SHANE FRANCIS, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF ALBANY, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE OFFICER JESSE MALL, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE JOHN REGAN, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE MICHAEL FARGIONE, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE MARK DIBBLE, CITY OF ALBANY POLICE DETECTIVE SERGEANT JAMES WOOD and JOHN DOES 1-10, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
1:22-cv-783 (ECC/ML)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
September 30, 2025
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge
Alishah E. Bhimani, Esq., for Plaintiff
Abigail W. Rehfuss, Esq., for Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Shane Francis filed this action pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND2
Between June 2021 and February 2022, the Albany Police Department (APD) investigated Rickardo Smith for a “narcotics and firearm distribution enterprise.” Def. SUMF ¶ 1. APD received information that Smith was selling “significant quantities of firearms from different locations within the City of Albany,” and receiving cocaine from higher level sources of supply, who were “of Jamaican descent.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3; see Ex. A to Rehfuss Aff. (Search Warrants) at 5–7, Dkt. No. 43-4. APD also received information that one of Smith‘s sources “was a Black male, approximately 30 years old, average height and heavy set.” Def. SUMF ¶ 4.
During the investigation, APD conducted four controlled buys from Smith, involving “over 130 grams of cocaine and a semiautomatic handgun.” Def. SUMF ¶¶ 5, 6. On February 2, 2022, an Albany City Court judge issued search warrants for Smith‘s home, and three other properties that Smith owned in Albany. Id. at ¶ 7; Search Warrants at 1, 15, 33, 43.
The same day, the APD unit investigating Smith “conducted a surveillance operation . . . in an effort to locate Smith, take him into custody, and then execute search warrants” at his
After waiting several hours for Smith to leave, APD officers observed Plaintiff, a Black man, arrive at Smith‘s home. Def. SUMF ¶ 9; Pl. SUMF ¶ 4. According to Defendants, Plaintiff matched the physical description of Smith‘s supplier. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 16, 30. Plaintiff contends that he did not know that Smith was under investigation or that APD was preparing to search Smith‘s properties. Pl. SUMF ¶¶ 9, 10. After Plaintiff attempted to reach Smith, Smith “eventually stuck his head out of the second-floor window, and made contact with” Plaintiff. Def. SUMF ¶ 10. Smith and Plaintiff “got into Smith‘s” truck, and Smith drove away. Id. at ¶ 11. The “police tailed it to an area away from Smith‘s address.” Def. SUMF ¶ 11.
A few blocks away,3 APD pulled over Smith‘s truck. Def. SUMF ¶ 13. In addition to a patrol vehicle, at least two unmarked vehicles participated in the stop, as well as one uniformed APD officer, Defendant Mall, and four plainclothes officers: Defendants Regan, Fargione, Dibble, and Wood. Ex. 2 to Bhimani Decl. (Dibble Video) at 5:00–5:06, Dkt. No. 47-6. The plainclothes officers wore bulletproof vests over their clothes, and at least two were visibly armed. Dibble Video at 4:56–5:00.
The Officers ordered Smith and Plaintiff to show their identification and then to get out of the truck. Ex. G to Rehfuss Aff (Mall Video) at 1:26–1:28, Dkt. No. 43-10; Ex. I to Rehfuss Aff.
At the station, officers placed Plaintiff in an interview room where he was handcuffed and shackled to a bench for approximately one hour and 50 minutes—“the time it took . . . to execute the search warrants and secure” the search warrant locations. Def. SUMF ¶¶ 32–33. Plaintiff described doing construction work for Smith at one of the search warrant locations. Video from Interview Room, Ex. H to Rehfuss Aff. at 0:00–1:19.
At each of the search warrant locations, “a couple members” of APD “were left behind” after the location was “secured.” Def. SUMF ¶ 25. After the locations had been secured, “a determination was made to release [Plaintiff].” Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff was never charged with a crime. Id. at ¶ 27.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). “When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Still, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment,” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Quarles
When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, a court “must evaluate each party‘s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Loc. 100 of New York, N.Y. & Vicinity v. City of New York Dep‘t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 543 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges the following claims under § 1983: (1) false arrest and illegal imprisonment, (2) municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep‘t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), (3) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause, and (4) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 81–100.
1. False Arrest4
Defendants argue that the Officer Defendants had authority to detain Plaintiff under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) and that Plaintiff was only subject to a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).5 Defendant‘s Memorandum of Law (Def. Mem.) at 5–9, Dkt. No. 43-1; Defendants Reply Memorandum (Def. Reply) at 4–8, Dkt. No. 51; Defendant‘s Supplemental Letter Brief (Def. Supp.) at 2, Dkt. No. 55. Defendants also argue that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Def. Mem. at 5–6, 9. Plaintiff responds that the detention authority in Summers is limited under Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013) to the immediate vicinity of a location to be searched, and that Plaintiff was subject to a de facto arrest after he was handcuffed and driven to the station. Plaintiff‘s Memorandum of Law (Pl. Mem.) at 12–17, 18–22, Dkt. No. 47-1.
To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “the [o]fficers intended to confine [him],” (2) he was “conscious of the confinement and did not consent to it,” and (3) “the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Berg v. Kelly, 897 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2003)). If the officers had probable cause for an arrest, or reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention, it is
The first issue is whether Summers allowed the Officers to detain Plaintiff until the properties subject to the search warrants were secure. Under Summers, officers executing a search warrant may “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U.S. at 705. “Once an individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched, however, detentions must be justified by some other rationale.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 202. Here, Plaintiff was stopped away from the search warrant locations, and his detention must therefore “be justified by some other rationale.” Id.
Defendants attempt to distinguish Bailey because it involved the search of a single residence that had already been secured, while here there were four locations that had not been secured. Hearing Tr. at 15–16. This is not persuasive because the Supreme Court made clear that Summers detention authority is limited to the “immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 202. Summers therefore does not provide a justification for Plaintiff‘s detention.
The next question is whether there was a basis for a Terry stop. It is well established that “a police officer may make a Terry stop ‘as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained is committing or has committed a criminal offense.‘” Grice v. McVeigh, 873 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. v. Compton, 830 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2016)). “The standard for reasonable suspicion is ‘not high,’ and is less than what probable cause requires.” Grice, 873 F.3d at 167 (quoting U.S. v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 332 (2d Cir. 2014)). In addition, “whether an officer‘s suspicion is reasonable is an objective inquiry based on the totality of the
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff. The Officers saw Plaintiff make “several attempts to reach Smith” at Smith‘s residence, Smith “eventually stuck his head out of the second-floor window, and made contact with Plaintiff,” and Plaintiff and Smith “eventually got into Smith‘s vehicle.” Def. SUMF ¶¶ 9–11. In addition, the Officers had a search warrant for Smith‘s residence based on probable cause to search for evidence of illegal drug and firearm sales. Finally, the video evidence suggests that Plaintiff generally matched the description of Smith‘s supplier, but this “vague” description “would fit a very large group of ordinary . . . men” and is “assigned little to no value for [the] probable cause analysis.” United States v. LeFebvre, 117 F.4th 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2024). Considering the totality of the circumstances, there was still a sufficient basis to stop Plaintiff for an investigative detention. See Bailey, 743 F.3d at 335 (concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to stop suspects “whose race, sex, build, and hair were consistent with an informant‘s description” of a drug dealer, and “who were seen leaving the very premises where the reported drug sale took place and where police had probable cause to think that an easily transportable firearm used in the drug trafficking was then located.“). In addition, the Officers had authority to detain Plaintiff as part of their stop of the car Smith was driving. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
The next question is whether the investigative stop became an arrest requiring probable cause. “If an investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion continues too long or becomes unreasonably intrusive, it will ripen into a de facto arrest that must be based on probable cause.” United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1992). “In assessing whether the degree of restraint was too intrusive to be classified as an investigative detention,” the Second Circuit has
“Handcuffing is ordinarily not incident to a Terry stop[] and tends to show that a stop has ripened into an arrest.” Grice, 873 F.3d at 167. Transportation to a police station and holding a person at the station has also been considered to be a factor supporting a conclusion under the totality of the circumstances that a stop has become an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 216 (1979) (holding that arrest occurred where suspect was “taken from a neighbor‘s home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room” and was “never informed that he was ‘free to go‘“); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (per curiam) (concluding that arrest occurred where a “17-year-old boy was awakened in his bedroom at three in the morning by at least three police officers, one of whom stated ‘we need to go and talk‘” and then “taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his underwear in January, placed in a
Finally, an officer “is entitled to qualified immunity against a suit for false arrest if he can establish that he had arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Id. (citation omitted).
“An officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Probable cause does not require that this “belief that a person has committed a crime be correct or more likely true than
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that there was not arguable probable cause to arrest at any point on February 2, 2022. The Officers were aware only that Plaintiff knew someone whom they had probable cause to suspect of illegal drug and firearm sales, that Plaintiff was familiar with locations they had probable cause to search related to the illegal drug and firearm sales, and that Plaintiff may have generally fit a “vague” description of a drug source that also “would fit a very large group of ordinary . . . men” and so “assigned little to no value for [the] probable cause analysis.” LeFebvre, 117 F.4th at 476. A reasonable jury could conclude that this does not amount to arguable probable cause. Accordingly, the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on their motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim is denied.
2. Monell Liability
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s claim for municipal liability against the City of Albany under Monell, 436 U.S. 658. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the
“To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).
“To establish a municipal policy, practice, or custom, a plaintiff must provide evidence of (1) a formal policy endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by the municipality‘s policymakers, which caused the alleged civil rights violation; (3) a practice so widespread that it constitutes ‘a custom or usage;’ or (4) a failure by the municipality‘s policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates.” Beckwith v. City of Syracuse, 642 F. Supp. 3d 283, 292–93 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 80–82 (2d Cir. 2006)). Here, Plaintiff claims that APD had a custom of detaining people offsite when executing search warrants and that APD did not train for the law established in Bailey.
To establish a policy through a “‘persistent and widespread’ practice by a subordinate municipal employee (or employees) other than a policymaker, the employee‘s unconstitutional conduct must be ‘so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making
Although the Second Circuit has not articulated a bright-line rule for the number of violations required to establish a policy or custom for Monell purposes, courts have found that evidence of only a handful of violations is not sufficient. See, e.g., Jones, 691 F.3d at 85 (holding that evidence of two or three incidents of unlawful conduct falls “far short” of demonstrating policy or custom); Giaccio v. City of New York, 308 F. App‘x 470, 472 (2d Cir. 2009) (four incidents insufficient); McLennon v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 69, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (six incidents insufficient). At some point on this spectrum, however, the number of incidents becomes cognizable. See, e.g., Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 335, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reasonable for jury to find Monell liability when there was evidence of eight similar unconstitutional arrests).
Here, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the municipal Defendant had a practice of illegally detaining individuals incident to executing search warrants, so widespread that it constituted a “custom.” Namely, Plaintiff points to the following deposition testimony given by Defendant Wood:
Q: Have you ever detained someone else who was not a suspect at the station while you were executing a search warrant on some properties in your career?
***
A: Numerous times.
Q: Can you identify any?
A: No. I can‘t recall.
Q: It happened so many [sic] you just can‘t recall?
A: I can‘t - I mean, no. I mean, I have done it numerous times. It would be impossible for me to remember a person or an event.
***
Q: Was it your practice to detain the people that you would find with the target under those circumstances [similar to Smith‘s and Plaintiff‘s]?
A: No. In fact, we don‘t want to do that ever. We, unfortunately, have to operate the way they operate. That is not something we want to do. We want our main target and we want it to be as easy as possible and move on with our business.
Q: But you told me a minute ago there have been many times you‘ve detained somebody like [Plaintiff] who is, for lack of a better term, a bystander, during a search warrant operation. What was it about — what were some of those circumstances where that would happen?
A: Well, I can only speculate and give you this exact example where we are waiting on a violent offender to come out of his house, and he comes out with another person. We have no choice but to now detain them because they may be involved or they could be destroying evidence or they could get hurt because they go back to the location while we are executing a search warrant. These situations are outside of our control. They are not something that we want to do. In fact, I wish [Plaintiff] had never been there. That way we could have just taken [Smith] and gone about our business.
Q: Right. But you said before it happens so many times you can‘t recall a specific time.
A: Well, not so many times. It happens numerous times, and I can‘t go back in my mind and now remember particular incidents where it occurred. You know, it doesn‘t strike my memory as important to recall that information. I just couldn‘t tell you. But it has happened before, yes.
Dkt. No. 43-7 at 30:16–31:5, 32:17–34:9. Based on this testimony, Plaintiff represents as undisputed fact that “[i]t is standard practice for [D]efendants, while executing a search warrant pursuant to a firearms investigation, to detain suspects away from the premises to be searched,”
Defendants deny this fact to the extent that Plaintiff interprets “numerous times” as displaying a “standard practice.” Def. Reply SUMF ¶¶ 43–44, Dkt. No. 51-1. Defendants further posit, without citation, that “[i]n firearms related offenses involving violent suspects, the police endeavor to intercept suspects away from locations where firearms are believed to be for operational safety reasons.” Id. at ¶ 43. This is, however, irrelevant to the central question of the Defendants’ practice concerning “bystanders” to such operations. Furthermore, Defendants do not meaningfully dispute that the conduct as testified to by Defendant Wood is unconstitutional, see the analysis of the false arrest claim above, nor do they deny that such measures occurred “numerous times.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court declines to grant summary judgment as to this theory of Plaintiff‘s Monell claim. Although the record could, perhaps, be more robust as to the number of instances the Defendants engaged in the purportedly unconstitutional practice, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of raising a dispute regarding a material fact as to whether the conduct was so “persistent and widespread,” “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,” and “so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials.” Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 870–71 (citations omitted). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied as to this theory of Monell liability. See Davis, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 355 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (concluding that fact issues precluded district judge from granting defendant‘s motion for summary judgment on Monell
Defendants are, however, entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s Monell claim premised on failure to train. To establish failure to train, a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary.‘” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm‘rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). A plaintiff “must show that a [municipal] policymaker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will confront a given situation,” and further “the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation.” Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Because of this high bar, a failure to train theory is where a “municipality‘s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
Here, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence of the municipality‘s training programs or advanced any theory as to how a training deficiency caused the officers to violate Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. Nor he has offered any evidence of purported inadequacies in the municipality‘s training program and the causal relationship between those inadequacies and the alleged constitutional violations. “Plaintiffs have provided no evidence tending to rule out those
3. Equal Protection
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s equal protection claim based on selective enforcement based on race8, arguing that Plaintiff cannot identify any similarly situated comparators or racially motivated conduct by the Defendants. Def. Mem. at 12–13; Def. Reply at 8–9. Plaintiff responds that “it is common practice for [APD] to falsely arrest a Black individual on the basis of race alone,” pointing to complaints from various lawsuits against Albany and APD officers. Pl. Mem. at 25–27.
There are “two types of equal protection claims,” intentional discrimination and selective enforcement. Dixon v. City of Syracuse, 493 F. Supp. 3d 30, 41–42 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). Plaintiff does not articulate which type of equal protection claim he asserts in his claim.
To establish an intentional discrimination claim, a plaintiff must (1) “point to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race,” (2) “identify a facially neutral law or
Here, Plaintiff‘s argument that APD has a “common practice of falsely arresting [Black] individuals on the basis of race alone,” relies on his request that the Court take judicial notice of several civil rights lawsuits filed against the City of Albany and APD members. Plaintiff‘s Supplemental Letter Brief (Pl. Supp.) at 4, Dkt. No. 54. “[C]ourts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts . . . not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation.” Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court therefore cannot take judicial notice of the other lawsuits for the truth of the matters asserted in that litigation. Even if the Court could take judicial notice of the other lawsuits for the truth of the matter asserted, however, that would still not establish the existence of a relevant law or policy because none of the suits allege that APD detained or arrested a Black person away from a search warrant location. See generally Dkt. No. 47-10. Other than the lawsuits, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of a law or policy that directly or indirectly classifies persons on race as required for his intentional discrimination claim. Therefore, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he cannot establish an intentional discrimination claim.
To prevail on a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff must establish that he was selectively treated compared with others similarly situated and that the selective treatment was impermissibly motivated. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995). That is, he “must specify at least one instance in which he was treated differently from another similarly situated.” Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2019).
4. Due Process
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.9 Defendants argue, among other things, that this claim is duplicative of Plaintiff‘s false arrest and Monell claims. Def. Reply at 10–11; Def. Supp. at 3. Plaintiff responds that his due process claim is not duplicative. Pl. Supp. at 1–3.
For substantive due process, “it is now well established that ‘[w]here another provision of the Constitution provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection, a court must assess a plaintiff‘s claims under that explicit provision and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process.‘” Hu, 927 F.3d at 104 (quoting Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2012)). District courts across the Second Circuit have held that procedural due process claims based on false arrests are duplicative of such Fourth Amendment claims. See Harris v. Binghamton Police Dep‘t, No. 3:22-cv-977 (BKS/ML), 2023 WL 7319090, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2023); Levantino v. Skala, 56 F. Supp. 3d 191, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 19-cv-1334, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85461, *11 (W.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022) report recommendation adopted 2022 WL 14912615 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2022). Here, Plaintiff‘s due process claims are duplicative of his false arrest claims because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection for the deprivations of liberty presented by a
B. Plaintiff‘s Motion10
1. False Arrest
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the undisputed facts establish that he was subject to a de facto arrest without probable cause. Pl. Mem. at 12–18. Defendants respond that handcuffing, transporting, then holding Plaintiff at the station was a legitimate means of confirming or dispelling reasonable suspicion, and that the Officer Defendants are protected by qualified immunity because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Def. Mem. at 5–6, 9; Def. Reply at 4–8.
“It is well settled that to establish a defendant‘s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant‘s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants, a jury could find that Plaintiff‘s detention became an arrest at some point before he was released from the station, and, if a jury reached that conclusion, there is a genuine issue of material disputed fact about which Officers would be liable based on their personal involvement.
Moreover, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Defendant, the Officers were aware that Plaintiff knew someone who they had probable cause to suspect of illegal drug and firearm sales, that Plaintiff was familiar with locations they had probable cause to search for evidence of the illegal drug and firearm sales, and that Plaintiff fit a description of a drug source.
2. Monell Liability
Plaintiff argues that judgment should be entered in his favor against the municipal defendant under Monell because of the custom of illegally detaining bystanders away from premises in which a search warrant is being executed. Pl. Mem. at 23–24. As previously discussed, the Court finds that a question of fact remains as to whether Plaintiff suffered a constitutional injury as a result of conduct that was so widespread and pervasive as to permit an inference of municipal liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied as to this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff‘s cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff‘s claims for (1) false arrest and (2) municipal liability pursuant to Monell on the theory of a custom; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is otherwise GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
Dated: September 30, 2025
Elizabeth C. Coombe
U.S. District Judge