DUTTON v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY
Case Number: 113170
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Decided: 06/30/2015
2015 OK 51, 353 P.3d 532
v.
THE CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, and THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents.
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
¶0 Petitioner sought an extraordinary writ in the Oklahoma Supreme Court and challenged his convictions in three criminal proceedings in the municipal court for The City of Midwest City. He also requested an alternative remedy that would compel the District Court to provide him with a new appeal of his convictions in the District Court. We assume original jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining our jurisdiction to review Petitioner‘s allegations. We hold that the Court does not possess jurisdiction to either review the merits of Petitioner‘s cause of action challenging his municipal criminal convictions or compel the District Court to provide him with a new direct appeal of those convictions to the District Court.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AND ALL REQUESTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER SEEKING RELIEF IN THE APPROPRIATE COURT
Rodney Dutton, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Petitioner Pro se.
David F. Howell and J. Steven Coates, Midwest City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, City of Midwest City.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 We assume original jurisdiction on the question whether this Court has original jurisdiction to adjudicate both the merits of the claim or cause of action that the Dutton (or Petitioner) has pled in this Court and the associated remedies he requests. We decline to assume original jurisdiction on either the merits of Dutton‘s cause of action or his requests for relief as pled by him in this Court.
¶2 Dutton pleads a cause of action challenging the correctness of a judgment and sentence in three municipal criminal matters. He seeks an adjudication on the legal correctness of these judgments and sentences in this proceeding, and in the alternative he requests an extraordinary remedy to compel the District Court to provide him a direct appeal of his municipal criminal convictions in the District Court. We conclude that the pled cause of action and remedy sought by him involve criminal matters that are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. We conclude that Dutton‘s action in this Court should be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking appropriate relief in the proper court.
I. Pleadings of Dutton and The City of Midwest City
¶3 Dutton alleges that on April 15, 2013, he was convicted in the municipal court of the City of Midwest City, Oklahoma, of the charges of assault, public intoxication, and domestic assault and battery. He states that he was sentenced to thirty days in jail. He states that he was incarcerated for a felony charge on November 24, 2011, which was ultimately dismissed, and he “was released on his own recognizance on about March 7, 2013,” and then transferred to the Midwest City jail for trial on his municipal charges. He alleges that he was released from the Midwest City jail on May 10, 2013. He states that while he was incarcerated on the felony charge he was represented by a “public defender.”
¶4 He states that he filed three applications for post-conviction relief in the District Court after his release. He alleges that the District Court dismissed the applications for the reason that they should have been filed with the municipal court in Midwest City. His application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction was filed on August 29, 2014, approximately one year and three months after his release.
¶5 Dutton alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied counsel at trial and was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. He alleges that he was denied his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. He states that he was denied (1) advance notice of the municipal charges against him, (2) a fair trial due to insufficient evidence, and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (3) counsel for an appeal, (4) a direct appeal, (5) “out-of-time appeal,” (6) an adequate post-conviction remedy, and (7) counsel for a post-conviction appeal. In his filing herein entitled “Motion to Provide Relief,” he alleges that he was “denied his 6th and 14th Amendments rights to counsel and a fair trial and subsequently denied his right to an appeal of wrongful convictions by the city of Midwest City, Oklahoma.”
¶6 Dutton alleges that shortly prior to his trial in municipal court he was provided with a written notice of one of the charges against him. He states that the judge refused his request to have a lawyer appointed for him. He states that after the City‘s prosecutor failed to appear for his trial, the judge questioned the witnesses and refused Dutton‘s request to cross-examine the witnesses.
¶7 Dutton alleges that the District Court of Oklahoma County:
. . . has delayed and denied the Petitioner in his pursuit of relief in this matter . . . and while “the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals provide him some relief at first and then declined to hear his appeal when the court reporter or court clerk failed to provide him a stamp-filed certified copy of the District Court‘s order dismissing two of his three post-conviction applications under the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals own rules.
Application to Assume, Aug. 29, 2014, at pg. 2, material omitted.
Dutton‘s appendix of exhibits, and his other filings in this Court, fail to contain photocopies of any the orders allegedly issued by the District Court of Oklahoma County about which he complains. He alleges that he sought relief in the District Court by filing applications for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oklahoma‘s Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
¶8 Dutton‘s Appendix does contain purported uncertified photocopies of orders issued by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Three orders, which show docket designations for post-conviction appeals, state that the Court of Criminal Appeals declines jurisdiction and dismisses the matters because Dutton failed to attach to his petition in error a certified copy of the District Court order being appealed, as required by the rules for the Court of Criminal Appeals.1
¶9 Dutton‘s Appendix also contains a purported photocopy of an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his motion for the court to reconsider “declining jurisdiction of his post-conviction appeals from Oklahoma County.” The court explains that a petition for rehearing that challenges the court‘s decision in post-conviction appeal is not allowed.
¶10 Midwest City‘s response states that Dutton‘s allegations relate to three different factual episodes resulting in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery on his wife, prosecutions for assault on a police officer and public intoxication, and then an arrest for felony possession of incendiary devices. He was released from jail, awaiting trial on the felony charge, and returned to the municipal jail for prosecution of the misdemeanors.
¶11 The response states that Dutton and his wife filed two civil rights actions pursuant to
Mr. Dutton‘s claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status, appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based upon an alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom [“I‘ll see you in federal court.“]; 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause; 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate; and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their “right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government.”
Order, Jan. 3, 2014, at p. 3, Rodney Dutton and Shirley Dutton v. City of Midwest City, et al., No. CIV-13-0911-HE, U. S. Dist. Crt., W. D. Okla., (explanation added).
The federal court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a
¶12 Dutton filed a reply to the city‘s response. He states his innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. He argues: (1) his municipal arrest was illegal, (2) the trial in the municipal court was not fair because he was not provided with an attorney, and (3) his municipal convictions are void because no record exists of the evidence used against him at the municipal trial. He also objects to the appearances made in this proceeding by two attorneys who filed a response for Midwest City. He requests that this Court “dismiss” these two attorneys from this proceeding.
¶13 In his reply, Dutton requests this Court adjudicate his convictions to be “invalid, null, and void” and to also grant the relief as set forth in his Application filed with this Court. In his Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, he requests an order of this Court directing the District Court of Oklahoma County “provide him a direct appeal with appointed counsel from Midwest City Municipal Cases docketed as #2011-4369 - Domestic Violence, #2011-5808 - public intoxication, and #2011-5808 - assault and/or any other relief that is appropriately just.”3 Dutton also states he seeks an order “overturning, vacating, and barring” the municipal convictions, or alternatively the Court provide him with a direct appeal of his convictions in the District Court with appointed counsel.4
II. The Court‘s Original Supervisory Civil Jurisdiction
¶14 This Court issued an order and requested Midwest City brief the issue whether this Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims made by Petitioner.5 The city‘s response argues that (1) the matter before this Court is criminal in nature, (2) “Petitioner has an adequate remedy available under the Post-Conviction Relief Act” (
¶15 A court has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court.6 This Court has stated a similar rule in various contexts.7 One application of this rule is found in explanations stating a court has an inherent power to adjudicate whether it possesses jurisdiction in the particular matter before that court,8 and this Court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a matter is within this Court‘s jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals.9
¶16 Subject matter jurisdiction is the “power to deal with the general subject involved in the action”10 or the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.11 The Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed by a party with a court and which show that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or power to grant the relief sought.12 Our inquiry requires us to examine the nature of Dutton‘s pled cause of action and the remedy he seeks in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.
¶17 The Legislature has authorized a municipality to create a municipal court not of record.13 A municipal court not of record has original jurisdiction to hear and determine prosecutions based upon an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance.14 The City of Midwest City has a municipal court not of record.
¶18 A final judgment of a municipal court not of record may be appealed by filing a notice of appeal in both the municipal court and in the District Court in the county where the municipal government is located.15 The notice of appeal is to be filed “within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment” of the municipal court.16 The appellate proceeding in the District Court is a trial de novo with a right to a jury trial in certain circumstances.17 A District Court adjudicates an appeal from a final judgment of the municipal court not of record, and the form of the District Court‘s adjudication is a “final judgment or order of a District Court,” and that final judgment or order of the District Court may be appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.18
¶19 The Oklahoma Constitution states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court “shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute....”
¶20 Dutton‘s pleadings fail to distinguish this Court‘s jurisdiction in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal appeals when it adjudicates a criminal cause of action, e.g., personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the imposition and execution of a criminal sentence. Secondly, his pleadings do not distinguish claims within the civil jurisdiction of this Court when they are based upon institutional deficiencies apart from a judicial adjudication of a criminal judgment and sentence in a particular case. Thirdly, Dutton does not distinguish our exercise of jurisdiction when the Court of Criminal Appeals has acted in excess of its authority. Fourthly, he does not show how his request is encompassed within other various circumstances where civil jurisdiction exists in this Court, although its exercise may involve a criminal proceeding in a different court.
¶21 The first distinction involves the issue defining civil and criminal matters for the purpose of defining a civil matter within this Court‘s supervisory civil jurisdiction and a criminal matter which is not. We have often explained that if a petitioner‘s claim is of such a nature that it is normally reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a properly filed proceeding in that Court such as a direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, then the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction on that claim.23 The scope of claims that are criminal-jurisdiction in nature includes those previously brought by a criminal defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or her criminal judgment and sentence.24 This is so because the Legislature created a post-conviction remedy that supplanted the common-law writs and redefined what post-conviction claims may be made.25 Under the Constitution and statutes of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, all other appellate courts and the District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody.”26 But “the traditional right to writs of habeas corpus in criminal cases has been incorporated into and amplified by Oklahoma‘s Post-Conviction Relief Act . . . and is therefore considered to be a criminal action” when used to challenge a criminal judgment and sentence.27 Dutton‘s pleadings may not be construed as properly seeking declaratory relief against a criminal judgment.28 In summary, when a petitioner files an application in this Court seeking a common-law extraordinary writ, that request does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter, and we must examine the substantive nature of the petitioner‘s claims to determine whether the matter is criminal or civil.
STATE
Discussed
MURRAH v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY
Discussed
HARGROVE v. STATE
Discussed
1975 OK CR 173, 540 P.2d 1187,
GRIFFIN v. STATE
Discussed at Length
SMITH v. STATE
Discussed
CAMPBELL v. STATE
Discussed
JACKSON v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA
Discussed
1973 OK CR 389, 513 P.2d 1399,
LUNA v. STATE
Discussed
BATTLE v. STATE
Discussed
Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| 1987 OK 32, 737 P.2d 109, 58 OBJ 1236 | Chrysler Corp. v. Clark | Discussed |
| 1987 OK 103, 746 P.2d 172, 58 OBJ 3054 | Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Com‘n | Discussed at Length |
| 1988 OK 38, 753 P.2d 1356, 59 OBJ 1081 | State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck | Discussed |
| 1939 OK 378, 95 P.2d 113, 185 Okla. 505 | In re INTEGRATION OF STATE BAR OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed |
| 1990 OK 3, 786 P.2d 82, 61 OBJ 145 | State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler | Discussed at Length |
| 1990 OK 82, 796 P.2d 1150, 61 OBJ 2102 | State v. Lynch | Discussed at Length |
| 1992 OK 88, 834 P.2d 439, 63 OBJ 1834 | Naylor v. Petuskey | Discussed |
| 1992 OK 142, 839 P.2d 655, 63 OBJ 3020 | Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers | Discussed |
| 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, 64 OBJ 978 | Ethics Com‘n of State of Okl. v. Cullison | Discussed at Length |
| 1938 OK 455, 85 P.2d 288, 184 Okla. 127 | STATE ex rel. CRAWFORD v. CORPORATION COMM‘N | Discussed |
| 1937 OK 16, 65 P.2d 531, 179 Okla. 309 | OKLAHOMA CITY v. ROBINSON | Discussed |
| 1915 OK 772, 152 P. 362, 49 Okla. 202 | STATE ex rel. FREELING v. KIGHT | Discussed at Length |
| 1994 OK 16, 868 P.2d 708, 65 OBJ 531 | Oklahoma State Senate ex rel. Roberts v. Hetherington | Discussed |
| 1994 OK 99, 880 P.2d 912, 65 OBJ 2532 | Stallings v. Oklahoma Tax Com‘n | Discussed |
| 1994 OK 104, 890 P.2d 836, 65 OBJ 3055 | Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd. | Discussed |
| 1936 OK 582, 62 P.2d 621, 178 Okla. 210 | HINKLE v. KENNY | Discussed |
| 1917 OK 269, 166 P. 193, 65 Okla. 233 | DUNN et al. v. STATE. | Discussed |
| 1955 OK 18, 281 P.2d 758 | DENNING v. VAN METER | Discussed |
| 2001 OK 95, 37 P.3d 872, 72 OBJ 3399 | SMITH v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS | Discussed |
| 1918 OK 20, 169 P. 1096, 69 Okla. 61 | GLACKEN v. ANDREW | Discussed at Length |
| 1921 OK 122, 197 P. 460, 81 Okla. 108 | WELLS v. SHRIVER | Discussed |
| 1922 OK 140, 206 P. 831, 87 Okla. 3 | JETER v. DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY | Discussed |
| 1909 OK 277, 105 P. 325, 25 Okla. 76 | In re OPINION OF THE JUDGES. | Discussed at Length |
| 1962 OK 74, 379 P.2d 851 | IN RE HESS’ ESTATE | Discussed |
| 1964 OK 74, 391 P.2d 242 | GORDON v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed |
| 1966 OK 183, 418 P.2d 949 | LA BELLMAN v. GLEASON & SANDERS, INC. | Discussed |
| 1923 OK 647, 218 P. 660, 92 Okla. 262 | RUGG v. LAYTON Co. Supt. | Discussed |
| 1968 OK 54, 440 P.2d 744 | STATE ex rel. BLANKENSHIP v. FREEMAN | Discussed |
| 1967 OK 177, 442 P.2d 313 | BUTLER v. BRECKINRIDGE | Discussed |
| 1995 OK 100, 905 P.2d 217, 66 OBJ 3048 | Jackson v. Freeman | Discussed |
| 1974 OK 19, 519 P.2d 491 | STATE EX REL. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL. CO. v. BROWN | Discussed |
| 1973 OK 151, 519 P.2d 1357 | STATE EX REL. YOUNG v. WOODSON | Discussed |
| 2004 OK 12, 87 P.3d 572 | STATE v. TORRES | Discussed |
| 2004 OK 34, 91 P.3d 651 | HENRY v. SCHMIDT | Discussed |
| 2006 OK 43, 157 P.3d 100 | REEDS v. WALKER | Discussed |
| 2006 OK 63, 145 P.3d 1040 | IN THE MATTER OF M.B. | Discussed at Length |
| 2007 OK 57, 193 P.3d 964 | HOUSE v. TOWN OF DICKSON | Discussed |
| 2008 OK 36, 184 P.3d 546 | MOVANTS TO QUASH MULTICOUNTY GRAND JURY SUBPOENA v. DIXON | Discussed |
| 2009 OK 86, 222 P.3d 966 | COLLIER v. REESE | Cited |
| 2010 OK 40, 237 P.3d 779 | STATE v. POWELL | Discussed |
| 2011 OK 31, 255 P.3d 411 | IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF HYDE | Discussed |
| 2011 OK 84, 264 P.3d 1197 | STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOTHERSHED | Discussed at Length |
| 2013 OK 64, 307 P.3d 337 | COURTNEY v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA | Discussed |
| 1980 OK 32, 607 P.2d 1180 | Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley | Discussed |
| 2013 OK 85, 315 P.3d 971 | LINCOLN FARM, L. L. C. v. OPPLIGER | Discussed |
| 2013 OK 104, 320 P.3d 1012 | KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed |
| 2013 OK 108, 316 P.3d 924 | COATES v. FALLIN | Cited |
| 2014 OK 22, 324 P.3d 399 | HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC | Discussed |
| 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 | LOCKETT v. EVANS | Cited |
| 1977 OK 143, 567 P.2d 84 | SANDERS v. FOLLOWELL | Discussed |
| 1978 OK 1, 572 P.2d 1296 | WILLITT v. ASG INDUSTRIES, INC. | Discussed |
| 1979 OK 16, 590 P.2d 674 | STATE v. ex rel. COMM‘N OF LAND OFFICE v. CORPORATION COMM‘N | Discussed |
| 1978 OK 130, 595 P.2d 416 | CARDER v. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS | Discussed at Length |
| 1980 OK 117, 621 P.2d 1142 | Draper v. State | Discussed |
| 1979 OK 158, 603 P.2d 761 | HALE v. BD. OF CTY. COM‘RS OF SEMINOLE CTY. | Discussed at Length |
| 1980 OK 174, 625 P.2d 595 | Initiative Petition No. 314, In re | Discussed |
| 2000 OK 30, 3 P.3d 154, 71 OBJ 960 | Towne v. Hubbard | Discussed at Length |
| 1981 OK 12, 624 P.2d 1049 | Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass‘n | Cited |
| 1981 OK 66, 630 P.2d 1276 | Muggenborg v. Kessler | Discussed |
| 1981 OK 106, 634 P.2d 718 | Berry v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co. | Cited |
| 1997 OK 126, 947 P.2d 525, 68 OBJ 3329 | IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed at Length |
| 1982 OK 36, 646 P.2d 605 | State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., Application of | Discussed |
| 1982 OK 88, 649 P.2d 529 | Farris v. Cannon | Discussed |
| 1982 OK 106, 652 P.2d 271 | Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep | Cited |
| 1926 OK 683, 255 P. 678, 124 Okla. 201 | DARNELL v. HIGGINS Co. Supt. | Discussed |
| 1948 OK 116, 195 P.2d 272, 200 Okla. 366 | SANDERS v. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COMM‘N | Discussed |
| 1998 OK 26, 957 P.2d 107, 69 OBJ 1167 | MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length |
| 1999 OK 1, 976 P.2d 1035, 70 OBJ 292 | In re Oklahoma Boll Weevil Eradication Organization | Discussed |
| 1904 OK 60, 78 P. 356, 14 Okla. 236 | HOBBS v. GERMAN-AMERICAN | Discussed at Length |
| 1944 OK 243, 153 P.2d 483, 194 Okla. 593 | BOARD OF COM‘RS OF HARMON CTY. v. KEEN | Discussed at Length |
| 1911 OK 159, 115 P. 775, 28 Okla. 616 | HERNDON v. HAMMOND | Discussed |
| 1911 OK 9, 113 P. 920, 27 Okla. 854 | BUCK v. DICK | Discussed at Length |
| 1912 OK 425, 124 P. 1092, 33 Okla. 141 | STATE ex rel. IKARD v. RUSSELL | Discussed |
| 1983 OK 117, 674 P.2d 539 | Johnson v. Johnson | Discussed |
Title 11. Cities and Towns
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Creation of Municipal Court Not of Record | Cited | |
| Jurisdiction | Cited | |
| Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari | Cited | |
| Appeals | Discussed at Length | |
| Orders Relative to Procedures and Practices by Supreme Court | Cited | |
| Appeal to Court of Criminal Appeals | Cited | |
| Appeals | Cited |
Title 20. Courts
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction | Cited |
Title 21. Crimes and Punishments
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Repealed | Cited |
Title 22. Criminal Procedure
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Post-Conviction Procedure Act - Right to Challenge Conviction or Sentence. | Discussed at Length | |
| Accusation Presented by Grand Jury | Cited | |
| Presentation of Accusation by County Commissioners or Judge and Treasurer -Jurisdiction | Cited |
Title 28. Fees
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Civil Actions - Charge in Addition to Flat Fee | Cited |
Title 51. Officers
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| Attorney General - Duties | Cited |
Notes
A. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
B. Upon conviction, at the request of the defendant, or upon notice of appeal being filed, the judge of the municipal court shall enter an order on the docket fixing an amount in which bond may be given by the defendant, in cash or sureties for cash in an amount of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than twice the amount of such fine. Bond shall be taken by the clerk of the court wherein judgment was rendered. Any pledge of sureties must be approved by a judge of the court.
C. Upon appeal being filed the judge shall within ten (10) days thereafter certify to the clerk of the appellate court the original papers in the case. If the papers have not been certified to the appellate court, the prosecuting attorney shall take the necessary steps to have the papers certified to the appellate court within twenty (20) days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and failure to do so, except for good cause shown, shall be grounds for dismissal of the charge by the appellate court, the cost to be taxed to the municipality. The certificate shall state whether or not the municipal judge hearing the case was a licensed attorney in Oklahoma.
D. All proceedings necessary to carry the judgment into effect shall be had in the appellate court.
Jackson v. City of Oklahoma City, 1984 OK CR 57, 678 P.2d 725 (Court cited Argersinger when explaining that “appellant was not required to make a ‘knowing and intelligent waiver’ of counsel since there was no possibility of imprisonment.“); Murrah v. Oklahoma City, 1980 OK CR 110, 620 P.2d 1335, 1337 (“In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the right to counsel must extend to any trial in which there is to be any imprisonment.“).
We also note that two authors have stated that in 1997 the State of New Jersey became the first state to enact legislation requiring every municipal court to have at least one municipal public defender appointed by the governing body of the municipality to represent an indigent defendant accused of an offense, which if convicted, would subject the defendant to imprisonment. Robert J. Martin and Walter Kowalski, “A Matter of Simple Justice“: Enactment of New Jersey‘s Municipal Public Defender Act, 51 Rutgers L.Rev. 637, 676-677, 694 (1999).
The
The Court‘s
“The Supreme Court is authorized to issue orders of statewide application relative to procedures in and practices before the municipal courts and appeals therefrom, subject to the provisions of this article, and under its general superintending control of all inferior courts, shall have the power and authority by and through the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to call annual conferences of the judges of the municipal courts of Oklahoma to consider matters calculated to bring about a speedier and more efficient administration of justice.”
The district court in each county wherein a municipal court is established shall have the same jurisdiction to issue to the municipal court writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari as the Supreme Court now has to issue such writs to courts of record.
Appeals may be taken from a judgment or order of a municipal criminal court of record to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner and to the same extent that appeals are now taken from the district courts to the Court of Criminal Appeals in criminal matters, and no appeals other than those herein provided shall be allowed.
Generally, the focus of a justiciability analysis is on the parties and the nature of their adverse legal interests in the particular pled controversy, and not on the nature of the pled cause of action as it relates to the power of the court to address that type of action. See, e.g., Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, 1982 OK 36, 646 P.2d 605, 608-609 (“Included within the rubric of ‘justiciability’ is a controversy which is (a) definite and concrete, (b) concerns legal relations among parties with adverse interests and (c) is real and substantial so as to be capable of a decision granting or denying specific relief.“).
This focus on the interests of the parties has been present when we addressed a justiciable controversy in the context of declaratory relief and have said that justiciability is present when there is: (1) a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 1987 OK 32, 737 P.2d 109, 110, quoting Gordon v. Followell, 1964 OK 74, 391 P.2d 242, 244.
District Courts possess “unlimited jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article . . . .”
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(a) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state;
(b) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(c) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(d) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(e) that his sentence has expired, his suspended sentence, probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(f) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy;
may institute a proceeding under this act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief. Excluding a timely appeal, this act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence.
Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1997 OK 126, ¶ 10, 947 P.2d 525, 527 quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369, 50 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1930).
We note that a federal constitutional requirement for a State court providing a remedy for a constitutional deprivation is not a rule of universal application. While Congress does not possess the power, under Article I of the U. S. Constitution, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their own courts, Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to the enforcement power of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).
A direct attack is an attempt to avoid or correct a judicial proceeding in some manner provided by law, such as by an appeal, or motion for new trial. House v. Town of Dickson, 2007 OK 57, n. 5, 193 P.3d 964; In re Hess’ Estate, 1962 OK 74, 379 P.2d 851, 855, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, Hess v. Kriz, 375 U.S. 45, 84 S.Ct. 157, 11 L.Ed.2d 108 (1963).
A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law; that is, in some other way than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for a new trial. In re Hyde, 2011 OK 31, ¶ 11, 255 P.3d 411, 414, quoting State ex rel. Comm‘rs of Land Office v. Corp. Comm‘n, 1979 OK 16, ¶ 9, 590 P.2d 674, 677.