JOSE GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF MOUNT PROSPECT, MOUNT PROSPECT POLICE PENSION BOARD, and GEORGE STEINER, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-2869
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
February 23, 2004
Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2003—DECIDED February 23, 2004
I. History
Jose Garcia, an Hispanic, was a police officer for the Village of Mount Prospect, Illinois from January 1984 until April 1998. During his tenure as a police officer, Garcia contributed to the Village‘s pension fund. This fund had been established, along with the Mount Prospect Police
Prior to his heart attack and disability application, Garcia had been a deposition witness in the case of Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000). In Martinez, an Hispanic former police trainee accused the Village Police Department of national origin employment discrimination. (R. 20-1 Ex. E.) On September 30, 1997, counsel for Martinez deposed Garcia at length about various discriminatory practices engaged in by the Village Police Department‘s command ranks, including Steiner. In January 1998, Garcia‘s deposition was used by Martinez in responding to the Village‘s ultimately unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.2
Following Garcia‘s June 20, 1998 duty-related disability pension application, the Board selected three physicians to examine Garcia to determine if he was disabled.
Hearings were held on May 12, 1999, and December 22, 1999, where additional evidence was submitted, including: Garcia‘s own testimony, supplemental medical reports from the Board-selected physicians, medical records from three Garcia-selected physicians, depositions of the Board-selected physicians, and miscellaneous employment records. At no time during any of the three hearings were any claims of employment discrimination made to the Board. After the December 22 hearing concluded, the Board met in a closed session and voted to deny Garcia‘s duty-related benefits, but to continue the non-duty-related benefits. A written Decision and Order to that effect was issued by the Board on February 14, 2000.
During the pendency of Garcia‘s ultimately unsuccessful administrative appeal, on September 15, 2000, he filed Title VII charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) He alleged that
In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982), the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit,
In the instant case, the Village, Board, and Steiner urge that the Illinois circuit court‘s administrative review of the Board‘s denial of duty-related benefits has a res judicata effect on Garcia‘s federal civil-rights claims. Our analysis, based upon Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82, has two prongs.
A. Illinois res judicata law
Under Illinois law, in order for res judicata to apply to Garcia‘s current civil-rights claims, the circuit court‘s previous affirmance of the Board‘s decision must: (1) have reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involve the same parties or their privies as the current claims; and (3) constitute the same cause of action as the current claims. Pirela v. Vill. of N. Aurora, 935 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (Ill. 1998). Here, only the second two elements are at issue.
1. Same parties
Garcia was the plaintiff in both the circuit court administrative appeal and in this case. Therefore, the second element of res judicata is easily met with respect to Garcia. There are three defendants in this case: the Board, the Village, and Steiner, in his individual and official capacities. Only the Board was a named party in Garcia‘s administrative appeal to the circuit court. Hence, the second element of res judicata is clearly met with respect to the Board. We must then consider whether the Village and Steiner are in privity with the Board.
Garcia offered no authority in his initial brief to this court for his assertion that neither the Village nor Steiner would be in privity with the Board. In his reply brief, Garcia cited but one case, Rhoads v. Board of Trustees, 689 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), in support of this argument. However, Rhoads is distinguishable from the instant case and is against the greater weight of authority.
Rhoads appealed this denial to a circuit court. He argued that the board should have awarded him full “duty-related” benefits because the worker‘s compensation settlement foreclosed any argument regarding whether his injuries were suffered in the line of duty. Id. The Illinois court held that because the defendant board was not in privity with the municipality, Rhoads could not avail himself of the benefits of issue preclusion stemming from the worker‘s compensation settlement in the pension board litigation. Id. at 270. The court reasoned that the board had not been consulted by the city during settlement negotiations, and that the two entities serve distinct constituencies with respect to incentives to settle or litigate. Id. Put simply, it would have been unfair to preclude the defendant board from litigating causation because the board‘s interests were not adequately protected in the settlement negotiations.
Unlike Rhoads, where a plaintiff attempted to use collateral estoppel offensively, based upon a settlement agreement, to the detriment of a defendant not party to the original action, here it is the defendants who seek to invoke res judicata defensively, based upon a final adjudi-
Furthermore, case law and common sense support a finding of privity between the Village and the Board. In effect, the Board is an agent of the Village, and the Village, therefore, is in privity with the Board. See McKinney v. City of E. St. Louis, 188 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). The Village has delegated the functions of overseeing and administering the Fund to the Board, in that the Village created the Board,
Garcia argues that despite the agency relationship described above, because the Village was not a named party in his appeal to the circuit court, the Village is not in privity with the Board. “The law cannot tolerate such an absurdity.” McKinney, 188 N.E.2d at 343, quoted in Dempsey v. City of Harrisburg, 279 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
The correct rule is: when a judgment is rendered against an officer of a municipal corporation who sues or is sued in his official capacity, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, upon other officers of the
Since Garcia raised no arguments regarding the privity of Steiner in his individual capacity with the Board,7 we need not address that issue here. However, Garcia did dispute the privity of Steiner in his official capacity, albeit in a summary fashion. As a sergeant in the Village police and as a Board member, Steiner is an employee (or agent) of the Village and/or the Board. Hence, as a Village employee and agent, under the above analysis, his privity with the Board is established. Alternately, as a Board employee and agent, he is in privity with the Board. See Davis, 53 F.3d at 803-04 (citations omitted).
2. Same cause of action
Having determined that the first two elements of res judicata are met, all that remains is to assess whether
Therefore, Garcia‘s federal causes of action, including Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims, will constitute the
As Garcia argues, it is true that his administrative appeal of the Board‘s decision looked only at whether the denial was against the manifest weight of the evidence, see Koulegeorge v. State of Ill. Human Rights Comm‘n, 738 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 744 N.E.2d 285, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 886 (adopting the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review), and arbitrary and capricious—a very narrow review of the decision‘s propriety. And Garcia‘s complaint in federal district court alleges that the Board‘s decision was improper because it was the product of illegal discrimination and retaliation, for which he should be compensated through an award of full duty-related disability benefits and damages. But regardless of what a court reviews the Board‘s decision for, both the administrative appeal and the instant lawsuit question the basis—either proper or improper—of the Board‘s denial of Garcia‘s disability benefits. The “core of operative facts” is identical for both causes of action: the acts of the Board and the Village Police Department leading up to and including the Board‘s decision to deny the benefits. Attempts to construe the causes of action in any other manner are futile.8
Furthermore, the Appellant‘s own EEOC filing and district court complaint reveal this to be the case. In his EEOC filing, two basic allegations were made: (1) “the denial of full pension benefits was based on my national origin, Hispanic;” and (2) “I was denied full pension benefits . . . in retaliation for having testified favorably for the plaintiff in a national origin discrimination suit brought by another Hispanic officer against the Village of Mount Prospect.” (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) The Appellant‘s allegations to the EEOC explicitly referenced national origin discrimination and retaliation only in the context of the Board‘s denial of his full benefits. This court‘s thorough review of the EEOC charge could not uncover any distinguishable allegation of workplace discrimination made without reference to the Board‘s decision.
Similarly, the allegations leveled in Garcia‘s district court complaint are framed solely in terms of the Board‘s denial of his disability benefit application. His recitation of facts, (R. 20-1 Ex. A at 3-7), and every claim, (R. 20-1 Ex. A at 7-21), focus entirely on the Board‘s denial. The complaint does
B. Full and fair opportunity to litigate
Having concluded that all three res judicata requirements under Illinois law are met, our remaining inquiry is whether Garcia had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. As a corollary to the transactional rule, Illinois adopted the doctrine of merger and bar which precludes the sequential pursuit not only of claims actually litigated, but of those that could have been litigated. Durgins, 272 F.3d at 843 (citing People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Ill. 1992); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1986) (summarizing Illinois law)); see also River Park, 703 N.E.2d at 895. Thus, so long as Garcia could have joined his federal
At first blush, this inquiry appears to be the most troublesome. This is due to conflicting Illinois case law regarding whether federal civil-rights claims may be joined as independent causes of action with administrative appeals heard by Illinois circuit courts prior to the exhaustion of Illinois’ administrative process for the civil-rights claims, established under the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 1979 (“ICRA,” “Illinois Human Rights Act,” “IHRA,” or “Act“), Pub. Act No. 81-1216, 1979;
We begin with the oft-acknowledged proposition that the states and the federal government share concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); Pirela, 935 F.2d at 913. Moreover, a state may limit, but not eliminate, the exercise of such jurisdiction in its own courts. See Faulkner-King v. Wicks, 590 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), quoted in Cooper v. Ill. State Univ., 772 N.E.2d 396, 399-400 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
A review of Illinois case law by this court reveals that since 1979, the application of 5/8-111(C), particularly the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” has been consistent for certain types of claims, but rather confusing for others.10 Illinois courts, and hence, federal courts, con-
Similarly, cases based upon the Illinois Constitution or other Illinois statutes which are “inextricably linked” to civil-rights violations are subject to the Act and its jurisdictional limits. See, e.g., Damato v. Phelan Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) Faulkner-King v. Wicks, 590 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (alleged constitutional vio-
Also, cases explicitly alleging civil-rights violations under Illinois law are subject to the Act. See, e.g., Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 738 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. 1985); Veazey v. LaSalle Telecomm., Inc., 779 N.E.2d 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Lewis v. Collinsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 511 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Williams v. Naylor, 497 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
However, where allegations of civil rights violations are framed only in terms of federal laws, such as the claims involved in this case, the Illinois courts have been much less clear. Compare Stykel v. City of Freeport, 742 N.E.2d 906, 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (determining that a trial court may consider federal civil-rights claims joined with an administrative review of a distinct claim before the circuit court);11 Stratton v. Wenona Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 1, 551 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. 1990) (holding that § 1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review);12 with
Garcia argues that since the greater weight of Illinois authority, see supra, holds that a circuit court cannot exercise original jurisdiction over federal civil-rights claims, he could not have joined his Title VII, § 1983, and § 1981 claims with his complaint for administrative review of the Board‘s denial of full duty-related benefits. But these cases stand for the proposition that Illinois circuit courts lack original jurisdiction over any claim involving civil rights.
Our jurisprudence makes this clear. A potential civil-rights claimant has “a reasonable opportunity to bring . . . equal protection claim[s] before the circuit court because Illinois allows a plaintiff to join constitutional claims under § 1983 with a request for administrative review [of a separate claim].” Manley, 236 F.3d at 397 (explicitly holding that a police officer appealing a review board‘s termination decision to the circuit court could have joined §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, although ultimately affirming the district court‘s dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Many of our cases, some of which are listed here, considered whether civil-rights claims can be joined with administrative appeals of different claims to Illinois circuit courts and bear striking similarities to the instant case. In Durgins, 272 F.3d at 843-44, we held that a police officer appealing her discharge by the City‘s Board of Police and Fire Commissioners to an Illinois circuit court could have joined her constitutional claims under
The practical difficulties of exhaustion will not prevent res judicata from applying. These issues are largely inconsequential to the our analysis because no matter how such complexities are sorted out, Garcia nevertheless would still have been able to join his civil-rights claims with his complaint for administrative review. For example, there may indeed be an exhaustion requirement under the IHRA in order to bring any federal civil-rights claims in Illinois circuit courts. And if so, in the case of Title VII claims, in order to preserve access to both the federal and state legal systems, a claimant must file his complaint with the IHRA.13 But again, a circuit court would nonetheless
We also note that Garcia was required to appeal the decision of the Board within thirty-five days of its decision. See
Ordinarily . . . the statutes of limitations governing the plaintiff‘s other claims will not be so short that he risks being barred from pursuing those claims by waiting to complete the Title VII administrative process. If [a plaintiff] does face a looming deadline for suing on his other claims, he can ask the EEOC or its state counterpart to accelerate the administrative process; he will have good cause for doing so. . . . [The plaintiff] can sue on his other claims, ask the court—and again he would have a very strong case for doing so—to stay the proceedings, until the Title VII administrative process is complete . . . . These possibilities make the danger that applying res judicata in Title VII suits will interfere with legislative design remote. Although it will mean additional delay in some cases, the plaintiff is protected, in part at least, against being harmed by delay by the fact that he will be accruing additional
entitlements to back pay [or lost benefits] during this period, and will receive prejudgment interest on his award when and if he does prevail.
Id. at 225 (emphasis added). The IARL explicitly provides for a circuit court to stay the decision of the administrative agency for good cause.14
Garcia also incorrectly argues that because his federal civil-rights claims would have necessitated evidence outside of the administrative record (i.e., Garcia‘s testimony in the Martinez case, Garcia‘s conversations with Steiner), the limited scope of a circuit court‘s administrative review which prevents the consideration of such “new” evidence,
Moreover, Garcia chose to pursue an administrative appeal of the Board‘s decision to the circuit court. He could have foregone that appeal (thereby avoiding the aforementioned procedural complexities) and simply pursued his federal civil-rights claims solely in federal court (of course, after exhausting his Title VII administrative remedies with the EEOC). As Judge Easterbrook pointed out in Davis, a plaintiff is free to pursue his claims strategically, but he must abide by the consequences of those choices.
[The plaintiff] split his claim for his own reasons: he wanted simple, streamlined litigation in the Circuit Court of Cook County so that he could get back pay as quickly as possible. His § 1983 claims against the [defendants] are more complicated and have lower stakes, so he wanted to postpone them. . . . That is an understandable strategy but not a good reason for foisting two suits on the judicial system and his adversary. Having made a tactical choice to expedite decision, [the plaintiff] must accept the consequences.
Because Illinois circuit courts could have exercised jurisdiction over Garcia‘s independent federal civil-rights claims either directly or after Garcia exhausted available administrative remedies, it was thus possible for Garcia to join those claims with his administrative appeal of the Board‘s decision. He had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his civil-rights claims and consequently, res judicata applies.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s dismissal is AFFIRMED on res judicata grounds.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USCA-02-C-0072—2-23-04