ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, APPELLANT v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, APPELLEE
No. 17-5225
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 13, 2018 Decided December 18, 2018
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:17-cv-00670)
John Davisson argued the cause for the appellant. Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler were with him on brief.
Michael Murray, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Thomas J. Clark, and Geoffrey J. Klimas, Attorneys, were on brief. Richard Caldarone, Attorney, entered an appearance.
Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
At first blush, the IRC stands in tension with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which vests the public with a broad right to access government records.
This case presents the question whether a member of the public—here, a nonprofit organization—can use a FOIA request to obtain an unrelated individual‘s tax records without his consent. With certain limited exceptions—all inapplicable here—the answer is no. No one can demand to inspect another‘s tax records. And the IRC‘s confidentiality protections extend to the ordinary taxpayer and the President alike. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)‘s lawsuit seeking President Donald J. Trump‘s income tax records.
I. BACKGROUND
EPIC is a nonprofit organization dedicated to focusing “public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.” A few months after the 2016 election, EPIC sent the IRS a FOIA request seeking President “Donald J. Trump‘s individual income tax returns for tax years 2010 forward, and any other indications of financial relations with the Russian government or Russian businesses.” The IRS declined to comply with the request for two reasons. First, the requested “documents, to the extent that any exist, [] consist of, or contain the tax returns or return information of a third party,” which “may not be disclosed unless specifically authorized by law.” Second, the IRS‘s rules require that a request for a third party‘s tax returns include his consent. See
EPIC then sent the IRS a second letter appealing the initial denial and renewing its request for President Trump‘s above-described tax information. The renewed request invoked
See
Again, the IRS declined to process the request, explaining that section 6103 prohibits the release of the requested records “unless disclosure is authorized by Title 26.” The second IRS letter stated that section 6103(k)(3) “does not afford any rights to requesters under the FOIA to the disclosure of tax returns or return information of third parties.” The letter concluded by telling EPIC “any future requests regarding this subject matter will not be processed.”
EPIC soon sued the IRS. Its complaint advanced three claims under FOIA,
II. ANALYSIS
We review the district court‘s dismissal de novo and may affirm its judgment on any basis supported by the record. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Office of Admin., 566 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d 116, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
A. FOIA CLAIMS
FOIA requires federal agencies to make “records promptly available” when a requester files a “request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules.”
The IRS invokes exemption 3 of FOIA, which allows an agency to withhold records “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” if the statute meets certain criteria.
The district court did not decide whether the IRS had met its burden of establishing that President Trump‘s tax information is exempt from FOIA. Instead, it dismissed EPIC‘s FOIA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although we agree with the district court‘s bottom-line determination that EPIC is not entitled to relief, we take a different path to get there. Skinner v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice & Bureau of Prisons, 584 F.3d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]his court can ‘affirm a correct decision even if on different grounds than those assigned in the decision on review.‘” (quoting Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm‘n, 716 F.3d 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013))). As explained infra, exhaustion does not bar review of EPIC‘s FOIA claims. Because EPIC requested only records that are in fact exempt from FOIA, however, we affirm on
1. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion applies to FOIA and limits the availability of judicial review. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep‘t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61–62 (D.C. Cir. 1990). A FOIA requester must complete the “statutory administrative appeal process, allowing the agency to complete its disclosure process before courts step in.” Id. at 65. “Although exhaustion of a FOIA request ‘is not jurisdictional because the FOIA does not unequivocally make it so,’ still ‘as a jurisprudential doctrine, failure to exhaust precludes judicial review if the purposes of exhaustion and the particular administrative scheme support such a bar.‘” Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (quoting Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256, 1258–59 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
This is not the ordinary exhaustion case in that the IRS does not claim that EPIC neglected to file an administrative appeal. Nor could it. EPIC appealed the denial of its FOIA request by letter dated March 29, 2017. Instead, the IRS argues that EPIC‘s requests violated its “published rules.” The IRS reads its regulations as requiring that a FOIA requester establish his entitlement to records—in other words, establish that the requested records are not exempt—before the IRS has any processing duty. Because EPIC failed to supply either President Trump‘s consent or the Joint Committee‘s approval, the IRS contends that EPIC did not establish its “entitlement” to the requested records, a violation, by its lights, of
As a starting point, we believe the IRS misunderstands its FOIA disclosure obligations. FOIA unambiguously places on an agency the burden of establishing that records are exempt.
information” subject to the section 6103(a) bar on disclosure. The IRS maintains that its “published rules,” however, shift that burden to the FOIA requester. See
Even assuming that EPIC‘s failure to meet the IRS‘s above-quoted rules counts as a failure to exhaust, exhaustion would not apply here. See Wilbur, 355 F.3d at 677 (FOIA‘s exhaustion bar inapplicable to requester who filed untimely administrative appeal but agency nonetheless considered appeal). Exhaustion applies only if its underlying purposes “support such a bar.” Id. (quoting Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1258–59)). The purposes of exhaustion include “preventing premature interference with agency processes, . . . afford[ing] the parties and the courts the benefit of [the agency‘s] experience and expertise, . . . [and] compil[ing] a record which is adequate for judicial review.” Hidalgo, 344 F.3d at 1259 (all but fifth alteration in original) (quoting Ryan v. Bentsen, 12 F.3d 245, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also Harry T. Edwards et al., Federal Standards of Review 145 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing purposes of non-jurisdictional exhaustion).
None of the purposes of exhaustion supports barring judicial review of EPIC‘s claims. The IRS denied EPIC‘s initial FOIA request, notifying EPIC that its request was closed “as incomplete.” EPIC faxed the IRS a letter “constitut[ing] an appeal and renewed request for disclosure of President Donald J. Trump‘s tax returns.” The letter fully explained the basis of EPIC‘s disagreement with the IRS‘s initial determination. In response, the IRS again rejected EPIC‘s arguments and notified it that “any future requests regarding this subject matter will not be processed.” The IRS‘s response manifests that the administrative process had run its course. EPIC gave the IRS the opportunity to reconsider its position and bring its expertise to bear. Cf. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 64 (“Allowing a FOIA requester to proceed immediately to court to challenge an agency‘s initial response would cut off the agency‘s power to correct or rethink initial misjudgments or errors.“). Its letter explained that section 6103(k)(3) provides EPIC‘s entitlement to records, obviating any need for President Trump‘s consent. The letter also set forth detailed allegations about President Trump‘s misstatements of fact, asserting that “the IRS must exercise its power under § 6103(k)(3).” In short, EPIC followed the administrative appeal process to the limited extent the IRS allowed and was repeatedly met with a closed door. Accordingly, we conclude that exhaustion does not bar review of EPIC‘s FOIA claims. Accord Hull v. IRS, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, 656 F.3d 1174, 1179–83 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to apply exhaustion where IRS determined FOIA requester violated its published rules and rejected administrative appeal).
2. THE MERITS
The IRS urges us to affirm the district court‘s dismissal on the alternative ground that counts one through three of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’ and to nudge his claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.‘” Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating the IRS‘s argument, we accept as true all factual allegations in EPIC‘s complaint. Kassem v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 513 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A successful FOIA claim has three elements. The requester must establish (or, at this stage, plausibly allege) that the agency has (1) improperly (2) withheld (3) agency records. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). The second and third elements are not in dispute. President Trump‘s tax returns and return information are “agency records.” See generally Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179–87 (1980) (discussing the definition of “agency records“). And the IRS withheld them. EPIC‘s success, then, turns on whether the IRS‘s withholding of those records is in error.
The IRS asserts the records EPIC requests are, in their entirety, exempt from disclosure. As noted earlier, section 6103(a) of the IRC is an exemption 3 provision and records falling within its confidentiality mandate are exempt from FOIA. See Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 611. But section 6103(a) is limited in scope. Not all IRS records constitute tax returns or return information. E.g., id. at 616 (legal analysis included in IRS Field Service Advice Memoranda does not constitute “return information“). And some records that do constitute tax returns or return information can fall within exceptions to section 6103(a). E.g.,
In challenging the IRS‘s denial decisions as erroneous, EPIC offers two theories. First, notwithstanding the IRS‘s categorical non-disclosure, some of the requested information (although EPIC never specifies which portions) allegedly does not qualify as “returns” or “return information,”
A. SEGREGATION OF NON-EXEMPT RECORDS
We start with its first theory. Section 6103(a) bars the disclosure of tax “[r]eturns and return information.”
tax returns for tax years 2010 forward and any other indications of financial relations with the Russian government or Russian businesses.” The first half of the request seeks tax returns and thus is plainly covered by section 6103(a)‘s bar.
But what about EPIC‘s request for “any other indications of financial relations” with Russian entities? IRS records containing the described information could reveal “return information,” including the “nature” and “source” of President Trump‘s income.
B. SECTION 6103(K)(3) EXCEPTION
As to the second theory—that President Trump‘s tax records fall within an exception to section 6103(a)‘s disclosure bar—EPIC identifies only one relevant exception, section 6103(k)(3). It provides:
The Secretary may, but only following approval by the Joint Committee on Taxation, disclose such return information or any other information with respect to any specific taxpayer to the extent necessary for tax administration purposes to correct a misstatement of fact published or disclosed with
respect to such taxpayer‘s return or any transaction of the taxpayer with the Internal Revenue Service.
Our interpretation of section 6103(k)(3) starts “with the plain meaning of the text, ‘looking to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.‘” Blackman v. D.C., 456 F.3d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Section 6103(a) makes returns and
The statute leaves undefined when the IRS must disclose records under section 6103(k)(3) and to whom. It does not speak to a request for disclosure, whether under FOIA or otherwise. It instead grants the IRS discretion to disclose certain information if the above-described preconditions are met. Even if the preconditions are met, however, the IRS may nonetheless choose not to disclose information. E.g., Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“may” generally grants discretion and does not create a duty to act); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (“may” is “permissive“). In other words, there is no IRS duty to disclose information under section 6103(k)(3). See Ass‘n of Retired R.R. Workers, Inc. v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 335–36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But the disclosure authority is narrower still. Section 6103(k)(3) instructs the IRS to disclose information only “to the extent necessary for tax administration purposes.”
There is scant history of the IRS‘s use of section 6103(k)(3). The IRC requires the IRS to provide the Joint Committee on Taxation an annual report listing (inter alia) “requests for disclosure of returns and return information” and “instances in which returns and return information were disclosed pursuant to such requests or otherwise.”
to the IRS. Section 6103(k)(3) is, as the district court aptly put it, a “rara avis.”
IRC provisions in pari materia with section 6103(k)(3) also manifest that, when the Congress intended to allow for public disclosure of IRS records under the exceptions to the section 6103(a) disclosure bar, it knew how to do so. For example, one exception requires the IRS to disclose or permit inspection of a third party‘s tax returns if certain individuals file a written request. See, e.g.,
[means] the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing.“). However the other section 6103 exceptions work with FOIA, the (k)(3) exception may be sui generis in that it affords a FOIA requester no disclosure right. EPIC has therefore failed to state a FOIA claim upon which relief can be granted and we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of counts one through three of the complaint.
B. APA CLAIMS
We next turn to the dismissal of EPIC‘s APA claims. The APA authorizes a reviewing court to set aside final agency action “found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
1. UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION
The APA provides a cause of action only if “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”
Count four challenges the IRS‘s “closure” of EPIC‘s FOIA requests. EPIC‘s complaint seeks several forms of relief, including an order requiring the IRS to process the FOIA requests and to disclose all nonexempt records. It does not specify which relief relates to the APA counts and which relates to the three FOIA counts. No matter. FOIA empowers a reviewing court to “enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant“—the very relief EPIC seeks.
2. UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD AGENCY ACTION
EPIC‘s count five fares no better, even assuming that FOIA does not provide an adequate remedy for that claim. The APA allows a reviewing court to compel agency action “unlawfully withheld” under narrow circumstances.
Finally, EPIC argues that the Internal Revenue Manual creates a non-discretionary duty. True enough, an agency can create a non-discretionary duty by binding itself through a regulation carrying the force of law. Cf. Norton, 542 U.S. at 65. The Internal Revenue Manual, however, does not do so. See Marks v. Comm‘r of Internal Revenue, 947 F.2d 983, 986 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). “It is well-settled . . . that the provisions of the [M]anual are directory rather than mandatory, are not codified regulations, and clearly do not have the
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
So ordered.
Notes
The Secretary may, subject to such requirements and conditions as he may prescribe by regulations, disclose the return of any taxpayer, or return information with respect to such taxpayer, to such person or persons as the taxpayer may designate in a request for or consent to such disclosure, or to any other person at the taxpayer‘s request to the extent necessary to comply with a request for information or assistance made by the taxpayer to such other person. However, return information shall not be disclosed to such person or persons if the Secretary determines that such disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax administration.
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this title—
(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency receiving information under subsection (i)(1)(C) or (7)(A), any local child
support enforcement agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in subsection (l)(7)(D) who has or had access to returns or return information under this section or section 6104(c), and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), subsection (k)(10), paragraph (6), (10), (12), (16), (19), (20), or (21) of subsection (l), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or subsection (n),
shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For purposes of this subsection, the term “officer or employee” includes a former officer or employee.
The term “return” means any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted under, the provisions of this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or with respect to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, including supporting schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part of, the return so filed.