, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent. These causes should be resolved in accordance with the well-established precedent of Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 67 O.O.2d 296, 313 N.E.2d 14, because Stanjim is consistent with controlling statutes, and because the facts underlying these causes are not substantively distinguishable from those in Stanjim.
{¶ 35}
{¶ 36}
{¶ 37} In Stanjim, we determined that “BTA Form 1 represents a lawful interpretation of the minimal, data requirements of
{¶ 38} It is true that former BTA Form 1, referred to in Stanjim, has been replaced by DTE Form 1. However, the differences between the two forms do not justify disregard of the substantive principles upon which the holding of Stanjim was based.
{¶ 39} DTE Form 1 indeed omits the “Pertinent Facts” section contained in the Stanjim form, and some of the information previously requested in BTA Form 1 is now obtainable from real property records of the county auditor. Nevertheless, whether portions of the information previously requested in BTA Form 1 are obtainable elsewhere or not, the requirements of
{¶ 40} The statements contained in the complaints in these cases, which are equivalent to mere expression of opinion that the assessed value is at least $50,000 too high, simply do not satisfy the statutory requirement of
{¶ 41} The majority acknowledges that the complainants’ responses to Questions 7 and 8 constitute unsupported expressions of mere opinion. However, rather than properly concluding that the complainants thereby failed to comply with the statutory mandate, the majority instead concludes that Question 8 of DTE Form 1 need not be answered at all, because it solicits the expression of opinion. We should construe DTE Form 1 in a manner consistent with
{¶ 43} Because the amount of tax liability is directly correlated to the value of property, the complainants’ responses to the questions on the form did little more than express the opinion that the current tax bills were too high and that the appropriate school boards should be notified of the complaints. These responses cannot be deemed complete, and do not constitute “full compliance” with DTE Form 1, as required by Middleton and Stanjim.
{¶ 44} Complainants acknowledge that they had notice of the challenged tax valuation as early as January 1995. Nevertheless, their complaints challenging that valuation were all signed on March 31, 1995—the day of the expiration of the statute of limitations.
{¶ 45} I cannot accept the majority‘s contention that expression by a complainant of a ceiling of maximum true value satisfies the applicable requirements. Whether a taxpayer is bound by the opinion of value expressed in his complaint thereafter is irrelevant to the determination of whether the taxpayer fully complied with all requirements for perfecting the appeal. The Tax Commissioner is required by
{¶ 46} The majority suggests that the complainants’ failure to respond to Question 7 should not be deemed jurisdictional in that the information sought to be elicited does not “go to the core of procedural efficiency,” citing Akron Std. Div. v. Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10, 11 OBR 9, 462 N.E.2d 419. Again I disagree. Questions 7 and 8 ask the complainant to set forth the amount of overvaluation and the reasons why the assessed value is an overvaluation.
{¶ 47} When those reasons are omitted from the complaint the board of revision is provided with virtually no information upon which it may process the complaint. It gives the board and interested persons no notice of a complainant‘s rationale for complaining. If, on the contrary, the information is contained on the
{¶ 48} Moreover, the majority fails to consider the negative effect such abbreviated responses may have on school boards or other property owners in determining whether to oppose reduction of assessed property values, in filing counter-complaints, and procuring evidence to be presented in opposition to reduction in valuation at the board of revision hearing. See
{¶ 49} If the answers provided by these complainants are deemed sufficient, then the complaint form could be further simplified by requiring a complainant to merely state that it wants a decrease in an amount which does or does not exceed $17,500. Such a form would ignore both the relevant statutes and the procedural needs of the board of revision and possible opponents.
{¶ 50} The board of revision dismissed the complaints for want of jurisdiction. On appeal the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the board of revision‘s dismissal of the complaints pursuant to Stanjim. The majority has disregarded our statutory mandate to affirm decisions if “the decision of the board appealed from is reasonable and lawful.”
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.