George HADDY, Appellant, v. John W. CALDWELL, Jr., Appellee.
No. 08-10-00168-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.
June 15, 2011.
Rehearing Overruled Aug. 24, 2011.
355 S.W.3d 247
We disagree with Macias‘s assertion that the arbitrator did not independently construe Texas law as required by the arbitration agreement. Unlike Tapers Industry, the record in this case reflects that the arbitrator construed the arbitration agreement and Texas law on limitations and concluded that Macias had not timely initiated the arbitration proceeding. The highlighted portion of the order indicates that the arbitrator found this issue to be dispositive. We have found no authority that an arbitrator imperfectly executes his powers by refusing to address all issues after deciding an issue that is dispositive of the entire dispute and we decline to so hold.
Common Law Grounds
Macias also sought to vacate the arbitrator‘s decision on the common law grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and the decision was contrary to public policy because it diminished Macias‘s rights under Texas law. The Supreme Court held in Hall Street that the grounds found in Section 10 are the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586, 128 S.Ct. at 1404. The cases relied on by Macias in support of her common law grounds pre-date Hall Street. See Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corporation, 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2000) (common law ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA includes when an award is arbitrary or capricious); Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (11th Cir.1992)(arbitration award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious when court cannot infer any ground for the awards from the facts); U.S. Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778-79 (11th Cir.1988) (award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious if it exhibits a wholesale departure from the law). Hall Street precludes the use of any common-law grounds as an independent basis for vacatur of an arbitration award. See Royce Homes, L.P. v. Bates, 315 S.W.3d 77, 90 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding that common law grounds, such as manifest disregard of law and gross mistake, were not valid grounds for vacatur of arbitration award as Hall Street forecloses any common law grounds for vacatur); LeFoumba v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd., No. 14-08-00243-CV, 2009 WL 3109875, at *2, (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] September 17, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (complaint that arbitration award violates public policy is not viable ground for vacating an award under the FAA); see also Citigroup Global Markets., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir.2009) (holding that Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in
Walter L. Boyaki, Miranda & Boyaki, El Paso, TX, for Appellee.
Before CHEW, C.J., MCCLURE, and RIVERA, JJ.
OPINION
ANN CRAWFORD MCCLURE, Justice.
George Haddy, appearing pro se, appeals from an order dismissing his legal malpractice suit against John W. Caldwell, Jr. on the ground that Haddy lacked standing. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Haddy‘s petition alleged that on January 12, 2004, he and his wife, Ana Haddy, entered into a contingency fee contract with Caldwell in connection with a medical malpractice claim against William Beaumont Army Medical Center. That medical malpractice claim related to medical treatment of Ana Haddy in October of 2003. Caldwell filed the suit in federal district court on September 13, 2006. Both Haddy and his former wife were named as plaintiffs. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on February 29, 2008. Haddy and his wife divorced in December of 2008. Haddy filed suit in the instant case on February 25, 2010. His petition alleged that he did not learn
Caldwell filed a motion to show authority pursuant to
VALIDITY OF MOTION TO DISMISS
In his first issue, Haddy contends that the trial court erred by granting Caldwell‘s motion to dismiss because such a motion is not the proper procedural tool for summary adjudication of an action. Caldwell‘s motions to show authority and to dismiss challenged Haddy‘s standing to bring the legal malpractice action.
Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex.2008); Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993). A court has no jurisdiction over a claim pursued by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert the claim. DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 304. When a plaintiff lacks standing, the proper resolution is to dismiss the lawsuit. Id.
It is well established that a party‘s standing may be challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction as well as by other procedural vehicles, such as a motion for summary judgment. Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). A lack of standing can be raised by a motion to dismiss but the motion is treated as a plea to the jurisdiction because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. See Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 n. 3 (Tex.2001); Clifton v. Walters, 308 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see also Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding that motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction). The trial court did not err by considering the standing issue raised by Caldwell in his motions seeking dismissal of the suit. Issue One is overruled.
STANDING
In Issue Two, Haddy argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he lacked standing to maintain the legal malpractice suit against Caldwell. As noted in our discussion of Issue One, we will review Caldwell‘s motion to dismiss based on lack of standing in the same manner as a plea to the jurisdiction. See Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 305 n. 3; Clifton, 308 S.W.3d at 98. Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Texas Association of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446. A plea to the jurisdiction can be utilized to challenge whether the plaintiff has met his burden of alleging jurisdictional facts but it can also raise a challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, as in this case, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional is-
To have standing, the plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of the suit, Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex.2001), and his injury must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical. DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 304-05. A party‘s standing is determined at the time suit is filed. Texas Association of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446 n. 9. In determining standing, we look to the facts alleged in the petition, but may consider other evidence in the record if necessary to resolve the question of standing. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555.
To recover on a claim of legal malpractice a plaintiff must prove: (1) the attorney owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the attorney breached that duty; (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injuries; and (4) damages occurred. Alexander v. Turtur & Associates, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex.2004); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. 1995). Privity, which refers to the contractual connection or relationship existing between attorney and client, is directly related to the existence of duty and is necessary for a plaintiff to have standing to bring a legal malpractice claim. Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, 859 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
Caldwell did not base his motion to dismiss on lack of privity. The record includes a copy of the contingency fee contract signed by Haddy and his former wife. The contract identifies Haddy and his former wife as the clients in the representation and Caldwell‘s firm agreed to represent them in connection with medical negligence at William Beaumont Army Medical Center in treating Ana Haddy in October of 2003. Given the existence of this contractual relationship between Haddy and Caldwell, there is no lack of privity.
Caldwell argued that Haddy lacked standing because his loss of consortium claim is a derivative claim which required his former wife to be joined as a party in order for Haddy to have standing to prosecute the legal malpractice action. Caldwell essentially argues that Haddy‘s loss of consortium claim is completely derivative of his former wife‘s medical malpractice claim, but this argument is not supported by applicable case law. Haddy‘s claim for loss of consortium is considered to be derivative of his former wife‘s medical malpractice claim to the extent that he would be required to establish the tortfeasor‘s liability for his former wife‘s injury in order to recover loss of consortium damages. See In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. 2009); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.1978). Loss of consortium claims are not, however, entirely derivative because they are separate and independent claims distinct from the injured spouse‘s claim. In re Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 646; Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667, 669 (holding that a spouse‘s loss of consortium claim is not barred by a settlement agreement or release executed by the injured spouse if the non-injured spouse did not sign the release). Even if Caldwell was correct that Haddy‘s loss of consortium claim is derivative of his wife‘s medical malpractice claim, he cites no authority which holds that Haddy‘s legal malpractice claim is likewise derivative of his former
ANN CRAWFORD MCCLURE
Justice