DOE ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF COLUMBUS ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2024-0056
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 1, 2026
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1095
Submitted March 11, 2025
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1095
DOE ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF COLUMBUS ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Doe v. Columbus, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1095.]
Appellate jurisdiction—
(No. 2024-0056—Submitted March 11, 2025—Decided April 1, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, No. 23CAE040028.
HAWKINS, J.
{¶ 1} This case presents the question whether the State of Ohio and its municipalities may immediately appeal orders preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of their duly enacted laws. In December 2022 and February 2023, the Columbus City Council passed a total of two ordinances relating to firearms. Appellees, five anonymous persons from Franklin County and one anonymous person from Delaware County (collectively, “the Does”), sued appellants, the City of Columbus, Columbus City Council President Shannon Hardin, and Columbus City Attorney Zach Klein (collectively, “the city”), challenging the constitutionality of portions of the ordinances that restricted the magazine capacity and storage of firearms. The trial court sided with the Does and issued a preliminary injunction, thereby barring the city from enforcing certain provisions of the Columbus City Code (“C.C.C.”) that were amended or enacted by the ordinances. The city appealed. The court of appeals, however, dismissed the city’s appeal on the grounds that the trial court’s preliminary-injunction order was not a final order that could be immediately appealed. We disagree with the court of appeals’ judgment.
{¶ 2} The State and its municipalities have a sovereign interest in passing and enforcing their duly enacted laws, and a court’s order enjoining the operation of such laws causes irreparable injury to that sovereign interest. Such an injunction, therefore, constitutes a final order that can be immediately appealed under
{¶ 3} On December 5, 2022, the Columbus City Council passed Ordinance No. 3176-2022, which amended, enacted, or repealed multiple provisions of the C.C.C. relating to firearms. The ordinance became law when it was signed by the mayor of Columbus on December 6.
{¶ 4} Among the newly enacted provisions, C.C.C. 2323.32(A) prohibits a person from knowingly possessing, purchasing, keeping for sale, offering or exposing for sale, transferring, distributing, or importing a “large capacity magazine,” which the C.C.C. defines as a magazine and other similar device that has the capacity to accept “thirty (30) or more rounds of ammunition for use in a firearm,” C.C.C. 2323.11(N). C.C.C. 2323.191(A)(1) prohibits “negligent storage of a firearm” at a person’s residence when the person “knows or reasonably should know a minor is able to gain access to the firearm.” The negligent-storage provision contains an exception for a person who keeps a firearm in “safe storage,” C.C.C. 2323.191(A)(2)(a), which is defined in C.C.C. 2323.11(O).1
{¶ 5} On February 27, 2023, the city council passed Ordinance No. 0680-2023, which amended the language of the magazine-capacity restriction and conferred immunity from prosecution until July 1, 2023, on persons who lawfully acquired or possessed prohibited large-capacity magazines prior to December 5, 2022.
{¶ 6} In March 2023, the Does filed an amended complaint against the city in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, alleging, among other claims, that
{¶ 7} The Does requested a preliminary injunction of certain C.C.C. provisions that were amended or enacted by the ordinances, arguing that they violate Ohio’s firearm-regulation preemption law codified in
{¶ 8} The city appealed the trial court’s preliminary-injunction order to the Fifth District. The Does filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the preliminary-injunction order did not satisfy the two conditions set forth in
{¶ 9} The city appealed the Fifth District’s judgment to this court, and we accepted review of the following two propositions of law:
Proposition of Law No. 1: The government may, under
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) , immediately appeal orders preliminarily enjoining its laws.
Proposition of Law No. 2: An order enjoining enforcement of a statute or ordinance causes irreparable harm to the sovereign interests of the government, and is immediately appealable.
See 2024-Ohio-1228.
II. Analysis
{¶ 10} Under the Ohio Constitution, courts of appeals are vested with jurisdiction as “provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district,” subject to an exception not applicable here.
{¶ 11} Typically, orders may be reviewed by appeal only following final judgment. See State v. Glenn, 2021-Ohio-3369, ¶ 10. However,
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
A. The trial court’s order granting a preliminary injunction satisfies R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a)
{¶ 13} The first condition set forth in
{¶ 14} This court has held that an order meets this condition when “‘“there was no further opportunity to petition the court for the remedy being sought,”’ [State v. Muncie, 2001-Ohio-93, ¶ 29,] quoting Swearingen v. Waste Technologies Industries, 134 Ohio App.3d 702, 713 (7th Dist. 1999), and there existed nothing further for the trial court to decide with respect to the provisional remedy.” In re Special Docket No. 73958, 2007-Ohio-5268, ¶ 29.
{¶ 15} The trial court in this case certainly made a definitive ruling when it determined that several of the newly amended or enacted C.C.C. provisions violated the Ohio Constitution and enjoined the city from enforcing those provisions. See Delaware C.P. No. 23 CV H 02 0089, at 20-25, 29 (Apr. 25, 2023). And although the trial court could theoretically revisit its order issuing the preliminary injunction, the practical result of its order prevents any further opportunity for the city to obtain a judgment denying the preliminary injunction. The trial court’s order granting the Does’ request for a preliminary injunction therefore satisfies
{¶ 16} The second condition set forth in
{¶ 17} The Ohio Constitution recognizes that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.”
{¶ 18} The United States Constitution “establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). The
{¶ 19} In Ohio, the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution grants municipalities the “‘broadest possible powers of self-government in connection
{¶ 20} The Home Rule Amendment provides “‘municipalities with “full and complete political power in all matters of local self government.”’” Newburgh Hts. v. State, 2022-Ohio-1642, ¶ 24, quoting Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 1998-Ohio-339, ¶ 20, quoting Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 255 (1923). Otherwise stated, the Home Rule Amendment confers on municipalities a sovereign interest in exercising police powers to enact legislation for the public good.
{¶ 21} Consistent with the division of power among the branches of government, “the ultimate authority to render definitive interpretations of the law has long been understood as resting exclusively in the judicial power.” TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 33.4 When a court is tasked with interpreting a statute or ordinance, that statute or ordinance cannot be enjoined unless it is unconstitutional. Toledo v. State, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶ 17. A court’s power to enjoin a statute or
{¶ 22} Thus, in assessing whether the party appealing a trial court’s preliminary-injunction order barring enforcement of a statute or ordinance would have a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment, an appellate court must presume that the appealing party has a meritorious argument that the statute or ordinance at issue is constitutional. Otherwise,
{¶ 23} Chief Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “‘any time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.’” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012), quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977). The Court has stated that “[u]nless that statute is unconstitutional,” an injunction would “seriously and irreparably harm the State, and only an interlocutory appeal can protect that State interest.” (Footnote omitted.) Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602-603 (2018).
{¶ 24} Additionally, courts across the country acknowledge that the harm to the government is the “‘“inability to enforce its duly enacted [law].”’” (Bracketed text added in OPAWL-Building.) Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Skrmetti, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 771, *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025), quoting OPAWL Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Yost, 118 F.4th 770, 785 (6th Cir. 2024),
{¶ 25} The dissent, however, takes a different view. Brushing aside any concern over the intrusion of sovereign interests, the dissent would instead have the city point to some other “specific, identifiable, individual interests,” dissenting opinion, ¶ 37, that it has “actually suffered,” id. at ¶ 43, for it to seek an immediate appeal of the trial court’s preliminary-injunction order. In this case, the city enacted ordinances that its elected councilmembers and mayor believe—rightly or wrongly—will address gun violence in their city. A single trial-court judge—rightly or wrongly—found these ordinances facially unconstitutional and—with the stroke of a pen—enjoined the city from enforcing them. Finding this intrusion into the city’s exercise of its constitutionally prescribed police powers as insufficiently harmful to merit an immediate appeal, the dissent would instead leave the enforcement of the city’s duly enacted ordinances at the mercy of the trial docket of the judge who, by finding the ordinances to be facially unconstitutional, has already effectively “determined the action,” as the dissent concedes, id. at ¶ 32, for the purposes of
{¶ 27} This appeal is about a court order enjoining the enforcement of certain provisions that were amended or enacted by two city ordinances, not an order enjoining the enforcement of a state law. However, it naturally follows that just as the General Assembly passes bills that reflect the will of Ohioans, the Columbus City Council passes ordinances that reflect the will of Columbus citizens. An order facially enjoining the enforcement of a duly enacted city ordinance therefore inflicts irreparable harm to the sovereign interests of that city, and an immediate appeal is necessary to provide “a meaningful or effective remedy” to that city,
{¶ 28} The trial court’s prohibition on the City of Columbus’s exercise of its police powers under the Home Rule Amendment, even on a temporary basis by a preliminary injunction, is a bell that cannot be unrung.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we conclude that there is an immediate right of review when a lower court facially enjoins the enforcement of a duly enacted law. We reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court for it to address the merits of the city’s appeal.
Judgment reversed
DOE ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF COLUMBUS ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2024-0056
Supreme Court of Ohio
April 1, 2026
{¶ 30} The courts of appeals in Ohio have “jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.”
{¶ 31} The majority opinion blithely sets aside the General Assembly’s “provided by law” constitutional authority and instead supplies what amounts to court-made legislation that grants municipalities the right to immediately appeal orders preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of municipal ordinances. We have no basis for making public policy, even if it involves the courts of this State, when it is the General Assembly that the people of this State have empowered to determine the jurisdiction of this State’s lower courts. Because the majority has no basis in law for its holding, be it constitutional or statutory, this court lacks the authority to permit a municipality to immediately appeal an order granting a preliminary injunction that stays the enforcement of a municipal ordinance. Accordingly, I dissent.
Appellate jurisdiction under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)
{¶ 32} A preliminary injunction, such as the one issued by the trial court enjoining appellants, the City of Columbus, Columbus City Council President Shannon Hardin, and Columbus City Attorney Zach Klein (collectively, “the city”), from enforcing portions of two gun-safety ordinances, is a “provisional remedy” as defined by
{¶ 33} The General Assembly has specified that several categories of orders may bypass the analysis required under
{¶ 34} The pivotal question here is whether the city would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy of the trial court’s order granting a preliminary injunction without an immediate appeal. This is a question that can be answered
The trial court’s preliminary-injunction order is not immediately appealable
{¶ 35} According to the majority, any time a municipal ordinance is enjoined by an order, that municipality suffers an irreparable injury that necessitates an immediate right to appeal that order. Majority opinion, ¶ 27. But the test under
{¶ 36} The city argues that the preliminary injunction is harmful to citizens because it causes confusion for gun owners about whether they need to comply with the ordinances and because the city cannot use the ordinances to protect citizens against preventable gun violence. So the proper question here regarding the appealability of the preliminary-injunction order is whether there is an effective mechanism for redress of these temporary harms after the trial court issues a final judgment.
{¶ 37} The majority opinion is devoid of explanation of the specific harms the city seeks to redress through an immediate appeal. The majority nonetheless reasons that the harm to citizens cannot be undone, like “‘“[t]he proverbial bell [that] cannot be unrung,”’” majority opinion at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Muncie, 2001-Ohio-93, ¶ 30, quoting Gibson-Myers & Assocs. v. Pearce, 1999 WL 980562, *2 (9th Dist. Oct. 27, 1999). But whether the reasoning is a proverb or a fable, it
{¶ 38} Medication cannot be ungiven, just like privileged material cannot be unseen. But laws can be tested, rewritten, or repealed. Municipal officials could decide not to enforce an ordinance, or they may enforce it imperfectly. In this case, the Columbus City Council demonstrated how pliable laws are when it passed Ordinance No. 0680-2023, which amended portions of the gun-safety ordinance that it passed two months earlier and postponed enforcement of part of the earlier ordinance for several months. The temporary harms claimed by the city are inherently diluted by the lawmaking process.
{¶ 39} And I am not persuaded as the majority appears to be by federal court precedent that strains to recognize a generic harm in the inability to enforce duly enacted laws. The majority opinion quotes out-of-context New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977), for its position that any time a state law is enjoined, the State suffers irreparable injury. See majority opinion at ¶ 23. New Motor Vehicle Bd. involved one justice’s order staying a
{¶ 40} And the additional federal cases cited in the majority opinion for the position that “courts across the country” recognize a generic harm to government when laws are enjoined, majority opinion at ¶ 24, suffer from the same flaws. These federal cases address injunction orders entered by federal district courts. Federal law recognizes a general right to appeal a district court’s interlocutory order “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions” to a federal court of appeals.
{¶ 42} I expect it to be troubling to many that the majority opinion appears to abhor the idea that the stroke of a single judge’s pen could temporarily enjoin a municipal ordinance that that judge has found to be unconstitutional. However, it is a “firmly established [and] an essential feature of the Ohio system of separation of powers” that the judicial branch—which includes trial-court judges and their
{¶ 43} In total, the majority points to no specific harm actually suffered by the city in requiring it to wait until after the case is fully litigated to institute an appeal. Whatever that harm may be, it is not irretrievably lost by the implementation of the preliminary injunction. The city will still have a meaningful and effective remedy—it is simply delayed in obtaining that remedy until the trial is complete and a final judgment is rendered.
{¶ 44} But more importantly, the majority’s rationale ignores the harms suffered by plaintiffs in cases like this if an unconstitutional law is imposed on them. As the majority notes, the city is entitled to a strong presumption that its ordinances are constitutional. See majority opinion at ¶ 21. Despite this strong presumption, the trial court concluded that “the plaintiffs appear[ed] likely to succeed” on at least two of their claims. Delaware C.P. No. 23 CV H 02 0089, 28 (Apr. 25, 2023).
{¶ 45} In my view, the most effective and meaningful way the city could have obtained a remedy for any harm suffered by the preliminary injunction was to see the case through to a trial on the request for a permanent injunction, which had been scheduled to begin on October 22, 2024. Delaware C.P. No. 23 CV H 02 0089, 4 (Dec. 28, 2023). If, following discovery and a full presentation of evidence, testimony, and argument, the trial court permanently enjoined the ordinances, an
{¶ 46} There may be an instance when an order granting a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of a municipal ordinance should be immediately appealable under
The Buckeye Institute, Robert Alt, David C. Tryon, Jay R. Carson, and Alex M. Certo, for appellees.
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, and Richard N. Coglianese, Matthew D. Sturtz, and Aaron D. Epstein, Assistant City Attorneys, for appellants.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, and Stephen P. Carney and Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitors General, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.
James N. Kline, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Council of Churches.
Baker Dublikar, James F. Mathews, and Brittany A. Bowland, urging reversal for amicus curiae Village of Scio.