FENYANG AJAMU STEWART, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ANDREI IANCU, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-1815
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Argued: October 30, 2018; Decided: January 8, 2019
PUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:16-cv-00213-LMB-JFA)
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Motz joined.
ARGUED: Kevin Spencer Elliker, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dennis Carl Barghaan, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
This appeal arises from the district court’s determination that Fenyang Ajamu Stewart (“Stewart”) is required to wait longer than 180 days to commence a civil action under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act after amending his initial administrative complaint before the relevant agency. But the text of Title VII, as well as the
I.
Stewart worked as a patent examiner for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). He suffers from bulging discs in his lower back and radiculopathy, resulting from compression of his sciatic nerve, as well as post- and continuous-traumatic stress disorder. Because of these medical conditions, Stewart filed a reasonable accommodation request with the PTO in April 2014. Specifically, he requested that he not be required to (1) come into work at a specified, mandatory time; (2) report his work schedule to his supervisor; and (3) schedule his meetings before 12:00 p.m., as his pain medications caused morning grogginess. In addition, Stewart requested an ergonomic chair and keyboard, a standing desk, and a foot stool.
On September 19, 2014, the PTO granted Stewart’s requests for the keyboard, standing desk, and foot stool. Stewart had already received an ergonomic chair by that point. Regarding his work schedule, the PTO determined that Stewart was already on the Increased Flexitime Program work schedule, which permitted him sufficient flexibility to “work around any difficulties” and that Stewart’s supervisor, when possible, would schedule meetings specifically designed for Stewart after 12:00 pm. However, the PTO denied Stewart’s request not to report his work schedule to his supervisor, as such a request would unduly burden his supervisor and the agency’s ability to oversee and administer Stewart’s work.
Stewart filed a formal complaint with the PTO’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity on July 14, 2015, challenging the PTO’s denial of his request for accommodations, asserting a hostile work environment and discrimination, and alleging various claims of retaliation. Stewart amended this administrative complaint eight times. After each of these amendments, the PTO’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity responded with a notice advising Stewart that (1) he may amend his formal complaint at any time before the investigation is complete, and any new claims “must be like or related to the claims raised” in the original complaint; and (2) he may “file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court at any time after 180 days have passed from the date [he] filed [his] original complaint.
On February 29, 2016—more than 180 days after the filing of his original administrative complaint, but less than 180 days after the filing of several of the amendments—Stewart filed pro se a civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging numerous violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
The PTO filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Stewart’s suit was premature under both
On March 17, 2017, the district court dismissed Stewart’s case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court held that Stewart had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because under
II.
A.
Stewart alleges violations of both the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. Rehabilitation Act claims “must comply with the same administrative procedures that govern federal employee Title VII claims.” Wilkinson v. Rumsfeld, 100 F. App‘x 155, 157 (4th Cir. 2004). Section 717, codified at
In addition to
B.
We begin with the threshold question of whether Title VII’s 180-day waiting period found in
Title VII directs federal employees to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2004). Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies serves twin objectives: protecting agency authority
in the administrative process and “promot[ing] efficiency” in the resolution of claims. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). By avoiding the “premature interruption of the administrative process,” exhaustion requirements ensure that agencies are provided the first opportunity to “exercise [] discretion” or “apply [] expertise.” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1969). The 180-day waiting period serves these purposes: it ensures that the employer is “put on notice of the alleged violations” to facilitate out-of-court resolution and permits sufficient, but finite, time for the agency to address the discrimination charges in the first instance. Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005). Indeed, courts have regularly characterized
However, it bears noting that the 180-day waiting period also is not a paradigmatic exhaustion requirement. Unlike most administrative exhaustion requirements premised on agency action, after which injured parties may “seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy” if warranted, the 180-day waiting period is satisfied by agency inaction. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993) (citation omitted). Indeed, Congress passed
This distinction informs our consideration of whether
In recent years, the Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned courts not to “confuse[] or conflate[]” subject-matter jurisdiction, on the one hand, with the “essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief,” on the other. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006). Applying this distinction, the Supreme Court has differentiated between non-jurisdictional “claim-processing” rules and jurisdictional rules that govern a court’s adjudicatory authority. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (pressing a “stricter distinction” between these two categories of rules). In particular, the Supreme Court has clarified that most time bars are “quintessential claim-processing rules,” which “promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011) (holding that a statute requiring filing of notice of appeal within 180 days of administrative decision constituted a “claim-processing rule” and therefore was not jurisdictional). Such rules do not strip a court of judicial authority to hear a case, even when the time limits are “framed in mandatory terms.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (holding that certain timely filing provisions in the Federal Torts Claims Act were not jurisdictional).
Instead, the Supreme Court has established a clear statement rule for determining whether procedural rules, including time bars, are jurisdictional. Only if the statutory text “plainly show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences” should a court treat a rule as jurisdictional. Id. Put otherwise, Congress must explicitly “tag” a procedural bar “as jurisdictional.” Id. In conducting this clear statement inquiry, the Supreme Court has looked to several factors, including the statutory text (if it speaks in “jurisdictional terms”); the placement of the rule (if it is located in the jurisdiction-granting provision of the statute); and legislative context. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 438.
Here, Congress has done nothing to “tag” as jurisdictional the 180-day waiting period. The text of
In addition,
In considering this issue, we emphasize the subtle, but important, distinction between those exhaustion requirements that operate as a jurisdictional bar and those that merely function as a statutory prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII. See Vinieratos, 939 F.2d at 768 n.5. Because we conclude that
Our holding also prevents the “drastic” consequences of treating a procedural rule as jurisdictional—consequences that “alter[] the normal operation of our adversarial system.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434. Jurisdictional defects can be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by the courts, even post-judgment, which may result in the “waste of judicial resources and may unfairly prejudice litigants.” Id. Because of the gravity of a jurisdictional label, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly demanded “discipline” in this inquiry. Id. at 435.
To be clear, we do not hold that all exhaustion requirements set forth in Title VII are non-jurisdictional. Rather, whether a particular exhaustion requirement—in Title VII or any other statute—is jurisdictional turns on the statutory language and purpose of the exhaustion provision at issue. Here,
Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing this case under
III.
A.
Having determined that
Stewart’s appeal requires us to construe the statutory language of
We begin with the plain language of the statute. In relevant part,
The statute’s use of the modifier “initial” also implicitly allows for the possibility of subsequent amendments—that there may well be additional “charge[s]” that follow the “initial charge.” Accordingly, the 180-day waiting period does not reset upon subsequent amendments to the administrative complaint. Had Congress not contemplated the possibility of amendments to the complaint, there would have been no reason to use the word “initial.” See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004) (observing it is “a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall
Turning to the legislative context, Congress passed
2, 1971). Ensuring that federal employees had “access to the courts” therefore drove the passage of
The 180 day [waiting period] provision represents a Congressional determination that providing prompt access to the courts in discrimination disputes is so important that the administrative process will be given only a finite time to deal alone with a given dispute. Indeed, the Act is in part a response to Congressional realization that “the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies... had become [a] barrier to meaningful court review.”
Wilson, 79 F.3d at 167 (quoting Grubbs, 514 F.2d at 1328). Allowing agencies to repeatedly delay individuals’ ability to go to court, simply because they have amended their administrative complaints, would frustrate a “congressional policy to make the courts the final tribunal for the resolution of controversies over charges of discrimination after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.” Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1974). Although
Our conclusion also comports with the broader purpose of Title VII as a “remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted); see also Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College, 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Title VII does not require procedural exactness from lay complainants.”). We must be wary of “overly technical concerns” laying a “tripwire for hapless plaintiffs.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594. Here, for example, the PTO repeatedly informed Stewart, after each of his amendments—and in accordance with the statute’s plain
B.
In support of its position that Stewart was required to wait beyond the initial 180-day waiting period, the PTO makes several arguments. First, the PTO argues that
In support of its first argument—that
“complaint” and “charge.” The PTO argues that the term “complaint” in
Even if we were to accept the PTO’s proposed distinction between these two terms, such a distinction does not aid the PTO’s position. If we treat “initial charge” as the first, informal “statement” through which an employee alleges unlawful discrimination, then the 180-day waiting period would be satisfied at the same time or earlier than under the reading we adopt because a “charge,” so conceived, never temporally follows a “complaint.” Under the PTO’s construction, Stewart’s “initial charge” occurred on April 30, 2015, when he submitted a document to the PTO’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity alleging harassment and discrimination on the basis of disability. Accepting the PTO’s position, then, would only hasten the date upon which Stewart could file a civil action. More significantly, PTO’s position in no*
way explains Congress’s express use of the word “initial,” which serves as the crux of our construction of
The district court, and the PTO, wrongly tether
First, as discussed above, the district court’s holding is contrary to the plain language of both
Additionally, the district court neglected an important facet of Title VII claims: we have long held that courts may in fact adjudicate claims not raised before the agency, if certain requirements are met. In Hill v. Western Electric Company, Inc., we recognized the “generally accepted principle” that the “scope of a Title VII lawsuit may extend to ‘any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case’” before the agency. 672 F.2d 381, 390 n.6 (4th Cir. 1982). Put otherwise, an “administrative charge of discrimination does not strictly limit a Title VII suit which may follow,” and federal courts may still hear claims that the employee did not raise before the agency, as long as they are “like or related” and grow out of the allegations during the pendency of the case before the agency. Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594. Only “those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.” Chacko v. Patuxent Institution, 429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000) (“If a plaintiff’s claims in her judicial complaint are reasonably related to her EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from
Nor is a plaintiff’s ability to raise new claims before the district court cabined to the context of retaliation claims, as the PTO appeared to briefly suggest at oral argument. Oral Argument at 27:53–28:25 (“I don’t think he can amend his complaint, [] unless it was for retaliation... because this Court’s jurisprudence provides that in cases of retaliation, the exhaustion procedures and principles are a little bit different.”). It is true that we have often addressed a plaintiff’s ability to do so in the specific context of retaliation claims. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992). Importantly, however, we have never held that the rule applies exclusively in the context of retaliation claims but rather that retaliation claims “receive extended flexibility” when being considered under the general rule referenced in Hill. Clarke v. Richmond Behavioral Health Auth., No. 3:09CV743, 2011 WL 13274273, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2011); see also Brown v. Runyon, 139 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (noting that our precedent “presupposes both that a retaliation count in a Title VII lawsuit be ‘related to’ and have ‘grown out’ of the EEO charge while the administrative charge remained pending”). We have reasoned that retaliation claims constitute a subset of the general rule noted in Hill, because “retaliation claims almost always relate back to previously filed EEO charges, and, therefore, may be raised for the first time in district court without the requirement that a plaintiff have exhausted his administrative remedies.” Brown, 139 F.3d at 888. Accordingly, retaliation claims represent the “inevitable corollary,” but not the exclusive application, of the “generally accepted principle” articulated in Hill. Id. (quoting Nealon, 958 F.2d at 590). We have therefore left open the possibility that district courts may hear claims for the first time, beyond just retaliation claims, if they are “reasonably related to the original complaint” and “developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint.” Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506.
Indeed, other circuits have recognized the need to grant Title VII plaintiffs “significant leeway” in drafting administrative complaints, given their lack of technical expertise. Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Applying this principle of liberal construction, other circuits permit litigants to bring claims not specifically pressed before the agency if they are “like or reasonably related to those contained in the [agency] complaint” and if they “reasonably could have developed from the [agency’s] investigation of the charges before it.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Foster v. BNSF Ry. Co., 866 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding same); Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.,
291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). We join these circuits today in reiterating our decision in Hill and Chacko that plaintiffs may bring Title VII claims for the first time before a district court, so long as they are like or reasonably related to charges in the original administrative complaint, and if they reasonably could have developed from the agency’s investigation of the original complaint. See Hill, 672 F.2d at 390 n.6; Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506.
Crucially, this “like or related” limitation also allays the PTO’s third argument regarding gamesmanship. The PTO argues that should we reverse the district court, a federal employee could file a “perfunctory
Second, as Stewart correctly points out, existing procedural guardrails further protect against such gamesmanship. When amending a complaint before the agency, the employee must file a letter with the agency’s Office of Equal Employment Director “describing the new incident(s) and stating that s/he wishes to amend his/her complaint to include the new incident(s).” EEOC Mgmt. Directive 110, Ch. 5.B. The Director must then review this request to determine if the claims are like or related, and “whether a fair and impartial investigation of the new claims can be accomplished within 360 days of the original filed complaint.” Id. If not, then the individual must start a new administrative process with respect to the new claim. Accordingly, employees cannot game the administrative process in the way suggested by the PTO. Indeed, if we were to accept the district court’s holding, we may even risk disincentivizing plaintiffs from bringing a “like or related” claim before the agency, as each amendment would only further delay the plaintiff’s access to court. Under the district court’s reading of
Our holding maintains the careful balance between the Title VII’s administrative framework and judicial remedies, between “providing notice to employers and the [agency] on the one hand and ensuring plaintiffs are not tripped up over technicalities on the other.” Id. at 594. We recognize the “substantial role” played by the administrative process in narrowing “formal litigation.” Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509. But it is equally well-established that if the claim raised for the first time before the district court contains factual allegations that “are reasonably related to the factual allegations in the formal litigation, the connection between the charge and the claim is sufficient.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a plaintiff may pursue a claim not explicitly included in an administrative complaint if the allegations are “like or reasonably related to” those in the charge).
*****
The plain text of
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Stewart’s amended complaint and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED