Scott Edward Diehl v. Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General; Jason Lengerich, Warden of Buena Vista Correctional Facility; and Dean Williams, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
No. 17SA285
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
July 1, 2019
2019 CO 70
JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appeal from the District Court, Chaffee County District Court Case No. 16CV30043, Honorable Patrick W. Murphy, Judge. en banc.
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
July 1, 2019
2019 CO 70
No. 17SA285, Diehl v. Weiser—Habeas Corpus—Parole Eligibility.
The supreme court determines how the department of corrections (“DOC“) should calculate an inmate’s parole eligibility date when an inmate is released to serve mandatory parole and recеives additional concurrent sentences. The supreme court concludes that the DOC’s interpretation of the statutory scheme for inmate and parole time computations is reasonable. Accordingly, the supreme court holds that the new parole eligibility date for an inmate who was reincarcerated for a parole violation and is sentenced for additional offenses should be calculated using the beginning of the period of mandatory parole as the start of the inmate’s one continuous sentence.
Judgment Reversed
en banc
July 1, 2019
Attorneys for Petitioner–Appellee:
The Law Office of April M. Elliott, P.C.
April M. Elliott
Denver, Colorado
Reppucci Law Firm, P.C.
Jonathan D. Reppucci
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents–Appellants:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Nicole Suzanne Gellar, First Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
¶1 This habeas corpus appeal requires us to determine how the Department of Corrections (“DOC“) should apply the “one-continuous-sentence” statute,
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 Petitioner-Appellee, Scott Edward Diehl, pleaded guilty to three drug offenses in 2005. For each offense, he received a sentence that required him to serve a designated number of years in prison as well as a period of mandatory parole. He began serving his term of imprisonment for those sentences, which ran concurrently, on September 6, 2005.
¶3 Diehl was released from prison at the discretion of the state board of parole on August 16, 2011, and he immediately began serving a five-year period of mandatory parole. Diehl absconded from parole from February 14 to March 28, 2013. He was arrested and returned to prison to serve the remainder of his mandatory parole term incarcerated. During this period of reincarceration, Diehl pleaded guilty in three additional cases arising from the time when he was on parole. He received new sentences that were to run concurrently with his outstanding sentences.
¶4 On December 8, 2016, Diehl filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the district court, arguing that he was being unlawfully denied consideration for discretionary parole. He contended that the DOC erred in using August 6, 2011, the date on which he was first released to mandatory parole, rather than September 6, 2005, the date on which he was first sentenced to prison, to calculate his parole eligibility date.
¶5 The district court agreed with Diehl. In doing so, the court rejected the DOC’s argument that Diehl’s “sentence to imprisonment” on his original convictions had been discharged when he began serving his mandatory period of parole and was thus no longer relevant to his new parole eligibility date. The district court concluded that a sentence, for purposes of Colorado’s “one-continuous-sentence” rule, see
¶6 The DOC appealed the district court’s order.1
II. Analysis
¶7 We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. We then set out the appropriate standаrd of review, noting that we give considerable deference to the DOC’s interpretation of the statutory scheme for inmate and parole time computations. Finally, we explain why the DOC’s interpretation of the relevant statutes is reasonable and the new parole eligibility date for an inmate who was reincarcerated for a parole violation and is then sentenced for additional offensеs should be calculated using the beginning of the period of mandatory parole as the start of the inmate’s one continuous sentence.
A. Jurisdiction
¶8 This case comes to us on appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. Habeas corpus is available to review claims that a petitioner is being denied the opportunity to be considered for parole. Naranjo v. Johnson, 770 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989). Diehl filed a writ of habeas cоrpus challenging the DOC’s calculation of his projected parole eligibility date and arguing that he had effectively been denied at least six opportunities for discretionary parole consideration. The district court agreed that Diehl was eligible for parole consideration, and the DOC appealed. We have jurisdiction over appeals from habeas corpus proceedings. Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, ¶ 11, 320 P.3d 340, 343; see also
¶9 While awaiting the resolution of this appeal, Diehl was released on parole. The DOC asks us to remand this case to the district court to consider whether this case is now moot. We need not remand to make this determination. Mootness is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be addressed at any stage during the proceedings. See People v. Shank, 2018 CO 51, ¶ 9, 420 P.3d 240, 243 (“[J]urisdictional prerequisite[s] . . . can be raised at any time during the proceedings.“); see also Nowak, ¶ 12, 320 P.3d at 343 (electing to address mootness, despite not being raised by the parties, because it could affect the existence of а justiciable controversy).
¶10 A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical legal effect on the existing controversy. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. 1990). When issues become moot because of subsequent events, as here where Diehl no longer has a claim that he is being unlawfully denied parole consideration, appellate courts will generally decline to render an opinion on the merits. Id. at 426-27. However, when the moot issuе is one that is capable of repetition, yet evading review, we may address the merits of the appeal. Nowak, ¶ 13, 320 P.3d at 343-44; see also State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam‘rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959, 971 (Colo. 1997).
¶11 This is one of those instances. During the DOC’s 2018 budget hearing, then DOC Executive Director Rick Raemisch explained
B. Standard of Review
¶12 Because the parties do not contest Diehl’s underlying sentences or time credits, the sole issue we must address is the application of sections 17-22.5-101 and 18-1.3-401 to the calculation of Diehl’s parole eligibility date. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, giving deference to the DOC’s interpretаtion of statutes pertaining to its responsibilities and authority when that interpretation is reasonable. See Fetzer, ¶ 17, 396 P.3d at 1113 (“[T]he department’s interpretation of its responsibilities to administer relevant statutory mandates is entitled to great weight . . . .“).
¶13 Our primary responsibility when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo. 2007). We do so by first looking to the plain language of the statute, reading words and phrases in context, and cоnstruing them according to their common usage. Id. at 690. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to rules of statutory construction, and our inquiry ends. “When statutory language conflicts with other provisions, we may rely on other factors such as legislative history, the consequences of a given construction and the goal of the statutory scheme to determine a statute’s meaning.” Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004).
C. Parole Eligibility Calculations
¶14 As pertinent here, a dеfendant who receives a sentence for a class 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 felony is eligible for parole when that person has served “fifty percent of the sentence imposed . . . less any time authorized for earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405.”
¶15 We start with
¶16 The question here is how the DOC should calculate a new parole eligibility date when an offender who is on parole violates conditions of parole and is both reincarcerated to serve the remainder of his parole period and also convicted of additional offenses for conduct that occurred while he was paroled. Diehl and the DOC urge very different answers to that question.
¶17 Diehl argues that calculation of his new parole eligibility date must include both his period of mandatory parole and his sentence to imprisonment on the earliest offense for which he is still serving either component. He argues that our prior cases make clear that a “sentence” as that word is used in
¶18 The district court accepted Diehl’s argument and further relied on
¶19 The DOC argues that
¶20 The DOC points out that its interpretation is supported by our decision in Luther, in which we stated that a prison sentence was “no longer operable in any sense” after an inmate was released to serve mandatory parole. 58 P.3d at 1016. In Luther, the inmate, like Diehl, was serving a mandatory period of parole whеn he committed the crime of escape. Id. at 1014. He was reincarcerated, and the district court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment plus a three-year period of mandatory parole for his new conviction, to begin after the completion of the revoked parole incarceration period. Id. at 1015. Luther argued that this sentence violated the prohibition on imposing two periods of mandatory parole. Id. at 1014; see
¶21 In rejecting Luther’s argument, we considered whether “the General Assembly intended that the period of reincarceration be classified as ‘mandatory parole’” and concluded that it did not, and instead that “reincarceration for violation of parole is not itself ‘parole’ . . . .” Luther, 58 P.3d at 1016-17.
¶22 Similarly, here, the DOC argues, when Diehl was reincarcerated for violating his parole, he was no longer serving a period of mandatory parole on the earlier sentences. Instead, his parole revocation reincarceration period is a separate and independent time рeriod that must be incorporated with his newly imposed sentences into the “one continuous sentence” required by
¶23 The parties’ disagreement reflects the reality that the relevant statutes are less than entirely clear. In some instances, the word “sentence” is used to mean both the combination of time in prison and time on mandatory parole. See Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138, 1139 (Colo. 2008) (holding that “sentence” in the presentence confinement credit statute means both the incarceration portion and the parole portion of an offender’s sentence); Norton, 63 P.3d at 343 (holding that the sentence, or penalty, imposed on felony offenders consists of “both an incarceration component and a parole component“). But elsewhere the word “sentence” is used to mean only time in prison. See Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 856 (Colo. 2001) (construing “maximum sentence imposed” in the parole board statute “as the sentence of incarceration ordered by the trial court“); People v. Johnson, 13 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo. 2000) (concluding that “sentence” in community corrections sentencing statute “refers to the period of confinement, imprisonment, or term of custody over which a court may exercise discretion when imposing a sentence, exclusive of any reference to mandatory parole“); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 963 (Colo. 1999) (“[M]andatоry parole is imposed in addition to the imprisonment component of a sentence.“). Similarly,
¶24 Given this lack of absolute statutory clarity, we will defer to the DOC’s interpretation unless it is unreasonable. We have emphasized that “in light of the practicalities inherent in administering the complex of sentencing and parole mandates imposed by statute, the department’s administrative interpretations are entitled to great weight.” Fetzer, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d at 1113. Here, we conclude that the DOC’s approach to calculating parole eligibility when an inmate is reincarcerated for a parole violation and sentenced on additional convictions for conduct that occurred while he was on parole is entirely reasonable. Indeed, in light of our decision in Luther, it is the better reading.
¶25 In Luther, we treated the parole revocation reincarceration period and the newly imposed sentence as two parts of one continuous sentence. The General Assembly amended the penalties statute the year after Luther was decided but did nothing to disavow that decision’s interpretation of the one-continuous-sentence rule. That is notable because, when a legislative body amends a statute, it is presumed that the legislature is aware of, and approves of, case law interpreting that statute. See Semendinger v. Brittain, 770 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1989). Because the General Assembly did not amend the penalties statute in a way that would override our holding in Luther, we presume that the General Assembly approves of that holding. The DOC was thеrefore reasonable in adopting the approach it did to calculate Diehl’s new parole eligibility date.
III. Conclusion
¶26 The DOC’s interpretation of sections 17-22.5-101 and 18-1.3-401 is reasonable. The new parole eligibility date for an inmate who was reincarcerated for a parole violation and is sentenced for additional offenses should be calculated using the beginning of the period of mandatory parole as the start of the inmate’s
Notes
- Whether the Department is required to include statutorily discharged prison components as part of an offender’s one continuous sentence for purposes of time computation?
- Whether the Department is required to calculate Diehl’s sentence “consistent with” a time computation example stated in the Final Order?