Raymond GRULLON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, and Warden, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 11-3184
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued: Jan. 11, 2013. Decided: June 19, 2013.
717 F.3d 133
The district court found that Bonventre failed to satisfy the first threshold requirement because he provided insufficient information for a court to evaluate the extent of his unrestrained funds. We agree. Bonventre did not disclose his net worth, provide a comprehensive list of his assets, or explain how he has been paying his significant living expenses. While the affidavits describe the aggregate balances of bank accounts enumerated in the government‘s submissions, they do not clarify whether Bonventre has access to other accounts and, if so, their value. Accordingly, the district court‘s determination was appropriate.7
CONCLUSION
The district court‘s denial of Bonventre‘s motion for a Monsanto hearing is AFFIRMED.
Katherine Swan, New York, NY (Guy Miller Struve, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael K. Skold, Assistant Attorney General, Hartford, CT (George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Warden.
Before: KEARSE and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges, RAKOFF, District Judge *
Plaintiff Raymond Grullon, who commenced this action pro se as a pretrial detainee, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Stefan R. Underhill, Judge, dismissing his complaint brought under
I. BACKGROUND
Grullon‘s complaint, the factual allegations of which we take as true for purposes of reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, see, e.g., DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 110-11 (2d Cir.2010), alleged principally as follows.
In January 2010, Grullon, who was in custody in New York, was transferred to NHCC because of an outstanding arrest warrant against him in Connecticut. At NHCC, Grullon “was not afforded a phone call, toothpaste, soap, p[e]n, [or] paper.” (Complaint at 8 (capitalization omitted).) Grullon was informed that NHCC did not have a law library and did not provide legal materials; Grullon did not otherwise have “access to the courts, or adequate assistance by a trained advisor.” (Id. (capitalization omitted).) Grullon was “placed into a cold cell” with “no blankets etc., sheets,” or other sleeping supplies. (Id. (capitalization omitted); see also id. at 5-A (alleging “dismal conditions” including “Excessive Heat“).) Grullon was placed in a cell with another inmate and bunk beds, but with “no ladder[ ],” and “no way of getting up-top“; and for the top bunk there were “no []guard rails,” producing “a dangerous condition.” (Id. at 8 (capitalization omitted).) Grullon‘s cell had dangerously poor “ventilation“; and the jail had an inadequate supply of food. (Id. (capitalization omitted).)
As required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“), the district court promptly reviewed the complaint, see
The Warden thereafter moved pursuant to
Grullon, in opposition to the motion, argued that one means of establishing a supervisory official‘s liability for a constitutional violation is to show that the official “after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.” (Grullon Response to Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss (“Grullon Re-
In a Ruling on Motion To Dismiss, dated July 8, 2011, reported at 2011 WL 2680843, the district court granted the Warden‘s motion to dismiss all of Grullon‘s claims. The court ruled that as to the claims against the Warden in his official capacity, the claims for damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the claims for equitable relief were moot because Grullon was no longer being detained at NHCC. See id. at *2. As to the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity, the court ruled that Grullon had failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted because he did not show that the Warden was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations. See id. at *3-*4.
With regard to the individual-capacity claims, the district court stated, inter alia, that
Grullon does not mention the Warden of NHCC other than in the caption of the complaint and description of defendants. Grullon does not allege that the Warden was directly involved in or knew about the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement at NHCC. Nor does Grullon claim that he made the Warden aware of the objectionable conditions.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The court noted that “[i]n response to the motion to dismiss, Grullon submits a copy of a letter that he claims to have sent to the Warden on April 18, 2010 regarding certain conditions of confinement at NHCC.” Id. But the court stated that it could not consider the Letter on the motion to dismiss:
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, . . . the Court may consider only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. . . . This letter was not attached to the complaint or referenced in the complaint and does not constitute a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court added that even if it were to take judicial notice of the Letter, the complaint would fail because “Grullon d[id] not allege that the Warden actually received the letter or whether he took any action in response to the letter.” Id. at *4. The court further stated that, in any event,
a supervisory official‘s mere receipt of a letter complaining about unconstitutional conduct is not enough to give rise to personal involvement on the part of the official. See Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1997) (prison official who received letter from inmate and forwarded it to subordinate for investigation and response was not personally involved in depriving inmate of constitutional right). . . . Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted on the ground that Grullon did not allege the personal involvement of the Warden in the
claimed unconstitutional conditions of confinement at NHCC.
2011 WL 2680843, at *4.
The district court denied Grullon‘s request for leave to amend his complaint to add allegations of notice to the Warden based on the Letter, ruling that there was an insufficient interval between the date of the letter and the filing of the complaint for Grullon to have exhausted his administrative remedies:
It is apparent that any attempt to amend the complaint to add Grullon‘s claim that he sent a letter to the Warden on April 18, 2010 would be futile because Grullon did not allow the Warden sufficient time to respond to the letter before filing this case. State of Connecticut Administrative Directive 9.6(6)(A) requires an inmate to attempt to informally resolve his complaints about conditions prior to filing a formal grievance. A prison official is to respond to an informal written attempt at resolution within fifteen calendar days of receipt of the written request. If the letter to the Warden is construed as Grullon‘s attempt to informally resolve his complaints about various conditions at New Haven Correctional and it is assumed that the Warden received it at the earliest on April 18, 2010, the day it was written, the Warden was required to respond on or before May 3, 2010. The complaint is dated May 1, 2010. Furthermore, Grullon does not allege that he took any other steps to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit.
2011 WL 2680843, at *4 n. 2 (emphases added).
Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. Grullon appealed and moved in this Court for in forma pauperis status and the assignment of counsel. We granted the motions with respect to Grullon‘s claims against the Warden in his individual capacity, dismissing the appeal with respect to the official-capacity claims. Our order did not mention the other defendants named in the complaint; and Grullon‘s brief on appeal makes no argument that the district court erred in dismissing claims against those defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Grullon, now represented by counsel, pursues the claims asserted against the Warden in his individual capacity, arguing principally that the district court erred in dismissing those claims without granting leave to file an amended complaint to allege that, based on Grullon‘s April 2010 Letter, the Warden had sufficient notice of the conditions complained of to expose him to personal liability. The Warden urges us to uphold the district court‘s rulings or, in the alternative, to affirm on the basis that Grullon‘s “conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim that any constitutional violations actually occurred” (Warden‘s brief on appeal at 6). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Grullon‘s request to file an amended complaint should have been granted.
A. The Sufficiency of the Complaint
It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant‘s individual liability in a suit brought under
[t]he personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 (emphases added); see Williams, 781 F.2d at 323-24. Although the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), may have heightened the requirements for showing a supervisor‘s personal involvement with respect to certain constitutional violations, we need not reach Iqbal‘s impact on Colon in this case, for Grullon‘s initial complaint did not adequately plead the Warden‘s personal involvement even under Colon.
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, “we view the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the appellant[],” Chase Group Alliance LLC v. City of New York Department of Finance, 620 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir.2010), “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor,” id. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we must interpret the factual allegations of a pro se complaint “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 133 (2d Cir.2008) (“courts are . . . to construe a pro se litigant‘s pleadings and motions liberally“).
Even within this framework, we agree with the district court that Grullon‘s complaint, as filed, did not sufficiently allege the Warden‘s personal involvement in or awareness of the health, safety, and communications issues raised by Grullon. There were no such direct allegations; there were no indirect allegations sufficient to permit an inference the Warden had acted or failed to act in any of the ways that would subject him to personal liability for the deprivations alleged by Grullon. We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Grullon‘s claims against the Warden in his individual capacity for lack of sufficient allegations of the Warden‘s personal involvement.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the denial of Grullon‘s request to amend.
B. The Denial of Permission To Amend
When a party requests leave to amend his complaint, permission generally should be freely granted. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962);
A district court‘s denial of a request for leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., id.; Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir.2012) (“Anderson“), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 846, 184 L.Ed.2d 655 (2013); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir.2010) (“Starr“), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 901, 178 L.Ed.2d 803 (2011). “An abuse of discretion may consist of an erroneous view of the law, a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts, or a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Anderson, 680 F.3d at 185; see, e.g., Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d at 132.
In the present case, although the district court properly described the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim, the court did not—other than indicating that leave to amend could be denied if it would be futile—discuss other principles governing motions to amend, e.g., that motions to amend should be granted freely in the interests of justice, that a pro se complaint generally should not be dismissed without granting the plaintiff leave to amend at least once, and that a pro se plaintiff‘s proposed amended complaint should be construed to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.
Although Grullon had not proffered a formal proposed amended complaint, he had asked that he “be allowed to amend his complaint” if the court found his allegations as to the Warden to be insufficient (Grullon Response ¶ 11 (capitalization omitted)), and he had submitted a copy of the April 18, 2010 Letter he claims he sent to the Warden complaining of the NHCC conditions. The Letter to the Warden plus the allegations of Grullon‘s initial complaint were sufficient to “give[] an[] indication that a valid claim might be stated,” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We disagree with the district court‘s decision to disregard the Letter on the basis that Grullon did “not allege that the Warden actually received the letter or whether he took any action in response to the letter,” 2011 WL 2680843, at *4. “[P]ersonal involvement is a question of fact,” Williams, 781 F.2d at 323; and Sealey, the principal case invoked by the district court (and by the Warden (see Warden‘s brief on appeal at 9)), did not involve a dismissal pursuant to
Here, the district court dismissed Grullon‘s action with prejudice on the basis of his initial pleading, denying him leave to file an amended complaint alleging that he in fact sent his Letter to the Warden complaining of prison conditions. At the pleading stage, even if Grullon had no knowledge or information as to what became of his Letter after he sent it, he would be entitled to have the court draw the reasonable inference—if his amended complaint contained factual allegations indicating that the Letter was sent to the Warden at an appropriate address and by appropriate means—that the Warden in fact received the Letter, read it, and thereby became aware of the alleged conditions of which Grullon complained. It is of course possible that the Warden read the Letter and took appropriate action or that an administrative procedure was in place by which the Warden himself would not have received the Letter addressed to him; but those are potential factual issues as to personal involvement that likely cannot be resolved without development of a factual record. As we have previously held, “when a pro se plaintiff brings a colorable claim against supervisory personnel, and those supervisory personnel respond with a dispositive motion grounded in the plaintiff‘s failure to identify the individuals who were personally involved, under circumstances in which the plaintiff would not be expected to have that knowledge, dismissal should not occur without an opportunity for additional discovery.” Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir.1998). We conclude that the district court should not have denied leave to amend for lack of allegations as to the Warden‘s actual receipt of the Letter and as to his response.
Finally, the district court erred in denying leave to amend the complaint on the ground that amendment would be “futile because” the complaint was dated May 1, and assuming that the Warden received the Letter on April 18, Grullon failed to give the Warden 15 days to act “prior to filing this lawsuit,” 2011 WL 2680843, at *4 n. 2. First, although the court assumed arguendo (quite generously) that Grullon‘s Letter dated April 18 would have been received by the Warden on that date, the finding that the complaint that was “dated” May 1, id., was “fil[ed]” on May 1, id., is contrary to the district court records. The complaint as it appears in the record was date-stamped by the district court as “FILED 2010 MAY 18“; and the district court docket sheets state that the complaint was filed on May 18.
More importantly, the court‘s legal framework for assessing the sufficiency of Grullon‘s proposal to amend his complaint was flawed, because although claims relating to “prison conditions” are subject to the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense,” and “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints,” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); see, e.g., Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675 (2d Cir.2004); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28-29 (2d Cir.1999). Thus, even if there were fewer than 15 days between the Warden‘s receipt of Grullon‘s Letter and Grullon‘s filing of his complaint, that would not have affected the complaint‘s sufficiency. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the district court did not properly exercise its
We reject the Warden‘s contention that, without regard to the issue of personal responsibility, we should affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend on the ground that Grullon has failed to allege constitutional violations. Allegations that a prisoner or detainee was denied meaningful access to the courts, leaving him unable to assert an allegedly legitimate legal claim, see generally Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), and allegations of deliberate indifference to serious threats to the well-being or safety of a person in custody, such as unhealthy extremes in temperature, see generally Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 165-66 (2d Cir.2001), or unhealthy air conditions in his cell, see, e.g., Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 52 (2d Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds, Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir.2009), have been held sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of the Warden‘s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is vacated to the extent that it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AMALYA L. KEARSE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE