Goldstein v. General Motors LLCGoldstein v. General Motors LLC
On September 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Matt Goldstein, Percy Sutton, Julian Wilder, Lana Savage, Gladys Tubbs, Kendra Piazza, and Rafael Martinez brought this putative class action against General Motors LLC (“GM”) for, among other things, purported breaches of express and implied warranties, and violations of various consumer protections laws based on allegedly defective Cadillac User Experience (“CUE”) navigation and radio touch screen displays in 2013-2017 Cadillac ATS, SRX and XTS vehicles and 2014-2017 Cadillac CTS, ELR, and Escalade vehicles (the “Class Vehicles”). (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of “all persons and entities in the United States who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle.” (Doc. No. 24 at 105.) Plaintiffs also intend to seek certification of various subclasses for purchasers in Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana,
On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 24.) On January 24, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 31.) On February 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. (Doc. No. 37.) On March 20, 2020, Defendant filed its Response. (Doc. No. 42.) On April 6, 2020, the Court held a hearing. Tarek H. Zohdy and Russell D. Paul appeared for the Plaintiffs and Andrew John William Holmer, Allyson Marie McKinstry, and Kathleen Taylor Sooy appeared for the Defendant. For the following reasons the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
I. Background
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs are purchasers of new and used Cadillacs from fourteen different states. (Doc. No. 24 at ¶¶20-48.) Six plaintiffs are citizens of California (collectively, the “California Plaintiffs”), and the remaining twenty-three plaintiffs are residents in thirteen different states: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia (the “Non-California Plaintiffs”). (Id. ¶¶26-48.) Plaintiffs allege that the in-vehicle infotainment device, also known as the CUE, used in the Class Vehicles is defective. (Id. at ¶79.) The infotainment device is comprised of a touch screen module that provides “entertainment and information delivery to drivers.” (Id.) The CUE controls the audio, phone, and climate inputs for the car and displays the rear-view camera when the vehicle is in reverse. (Id. ¶¶63-69.)
The Alleged Defect
The CUE is made of two major components: a projected capacitance touch screen and a plastic cover. (Id. at ¶¶74-77.) Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is defective. First, Plaintiffs allege that the “plastic cover is prone to delaminating or separating from the touch screen glass.” (Id. at ¶79.) When the plastic cover separates, Plaintiffs allege, it causes a
Plaintiffs allege that either mechanical or thermal stress can cause the plastic cover to separate from the touch screen. (Id. at ¶80.) Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is “defectively designed” because of the placement of the screws and rubberized gasket that hold the plastic cover to the frame of the CUE. (Id. ¶82.) The plastic cover is anchored to the touch screen by eight screws. (Id. ¶82.) Plaintiffs allege that only two screws are placed on “the bottom portion of the plastic cover, which causes it to flex and move when pressure is applied.” (Id. ¶84.) This, according to Plaintiffs, makes the plastic cover prone to separating from the touch screen glass. (Id. ¶85.) Plaintiffs also allege that the rubber gasket is cut in a way that creates excessive space between the touch screen and the plastic cover which also “allows for more flexibility in the plastic cover, which leads to the spider-webbing defect.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs further allege that the plastic cover delaminates as a result of temperature fluctuations. (Id. ¶86.) The touch screen assembly is “made up of materials with different thermal expansion coefficients.” (Id. ¶87.) Plaintiffs allege that this difference in the thermal expansion coefficient between the separate materials can “cause delamination between the plastic cover and the touch screen glass.” (Id.) Plaintiffs maintain that the defect poses a safety risk and causes unsafe driving by distracting drivers and by not allowing them to make use of the backup camera when in reverse. (Id. ¶¶93-94.)
Defendant’s Alleged Knowledge of the Defect
Plaintiffs allege that GM “knew, or should have known, about the Defect . . . .” (Id. ¶98.) In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite to four service bulletins and service bulletin updates (“Technical Service Bulletins” or “TSBs”) that GM allegedly issued to its dealers in the United States between December 2014 to August 2017. (Id. ¶102.) Plaintiffs allege that these Technical Service Bulletins demonstrated that “GM was aware of the Defect and recognized it was covered under its Warranty. . . .” (Id. ¶102.) These TSBs stated that “[s]ome customers may report that their radio screen appears bubbled, crack, or
II. Legal Standards
Defendant moves to dismiss the claims of all Non-Californian Plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Under
In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court also need not accept as true allegations that contradict matter properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
Additionally claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.
III. Discussion
1. Specific Personal Jurisdiction – Non-Californian Plaintiffs
Defendant argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GM for Non-Californian Plaintiffs’ claims. Personal jurisdiction must exist for each claim asserted against a defendant.” Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (quoting Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted)).
Since the Supreme Court’s “seminal decision in International Shoe,” courts “have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80 (2017). “The paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is appropriate over a
Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Non-California Plaintiffs’ claims since these Plaintiffs do “not allege that their vehicles were manufactured, sold, or driven in California . . . .” (Doc. No. 31 at 8.) GM argues that there is no connection between California and the individual claims of the Non-California Plaintiffs. (Id.) In support of this argument, GM cites Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
In Bristol-Myers, Plaintiffs around the country sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) in a mass action in California state court, alleging that its drug Plavix damaged their health and violated various California products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading advertising laws. BMS challenged whether the Court had jurisdiction over the claims of the out of state Plaintiffs. The California Supreme Court found that the California court had specific jurisdiction over BMS utilizing a “sliding scale approach” where “the more wide ranging the forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1773. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there “must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” Id. (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
The majority opinion, however, did “not confront the question whether its opinion . . . would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there,” Id. at 1789,
Defendant argues that Bristol-Myers, and subsequent district court cases interpreting it’s holding, controls the resolution of the Non-California Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. No. 31 at 8-9.) Defendant contends that since the Non-California Plaintiffs fail to plead any connection between their causes of action and California this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GM. Plaintiffs argue that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions and that since GM has “purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
This Court agrees with the cases finding that Bristol-Myers applies to named plaintiffs in class actions for federal courts sitting in diversity. “[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. “The specific personal jurisdiction inquiry is ‘defendant-focused,’ with an emphasis ‘on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Matus v. Premium Nutraceuticals, LLC, 715 F. App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)). Jurisdiction “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (emphasis in original) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The primary concern in determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, therefore, is “the burden on the defendant.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. This burden “encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (emphasis added). The “claims in question” here for the Non-California Plaintiffs are those related to purchases of Class Vehicles that occurred outside of California. California has little interest in the claims of the Non-California Plaintiffs arising out purchases made outside California from a Delaware company with a principal place of business in Michigan. That GM sold some Class Vehicles in California does not create a sufficient relationship between GM and California such that GM should be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California for the claims of named class representatives with no connection to California. The federalism concerns that animated the majority’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb are equally relevant here and necessitate dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The fact that the named Plaintiffs bring their claims as a putative class action does not change this result.
Accordingly, The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Non-California Plaintiffs with prejudice since amendment would be futile. See Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.
2. California Plaintiffs’ Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act Claims
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) Claims, arguing that “plaintiffs cannot satisfy the MMWA’s express jurisdictional requirements.” (Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Defendant argues that to maintain a class action under the MMWA, “the number of named plaintiffs must be at least 100,” and here, Plaintiffs only name twenty-nine individual, even including the Non-California Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs argue that the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows jurisdiction over MMWA claims that “do not satisfy MMWA’s explicit jurisdictional requirements.” (Doc. No. 37 at 5.)
Section 2310(d)(3)(C), of the MMWA, states that no claim shall be cognizable in a district court “if the action is brought as a class action and the number of named plaintiffs is less than one hundred.”
3. Breach of Express Warranty Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not pled a viable claim for breach of the New Vehicle Limited Warranty offered by Cadillac (the “Warranty”) because “they do not allege that they (1) experienced the alleged defect during the warranty period; (2) presented their vehicles to GM for repair during the warranty period; and (3) [that] GM refused or failed to repair their vehicles.” (Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs allege a design defect which is explicitly excluded from coverage under GM’s Limited Warranty. Plaintiffs argue that they have pled a viable claim by alleging that the Defect existed within the Warranty’s limits and that, even if they do not, the Warranty’s durational limits are unconscionable and should be ignored. (Doc. No. 37 at 7.) Plaintiffs also maintain that the Defect is a result of a “design and/or manufacturing defect” and that both are plausibly covered under the terms of the Warranty. (Id. at 8.)
In California, to state an express warranty claim, “a plaintiff must show that the seller: (1) made an affirmation of fact or promise or provided a description of its goods; (2) the promise or description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.” Rodarte v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CV-03-0353 FMC (CTx), 2003 WL 23341208, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2003);
The Warranty covers “repairs to correct any vehicle defect, not slight noise, vibrations, or other normal characteristics of the vehicle due to materials or workmanship occurring during the warranty period.” (Doc. No. 24 at 10.) In order to obtain repairs the vehicle owner must “take the vehicle to a Cadillac dealer facility within the warranty period and request the needed repairs.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Warranty lasts for “4 years or 50,000 miles, whichever comes first . . . .” (Id. at 11.)
Of the California Plaintiffs, only three (Matt Goldstein, Percy Sutton, and Julian Wilder), allege that they followed the terms of the Warranty and requested repairs from GM. Even if Plaintiffs plead that the durational limit of the Warranty is unconscionable, this does not absolve Plaintiffs of needing to adequately plead that they sought repairs under the terms of the Warranty. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2010.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled that the durational limits of the Warranty are unconscionable. (Doc. No. 37 at 7.) Under California law, “unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element.” Aron v. U–Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal. App. 4th 796, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). A contract or contractual clause is invalid as unconscionable only if both elements are present, “although the degree to which each must exist may vary.” Id.
Procedural unconscionability exists when a contract reflects “an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.” Seifi v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2013 WL 2285339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (citing A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). Plaintiffs have adequately alleged procedural unconscionability by pleading a gross disparity in bargaining power and a lack of meaningful choice in accepting the Warranty. (Doc. No. 37 at 8.)
The substantive element of unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create “‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results as to ‘shock the conscience.’” Seifi, 2013 WL 2285339, at *5 (citing Aron, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 808). Plaintiffs allege that given GM’s concealment of the defect, the durational limits of the warranty are unconscionable. In Seifi, the court held that even accepting as true plaintiffs’ allegation that the car manufacturer knew about the car’s defective gears, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the warranty durational limits (i.e., either 48
4. Breach of Implied Warranty
Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and
The law is clear that to be fit for its ordinary purpose, a vehicle must be “in safe condition and substantially free of defects.” Isip v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 155 Cal. App. 4th 19, 27 (2007). Moreover, it must provide “reliable” transportation. Brand v. Hyundai Motor Am., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1547 (2014) (quotation omitted). Thus, three factors related to vehicle merchantability are safety, reliability, and substantial freedom from defects.
In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 291 F. Supp. 3d 936, 945-46 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (footnote omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not pled facts that show that their vehicles were not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (Doc. No. 31 at 27.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defect occurred within the term of the warranty, that certain Plaintiffs’ claims are time barred, that the purchasers
A. Whether Plaintiffs have Pled Unmerchantability
Defendant urges this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims because, they argue, Plaintiffs have not pled facts which establish that the Class Vehicles were not fit for their ordinary purpose. Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs do not plead that the alleged Defect has “drastically undermined the ordinary operation of the[ir] vehicles . . . or forced them to stop driving . . . .” they have not made out a case for a breach of implied warranty. (Doc. No. 31 at 13.) Plaintiffs argue that due to the Defect, the CUE “touchscreen becomes “entirely unresponsive” and “was delayed in responding to commands,” resulting in its features not working, impairing the vehicles’ safety and operability.” (Doc. No. 37 at 9-10.) In reviewing a
B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Occurred Within the Term of the Warranty
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims should be dismissed because the defect did not occur within the term of the warranty. (Doc. No. 31 at 15.) Defendant argues that the Song-Beverley Act allows a warrantor to limit the terms of the implied warranty “provided that they do so in writing and in conspicuous language.” (Id.) Defendant argues that the Warranty provides that “[a]ny implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose applicable to this vehicle is limited in duration to the duration of this written warranty.” (Id.) Plaintiffs argue that the implied warranty claims are timely because they relate to a latent defect and that the Song-Beverley Act does not require Plaintiffs to have discovered and reported that defect within the
In Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit found that Song-Beverley “does not create a deadline for discovering latent defects or for giving notice to the seller . . . .” Id. at 1223. Plaintiffs have pled that the Defect was latent. (Doc. No. 37 at 27.) Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the implied warranty claims for occurring outside of the scope of the warranty since Plaintiffs have pled that the Defect was latent and existed within the time period of the Warranty.
C. Whether California Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder’s Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Defendant argues that California Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder are barred from bringing their implied warranty claims under Song-Beverly’s statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 31-1.) Song-Beverly’s statute of limitations is four years and the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 291-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). However, Plaintiffs argue that “equitable tolling principles – including fraudulent concealment tolling – apply to the statute of limitations for implied warranty of merchantability claims.” (Doc. No. 37 at 13.) The Court will now examine whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled fraudulent concealment to equitably toll Song Beverly’s statute of limitations.
D. Fraudulent Concealment
Section 2725(4) of the
“When a plaintiff alleges the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, the same pleading and proof is required as in fraud cases: the plaintiff must show (1) the substantive elements of fraud, and (2) an excuse for late discovery of the facts.” Finney v. Ford Motor Co., No. 17-cv-06183-JST, 2018 WL 2552266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (citing Community Case v. Boatwright, 124 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 888, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). The second element requires a plaintiff to allege “(1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under which it was discovered; and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for failing to discover it or had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry.” Id.; see also Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining fraudulent concealment tolling “will last as long as a plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentations is reasonable”). “Fraudulent concealment tolling must be pled with particularity under
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not met the heighted particularity requirement of
A claim based on a nondisclosure or omission is a claim for misrepresentation in a cause of action for fraud, and it must be pleaded with particularity under
E. Whether Used Car Purchasers’ Implied Warranty Claims Are Excluded
Defendant argues that Song-Beverly excludes claims related to the purchase of used vehicles. Consequently, Defendant maintains that California Plaintiffs Goldstein, Sutton,
Song-Beverly extends to “used goods,” but “[i]t shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller).”
F. Whether State Law Privity Requirements Bar Plaintiffs’ Claims
Lastly, Defendant argues that all of the California Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims under both Song-Beverly and
California courts have found an exception to the privity requirement for Song Beverly implied warranty claims in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 947 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Song-Beverley does not impose a privity requirement); Gonzalez v. Drew Industries, 750 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1072–73 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding no privity requirement based on the plain language of the statute); Gusse v. Damon Corp., 470 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1116 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (imposing a privity requirement would “ignore[ ] the plain language of the Song–Beverly Act” that all goods sold at retail are accompanied by the manufacturer’s implied warranty). Accordingly, the Court declines, at this time, to dismiss the remaining implied warranty claims since Plaintiffs have pled that they were the intended beneficiary of the contract between GM and its dealerships.
However, the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that under
5. Common Law Fraud Claims
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ common law fraud claims should be dismissed because they fail to meet
“A claim for fraud based on concealment or omission requires that: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would have acted otherwise if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.” In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prod. Liab. Lit., No. 17-cv-06656, 2019 WL 3000646, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2019).
The Court has already determined that Plaintiffs have not met the heightened pleadings standards of
6. State Law Consumer Protection Claims
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and
Plaintiffs’ claims under the CLRA and UCL sound in fraud. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012.) The Court has already addressed whether the claims that sound in fraud are pled with particularity such that they satisfy
7. Unjust Enrichment Claims
Plaintiffs bring claims of unjust enrichment as a nationwide class, or, in the alternative on behalf of each of the State Sub-Classes. (Doc. No. 24 at ¶978.) “The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the receipt of a benefit and the unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.” Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1593 (2008) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a nationwide claim for unjust enrichment and that the California claim cannot proceed because Plaintiffs have pled
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims in the states that they do not reside. Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir.), forecloses this argument because the Circuit adopted a “class certification approach” which found that “once the named plaintiff demonstrates her individual standing to bring a claim, the standing inquiry is concluded, and the court proceeds to consider whether the
The question here is whether the named Plaintiffs have standing to bring certain claims, not standing “to obtain relief for unnamed class members” for the same injury as was the case in Melendres. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (Article III must be measured claim-by-claim). Plaintiffs must show they have standing for each claim they raise, and Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring claims under the laws of states where they have alleged no injury, residence, or other pertinent connection. See Pardini v. Unilever United States, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see also In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1096–97 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (discussing Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1261-62). Accordingly, Melendres does not, in the Court’s view, stand for the proposition that this Court must delay its consideration of standing.
The California Plaintiffs have Article III standing to represent a class of purchasers of Class Vehicles who have claims under California law. The question here is whether the California Plaintiffs have standing to assert unjust enrichment claims on behalf of unnamed class members under other states’ laws. They do not. Therefore, the nationwide unjust enrichment claims in the FAC on behalf of the “nationwide class,” must be dismissed because the California Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert claims under those other states’ laws.
Generally, a party “may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency.”
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 31.) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 13, 2020
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge