ESTATE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN SCHUCK, by and through his successors-in-interest Sabrina Schuck and Timothy Schuck; et al. v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.
Case No.: 23-cv-785-DMS-AHG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 11, 2025
Following the death of William Hayden Schuck (“Schuck“) in San Diego Central Jail on March 16, 2022, Schuck‘s parents, Sabrina and Timothy Schuck, on behalf of Schuck‘s estate and in their individual capacities as Schuck‘s next of kin, sued the County of San Diego (“the County“), Correctional Healthcare Partners (“CHP“), and employees of the two entities for constitutional and state-law violations. Pending before the Court are County Defendants’1 Motion for Summary Judgment, (County MSJ Mot., ECF No. 109),
I. BACKGROUND
A. The County and CHP
The County operates multiple jails within its territory. In 2022, the California State Auditor issued a report documenting that from 2006–20, 185 in-custody deaths occurred in County jails. (County Opp‘n Ex. 46 at 1). Eighteen deaths also took place in 2021, the year before Schuck‘s death. (Id. at 14). The number of detainee deaths in San Diego County has historically been higher than in comparable counties, including Alameda, Riverside, and Orange. (Id. at 16). At the time of Schuck‘s death, Sheriff Kelly Martinez was the Sheriff and Dr. Jon Montgomery was the Chief Medical Officer for the County‘s Sheriff‘s Department. (TAC, ECF No. 78 at 6–7); (County Opp‘n Ex. 52 at 1, 14). Just prior to his death, Sheriff William Gore was the Sheriff and Sheriff Martinez was the Undersheriff. (TAC 6); (County Opp‘n Ex. 52 at 1).
In October 2020, CHP contracted with the County to provide medical services in County jails. (CHP MSJ Ex. M at 45); (see generally CHP Opp‘n Ex. 1). Pursuant to the contract, CHP “provide[s] on-site physicians” for “sick call and specialty clinic services.” (Id. at 24–25); (CHP MSJ Ex. M at 17-18). It also “works closely” with the Sheriff‘s Department to ensure that medical care in County jails conforms with “acceptable standards.” (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 1 at 27). CHP employees are responsible for treating patients on their sick call and chart check lists. (Id. at Ex. 2 at 19–21, 98); (CHP MSJ Ex. W at 51–53). While sick calls and chart checks are practices that have existed for many years, they
B. Schuck‘s Incarceration
On the morning of March 10, 2022, Schuck was involved in a rollover motor vehicle accident. (County MSJ Ex. A at 32); (CHP MSJ Ex. F at 676); (County Opp‘n Ex. 1 at 18-19). At the scene of the accident, police arrested him for driving under the influence of a controlled substance and for carrying several firearms. (CHP MSJ Ex. A at 741, 746-47; Ex. B at 1-2). While Schuck seemed well enough to perform the field sobriety tests, he failed several of them. (County MSJ Ex. A at 32); (CHP MSJ Ex. A at 746–47). As he sat in the back of a police car during his arrest, Schuck appeared disoriented: he had bulging eyes, held his face between his legs, and spoke to a girlfriend who was not present. (County Opp‘n Ex. 3 at 1:12:24 P.M.–1:12:52 P.M.).
Following his arrest, Schuck was transported to San Diego Central Jail. Schuck‘s transporting officer described his behavior as “erratic” and “consistent with someone under the influence of methamphetamines.” (Id. at Ex. 1 at 24). Nurse Manuel Nozawa “gate refused” Schuck at the jail, finding that he needed medical clearance first. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 633); (County MSJ Ex. B at 633). As a result, Schuck went to the emergency department at the University of California, San Diego (“UCSD“) Hospital. However, beyond an initial physical examination by Dr. Kyle Rourke, Schuck refused treatment and left UCSD against medical advice. (CHP MSJ Ex. F at 676). Dr. Rourke documented that Schuck demonstrated sufficient understanding to refuse treatment. (Id. at Ex. G at 36).
In Schuck‘s UCSD After Visit Summary (“AVS“), Dr. Rourke wrote that Schuck had been involved in a motor vehicle accident; “refus[ed] medical evaluation, [but] ha[d] medical decision-making capacity“; and had “[n]o obvious signs of trauma or illness but occult injury [was] possible given mechanism.” (Id. at Ex. F at 676). Dr. Rourke was not “overtly concerned” about an occult injury but noted its possibility because he had wanted to notify jail staff that if Schuck started presenting abnormal symptoms, he should be evaluated for one. (Id. at Ex. G at 23–24, 43). The AVS also stated Schuck‘s vital signs.
After refusing treatment, the police brought Schuck back to San Diego Central Jail. He arrived wearing an unbuttoned shirt and no shoes. (County Opp‘n Ex. 8 at 9:09:28 P.M.–9:09:43 P.M.). Nurse Jameelyn Barrera cleared him for booking. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 642-43). Nurse Barrera noted that Schuck made “grandiose statements” and did not understand the booking process. (Id. at 658). For instance, he asked to take photos of his medical records with his phone even though it had shattered during his motor vehicle accident. (Id.). He also asked for twenty dollars to give to the nurse for water. (Id.). She scheduled him to see a qualified mental health practitioner (“QMHP“) as a result. (See id.). Despite his behavior, Nurse Barrera felt Schuck was fit for booking because she did not see obvious signs of trauma, broken bones, or bleeding. (County MSJ Ex. D at 116).
Later that evening, while in a holding cell, Schuck continued to demonstrate odd symptoms. At 10:07 P.M., he picked up a discarded milk carton off the floor and drank from it. (County Opp‘n Ex. 14 at 10:07:39 P.M.–10:07:59 P.M.).
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Schuck was unable to move to a regular housing unit. Instead, he was placed in the “Back 40,” which was historically not used for housing because “sometimes [jail staff] would not know that [detainees] were back there.” (Id. at Ex. 44 at 61). The holding cells in the “Back 40” contained metal benches and a bathroom. (Id. at Ex. 33 at 88–89). When detainees stayed in the “Back 40” during the time of Schuck‘s incarceration, they generally were not given a mattress, blanket, or access to a shower. (Id.). No evidence suggests that Schuck received these necessities.
On the morning of March 15, 2022, four deputies saw Schuck in his cell talking to himself and not wearing pants. (Id. at Ex. 18 at 13, 15; Ex. 20 at 8:01:45 A.M.–8:01:59
At Medical, Nurse Romeo DeGuzman evaluated Schuck. (Id. at Ex. 21 at 29); (County MSJ Ex. F at 29). When the deputies presented Schuck to Nurse DeGuzman, he was wearing a wet shirt smeared with blood and no pants. (County Opp‘n Ex. 21 at 29, 31). He also had a wound on his lower leg. (Id. at 29). Nurse DeGuzman thought Schuck was “alert,” “responsive,” “ambulatory,” and “not in respiratory distress.” (County MSJ Ex. F at 41–42). However, he simultaneously observed that Schuck was “disorganized,” “nonsensical,” “uncooperative,” “naked,” “not healthy mentally,” and had an elevated blood pressure of 148/96. (County Opp‘n Ex. 7 at 659; Ex. 21 at 42, 124). Schuck also reported to Nurse DeGuzman that he had used acid in the streets. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 659). Nurse DeGuzman asked Schuck a series of questions, took his vital signs, referred him to a mental health clinician, requested a medical chart review of his AVS from UCSD, and placed him on the sick call list for a wellness check. (County MSJ Ex. F at 44-45); (County Opp‘n Ex. 7 at 658; Ex. 21 at 44–45).
Schuck then went to court for his arraignment. (CHP MSJ Ex. O at 1). Public Defender Stephen Trenholme represented him. (County MSJ Ex. W at 2). Public Defender Trenholme requested the court to make a referral within the jail for medical attention. (Id.). The judge agreed, “refer[ring] [Schuck] to the jail mental health unit as soon as possible to determine if medications [were] appropriate.” (Id. at 3). The resulting court order stated that the court “refers [Schuck] to jail medical to be screened for medications.” (Id. at Ex. AC at 85, Dep. Ex. 18); (County Opp‘n Ex. 7 at 679).
Later in the afternoon, at 4:12 P.M., Nurse Nicholas Kahl completed the “medical chart review” requested by Nurse DeGuzman. (CHP MSJ Ex. V at 660). Nurse
At around 5:30 P.M., Deputy Alan Griffith brought Schuck back to the jail from court. (CHP MSJ Ex. O at 1); (County MSJ Ex. G at 54). When Deputy Griffith retrieved Schuck, he was told that Schuck was acting “odd, weird, and not following instructions.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 28 at 48). He observed that Schuck “drift[ed]” and “wander[ed] off.” (Id. at 49). When Schuck spoke, Deputy Griffith could not understand him: he “mumble[d],” sounding like somebody who had their “wisdom teeth [out]” or a “cotton ball in their mouth.” (Id. at 51). Deputy Griffith brought Schuck to Deputy Allan Valbuena, the deputy responsible for the receipt of detainees returning from court. (County MSJ Ex. G at 54–55); (County Opp‘n Ex. 29 at 39). During their initial exchange, Deputy Griffith told Deputy Valbuena that Schuck‘s court appearance was “cut short“; that Schuck was “cross-chained” because he was “acting odd and weird“; and that Schuck “need[ed] to go see [M]edical.” (Id. at Ex. 28 at 57); (County MSJ Ex. G at 57). According to Deputy Griffith, he communicated to Deputy Valbuena that Schuck needed to be seen “soon” or “within a reasonable time,” which he considered to be “within the hour.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 28 at 72).
Deputy Valbuena saw Schuck sitting on the floor in a place where detainees do not normally sit. (Id. at Ex. 29 at 40, 45, 47). When Deputy Valbuena asked Schuck what was wrong, Schuck said he was thirsty. (Id. at 40, 43, 47). Deputy Valbuena asked Deputy Griffith if he would walk with him to bring Schuck to the second floor. (Id. at Ex. 28 at
At around 8:15 P.M., Deputy Jessica Ramirez and Deputy Justin Page escorted Schuck from his holding cell in the “Back 40” to a housing module on the seventh floor, called “7 David” (“7D“). (Id. at Ex. 33 at 48, 50); (County MSJ Ex. K at 12–13). Deputy Ramirez thought that Schuck “[v]isually . . . looked fine” because he “wasn‘t flush,” “wasn‘t bleeding,” and “was breathing.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 33 at 67). Deputy Page thought similarly, finding nothing remarkable about his appearance. (County MSJ Ex. L at 75). However, they observed him acting “childlike” and demonstrating “abnormal behavior“: he pretended to row a canoe and to call his mom with a hand phone while in his cell. (County Opp‘n Ex. 33 at 66–67); (County MSJ Ex. K at 51, 66–67). Deputy Ramirez and Deputy Page handcuffed Schuck to bring him to 7D. (Id. at 67). Although handcuffs are not required to move detainees between floors, they used them because Schuck‘s unpredictability raised safety concerns. (Id. at Ex. K at 67; Ex. L at 74). In the elevator, Schuck claimed to be Spiderman and attempted to climb the walls. (Id. at Ex. K at 79).
While walking to the housing module, Schuck ended up on the ground twice. (Id. at 79-80, 102–03); (County Opp‘n Ex. 32 at 8:20:10 P.M.–8:21:10 P.M.). According to Deputies Ramirez and Page, Schuck claimed he needed to urinate. (County MSJ Ex. K at 102-03; Ex. L at 76). After he was back on his feet, the Deputies walked him to 7D and dropped him off. (Id. at Ex. K at 103); (County Opp‘n Ex. 33 at 105).
Roughly an hour later, at approximately 9:30 P.M., Nurse Carina Echon received the court order from Schuck‘s arraignment that day. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 660; Ex. 35 at 69). Nurse Echon reviewed the court order and found that it only required Schuck to be screened for medication, not to be seen promptly by a doctor. (County MSJ Ex. I at 81); (County Opp‘n Ex. 35 at 74). She then went to Schuck‘s profile and saw that he already had a sick call scheduled. (County MSJ Ex. I at 81). As a result, she did not take further action. (Id. at 75); (County Opp‘n Ex. 35 at 80). Nurse Echon did not detail her thought process in her progress notes. (Id.).2
On the morning of March 16, 2022, Deputy Jeff Amado and Deputy Thomas Mace conducted several safety checks on Schuck. (County MSJ Ex. M at 27; Ex. N at 16). At around 9:05 A.M., Deputy Amado went with Nurse Loraine Gallegos to Schuck‘s cell. (County Opp‘n Ex. 36 at 9:07:00 A.M.–9:07:15 A.M.; Ex. 38 at 41; Ex. 39 at 47–48). Nurse Gallegos brought an ROI form for Schuck to sign so his parents could receive his medical information. (Id. at Ex. 38 at 35–37). When Nurse Gallegos called Schuck‘s name, he did not come to the door. (Id. at 41). She noticed that Schuck had quarter-sized, red sores on his back. (Id. at 43–44). She also remembered that he was facing the wall, lying down, and mumbling while she was trying to get his attention. (Id. at 45, 47). Deputy Amado, by contrast, recalled Schuck standing in his cell and walking away from them. (Id. at Ex. 39 at 48). They left his cell a little more than a minute later. (Id. at Ex. 36 at 9:07:00 A.M.–9:08:20 A.M.).
Nurse Gallegos then spoke with Nurse Emily Lymburn about evaluating Schuck‘s wounds and getting him to sign the ROI form. (Id. at Ex. 38 at 48–50). At 9:13 A.M., Nurse Lymburn and Deputy Mace went to Schuck‘s cell to conduct a wellness check and to obtain his signature. (Id. at Ex. 36 at 9:13:40 A.M.–9:13:55 A.M.; Ex. 40 at 66, 70);
Nurse Lymburn also observed that Schuck was “naked,” “skinny,” and “laying down on his left side facing the wall.” (Id. at Ex. 7 at 660; Ex. 40 at 70–71). While she found Schuck‘s “[r]espirations [were] even and unlabored,” he also did not engage with or respond to her. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 660; Ex. 40 at 65). Nurse Lymburn asked him to move his leg as a “sign of life,” and he did so. (Id. at Ex. 40 at 65). Because he followed directions by moving his leg, Nurse Lymburn decided against opening the food flap to converse with him further. (Id. at 72).
After leaving Schuck‘s cell, Nurse Lymburn checked on one more patient in her housing module. (Id. at 66, 95–96). She then went to the clinic on the third floor to get medical attention for Schuck. (Id.). Nurse Lymburn told Nurse Jennifer Vivona that Schuck needed to see Medical “now” because his wounds “didn‘t look good” and he “wasn‘t answering her questions.” (Id. at 96); (County MSJ Ex. P at 54). Nurse Vivona sent Deputy Alexander Cortez to bring Schuck from 7D to the clinic. (Id.).
At 9:37 A.M., Deputy Cortez arrived at Schuck‘s cell. (County Opp‘n Ex. 37 at 9:37:00 A.M.–9:37:05 A.M.). He called out to Schuck three or four times, but Schuck did not respond. (County MSJ Ex. Q at 74). Because Schuck was not responsive, Deputy Cortez used his radio to request that Deputies Amado and Mace assist him inside Schuck‘s cell. (Id. at 76). They pulled his body out of 7D at 9:39 A.M. (County Opp‘n Ex. 37 at 9:38:40 A.M.–9:39:50 A.M.). Despite their attempt at lifesaving measures, Schuck was pronounced dead at 10:18 A.M. (Id. at Ex. 37 at 9:39:50 A.M.–9:42:15 A.M.; Ex. 50 at 36). Schuck‘s autopsy revealed that he died from complications relating to cocaine and
C. Procedural History
On April 28, 2023, Plaintiffs initiated this action. (ECF No. 1). After several rounds of motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (“TAC“) on August 12, 2024. (See generally TAC). The TAC asserts nine causes of action: (1) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference under
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
There are three matters the Court must address before evaluating the substance of Defendants’ Motions. First, Plaintiffs have moved to strike County Defendants’ lodgment of and related declaration about a voicemail from Public Defender Trenholme. (Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 120). Second, the parties dispute whether several videos produced in discovery of Schuck‘s time in jail should be publicly filed. (Public Filing Mot., ECF No. 122). Third, Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of all claims against Nurse Vivona and the dismissal of their
A. Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs request that the Court strike exhibits relating to Public Defender Trenholme‘s voicemail for lack of authentication and failure to produce in discovery. (Mot. to Strike 2). In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, County Defendants lodged a voicemail that Public Defender Trenholme left for Steven Houk, the Claims and Investigator Supervisor at the Office of County Counsel. (County MSJ Houk Decl.). In that voicemail, Public Defender Trenholme read from notes he took during Schuck‘s arraignment about Schuck‘s behavior. (See id.); (Strike Opp‘n, ECF No. 133). County Defendants also filed a declaration from Investigator Houk about the circumstances of the voicemail. (See generally County MSJ Houk Decl.).
a. Authentication
“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Because “[a]uthentication is a condition precedent to admissibility,” the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). To authenticate evidence, “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
The Court finds there is enough evidence to authenticate Public Defender Trenholme‘s voicemail. In his declaration, Investigator Houk stated that he received a voicemail from Public Defender Trenholme after he contacted the Office of the Public
b. Failure to Produce in Discovery
Under
Plaintiffs contend that County Defendants should have produced the voicemail in response to broad discovery requests for information related to Schuck‘s incarceration and death. (Mot. to Strike 2-4). The Court agrees. Even accepting County Defendants’ representation that Public Defender Trenholme is not a “County employee,” (Strike Opp‘n 2), the voicemail appears responsive to several of Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, including
County Defendants have not demonstrated that their failure to produce is substantially justified or harmless. In terms of substantial justification, County Defendants state that they did not know about the existence of the voicemail during the discovery period. (County Opp‘n 2). They fail, however, to explain why they did not know about the voicemail, considering that it was left by Investigator Houk on the County‘s shared drive. (See id.). Regarding harmlessness, County Defendants assert that Plaintiffs could have contacted Public Defender Trenholme before filing their Opposition. (See id.). Although true, the fact that Plaintiffs could have refuted the evidence at the last moment does not show a lack of harm: to the contrary, the late disclosure prevented Plaintiffs from thoroughly investigating the voicemail, deposing Public Defender Trenholme about his notes, or asking other witnesses about Schuck‘s condition at his arraignment. See Algaier v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2015 WL 5944177, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2015), aff‘d, 691 F. App‘x 497 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Moreover, this failure is not harmless: discovery has now
B. Motion to Permit Public Filing of Video Evidence
Plaintiffs would like to publicly file several videos of Schuck while in custody in support of their Oppositions to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (Public Filing Mot. 2). County Defendants oppose the public filing of Exhibits 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, and 32 because they jeopardize the safety and security of detainees and jail staff. (Public Filing Opp‘n, ECF Nos. 132, 134).
“Courts have long recognized ‘a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.‘” Rieckborn v. Velti PLC, 2014 WL 4964313, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc‘ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). However, “[t]his right is not absolute. To balance the competing interests of the public‘s right of access against litigants’ need for confidentiality, a party seeking to file under seal materials related to dispositive motions must provide ‘compelling reasons’ to do so.” Id. (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). Under this standard, “a party seeking to seal materials must ‘articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings,’ providing the court with ‘articulable facts’ identifying the particular interests favoring secrecy and showing how those interests outweigh the ‘strong presumption’ favoring disclosure.” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–81). A summary judgment motion is a dispositive pleading, and the ‘compelling reasons’ standard is invoked even if the dispositive motion, or its
The “compelling reasons” standard applies because a summary judgment motion is a dispositive motion that is “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. The Court finds that County Defendants have met their burden: they identified a compelling justification for sealing—security—and narrowly tailored their request only to those exhibits “contain[ing] video of hallways, entrances, and exits that are not viewed by the public and disclose the locations and camera angles of the cameras in those areas.” (Public Filing Opp‘n 1); Ortiz v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2020 WL 2793615, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2020) (sealing jail surveillance video that shows layout of jail, entry and exit points, and angles of cameras). As a result, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to publicly file Exhibits 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, and 32.4
C. Dismissals
Plaintiffs no longer appear to move forward with their claims against Nurse Vivona. (County Opp‘n 32) (“Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of Nurse Vivona.“); (see generally id.) (presenting no evidence and making no arguments with respect to Nurse Vivona‘s conduct). They also do not oppose the dismissal of their
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party‘s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Butler v. San Diego Dist. Att‘y‘s Off., 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). “The district court may not weigh the evidence at the summary judgment stage but should focus on whether there are any triable issues of fact.” France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended on reh‘g, (Oct. 14, 2015).
“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
a. Individual Defendants
Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action are for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause under
“Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). “Individuals in state custody have a constitutional right to adequate medical treatment.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)). For pretrial detainees, this right arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979)). The Ninth Circuit applies an “objective deliberate indifference” standard to Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging a pretrial detainee received deficient medical care. Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange (Gordon I), 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018). Under this standard, pretrial detainees alleging that jail officials failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care must show:
- The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined [including a decision with respect to medical treatment];
- Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;
- The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant‘s conduct obvious; and
- By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff‘s injuries.
Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669 (quoting Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125) (alteration in original).
The parties dispute the second, third, and fourth factors under Gordon. As for the second, there is a “substantial risk of . . . serious harm” if there is a “serious medical need, such that a failure to treat a prisoner‘s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125; Russell v. Lumitap, 31 F.4th 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). This includes the “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual‘s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. (quoting Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)). Conditions causing death are serious medical needs. Id. (“Russell‘s aortic dissection was indeed a ‘serious’ medical need, as it resulted in his death.“).
“To satisfy the third element [of Gordon], the plaintiff must show that the defendant‘s actions were ‘objectively unreasonable,’ which requires a showing of ‘more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.‘” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669 (quoting Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125). This means “that the defendant disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff‘s health and safety by failing to take reasonable and available measures that could have eliminated that risk.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf‘t, 16 F.4th 613, 636 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “A defendant can be liable even if he did not actually draw the inference that the plaintiff was at a substantial risk of suffering serious harm, so long as a reasonable official in his circumstances would have drawn that inference.” Russell, 31 F.4th at 739.
The fourth factor is causation. To succeed on a
The Court will now examine the relevant facts with respect to each individual Defendant.
i. DeGuzman
According to County Defendants, Nurse DeGuzman did not act with deliberate indifference towards Schuck because he treated Schuck when he was alert, responsive, and ambulatory; cleaned Schuck‘s wounds; and made sure that Schuck was scheduled for a mental health evaluation. (County MSJ Mot. 11).
Plaintiffs, however, put forth evidence painting a more concerning picture of Schuck‘s condition at the time of Nurse DeGuzman‘s examination. Nurse DeGuzman examined Schuck after four deputies found Schuck talking to himself and not wearing pants. (County Opp‘n Ex. 18 at 13, 15; Ex. 20 at 8:01:45 A.M.–8:01:50 A.M.). He was covered in food and what seemed to be fecal matter based on the “terrible” odor of the substance. (Id. at Ex. 18 at 15–16; Ex. 19 at 16–17); (County MSJ Ex. E at 15–16). The deputies brought Schuck to Nurse DeGuzman for medical examination to “verify whether [his behavior] was a mental issue or something else.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 18 at 24); (County MSJ Ex. E at 18). Upon Schuck‘s arrival, Nurse DeGuzman observed that Schuck was wounded; was wearing a soiled shirt and no pants; and was disheveled, disorganized, nonsensical, and difficult to follow. (County Opp‘n Ex. 7 at 659; Ex. 21 at 29, 42). Schuck reported that he had used acid, and Nurse DeGuzman documented that Schuck had elevated blood pressure. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 659). By the time Schuck arrived in court later that morning, his condition was such that the judge ordered he be screened for medication. (Id. at Ex. 45 at 33).
Notably, Nurse DeGuzman scheduled Schuck for wound care, psychiatric evaluation, and housing unit rounds. (County MSJ Ex. F at 45). However, considering
ii. Valbuena
County Defendants assert that Deputy Valbuena did not act with deliberate indifference because he told the second-floor deputy to take Schuck to Medical for evaluation. (County MSJ Mot. 12). In County Defendants’ view, it was reasonable for Deputy Valbuena to let the second-floor deputy handle Schuck‘s medical needs because Schuck “appeared fine,” with no physical symptoms. (Id.).
Upon review of the record, the distinction between Schuck‘s mental and physical wellness is not as clearcut as County Defendants describe it. When Deputy Griffith transported Schuck from court, he wandered, drifted, and appeared unable to follow directions. (County Opp‘n Ex. 28 at 49). Schuck also had difficulty communicating—he
There are other facts that raise doubt about the reasonableness of Deputy Valbuena‘s conduct as well.5 First, Deputy Griffith told Deputy Valbuena that Schuck needed to be evaluated. (County Opp‘n Ex. 28 at 57, 72). From Deputy Griffith‘s perspective, he communicated to Deputy Valbuena that a medical visit should occur “soon,” meaning “within the hour.” (Id. at 72). Second, Deputy Valbuena had subjective awareness; he thought that Schuck might have been detoxing or withdrawing due to his dehydration and muscle weakness. (Id. at Ex. 29 at 54-57). He also knew that, in borderline cases, deputies should err on the side of caution and bring an inmate to receive medical attention. (Id. at 119-20). Third, Deputy Valbuena did not check whether Schuck received medical care after dropping him off on the second floor. (Id. at 84).
Viewing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Schuck‘s erratic behavior should have prompted Deputy Valbuena to ensure swift medical attention. Deputy Valbuena is not entitled to summary judgment.
iii. Echon
County Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims against Nurse Echon because she never treated Schuck. (County MSJ
Considering Nurse Echon‘s minor role in Schuck‘s treatment, the facts do not show deliberate indifference. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention that “[Nurse] Echon did not schedule [Schuck] to be seen by a doctor because she misread the medical record and thought that [Schuck] refused care,” she testified that she did not schedule an appointment for Schuck because he already had a nurse sick call registered for the next day. (County Opp‘n 24); (County MSJ Ex. I at 75-76, 81); (County Opp‘n Ex. 35 at 80). In other words, she took no action because the appointment had already been scheduled. To Plaintiffs’ point, Nurse Echon acknowledged that she made a mistake in noting that Schuck refused medical care at the jail. (Id. at 73-74). However, her testimony does not imply that her mistake was the reason why she did not refer him to Medical.
Further, there were no facts from which Nurse Echon could conclude that Schuck required immediate medical attention. The court order provided no sense of urgency. It stated only: “The court refers Defendant to jail medical to be screened for medications.” (County MSJ Ex. AC at 85, Dep. Ex. 18). It did not state that Schuck exhibited concerning symptoms while in court or mandate that Schuck be seen promptly. The framing of the order is significant because in Nurse Echon‘s experience, court orders expressing urgency “always [use] the word ASAP or immediately.” (Id. at Ex. I at 112). Although Nurse DeGuzman‘s entry described Schuck as being “disorganized, nonsensical, [and] disheveled,” Nurse Echon had no reason to find that Schuck was at a substantial risk of harm, especially since the entry was made thirteen hours prior and Schuck had appeared at
Without an indication of immediacy from the court, no reasonable juror could conclude that Nurse Echon perceived a substantial risk of harm and acted unreasonably. She responded to the court order by ensuring that Schuck was scheduled for an evaluation the next day. Accordingly, the Court enters summary judgment in favor of Nurse Echon on Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims.
iv. Ramirez and Page
County Defendants argue that, although Schuck exhibited odd behavior, neither Deputy Ramirez nor Deputy Page acted deliberately indifferent because they did not observe him in physical distress. (See County MSJ Mot. 13).
As discussed above, the Court is reluctant to accept County Defendants’ strict binary between Schuck‘s medical and physical symptoms. There are facts showing that Schuck displayed disorientation and abnormal behavior. When Deputies Ramirez and Page arrived at Schuck‘s holding cell to transport him to the seventh floor, he acted “childlike,” pretending to canoe while sitting on the bench and to call his mom with his hand. (County MSJ Ex. K at 51, 66-67); (County Opp‘n Ex. 33 at 66-67). As a result of this behavior, the Deputies found Schuck “unpredictable” and decided to handcuff him. (Id. at 67). During the transport, Schuck claimed to be Spiderman and climbed the walls of the elevator. (Id. at 85); (County MSJ Ex. K at 79). He also fidgeted and moved his body back and forth. (County Opp‘n Ex. 34 at 76).
County Defendants discount these facts by pointing to the Deputies’ assessment that Schuck “followed instructions,” had “dry” skin tone, “wasn‘t flush,” lacked visible injuries or dilated pupils, and was “breathing, talking, [and] conscious.” (County MSJ Ex. K at 66;
Further, the circumstances of Schuck finding himself on the ground are disputed. According to County Defendants, Schuck “dropped his weight” and “went down to the ground” in a “controlled manner” because he needed to urinate. (County MSJ Mot. 5) (citing County MSJ Ex. K at 102-03; Ex. L at 73-76); (County Reply 6) (citing County Opp‘n Ex. 32). From Plaintiffs’ perspective, Schuck collapsed twice and needed the Deputies to physically lift him to his feet. (County Opp‘n 13) (citing County Opp‘n Ex. 32). The video evidence reasonably supports both narratives—and is therefore a jury question. On the one hand, Schuck appears to lower himself to the ground slowly, ending up in a seated position. (County Opp‘n Ex. 32 at 8:20:10 A.M.-8:20:55 A.M.). This could suggest deliberateness on his part, supporting the Deputies’ testimony that Schuck dropped his weight. On the other hand, before arriving on the ground, Schuck was unsteady on his feet. (See id.). Specifically, he hung his head, bent sharply at his waist, and looked wobbly. (See id.). This could imply that Schuck felt disoriented, fatigued, or dizzy, which prompted his body to slow to minimize the impact of his fall. A jury could thus conclude that Schuck fell and that such an episode of physical distress was illustrative of a substantial risk of
Ultimately, County Defendants have failed to show no genuine dispute of material fact about the conduct of Deputies Ramirez and Page. Summary judgment is not appropriate.
v. Lymburn
County Defendants characterize Nurse Lymburn‘s actions as objectively reasonable—and therefore suitable for resolution on summary judgment—because after she evaluated Schuck, she went to the clinic and told Nurse Vivona that Schuck needed to be brought down from his cell and evaluated “now.” (County MSJ Mot. 11); (County MSJ Ex. P at 54). In response, Plaintiffs point to the fact that Nurse Lymburn knew that Schuck was exhibiting withdrawal symptoms and still waited twenty minutes to go down to the clinic and tell Nurse Vivona that he needed medical attention. (County Opp‘n 25); (County Opp‘n Ex. 40 at 66, 95-96).
The Court finds that Nurse Lymburn‘s decision to see another patient in her housing module before personally seeking medical attention for Schuck raises a triable issue of fact about the reasonableness of her conduct. (See id.). Viewing the evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, this decision meant the difference between life and death for Schuck.
Nurse Lymburn testified that she knew Schuck was at risk of withdrawal because her sick call list stated that he had “use[d] acid.” (Id.Id.). When she saw Schuck, he was naked and had sores on his tailbone, buttocks, elbows, and legs. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 660; Ex. 40 at 32). He faced the wall and did not engage with Nurse Lymburn, even though she attempted to engage with him. (Id. at Ex. 7 at 660; Ex. 40 at 65). The only response he
Looking at the totality of the record, particularly Schuck‘s minimal responsiveness, Nurse Lymburn‘s knowledge that Schuck was likely experiencing withdrawal, and Nurse Lymburn‘s understanding that withdrawal could be “life-threatening,” a reasonable jury could find that Nurse Lymburn acted with deliberate indifference. (Id. at Ex. 40 at 63, 65). The Court declines to grant summary judgment in favor of Nurse Lymburn on Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims. See M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim because there was “sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Sancho was subjectively aware of the risk of alcohol withdrawal, but failed nevertheless to fill out a CIWA form, initiate the CIWA protocol, or otherwise ensure Harrison would receive medical help“).
vi. Amado and Mace
County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show deliberate indifference by Deputies Amado and Mace because they conducted their safety checks in accordance with stated policies and saw no evidence giving them reason to believe that Schuck was at a substantial risk of harm. (County MSJ Mot. 14).
Deputies Amado and Mace were responsible for safety checks on Schuck the morning of his death. (County MSJ Ex. M at 27). While deposed, Deputy Amado stated that he conducted three safety checks on Schuck. (Id.). During these checks, Deputy Amado observed that Schuck was naked, not “very responsive,” and had sores on his buttocks and legs. (Id.). However, Deputy Amado claims to have seen signs that Schuck was not in medical distress. Between the three occasions, Deputy Amado saw Schuck standing, sitting on his stool, and nodding in reply to Deputy Amado‘s asking if he was okay. (Id. at 27, 40). Later in the morning, Deputy Mace also checked on Schuck. (Id. at Ex. N at 108). Like Deputy Amado, Deputy Mace noted that, although Schuck was naked and had sores on his back and buttocks, he was reactive: at one point, Schuck said “fuck you” or “fuck off” to get Deputy Mace to leave. (Id. at 15, 18, 108).
vii. Kahl
Defendants CHP and Kahl assert that Plaintiffs cannot establish the second, third, and fourth factors of their deliberate indifference claims against Nurse Kahl. (See CHP MSJ Mot. 11-17). With respect to the second factor, Defendants CHP and Kahl contend
Like Nurse Echon, Nurse Kahl never treated or interacted with Schuck.10 The only facts available to Nurse Kahl were in Schuck‘s medical records. Nurse Kahl became involved with Schuck‘s care on March 15, 2022 because Nurse DeGuzman requested a “medical chart review” by Nurse Kahl to “[r]eview [the] scanned discharge order from UCSD” dated March 10, 2022. (CHP MSJ Ex. K at 658). The AVS alerted Nurse Kahl that: (1) Schuck had been in a motor vehicle accident; (2) Schuck had “medical decision-making capacity” and “refus[ed] medical evaluation“; and (3) Schuck had “[n]o obvious external signs of trauma or illness but occult injury [was] possible given mechanism.” (Id. at Ex. F at 676). It also documented Schuck‘s vital signs, including his high blood pressure and pulse. (Id.).
The Court finds that the AVS was insufficient to put Nurse Kahl—or any reasonable nurse—on notice that Schuck was at a substantial risk of harm. Russell, 31 F.4th at 739. Plaintiffs isolate statements in the AVS that Schuck was in a motor vehicle accident, left UCSD against medical advice, and possibly suffered from an occult injury. (CHP Opp‘n 15-16). The surrounding context, however, mitigates any inference of substantial harm that could be drawn from these statements.
Second, the AVS did not suggest that Dr. Rourke was worried about an occult injury. He did not order that Schuck see another provider or describe symptoms that unsettled him. (Id.); (see also id. at Ex. M at 28) (testimony that discharge summaries typically include doctor‘s orders). While deposed, Dr. Rourke testified that he was not “overtly concerned” about Schuck and included the possibility of an occult injury only as a “precautionary statement.” (Id. at Ex. G at 43-44). By the time Nurse Kahl reviewed the notation, it had already been five days since Dr. Rourke drafted the AVS, and Nurse Kahl had not received direct information that Schuck began manifesting symptoms in the interim. Plaintiffs’ assertion that the AVS made Nurse Kahl aware that Schuck “could have been suffering from internal bleeding or a brain injury based on the motor vehicle crash” does not dispute the evidence that Schuck was not at a substantial risk of suffering an occult injury from his motor vehicle accident. (CHP Opp‘n 16). Their argument here is ultimately a red herring: Schuck‘s autopsy did not show evidence that he died from lacerations, internal bleeding, or any other injuries from the motor vehicle accident. (CHP MSJ Ex. AH at 58-59).
Third, Schuck‘s elevated blood pressure was insufficient to raise immediate concern. Plaintiffs’ general argument here is that elevated blood pressure is indicative of a medical issue necessitating medical intervention. The record does not challenge this assertion. However, it simultaneously does not show that Nurse Kahl should have been alerted to a
Further, neither doctor found Schuck‘s blood pressure objectively alarming. Dr. Rourke testified that people have above-average blood pressures in the emergency room due to the stressful environment. (Id. at Ex. G at 44). Dr. Ojo conceded similar remarks—while deposed, he explained that a blood pressure of 142/102 is not “life threatening” for the average patient and could have resulted from the stress of Schuck‘s motor vehicle accident. (Id. at Ex. AH at 27, 67). While Plaintiffs rely on the AHA‘s categorization of Schuck‘s blood pressure as “Hypertension Stage 2,” the AHA does not recommend that an individual seek immediate medical advice until they have a blood pressure in the “Hypertensive Crisis” category. (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 23). As a result, Schuck‘s blood pressure was not enough to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm, especially of withdrawal and dehydration.
In addition to the AVS, Plaintiffs contend that Nurse Kahl knew that Schuck was at a substantial risk of harm because he was aware of general statistics about prisons—namely that detainees are often under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that County jails have a high rate of in-custody deaths. (CHP Opp‘n 16). These arguments are unpersuasive. Taking them at face value would mean that all detainees would be at a substantial risk of harm. The Court declines to find that a reasonable nurse would perceive a substantial risk of harm based on prison conditions alone, without corroborating facts about the health
In short, Nurse Kahl was not privy to facts displaying the severity of Schuck‘s condition. Considering the information available to him, he acted diligently by requesting the nursing staff to obtain all of Schuck‘s records from UCSD. (CHP MSJ Ex. V at 660; Ex. W at 79). While Plaintiffs argue that it was unreasonable for Nurse Kahl to not review Schuck‘s other jail records, (CHP Opp‘n 17-18), he was not requested to do so. His assignment was to “[r]eview [Schuck‘s] scanned discharge order from UCSD.” (CHP MSJ Ex. K at 658). The assertions of Plaintiffs’ experts that Nurse Kahl acted below the standard of care when failing to review Schuck‘s other records support only a finding of negligence. (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 19 at 30-31; Ex. 20 at 9); Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that mere lack of due care . . . does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the test to be applied . . . must require a pretrial detainee . . . to prove more than negligence . . . .” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Nurse Kahl complied with the plain meaning of Nurse DeGuzman‘s request: he checked the chart scanned from UCSD. (CHP MSJ Ex. K at 658). To the extent that “chart check” had a different meaning, Nurse Kahl cannot be held to that definition since no evidence suggests there were formal policies or procedures explaining the parameters of “medical doctor chart checks” and “sick calls.” (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 19 at 28).
viii. Conclusion
In sum, with respect to Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims, the Court DENIES County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Nurse DeGuzman, Deputy Valbuena, Deputy Ramirez, Deputy Page, Nurse Lymburn, Deputy Amado, and Deputy Mace; GRANTS County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Nurse Echon; and GRANTS Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Nurse Kahl.
b. Entity Defendants (County and CHP)
Plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action are against Defendants County and CHP for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under
A local government cannot be vicariously liable under
The Monell standard also applies to
“A ‘policy’ is ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.‘” Id. at 1143 (alteration in original) (quoting Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff can satisfy Monell‘s policy requirement in one of three ways. First, a plaintiff can show that the local government or private entity acting under color of state law acted “pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange (Gordon II), 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Thomas v. Cnty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014)). Second, “a public entity may be held liable for a ‘longstanding practice or custom.‘” Id. (quoting Thomas, 763 F.3d at 1170). Third, a plaintiff can show that “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority[,]’ or [that] such an official ‘ratified a subordinate‘s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.‘” Id. at 974 (quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070).
The Court will now examine the Monell arguments applicable to the County and CHP, respectively.
i. The County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish Monell liability because “a single occurrence of unconstitutional conduct” does not suffice to “establish the existence
1. Failure to Implement
Plaintiffs’ first Monell theory is that the County failed to implement safeguards despite “staggering rates” of in-custody deaths. (County Opp‘n 27) (“[T]he County has known for years that its detainees were dying at staggering rates . . . . The County did not make any meaningful changes in response to this information and Hayden‘s death resulted from these same issues.“).
Under Ninth Circuit caselaw, “[a] policy of inaction or omission may be based on failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143. To establish a policy in this scenario, “a plaintiff must show, in addition to a constitutional violation, that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff‘s constitutional right,” which means that the entity “was on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1143, 1145 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A plaintiff must also show “that the policy caused the violation, in the sense that the [local government] could have prevented the violation with an appropriate policy.” Id. at 1143 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Generally, there must be a pattern of “prior related incidents,” Simms-Belaire v. Washington Cnty., 2024 WL 279020, at *16 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2024), not just a “single constitutional deprivation,” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
When these elements are met, liability attaches because an entity‘s “‘policy of inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the functional equivalent of a decision by [that entity] to violate the Constitution.‘” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 395 (1989)) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is thus distinct from respondeat superior liability, which is impermissible under Monell. See Simms-Belaire, 2024 WL 279020, at *15 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit is consistent in describing the heightened requirements that a plaintiff must show to prove a violation based on inaction or omission to avoid imposing respondeat superior liability.“); see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 385 (“In Monell . . . , we decided that a municipality can be found liable under
Plaintiffs raise triable issues of fact as to whether the County has a policy of omission—specifically, its failure to implement measures mitigating in-custody deaths. Plaintiffs reference statistics showing that in-custody deaths in County jails have been shockingly high for years. A report by the California State Auditor found that from 2006 through 2020, “185 people died in San Diego County‘s jails—one of the highest totals among counties in the State.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 46 at 1); (see also id. at 15) (“[M]ore individuals died of natural and accidental causes in the custody of the San Diego Sheriff‘s Department than in the custody of . . . comparable counties, raising concerns about its ability to provide adequate safety and medical care to those it incarcerates.“). In 2021, the year prior to Schuck‘s death, there were eighteen in-custody deaths. (Id. at 14). Disability Rights California, examining deaths resulting from suicide, found that the County had over thirty reported suicides between 2010 and 2018, “the highest reported number of suicides in a California jail system.” (Id. at Ex. 47 at 4).
County Defendants criticize the California State Auditor report as using unreliable metrics. (County Reply 10). The reliability of the report, however, is a jury question: it is for the jury to decide how much weight to give to the report‘s findings. County Defendants’ rebuttal here does not demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about the County‘s inaction in the face of in-custody deaths.
A reasonable jury could conclude that the County had notice of in-custody deaths and that their inaction amounted to deliberate indifference. Two months before Schuck‘s death, the County Sheriff‘s Department responded to the California State Auditor report. (County Opp‘n Ex. 46 at 83). Families of the deceased have filed a slew of wrongful death lawsuits as well, increasing the publicity of these deaths. In fact, at oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions, the County conceded that the Sheriff‘s Department “would have more resources” if it was not defending itself in so many “lawsuits.” (ECF No. 144 at 39). While County Defendants have attempted to distinguish other wrongful
Finally, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Schuck‘s death was caused by the County‘s inaction. For the reasons described previously, evidence exists that Nurse DeGuzman, Deputy Valbuena, Deputy Ramirez, Deputy Page, Nurse Lymburn, Deputy Amado, and Deputy Mace inadequately addressed Schuck‘s deteriorating condition. See supra IV.A.a. Dr. Ojo opined that “[t]he plethora of healthcare and custody deficiencies identified directly contributed to William Hayden Schuck‘s preventable in-custody death.” (County Opp‘n Ex. 50 at 37); (see also id.) (“His premature demise was completely preventable.“). In line with Dr. Ojo‘s assessment, Mr. Price, Plaintiffs’ correctional expert, found that failures in Schuck‘s care “are a direct result of the [County‘s] failure to ensure policies and procedures were performed correctly by [jail] staff.” (Id. at Ex. 51 at 3); (see also id. at 4) (“The [San Diego County Jail] did not act accordingly, which ultimately led to Mr. Schuck‘s untimely death.“). These opinions are in accord with Schuck‘s autopsy report, which indicates that Schuck died from dehydration, cocaine withdrawal, and sepsis. (Id. at Ex. 50 at 36-37). None of these conditions are inevitably fatal if treated and monitored. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ failure-to-implement theory is sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
2. Actual Policies
Plaintiffs’ second Monell theory is that “the County had specific policies that were known to be dangerous,” including its policy of “‘mixed-use’ cells and informal oral pass-
In terms of causation, County Defendants contend generally that Plaintiffs cannot “show that any policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.” (Id. at 12). Plaintiffs have proffered facts, however, showing causation is in dispute. When Deputy Ramirez left Schuck in 7D, she could not recall whether she orally briefed anyone on the fact that Schuck claimed to be Spiderman, pretended to row a canoe, and tried talking on an imaginary phone. (County Opp‘n Ex. 33 at 98-99); (see also id. at 99) (responding “no” in deposition to question asking “whether [she] told anybody that [she] thought Mr. Schuck might be mentally disabled or might possibly be under the influence of drugs“). Had a formal, written system of briefing been in place, incoming deputies, including Deputies Amado and Mace, could have been notified of these behaviors
3. Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline
Plaintiffs’ third Monell theory is that the County failed to supervise, train, and discipline its employees, including after Schuck‘s death. (County Opp‘n 28). “A failure to train or supervise can amount to a ‘policy or custom’ sufficient to impose liability on the County.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). While “[a] [local government‘s] culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train,” liability will attach when “a [local government‘s] failure to train . . . amount[s] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original). “Under a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must provide evidence (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if the [local government] properly trained their employees.” Simms-Belaire, 2024 WL 279020, at *17 (quoting Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2021)).
The County‘s response to Schuck‘s death—or rather lack thereof—demonstrates a triable issue of fact as to whether the County has a policy or practice of failing to train, supervise, or discipline its employees. Following Schuck‘s death, at least nine of the jail staff involved did not receive feedback. (County Opp‘n 16-18); See Nyarecha v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2024 WL 4511616, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Los Angeles Cnty. v. Nyarecha, 145 S. Ct. 1930 (2025) (explaining that Monell liability can be found where constitutionally inadequate conduct “occurred in quick succession over a relatively short period of time“). Deputy Valbuena, Deputy Page, and Nurse Echon, for example, testified that they were not questioned or spoken to about Schuck‘s death. (County Opp‘n Ex. 29 at 18; Ex. 34 at 101; Ex. 35 at 100-01). Deputy Ramirez learned only that Schuck died and was unaware of any training implemented because of his death. (Id. at Ex. 33 at 130). Nurses Lymburn and Gallegos similarly admitted that no one asked them what they could have done differently or could have learned from the experience. (Id. at Ex. 38 at 74; Ex. 40 at 140). The natural inference from this testimony is that
Beyond Schuck‘s death, Plaintiffs present evidence that the County has treated other in-custody deaths with the same apathy. Deputy Mace, for instance, explained that at the time of Schuck‘s death, he had not received training, briefing, or other correspondence on the jail‘s death rate. (Id. at Ex. 41 at 151-52).15 Deputy Amado‘s testimony was in accord: when asked if he remembered ever participating in a meeting designed to review and learn from an in-custody death, Deputy Amado answered “no.” (Id. at Ex. 39 at 89). This systemic lack of reflection after the death of a detainee is alarming. While not all in-custody deaths necessarily arise from unconstitutional conduct, this evidence suggests that the County has been passive in the aftermath of all deaths, resulting from deliberate indifference, mere negligence, or otherwise. A reasonable jury could find that this practice constitutes deliberate indifference.
Because a reasonable jury could also conclude that the County‘s unwillingness to investigate the root causes of in-custody deaths and to institute dialogue with its employees on how to be more proactive caused Schuck‘s death, Plaintiffs’ failure to train, supervise, and discipline theory is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
ii. CHP
Defendants CHP and Kahl assert that Plaintiffs cannot establish Monell liability because they have shown neither the existence of a constitutional violation by Nurse Kahl nor a longstanding custom or policy by CHP. (CHP MSJ Mot. 19). Plaintiffs respond that CHP is jointly responsible for the County‘s policies and maintained its own policies giving rise to Monell liability. (CHP Opp‘n 22-25).
As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s assertion that there must be a constitutional violation by Nurse Kahl for Plaintiffs’ Monell claims to survive. See Richards v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 39 F.4th 562, 574 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]his Court has rejected the view that municipal liability is precluded as a matter of law under
1. Joint Responsibility
Plaintiffs’ first theory of Monell liability is that CHP should be held jointly responsible for the County‘s policies. (CHP Opp‘n 22) (“Accordingly, to the extent the County is liable for Monell violations for inadequate provision of healthcare, CHP is too liable.“). In Plaintiffs’ view, the County‘s policies are also CHP‘s policies because CHP entered into a contract with the County to provide medical care to detainees in County jails. (See id.). The Court disagrees. While the contract states that CHP is responsible for providing on-site physicians and specialty care services to inmates, it also makes clear that the agreement is a “necessary and critical component of the County‘s ongoing COVID-19 response” and that CHP is an independent contractor. (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 1 at 1) (emphasis added). As a result of this status, “neither [CHP] nor [CHP‘s] employees or subcontractors shall be deemed to be employees of the County.” (Id.). Further, the County has no control
2. CHP‘s Own Policies
Plaintiffs’ second Monell theory is that CHP has its own policies, including a failure to train its staff, a failure to implement measures in light of high death rates, and an inadequate “chart check” practice. (CHP Opp‘n 22-25). The Court incorporates the rule statements found in IV.A.b.i as the basis for analyzing these policies.
a. Failure to Train
Plaintiffs have not proffered sufficient evidence to support their failure-to-train theory. Plaintiffs direct this Court to testimony explaining that CHP relied on the County to train CHP employees on County procedures, and that the County‘s training on its procedures, including MSD.C.4, was mediocre. (CHP Opp‘n 23); (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 2 at 61, 143-44; Ex. 3 at 60-62, 65). Specifically, when Nurse Kahl began his employment at San Diego Central Jail, he received a one-day orientation from the County that covered
The Court enters summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against CHP to the extent they are premised on CHP‘s failure to train.
b. Failure to Implement
The Court declines to address whether CHP has a policy of failing to implement measures to counteract County jails’ high in-custody death rate because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a direct causal connection between the alleged policy and Schuck‘s death. Nurse Kahl‘s involvement in Schuck‘s case was limited to a medical chart check, which the Court addresses separately in more detail. Even if CHP had instituted other safeguards and policies to ensure better medical treatment by its employees, they would have had no bearing on Schuck‘s case because he was tended to by jail staff for the rest of his time spent in custody. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against CHP are subject to summary judgment insofar as they rely on a failure-to-implement theory.
c. Chart Check
Plaintiffs’ theory with respect to CHP‘s chart check practice is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. First, it is disputable whether Schuck suffered a constitutional deprivation not from Nurse Kahl‘s actions, but “as a result of the collective inaction of [CHP].” Fairley, 281 F.3d at 917. Schuck, as a detainee in state custody, had “a constitutional right to adequate medical treatment.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 667. Schuck demonstrated symptoms consistent with drug withdrawal, which itself “constitutes a serious medical need requiring appropriate medical care.” Villarreal v. Cnty. of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The jury could conclude that, in not specifying that nurse practitioners or physicians must review all of a patient‘s available records, CHP denied Schuck adequate medical treatment insofar as its practice enabled Nurse Kahl to miss or overlook his withdrawal symptoms.
Second, there is evidence in the record that CHP lacks a formal policy explaining the requirements of a chart check. Chart checks do not appear to be addressed in any of the policies and procedures manuals. (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 19 at 28). Medical staff also understand the term differently: while Nurse Kahl did not review Schuck‘s jail medical
Third, a reasonable jury could conclude that CHP was on notice that its lack of a formal policy resulted in doctors and nurse practitioners making uninformed medical decisions because they reviewed isolated charts rather than a detainee‘s entire medical record. Plaintiffs point specifically to Wilson, an in-custody jail death case in which the district court denied summary judgment on the plaintiff‘s Monell claim against CHP‘s predecessor, Coast Correctional Medical Group (“CCMG“), for the same practice. While Defendants CHP and Kahl argue that Wilson—and the three related cases Wilson cites—are irrelevant because CCMG, not CHP, was the named defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have proffered facts suggesting a continuity between the entities. Importantly, Dr. Freedland was a named defendant in Wilson; as part of its analysis when denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court found that a jury could conclude that Dr. Freedland “did not sufficiently review all of [the detainee‘s] medical records, including his medication administration history, prior to or during [his] examination[] of him.” Wilson, 2023 WL 8360718, at *34.17 In addition to the fact that Dr. Freedland practiced as a physician for CCMG and testified that the “chart check” policy “has been an ongoing
Fourth, Plaintiffs have shown causation is in dispute. Schuck‘s jail records at the time of Nurse Kahl‘s chart check indicated that he made “grandiose statements“; did not understand the booking process; used acid drugs in the street; and appeared “disorganized, nonsensical, [and] disheveled,” wearing a “soiled t shirt” and no pants. (Id. at Ex. 14 at 658-59). From these notations, Dr. Guzman could have drawn the inference that Schuck was suffering from withdrawal and either evaluated him the same day or scheduled another nurse practitioner or physician to do so. This evaluation, in turn, could have alerted the medical team to Schuck‘s condition and ensured that he was appropriately treated for withdrawal. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against CHP survive to the extent they are premised on its chart check practice.18
iii. Conclusion
The Court DENIES County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all three of Plaintiffs’ Monell theories against the County; GRANTS Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Monell theories against CHP based on joint responsibility, a failure to train, and a failure to implement measures addressing
c. Supervisory Defendants (Gore, Martinez, Montgomery)
Under their first and second causes of action, Plaintiffs seek to hold Sheriff Gore, Sheriff Martinez, and Dr. Montgomery directly liable for violations of the
Plaintiffs have shown a triable issue as to “Supervisory Defendants’ personal culpable inaction in the failure to train, supervise, or discipline their subordinates.” Id. With respect to the Sheriffs, Sheriff Gore was “the Sheriff for the San Diego County Sheriff‘s Department just prior to Hayden‘s death” and Sheriff Martinez was “the Undersheriff for the . . . Sheriff‘s Department prior to Hayden‘s death and the Acting Sheriff at the time of Hayden‘s death.” (TAC 6); (see also County Opp‘n Ex. 52 at 1) (showing supervisors of Sheriff‘s Department in 2019-20 annual report). In these capacities, they were “responsible for the County‘s compliance with state and federal laws
The third Supervisory Defendant, Dr. Montgomery, was “the Chief Medical Officer for the Sheriff‘s Department and was responsible for overseeing the Medical Services Division at . . . San Diego [Central] Jail.” (TAC 6-7); (County Opp‘n Ex. 52 at 14). In this role, he was “responsible for overseeing, developing[,] and implementing medical, psychiatric, and nursing protocols. [He was] also known and referred to as the responsible physician or medical advisor. Final clinical decisions rest[ed] with [him],” which meant that he had “final authority . . . regarding clinical issues.” (Id. at Ex. 50 at 37). This authority extended to reviews of in-custody deaths. (Id. at Ex. 46 at 34) (“Sheriff‘s Department policy states that the medical services administrator, in consultation with the chief medical officer, is responsible for reviewing all in-custody deaths within 30 days.“). Dr. Montgomery testified that he was aware of the California State Auditor report and that, while some policies were evolving at the time the audit was made, no changes directly resulted from it. (County MSJ Ex. V at 49). He also stated that the Medical Services Division does not provide withdrawal training to sworn jail staff. (County Opp‘n Ex. 13
Considering Plaintiffs’ evidence that individual employees rarely receive feedback or discipline when an in-custody death occurs and that death rates remained high at the time of Schuck‘s death, there is a triable issue as to whether the Supervisory Defendants’ inaction (or partial action) in the face of systemic deficiencies caused Schuck‘s death. The Court DENIES County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims against Sheriff Gore, Sheriff Martinez, and Dr. Montgomery. See Greer, 726 F. Supp. 3d at 1081 (“For the reasons set forth above, a reasonable jury could infer that Dr. Joshua and Ms. Lee were on notice of medical staff failures to follow up with treatment for medical conditions and communicate that information to detention staff; that based on this notice, they had reason to believe that similar injuries could occur to inmates in the future if they did not take any action to fix this misconduct with better training; and their failure to train was the cause of Plaintiff‘s injury.“).
B. State-Law Claims
a. Bane Act
Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is that all Defendants except Sheriff Gore violated the Bane Act. (TAC 42-43). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation[,] or coercion‘), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the
County Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to show deliberate indifference. (County MSJ Mot. 17). Defendants CHP and Kahl make the same argument. (CHP MSJ Mot. 23-24). This is true only of Nurse Echon and Nurse Kahl. As discussed above, a reasonable jury could conclude that the County, Nurse DeGuzman, Deputy Valbuena, Deputy Ramirez, Deputy Page, Nurse Lymburn, Deputy Amado, Deputy Mace, Sheriff Martinez, Dr. Montgomery, and CHP acted deliberately indifferent with respect to Schuck‘s
493 F. Supp. 3d 890, 903 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate as to Plaintiff‘s Bane Act Claim. First, the right at issue, a pretrial detainee‘s right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, is clearly delineated and plainly applicable to the circumstances. Second, as found above, there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Nurse Blakely acted with deliberate indifference to Ms. Scalia‘s medical needs. Thus, similarly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Nurse Blakely acted with reckless disregard for Ms. Scalia‘s rights which is all that is necessary to demonstrate specific intent under the Bane Act.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also Cravotta v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 717 F. Supp. 3d 941, 965 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (finding in motion to dismiss context that because “Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead his deliberate indifference claim against the Officer Defendants[,] . . . . he has also failed to plead a Bane Act claim against [them]“).
b. Failure to Summon Medical Care
Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action alleges that County Defendants except Sheriff Gore failed to summon medical care in violation of
County Defendants argue that this claim is subject to summary judgment because none of the individual Defendants had any reason to think that Schuck required immediate care and all of them, nonetheless, summoned further care. (County MSJ Mot. 17-18). County Defendants further argue that the Nurse Defendants are “medical care” themselves and cannot be sued under this claim because their care was inadequate. (Id. at 18).
As for Nurses Barrera, DeGuzman, Echon, and Lymburn, the Court agrees with County Defendants. Nurses, by definition, are responsible for the provision of medical care. “[O]nce an inmate is receiving medical care,
For the reasons stated in IV.A.a, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Deputies Valbuena, Ramirez, Page, Amado, and Mace reasonably summoned medical care. Although County Defendants assert that the Deputies summoned care, (County MSJ Mot. 18), there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they summoned care in a reasonable time frame and in a reasonable manner. The Court DENIES County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim against the Deputy Defendants. Because the County and Sheriff Martinez can be held vicariously liable for the Deputies’ conduct, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to them as well. See
c. Negligence
Plaintiffs direct their seventh claim against all Defendants except Sheriff Gore for negligence. (TAC 46-48). To succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant had a legal duty to use due care, (2) the defendant breached such duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Lovett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2024 WL 4766205, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4765853 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 1216900 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2025) (citing Ladd v. Cnty. of San Mateo, 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 (1996)).
i. County Defendants
County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is precluded by statutory immunity. (County MSJ Mot. 19). The Court disagrees. As for the individual County Defendants, “a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”
By contrast, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Nurse Echon breached a duty of care to Schuck. As described earlier in this Order, she promptly complied with the court order by making sure that Schuck was scheduled for an appointment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Nurse Echon on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
With respect to the County, “a public entity is not liable for . . . [a]n injury to any prisoner.”
ii. Defendants CHP and Kahl
Defendants CHP and Kahl assert that “Plaintiffs cannot establish, based on the undisputed facts, that [they] breached the standard of care or that such breach led to Schuck‘s passing.” (CHP MSJ Mot. 24).
Because a reasonable jury could conclude that CHP‘s chart check practice amounted to deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to sustain their negligence claim against CHP at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Nurse Kahl survives as well. Although the record does not suggest that Nurse Kahl acted with deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs provide two expert reports opining that Nurse Kahl‘s decision not to review Schuck‘s available medical records was “below the standard of care.” (CHP Opp‘n Ex. 19 at 30-31; Ex. 20 at 9). This is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact here. Accordingly, Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is DENIED.
d. Negligent Training and Supervision
Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action, which they consider “a theory of liability for the overarching tort of negligence,” alleges negligent training and supervision by the County, Sheriff Gore, Sheriff Martinez, Dr. Montgomery, and CHP. (TAC 48-49). “A plaintiff alleging negligent training under California law must show that the employer negligently trained the employee as to the performance of the employee‘s job duties and as a result of such negligent instruction, the employee while carrying out his job duties caused injury or damage to the plaintiff.” Est. of Escobar v. United States, 2022 WL 3209380, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2022) (quoting Garcia ex rel. Marin v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). “An employer can be held liable for negligent supervision if it knows or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to discover the employee‘s unfitness.” Id. at *3 (quoting Alexander v. Cmty. Hosp. of Long Beach, 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 259, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 356 (2020)).
For the reasons described in IV.A.b.i.3 and IV.A.c, the Court finds there are triable issues concerning whether the County, Sheriff Gore, Sheriff Martinez, and Dr. Montgomery can be held liable for negligent training and supervision. Conversely, a reasonable jury could not find that CHP‘s training and supervision of Nurse Kahl was negligent. See supra IV.A.b.ii.2.a; (CHP MSJ Ex. W at 13-14). CHP provided substantial training to Nurse Kahl and there is no evidence that he was unfit. Therefore, the Court DENIES County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligent training and supervision claim.
e. Wrongful Death
Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action is against all Defendants except Sheriff Gore for wrongful death. (TAC 50-52). Plaintiffs premise their wrongful death claim on Defendants acting deliberately indifferent in violation of
Except for Nurse Echon, a reasonable jury could conclude that the remaining individual County Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Nurse Echon and DENIES summary judgment for the remaining County Defendants.21 The same analysis applies to Defendants CHP and Kahl: because there are triable issues of fact about whether CHP acted deliberately indifferent and Nurse Kahl acted negligently, Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim survives.
The Court DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim against them.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants CHP and Kahl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 11, 2025
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge