Dl v. District of ColumbiaDl v. District of Columbia
Timothy Lantry, pro se.
Arlette Mankemi, pro se.
Kerianne Piester, pro se.
TL, pro se.
Ronald Wisor, pro se.
XY, pro se.
Bryan Young, pro se.
Tammika Young, pro se.
Chad Wayne Copeland, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Daniel Albert Rezneck, Office of Attorney General, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, Samuel C. Kaplan, Office of the Attorney General-District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (CLASS ACTION ISSUES)
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
This opinion addresses the question of whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) requires modification of the class certification order in this case. Before the Court are the following motions: defendants’ Motion [214] to Decertify the Class, plaintiffs’ Motion [271] for Class Certification, and plaintiffs’ Motion [270] for Leave to File their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Also before the Court are a battery of meta-motions for leave to file sur- (and even sur-sur-) replies: plaintiffs’ Motion [259] for Leave to File a Sur-Reply to Defendants’ Reply in Support of its Motion to Decertify the Class, defendants’ Motion [288] for Leave to File Sur-Replies, and plaintiffs’ Motion [290] for Leave to File Sur-Sur-Reply Briefs in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File their Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Re-Certification. Having carefully considered the Motions, the Oppositions, the Replies, the entire record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both defendants’ Motion [214] to Decertify the Class and plaintiffs’
I. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with its prior opinions in this case, which set out the factual and procedural background in detail. See, e.g., DL v. District of Columbia, 730 F.Supp.2d 84, 87-88 (D.D.C.2010); DL v. District of Columbia, 237 F.R.D. 319, 320-21 (D.D.C.2006). Since the instant motions concern class certification and the impact of the Wal-Mart case upon this action, the Court will briefly set forth the facts germane to these issues.
The named plaintiffs—former preschool-aged children in the District with various disabilities—filed suit in July 2005, alleging that defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to provide special education and related services to them and other children, in violation of the
In August 2006, the Court certified a class action pursuant to
All children who are or may be eligible for special education and related services, who live in, or are wards of, the District of Columbia, and (1) whom defendants did not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child was between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive, or (2) whom defendants have not or will not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child is between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive.
Id.
Toward the end of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August 2010, the Court ruled upon those motions and concluded, among other things, that defendants “denied a [free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) ] to a large number of children aged 3 to 5 years old, in violation of
In 2011, and about a month before a scheduled bench trial that would determine defendants’ remaining liability, defendants filed a Motion [214] to Decertify the Class, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing and could no longer satisfy the commonality or typicality requirements of
In April 2011, before ruling on defendants’ decertification motion, the Court held a two-day bench trial on the question of defendants’ liability for the period 2008 to the present. At the end of the trial, the Court ordered the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, reserving decision for a later date. Trial Tr. 90:12-16, Apr. 7, 2011.
However, before this Court ruled, an opinion of significant importance to federal class-action litigation came down from the United States Supreme Court. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court held, first, that the certification of a class of 1.5 million female employees was inconsistent with the commonality requirement of
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’ proof failed to establish commonality. Id. at 2554. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that commonality “requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury’....” Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)). Furthermore,
Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
Id. The Court also made clear that the type of claim involved must have an important bearing on the commonality analysis. It stated that, in Wal-Mart, “proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with [plaintiffs’] merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. That is so because, in resolving an individual’s Title VII claim, the crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for the particular employment decision.’” Id. at 2552 (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984)). Moving from the individual level to a class action involving millions of individuals and millions of individual employment decisions, the Court stated that the Title VII plaintiffs had to present “some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those [employment] decisions together,” such as a biased testing procedure or “significant proof” that the employer “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Id. Concluding that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ were “worlds away” from such proof, id. at 2554, the Court determined that they had failed to “establish[] the existence of any common question.” Id. at 2556-57.
The Supreme Court’s second principal holding in Wal-Mart concerned whether the class had been properly certified under
A couple of weeks after the Supreme Court issued the Wal-Mart opinion, defendants in this case filed a Supplemental Memorandum [265] of Law in further support of their motion to decertify the class. They argued that since plaintiffs had “bundled together [in their Complaint] multiple different allegations of a variety of different provisions of the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and local District of Columbia law,” plaintiffs had essentially “amalgamat[ed] ... a variety of provisions of a single statutory scheme,” an approach defendants contend Wal-Mart expressly rejected. Defs.’ Supp. Mem. [265] 2. Defendants also urged decertification of plaintiffs’ claims for reimbursement and compensatory education under
In August 2011, as advertised, plaintiffs filed a Motion [271] for Class Certification and a Motion [270] for Leave to File their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. This new complaint retained the original class definition but divided the class into four subclasses. Pls.’ Mot. Leave [270], Ex. 1 [270-2] at ¶ 80. Plaintiffs argued that
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
With regard to the familiar substantive requirements of class certification,
- the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
- there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
- the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
- the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
In addition to the four prerequisites of
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants’ Motion [214] to Decertify the Class
1. Standing
As an initial matter, since this case was filed, each of the named plaintiffs has grown older. Consequently, as defendants point out, they are no longer within the 3- to 5-year age group of the class and so, unlike the rest of the class, the named plaintiffs are not at risk of being denied a FAPE in the future. Defs.’ Reply [252] 2. Therefore, no injury threatens the named plaintiffs that an award of declaratory or injunctive relief would redress. According to defendants, this fact strips this Court of subject matter jurisdiction because the named plaintiffs can no longer satisfy the requirements of Article III standing to seek injunctive relief. Defs.’ Mot. Decertify [214] 6.
However, the Supreme Court has also held that a “controversy may exist ... between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402, 95 S.Ct. 553. This is because once a class is certified, it acquires “a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff].” Id. at 399, 95 S.Ct. 553. The named plaintiff may therefore continue to represent the interests of the class, so long as she continues to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Id. at 404, 95 S.Ct. 553 (citing
Here, there is no question that the named plaintiffs had standing at the time they filed their complaint and at the time of certification. Defendants’ extensive discussion of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) is beside the point, as that case did not involve a class action. Furthermore, Lyons is distinguishable from situations where, as here and as in Sosna, the named plaintiffs had standing at the time of the complaint and at the time of certification. Here, it was obvious to everyone involved that this Court’s power to remedy the named plaintiffs’ injuries via injunctive or declaratory relief would dissipate during the time that would be required to resolve the controversy, further supporting the Court’s conclusion that Article III standing continues to be satisfied. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 401-02, 95 S.Ct. 553.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the named plaintiffs will continue to adequately represent the interests of the class. The class representatives and their counsel have adequately and competently urged the interests of the class in each stage of this litigation, and defendants have failed to identify any interests of the class representatives that conflict with those of the class they represent.
2. Rule 23
In their motion, defendants challenge continued certification on the grounds that the class fails to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of
a. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality
Defendants’ primary challenge to continued certification concerns
Here, plaintiffs have amply demonstrated that there are questions of law and fact common to the class. All of the class members have suffered the same injury: denial of their statutory right to a free appropriate public education. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have impermissibly “bundled together multiple different allegations” of violations of various laws. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. [265] 1-2. However, these differing allegations only represent the differing ways in which defendants have caused class members’ common injury. For example, when defendants failed to put policies and procedures in place to ensure that “all” children with disabilities in the District were “identified, located, and evaluated,”
This is not simply a matter of common sense, but is reflected in the statutory definition of a FAPE and its construction by the U.S. Supreme Court. The IDEA defines a “free appropriate public education” as “special education and related services....”
... transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.
Against this conclusion, defendants claim that Wal-Mart requires not only that the class members suffer the same injury, but that this common injury must stem from a
Even assuming that defendants have read and applied Wal-Mart correctly, plaintiffs have presented significant proof or “glue” binding together the various reasons why individual class members were denied a FAPE—namely, “systemic failures” within defendants’ education system. Am. Compl. [61] 3. Plaintiffs presented credible evidence of defendants’ ineffective policies and practices, which persisted for years without leading to any significant increase in the number of preschool-age children receiving a FAPE. See, e.g., Dunst Direct Testimony, Pls.’ Ex. 1, p. 27; see also Pls.’ Supp. Mem. [267] 6-8. Indeed, this Court has found that at least for the period up to and including 2007, plaintiffs presented conclusive evidence that their injuries were the result of defendants’ “bad faith or gross mismanagement.” Mem. Op. [198] 23, Aug. 8, 2010. In sum, the “glue” found lacking in Wal-Mart is amply demonstrated here.
b. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality
Defendants also state in passing in their motion that the class should be decertified because plaintiffs’ cannot satisfy the typicality requirement of
The Court finds that the named plaintiffs’ claims, all relating to the common issue of defendants’ violation of their right to a FAPE under the IDEA, are typical of the claims of the absent class members. In addition, as discussed above in the context of the Court’s rejection of defendants’ standing argument, while defendants correctly note that the named plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are now moot, their interests are sufficient aligned with those of the class members to ensure that the latter are fairly represented in this litigation now and going forward.
In sum, defendants’ motion to decertify the class will be granted insofar as it seeks decertification of plaintiffs’ claims for reimbursement and compensatory education within a
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion [271] for Class Certification
Plaintiffs, responding to defendants’ argument that Wal-Mart requires partial or total
Regarding plaintiffs’ request to recertify their claims for reimbursement and compensatory education under
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matter pertinent to these findings include:
- the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
- the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
- the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
- the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
The Court finds that plaintiffs, in addition to the requirements of
As to
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ Motion [214] to Decertify the Class and grant in part and deny in part plaintiffs’ Motion [271] for Class Certification. The Court will also deny without prejudice plaintiffs’ Motion [270] for Leave to File their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and will grant plaintiffs’ Motion [259] for Leave to File a Sur-Reply to Defendants’ Reply in Support of its Motion to Decertify the Class. Defendants’ Motion [288] for Leave to File Sur-Replies will be granted as to its attached Sur-Reply in Further Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Re-Certification, but otherwise denied as moot. Plaintiffs’ Motion [290] for Leave to File Sur-Sur-Reply Briefs will be denied.
A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.