Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this case, we must resolve a conflict
Senate Bill 01-168, which both parties agree was in effect at the time of the crime, was an Act focused on treatment for drunk drivers. It made reference to section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I), 6 C.R.S. (2001), which is the statute that sets out the elements of vehicular homicide, and prescribed a penalty of one year in the county jail.
We conclude that the references to the felony of vehicular homicide that appear in Senate Bill 01-168 create an ambiguity both when viewed within the statute as a whole and when viewed with reference to the provisions for felony offenses contained within Title 18 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. In construing legislation, our first goal is to apply the statute as the General Assembly intended. There is no question here that the General Assembly did not intend, by Senate Bill 01-168, to reduce the sentence for felony vehicular homicide from between four and twelve years in the Department of Corrections to one year in the county jail. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision, which in turn upheld the trial court’s imposition of a six-year sentence.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a fatal motorcycle accident that occurred in the early morning hours of August 12, 2001. Prior to the accident, Frazier and the victim, Troy Christensen, cоnsumed significant quantities of alcohol. Frazier then agreed to give Christensen a ride on his motorcycle. Only a few blocks from Christensen’s home, Frazier lost control and struck a curb while traveling at a speed of approximately forty-five miles per hour. Both men were thrown from the motorcycle. Frazier, who was wearing a protective helmet, survived the accident but sustained serious injuries. Christensen, however, who was not wearing a helmet, died as a result of his injuries. Both Christensen and Frazier were twenty-five years old at the timе of the accident.
On March 4, 2002, Frazier pled guilty to vehicular homicide pursuant to sections 18-3-106(l)(a) and (b), 6 C.R.S. (2001). Frazier signed a written Crim. P. 11 advisement form in which he indicated his understanding that the presumptive sentencing range for vehicular homicide was between four and twelve years. The trial court also verbally advised Frazier during the disposition hearing that the crime of vehicular homicide was a class three felony and that the potential sentence for class three felonies was a presumptive range of four to twelvе years in the Department of Corrections. Frazier indicated to the trial court that he understood the legal consequences and potential punishment resulting from his guilty plea.
Before the sentencing hearing on June 25, 2002, Frazier filed a Motion for Sentencing. Frazier argued at that time through counsel that Senate Bill 01-168, which amended section 42-4-1301,11 C.R.S. (2001), authorized a maximum sentence of one year in county jail for the crime of vehicular homicide. The trial court rejected Frazier’s argument and sentenced him to six years in thе custody of the Department of Corrections. The trial court relied in part on Senate Bill 01S2-008,
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence in Frazier,
We granted certiorari to address “whether Senate Bill 01-168, whiсh set the maximum penalty for vehicular homicide involving alcohol at one year in county jail, was clear and unambiguous, and therefore not subject to interpretive rules of statutory construction.” We now affirm the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court’s sentence of six years.
III. ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 01-168 is a statute designed to provide treatment alternatives for individuals convicted of offenses involving alcohol. It does not reclassify offenses. It does, however, make reference to the fеlony vehicular homicide statute. Frazier argues that, by that reference, the statute clearly and unambiguously sets the maximum sentence for vehicular homicide at one year in county jail. To the contrary, we conclude that the reference creates an ambiguity. Therefore, we rely on interpretive rules of statutory construction and conclude that the trial court was authorized to sentence Frazier to six years in the custody of the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 18-1.3 — 401(l)(a)(V)(A).
A. Background
Section 18-3-106 defines the substantive offense of vehicular homicide. It provides that “[i]f a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.” § 18 — 3—106(l)(a) (“reckless vehicular homicide”). In addition, section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I) (“DUI vehicular homicide”) provides that “[i]f a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs ... and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide. This is a strict liability offense.” Accordingly, a person may commit vehicular homicide either by driving in a reckless manner or by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
In this case, Frazier pled guilty to committing both reckless and DUI vehicular homicide. However, these are not separate offenses but rather alternatives by which criminal liability for vehicular homicide may be charged and prosecuted. People v. Lucero,
Section 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) prescribes the sentence for felonies committed on or after July 1, 1993. The applicable sentencе for a class three felony is a presumptive range of between four and twelve years. Thus, the trial court’s sentence of six years
However, during the 2001 legislative session, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 01-168, titled “concerning the requirement of the completion of level II alcohol treatment for persistent drunk drivers, and making an appropriation therefor.” Section 8 of the Act amended section 42-4-1301(9)(a)(II) to add the following language:
An offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year, and, in addition, the court may impose a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars upon a conviction of a violation of any of the following:
* * ⅜
(B) Section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I), C.R.S.
Senate Bill 01-168 similarly amended sections 42-4-1301(a)(rV), (b)(II), and (b)(IV). See Colo. Sess. Laws 2001, ch. 229 аt 790-792. Senate Bill 01-168 became effective on July 1, 2001, and was in effect on the date Frazier committed vehicular homicide.
In September of 2001, the General Assembly held an extraordinary session. During this session, Senate Bill 01S2-008 was passed. As pertinent here, that bill stated:
SECTION 1. Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that:
(a)An amendment to Colorado’s drunk driving laws, enacted by Senate Bill 01-168, was intended as a conforming amendment only but may inadvertently have created ambiguity in the applicable рenalties for the crimes of vehicular assault, vehicular homicide, and second and subsequent convictions for; driving under the influence, driving while ability impaired, and driving with excessive alcoholic content;
(b) The applicable penalties for such crimes. were never intended to be, and never were, reduced as a result of any provision in Senate Bill 01-168, and the penalties set forth for such crimes in title 18, C;R.S., have at all relevant times continued to apply; and
(c) This act is intended to remove any such ambiguity and to clarify the existing system of penalties for such offenses.
Senate Bill 01S2-008, efféctive September 25, 2001, also amended the relevant portions of section 42-4-1301, deleting all language referring to the penalties prescribed for vehicular homicide.
We are left, then, with a small period of time between the enactments of Senate Bills 01-168 and 01S2-008 where two wholly separate statutes prescribed different penalties for the crime of vehicular homicide. To resolve this conflict, we must apply interpretive rules of stаtutory construction so as to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.
B. Statutory Analysis
Frazier maintains that Senate Bill 01-168 is clear and unambiguous because it states that the punishment for vehicular homicide “shall” be no more than one year in county jail. Therefore, Frazier asserts that the trial court erred in sentencing him under 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) to six years of incarceration. We disagree.
To interpret a statute, this court begins with its plain language. People v. Luther,
i. Legislative History
In this case, the legislative intent, as reflected in the title of the Bill, was to impose additional treatment requirements upon persistent drunk drivers and allocate public resources for that purpose. Although the title of a statute is not dispositive of legislative intent, it is a useful aid in construing a statute. Martinez v. Cont’l Enter.,
Some months later, in Senate Bill 01S2-008, the same General Assembly did explicitly state its intent as to the precisé issue we here address. Although this subsequent expression of legislative intent cannot alone resolve the issue before us, it is instructive in our analysis of what that very General Assembly may have intended. See People v. Holland,
Thus, we are not presented with a case where we must sift through boxes of documents and transcripts of legislative history to decipher the General Assembly’s intent. Rather, it is unmistakably clear that the legislature never sought the outcome that Frazier advocates: namely, that felony vehicular homicide would become for all practical purposes a misdemeanor offense.
ii. Consequences of a Particular Construction
When we examine the consequencеs of construing Senate Bill 01-168 as Frazier' proposes, we find further support for our conclusion. A statutory interpretation leading to an illogical or absurd result will not be followed. State v. Nieto,
First, Senate Bill 01-168 only makes reference to the statutory provision pertaining to DUI vehicular homicide. The statutory provision relating to reckless vehicular homicide remained unaltered. To construe Senate Bill 01-168 as mandating a one year county jail sentenсe for DUI vehicular homicide, while reckless vehicular homicide remained a class four felony subject to two to six years in the Department of Corrections, would require courts to recognize the presence of drugs or alcohol as a mitigating factor in vehicular homicide cases. Clearly, the legislature expressed no such intent; Title 18 has at all times treated DUI vehicular homicide as a more serious offense than reckless vehicular homicide.
Second, Frazier’s interpretation' would requirе us to conclude that the General Assembly intended for certain felony offenses to be punishable by one year or less in county jail. Traditionally, and by constitutional mandate, a sentence in county jail applies to misdemeanor offenses only. Colo. Const, art. XVIII, § 4 (“The term felony, wherever it may occur in this constitution, or the laws of the state, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and none other.”); Brooks v. People,
Nowhere does Senate Bill 01-168 change the classification of vehicular homicide to a misdemeanor, or change the place of incarceration for a felony conviction from the penitentiary to the county jail.
For both of these reasons, we determine that Frazier’s construction of Senate Bill 01-168 would lead to an illogical and unsupportable result.
iii. Goal of Statutory Scheme
Finally, we examine the goals of the statutory scheme and conclude that Senate Bill 01-168 was not intended to alter the sentences for criminal offenses defined in Title 18. Section 42^4-1301, to which Senate Bill 01-168 pertains, appears within the vehicle and traffic regulation portion of the statutes. It deals with misdemeanors, driving under the influence, and driving while ability impaired offenses. Senate Bill 01-168 is titled “[cjoncerning the requirement of completion of level II alcohol treatment for persistent drunk drivers, and making an appropriation therefor.” Conversely, Title 18 of the Colorado Revised Statutes addresses the substantive elements of criminal offenses and the corresponding penalties. Thus, as the People point out in their briefs to this court, the traffic code and the criminal code are directed at different societal harms. See Daniels v. People,
Here, we conclude that the goal of Senate Bill 01-168 was not to decrease the penalty for alcohol related offenses but rather to increase those penaltiеs. In light of this goal, we cannot interpret Senate Bill 01-168 in a manner that would achieve the opposite effect.
IY. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Senate Bill 01-168 flatly and irreconcilably conflicts with other provisions of the Colorado Revised Statutes. In light of that conflict, we apply interpretive rules of statutory construction to determine the General Assembly’s intent, and we hold that Senate Bill 01-168 did not require the trial court to sentence Frazier to one year in county jail. To the contrary, the trial court properly sentеnced Frazier under Title 18 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals which upheld the trial court’s imposition of a six-year sentence for the crime of vehicular homicide.
Notes
. An Act Concerning the Requirement of the Completion of Level II Alcohol Treatment for Persistent Drunk Drivers, and Making an Appropriation Therefor, Ch. 229, sec. 8, § 42-4-1301, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 786, 789-93.
. An Act Concerning Clarification of the Applicable Penalties for Offenses Involving thе Operation of a Motor Vehicle by a Person who has Consumed Alcohol, Ch. 1, secs. 1 and 3, § 42-4-1301, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws (2d Extraordinary Session), 1, 1-7.
. We note that the court of appeals on one occasion referred to section 18 — 1.3—401 (l)(a)(IV)(A) in its opinion. People v. Frazier,
. The court of appeals also rejected Frazier’s claims that its interpretation of the relevаnt statutes violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation and guarantee of equal protection under the law. Frazier,
. This is the vehicular homicide statute to which Frazier pled guilty.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
There is no dispute in this case that SB 01-168 was in effect when Scott Alan Frazier pled guilty to violating section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I) (“DUI -vehicular homicide”). Neither is there any dispute that SB 01-168 prescribes a penalty of “imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year” for a defendant convicted of DUI vehicular homicide.
This penalty provision conflicts irreconcilably with-Title 18’s prescribed sentence for DUI vehicular homicide, between four and twelve years. See § 18-1.3^401(l)(a)(V)(A), 6 C-R-S. (2003). When two statutes conflict directly and irreconcilably, the General Assembly requires us to apply the statute enacted latest in time.
In this case, the “latest in time” rule requires us to apply SB 01-168 because it was the most recently enacted statute at the time the crime was committed. The majority, however, uses principles of statutory construction, which, in my view, are not applicable to the circumstances of this case, to con-
To my mind, the majority ovеrlooks the applicability of the “latest in time” rule and engages instead in an analysis that does not resolve the issue presented in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Discussion
SB 01-168 was enacted on June 1, 2001, a little more than one month before the accident that led to the defendant’s guilty plea in this case. The bill mandated that any offender convicted of violating section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I), which defines the crime of DUI vehicular homicide, “shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year.”
Before SB 01-168 was enacted, the sentencing statute prescribed a presumptive sentence range for a class three felony, such as DUI vehicular homicide, of between four and twelve years. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), 6 C.R.S. (2003). Indeed, the sentencing scheme for conviction of a class three felony remained the same after SB 01-168 was enacted, which created a direct conflict between SB 01-168 and § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A).
The majority concludes that because SB 01-168 contains references to the felony of DUI vehicular homicide, the bill creates “an ambiguity both when viewed within the statute as a whole and when viewed with reference to the provisions for felony offenses contained within Title 18 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.” Maj. op. at 808. I agree that the reference in SB 01-168 to DUI vehicular homicide creates some confusion about the appropriate sentence for commission of that offense, but I do not agree that the confusion stems from any “ambiguity” in the language of SB 01-168. There is nothing ambiguous about the directive of SB 01-168, which states that DUI vеhicular homicide is to be punished as a misdemeanor offense.
A court should attempt to reconcile statutes whenever possible to give effect to both, but when two statues conflict directly and irreconcilably, the General Assembly requires us to apply the statute that was enacted later in time. § 2-4-206, 1 C.R.S. (2003) (“If statutes enacted at the same or differеnt sessions of the general assembly are irreconcilable, the statute prevails which is latest in its effective date.”); see also People v. Heitzman,
Adherence to the “latest in time” rule is also mandated in this case by constitutional notice requirements. To comport with due process, a statute must adequately inform a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct it prohibits. See People v. Holmes,
In this case, the defendant had constructive notice of the conflicting penalty provisions in SB 01-168 and § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), and of section 2-4-206, which requires this court to resolve the conflict by applying the statute enacted latest in time. To apply any statute other than SB 01-168 to this case, then, violates both the statutory requirement that we apply the statute enacted latest in time and the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause.
In addition to the mandates of the General Assembly and the requirements of due process, other principles of criminal jurisprudence require -us to rely on the “latest in time” rule. Criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of an accused because of the liberty interest at stake in any criminal proceeding. See; e.g., People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc.,
The rationale of these fundamental principles as well as the requirements of our statutes and due process is. that the risks of any deficiency in a criminal statute are to be borne by its author, the state, rather than an accused. The majority fails to adhere to this rationale by overlooking the “latest in time” rule-in this case. This failure is especially noticeable here, where the language of SB 01-168 is so readily understandable. Rules of statutory construction are meant to resolve ambiguity, not to create them.
In this case, SB 01-168 conflicted directly and irreconcilably with section 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) at the time the underlying crime was committed. When faced with such a conflict, our precedent and our statutes require us to apply the statute enacted latest in time.
I am authorized to state that Justice MARTINEZ joins in this dissent.
. The sentence provision in SB 01-168 provides in relevant part:
(II) An offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year ... upon conviction of a violation of any of'the following:
(B) Section 18-3-106(l)(b)(I), C.R.S.