Diehl v. Weiser
2019 CO 70
Colo.2019Background
- Scott Diehl was sentenced in 2005 to concurrent prison terms with mandatory parole and began serving those sentences on September 6, 2005.
- He was released to mandatory parole on August 16, 2011, then absconded in 2013; upon arrest he was reincarcerated to serve the remainder of his mandatory parole.
- While reincarcerated for the parole violation, Diehl pleaded guilty to additional offenses arising from conduct on parole and received new sentences to run concurrently with his outstanding sentences.
- DOC computed a new parole-eligibility date using the start of the mandatory-parole period (August 16, 2011) as the beginning of one "continuous sentence." Diehl argued DOC should use his original incarceration start date (September 6, 2005).
- The district court agreed with Diehl and granted habeas relief; DOC appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOC must include discharged prison components (pre-parole incarceration) in the recalculated one-continuous-sentence for parole-eligibility after reincarceration and new concurrent sentences | Diehl: a "sentence" includes both incarceration and mandatory parole; the original imprisonment remains part of the continuous sentence and must be included, so the start date is the original incarceration date | DOC: when an inmate is released to mandatory parole the imprisonment component is discharged; upon reincarceration for parole violation that term is a separate revocation period which, together with the new sentences, forms one continuous sentence starting at the beginning of mandatory parole | Court reverses district court: DOC’s approach is reasonable; the continuous-sentence calculation should begin at the start of the mandatory-parole period (the beginning of parole), not the original incarceration date |
Key Cases Cited
- Nowak v. Suthers, 320 P.3d 340 (Colo. 2014) (habeas appeals jurisdiction and parole-eligibility aggregation principles)
- Executive Director of Colo. Dep’t of Corr. v. Fetzer, 396 P.3d 1108 (Colo. 2017) (deference to DOC interpretations on time computations)
- People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013 (Colo. 2002) (parole revocation reincarceration is not itself "parole" and treated with new sentence as one continuous sentence)
- People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003) (mandatory parole included in the notion of a defendant’s "sentence" for some statutory contexts)
- Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138 (Colo. 2008) (interpreting "sentence" to include both incarceration and parole components for presentence-confinement-credit statute)