Dye, John L. v. Kingston, PhilDye, John L. v. Kingston, Phil
Wisconsin prisoner John L. Dye, Jr., brought suit under
Dye‘s claims stem from the failure of prison officials to return personal property after he was transferred to Columbia Correctional Institution in November 2002. Before moving to CCI, Dye packed his possessions in a bоx. Several days later, after staff at CCI inventoried Dye‘s incoming property to ensure compliance with prison regulations, Dye received his box. When unpacking, Dye realized that several items were missing, including Bibles and legal mаterials. The legal materials included compilations of various statutes and rules, which appear to be available in the prison library, in addition to a Defensive and Arrest Tactics Training (DATT) Manual that Dye obtained through discovery in a pending civil case.
Dye contacted Warden Phillip Kingston, Security Director Tim Douma, Mail/Property Supervisor Jim Spangberg, and Mail/Property Sergeant Mawby (all defendants in this action) and submitted informal Interview/Information Rеquests asking that his missing property be returned.
In addition to his informal requests, in December 2002, Dye filed a timely grievance, identified as Complaint No. CCI 2002-42191, demanding the return of the same items identified in his informal requests, including deodorant, hair nets, shower caps, pens, tobacco, lotion, tennis shoes, and a television cable as well as “legal materials” and “two large print Bibles.” Dye said little about his present need for the legal materials and nothing about the missing Bibles hindering his religious observance. Officer William Noland (also a defendant) denied his grievance stating first that Dye was “fully aware of where his property” was because he “sent out” his property “on a visit.” In addition, Noland noted that the prison confiscated Dye‘s publications because he had 59 more than the 25-publication limit allowed at CCI. In his grievance Dye did not name any prison staff responsible for withholding the property, but in his administrative appeal he identified Kingston, Douma, Mawbey, and Spangberg as officials who refused “to respond” to his requests for return of legal materials “which pertain to presently pеnding court matters.” That appeal was denied.
Dye then attached the resolution of Complaint No. 42191 in a second grievance, Complaint No. CCI-2003-3391. Though Dye repeated his general assertions about wanting the return of his “prоperty/legal materials,” he made no specific mention of the withheld Bibles. This grievance and Dye‘s related appeals were denied, but in January 2003, Correctional Officer Ditter (a sixth defendant) did return some of Dye‘s legal mаterials. And Ditter informed Dye that he could pay $100 to have the remaining property that was being withheld for violating the mandated limits sent out of the prison or else it would be destroyed.
Dye then brought this civil rights action complaining that the defendants were violating his First Amendment rights by withholding his legal and religious materials. (Dye also claimed the defendants were hindering his access to the courts by giving him lined paper instead of his preferred typing paper, and by refusing to authorize further loans under
The defendants later renewed their motion for summary judgment, again arguing that Dye had failed to exhaust his First Amendment claims through the administrative process. This time granting the motion, the district court concluded that Dye‘s grievances about his missing property made “no specific allegations against the defendants“; rather, the court noted, Grievance No. 49121 simply presented a “laundry list” of missing items. Reаsoning that Dye had not suggested “that it was prison policy to deny inmates religious and legal materials,” and that his grievances included too little information “to link any of the defendants to his missing property,” the court held that Dye had not given “notice” of his contentions, and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
On appeal Dye disputes the district court‘s determination that prison officials were not given sufficient notice of his First Amendment claims. Dye argues that his grievances were “not lacking such information that the administrative system requires,” and that he gave the prison the necessary opportunity to respond to his complaint about the withheld property. And, in answer to the defendаnts’ argument that he could not have exhausted without specifically naming them in his grievances, Dye argues that it was enough that he identified them in his administrative appeal of Complaint No. 42191.
A purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow prison officials time and opportunity to respond to complaints internally before an inmate initiates litigation. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); see Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir.2001). To provide officials with sufficient notice, inmates must file grievances at the place and time and with the information required by the prison‘s administrative rules. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir.2002). Where the rules are silent, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Id. at 650; see Riccardo v. Rausch, 375F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir.2004). Thus, drawing on principles of notice pleading, we have held that absent more stringent administrative requirements an inmate need not state “facts, legal theories, or demand relief,” so long as the grievance objects “intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.” Strong, 297 F.3d at 650; see Riccardo, 375 F.3d at 524. We and the majority оf the circuits have never endorsed, though, the defendants’ invitation to engraft onto
We start with the free-exercise claim. Although we reject the defendants’ premise that Dye failed to exhaust his administrative remedies solely because he did not
That leaves only the legal materials, and although we believe it a closer question, we need not resolve the question because the claim goes nowhere on the merits. Unlike with his frеe-exercise claim, Dye in his grievances and correspondence delineates his legal materials from the rest of his property and mentions, albeit in vague terms, that withholding the materials was impacting pending litigation. But rеgardless of notice, at this late point in the litigation—following Dye‘s own failed motion for summary judgment—the record is empty of any evidence of actual harm to his pending or potential litigation as a result of his inability to acсess the missing materials. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (holding that inmate must demonstrate “actual injury,” i.e., that his efforts to pursue nonfrivolous legal claim were or are hindered); Tarpley v. Allen County, 312 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.2002). Despite the obvious need to provide the district court with all of his evidence of impacted litigation when he moved for summary judgment, the closest Dye comes to even asserting actual harm is his belated allegation in his appellate brief that he was unable to respond to discovery in one сase. Yet, Dye fails to identify what consequences, if any, befell him as a result of not having the legal material; he makes no mention of a court sanction for the delay, let alone any action that resulted “in actual substantial prejudice to specific litigation.” See Johnson v. Barczak, 338 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because Dye cannot satisfy the elements of an aceess-to-the-courts claim, we conclude that there is no neеd to remand this case for further proceedings.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.