DE‘ANGELO A. CROSS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee, and CARL LEO DAVIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee.
Nos. 17-2282 & 17-2724
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 7, 2018
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 15-C-1338 — J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge, and No. 16-C-747 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.
WOOD, Chief Judge. When compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was still understood to be mandatory, district courts were required to impose an extended term of incarceration on so-called career criminals. This class of repeat felons was limited to those previously convicted twice for drug crimes or crimes of violence. The latter offenses included any felony “involv[ing] conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
The Supreme Court jettisoned the mandatory nature of the guidelines in 2005, in its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Booker decision did not, however, immediately affect sentences imposed on defendants previously. Thus, De‘Angelo Cross and Carl Davis continued to serve obligatory sentences as career offenders as required by the mandatory guidelines. Both Cross and Davis qualified for that designation because of the residual clause. Their present appeal challenged the constitutionality of that clause.
Two recent developments form the backdrop for our decision: first, the Supreme Court‘s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the identical language in the Armed Career Criminal Act,
I
Cross and Davis brought their cases to the district court through motions under
When the district court sentenced Cross (2000) and Davis (1992), the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines prescribed an elevated sentence for those denominated career offenders.
Since Davis‘s and Cross‘s convictions, the Supreme Court has dramatically altered the federal sentencing landscape. First, Booker demoted the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to advisory. 543 U.S. 220. Then Johnson struck down the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as unconstitutionally vague, overruling contrary decisions in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), and upsetting a host of decisions from every court of appeals in the country. The residual clause of the ACCA, which imposed increased minimum and maximum sentences, used identical language to that employed in the guidelines. Compare
In light of these developments and within one year of Johnson, Cross and Davis each sought resentencing under
A different district judge handled Davis‘s motion, but he too concluded that relief was not in order. He found that Davis‘s motion was barred by the one-year limitations period in
II
Because Cross‘s and Davis‘s appeals present legal, rather than factual disputes, we consider the district courts’ conclusions de novo. Delatorre v. United States, 847 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2017). We begin by explaining why we reject the various procedural hurdles that the government has raised as a bar to our reaching the merits of both these appeals.
A
Cross and Davis each filed his section 2255 motion within one year of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson. The government nonetheless argues that their motions were untimely. Federal prisoners “claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” may ask the sentencing court to “vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
The government argues that Johnson recognized the invalidity of the residual clause only vis-à-vis the ACCA. Cross and Davis, unlike Johnson, were sentenced under the residual clause of the guidelines. The government concludes, therefore, that section
The government‘s approach suffers from a fundamental flaw. It improperly reads a merits analysis into the limitations period. Section
Here, Cross and Davis claim the right to be resentenced on the ground that the vague (yet mandatory) residual clause unconstitutionally fixed their terms of imprisonment. The right not to be sentenced under a rule of law using this vague language was recognized in Johnson. 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (“The
We are satisfied that the requirements of section
B
The government next raised the ubiquitous specter of procedural default. Because neither Cross nor Davis challenged the constitutionality of the residual clause at trial or on direct appeal, the government argues they are barred from doing so now.
As an initial matter, forfeiture and waiver can stymie an appellee as well as an appellant. In Cross‘s case, the government waived its procedural default argument vis-à-vis Cross
In general, habeas corpus petitioners may not raise any issue that they might have presented on direct appeal. McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2016). A petitioner may, however, overcome procedural default by showing cause for the default and actual prejudice, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998), or that “failure to consider the defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Johnson v. Loftus, 518 F.3d 453, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2008). Cross and Davis have established their right to raise this claim by way of the “cause and prejudice” avenue. We thus have no need to discuss the question whether the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” approach might also support their motions.
We have no doubt that an extended prison term—which was imposed on both men as a result of their designation as career offenders—constitutes prejudice. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001). That narrows our inquiry to whether they have shown cause for not objecting at trial. A change in the law may constitute cause for a procedural default if it creates “a claim that ‘is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.‘” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). In Reed, the Court identified three nonexclusive situations in which an attorney may lack a “reasonable basis” to raise a novel claim:
First, a decision of this Court may explicitly overrule one of our precedents. Second, a decision may “overtur[n] a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved.” And, finally, a decision may “disapprov[e] a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.”
Reed, 468 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)).
The government, relying on a footnote in Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 274 n.7 (7th Cir. 2014), suggests that Reed is no longer good law. In Richardson, we assumed the validity of Reed, even as we noted that in Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990), we had questioned Reed‘s continuing force after Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Later cases, however, put our concerns to rest. The Supreme Court has since relied on Reed, see Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, as have we, e.g., McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d at 295–96 (7th Cir. 2016); McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2016). Moreover, Prihoda did not hold that legal change as understood by Reed could never constitute cause; rather, it said that legal change had to qualify as retroactive under Teague for the petitioner to prevail. Prihoda, 910 F.2d at 1385–86. In other words, we thought that legal change under Teague was concentrically nested within legal change under Reed, rendering the latter superfluous once a claim qualified under Teague. Id.
Cross and Davis could not reasonably have challenged the guidelines residual clause when the district court sentenced them in 1992 and 2000 respectively. On this point, we agree
Johnson represented the type of abrupt shift with which Reed was concerned. Until Johnson, the Supreme Court had been engaged in a painful effort to make sense of the residual clause. In James, it took the position that the validity of the residual clause was so clear that it could summarily reject Justice Scalia‘s contrary view in a footnote. That footnote provided no argument, noted that the constitutional issue was not even “pressed by James or his amici,” and took comfort from the broad use of “[s]imilar formulations” throughout the statute books. James, 550 U.S. at 210 n.6. Eight years later, the Court made a U-turn and tossed out the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. We join the Tenth Circuit
The second and third scenarios identified by Reed present even more compelling grounds to excuse Cross‘s and Davis‘s procedural defaults. Johnson abrogated a substantial body of circuit court precedent upholding the residual clause against vagueness challenges. E.g., Brierton, 165 F.3d at 1138–39; United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Argo, 925 F.2d 1133, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 1991). Although most of these decisions postdate Davis‘s sentencing (though not Cross‘s), no court ever came close to striking down the residual clause before 1992 or even suggested that it would entertain such a challenge. Finally, the Supreme Court had implicitly “sanctioned” the residual clause by interpreting it as if it were determinate. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Thus, the parties’ inability to anticipate Johnson excuses their procedural default.
III
A
The government has also raised particular objections in each case. We begin with Davis‘s appeal. The government suggests that Davis‘s predicate conviction for robbery, to which the residual clause applied, also fell afoul of the elements clause of the guidelines. Thus, it says, regardless of the validity of the residual clause, the district court properly classified and sentenced him as a career offender. That argument may work in some cases, but it does not suffice here. Although
Davis‘s earlier conviction was for simple robbery. The guidelines designate a felony as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
The same is true of Davis‘s conviction for simple robbery in Wisconsin. The relevant Wisconsin statute provides that robbery can be committed in two ways:
(a) By using force against the person of the owner with intent thereby to overcome his or her physical resistance or physical power of resistance to the taking or carrying away of the property; or
(b) By threatening the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or of another who is present with intent thereby to compel the owner to acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the property.
Curtis Johnson, of course, said nothing about the residual clause. It spoke only to the elements clause. Curtis Johnson thus provided Davis with no basis to move for resentencing under section 2255. Contrary to the government‘s assertion, nothing had happened that would have initiated the relevant limitation period under section
Prior to Johnson, Davis had no basis to assert that his sentence was illegal and thus he could not claim a right to be released. Curtis Johnson did not change that fact: all it did was to eliminate the elements clause as a basis for Davis‘s status, which became entirely dependent on the residual clause. There matters stayed until Johnson. Only then could Davis file a nonfrivolous motion for relief. Section
In support of its proposed rule, the government offers only an excerpt from a single case, Stanley v. United States, which held that Curtis Johnson rather than Johnson triggered the limitation period under section 2255(f)(3). 827 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2016). But a closer look at Stanley demonstrates that it does not help the government. In Stanley, Johnson did not reopen the limitations period because, regardless of the constitutionality of the residual clause, only the elements clause had ever justified Stanley‘s sentence. Stanley, 827 F.3d at 565. The residual clause, and hence Johnson, was irrelevant. Id.
Moreover, we were careful to note that the prisoner might have relied on Johnson to trigger section
B
Turning to Cross‘s case, the government argues that a waiver clause in his plea agreement bars him from bringing his motion under section 2255. Plea agreements are contracts through which defendants bargain away fundamental rights. E.g., United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992). We therefore construe plea agreements according to the ordinary principles of contract law, but with a heightened obligation both to secure for defendants the benefits of their negotiation and to restrict only those rights they properly relinquished. E.g., id. (“Plea agreements, however, are ‘unique contracts’ and the ordinary contract principles are supplemented with a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant‘s right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause.“); United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (2010) (“‘[W]e interpret the terms of the agreement according to the parties’ reasonable expectations’ and construe any ambiguities in the light most favorable to” the defendant), quoting United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also, e.g., United States v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012). A valid appeal waiver must speak in “express and unambiguous” terms. Quintero, 618 F.3d at 751; United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1994). Contrary to the
Cross‘s waiver of his right to bring a section 2255 motion was not unlimited. It did not include, for instance, a challenge to “the court‘s reliance on any constitutionally impermissible factor.” Both the district court and government interpret that carve-out to encompass only a narrow set of factors read into all appeal waivers as a matter of constitutional law. Under this exception, even a blanket appeal waiver cannot foreclose a defendant‘s right to challenge the sentencing court‘s use of a constitutionally impermissible, identity-based factor such as race or gender. E.g., Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). According to the government, the written carve-out in Cross‘s agreement merely replicates this constitutional baseline and thus does not cover Cross‘s motion.
Cross reads the carve-out to include any unconstitutional input in sentencing. This is a reasonable interpretation. Even if we thought the government‘s reading were also reasonable, we would be left with an ambiguous waiver that should not apply to Cross‘s section 2255 motion. The language of the plea agreement does not limit the term “constitutionally impermissible factor” to the exceptions that we must read into all appeal waivers. A “factor,” in its relevant sense, is simply “[a]n element or constituent, esp[ecially] one which contributes to or influences a process or result.” Factor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. Sept. 2014), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67512?rskey=tf2pMV&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. Courts routinely use the word factor to refer to mandatory-guidelines inputs. E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 241–42 (2005) (noting that the guidelines
We are satisfied that the exception in Cross‘s waiver for any “constitutionally impermissible factor” in sentencing covers the alleged illicit use of the residual clause to calculate his guidelines range. Cross thus retained the right to file the present section 2255 motion.
IV
Having dispensed with these procedural hurdles, we are at last ready to resolve the central issue on appeal: whether, under Johnson, relief is available to Davis and Cross. Johnson establishes that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Therefore, if a) the residual clause of the guidelines suffers from the same indeterminacy and b) the constitutional requirement of clarity applies to the mandatory guidelines, then we must declare that clause void as well.
A
Johnson homed in on a confluence of two factors that deprived the residual clause of the ACCA of sufficiently definite meaning. 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018). First, the ACCA clause required judges to assess the risk of injury associated with a defendant‘s prior convictions using a categorical approach. Johnson,
These same two faults inhere in the residual clause of the guidelines. It hardly could be otherwise because the two clauses are materially identical. The mandatory minimum provisions of the ACCA apply to defendants who “ha[ve] three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”
- has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
- is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
- has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
- is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
Johnson confirmed that the categorical approach applies to the residual clause of the ACCA. 135 S. Ct. at 2561–62; see also id. at 2579–80 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority gave three reasons for doing so. All three of those reasons apply with equal force to the guidelines. First, in the face of the Court‘s consistent application of the categorical approach to the residual clause, the government did not, in Johnson, ask it to abandon that approach. Id. at 2562 (majority opinion). We too have
The additional words, “of a dwelling,” in the guidelines’ enumerated clause do not focus the meaning of the phrase “serious potential risk” in the residual clause that follows. It might once have been argued that narrowing the enumerated burglary offense allows a more precise analogy to be drawn to the degree of harm with which the residual clause is concerned. But the Supreme Court closed the door on this noscitur a sociis style argument in Taylor. Taylor faced the converse problem of trying to determine the meaning of “burglary” in the enumerated clause of the ACCA, and in particular
It could be argued, of course, that common-law burglary, by and large, involves a greater “potential risk of physical injury to another.”
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) . But, even assuming that Congress intended to restrict the predicate offense to some especially dangerous subclass of burglaries, restricting it to common-law burglary would not be a rational way of doing so. The common-law definition does not require that the offender be armed or that the dwelling be occupied at the time of the crime. An armed burglary of an occupied commercial building, in the daytime, would seem to pose a far greater risk of harm to persons than an unarmed nocturnal breaking and entering of an unoccupied house. It seems unlikely that Congress would have considered the latter, but not the former, to be a “violent felony” counting towards a sentence enhancement.
Id. at 594. Thus, limiting the enumerated offense to burglaries of dwellings sheds no light on the degree of risk required in the residual clause.
The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Dimaya reconfirms our view that the residual clause of the guidelines shares the weaknesses that Johnson identified in the ACCA. Dimaya concerned an analogous residual clause in
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
The Court turned to Johnson for guidance in how to read section 16. It found no principled difference between the two statutes: Johnson, it said, “is a straightforward decision, with equally straightforward application here.” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213. Section 16‘s residual clause suffered from indeterminacy in “just the same way” as the ACCA‘s. Id. at 1213. Both required a categorical approach to the predicate offenses, and both vaguely called for a “not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk.” Id. at 1216. In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch highlighted the key parallels between the ACCA and statutory scheme at issue in Dimaya from which the Court‘s conclusion flowed:
Just like the statute in Johnson, the statute here instructs courts to impose special penalties on individuals previously “convicted of” a “crime of violence.” Just like the statute in Johnson, the statute here fails to specify which crimes qualify for that label. Instead, and again like the statute in Johnson, the statute here seems to require a judge to guess about the ordinary case of the crime and conviction and then guess whether a “substantial risk” of “physical force” attends its commission. Johnson held that a law that asks so much of courts while offering them so little by way of guidance is unconstitutionally vague. And I do not see how we might reach a different judgment here.
Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As we already have highlighted, each of those three hallmarks is shared by the guidelines. The guidelines speak of a defendant “convicted of” a crime of violence, do not specify the offenses belonging to the category, and leave judges to guess how much risk offenses must entail. Thus, to borrow Justice Gorsuch‘s phrase, we “do not see how we might reach a different judgment here.”
In fact, the textual differences between the ACCA and guidelines pale in comparison to the differences between the ACCA and section 16: section 16 lacks an enumerated clause; its residual clause requires “physical force” rather than “physical injury“; it requires a “substantial risk” rather than a “serious potential risk“; and it additionally requires that the offense involve that risk “by its nature” and that the risk arise “in the course of committing the offense.” Compare
Although several justices in Dimaya did question the vitality of the categorical approach, their opinions do not undercut our interpretation of the guidelines for two reasons. First, only a minority of the justices cast aspersions on the categorical approach. Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justices Kennedy and Alito, did so in dissent. Id. at 1250-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch‘s concurrence reserved judgment on the issue for the future. Id. at 1232-33 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Until that time, Justice Gorsuch assumed that the categorical approach did apply because, in part, the Supreme Court‘s “precedent seemingly requires this approach.” Id. at 1232. If that was enough to persuade the Justice, it is more than enough for us. As a lower court, we are required to follow the Court‘s precedents until the Court itself tells us otherwise. Unless and until a majority of the Court overrules the
In developing this argument, Justice Thomas was careful to distance section 16 from the factors that had justified adopting the categorical approach for the ACCA-factors that apply with equal force to the guidelines. First, adopting the underlying-facts approach for the ACCA would have raised Sixth Amendment concerns. Although those same concerns apply to the mandatory guidelines, see Booker, 543 U.S. 220, a jury right does not attach to immigration cases, Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1256. When section 16 is applied to criminal cases, Justice Thomas suggested that the defendant‘s prior conduct should simply be indicted and proven at trial. Regardless of the merits of that suggestion (which Johnson rejected for the ACCA, see 135 S. Ct. at 2580 (Alito, J., dissenting)), that forward-looking strategy cannot be applied to the now-concluded era of mandatory guidelines. Justice Thomas also invoked context in support of his view. He noted that in the unique setting of the INA the Supreme Court had required an underlying-conduct approach to identify other aggravated felonies. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1257. Finally, Justice Thomas
B
The penultimate question before us is whether a vagueness challenge directed against the guidelines is possible for defendants such as Cross and Davis whose sentences were handed down before Booker, when the guidelines were mandatory. If so, then they have a right to be resentenced because the residual clause that underlay both of their sentences suffered from the same vagueness that doomed its counterpart in the ACCA.
The answer to that question depends in the first instance on the breadth of the Supreme Court‘s holding in Beckles. In the context of a sentence imposed after the guidelines became discretionary, Beckles upheld the residual clause of the guidelines against a Johnson-inspired vagueness challenge. 137 S. Ct. at 890. The Supreme Court took care, however, to specify that it was addressing only the post-Booker, advisory version of the guidelines. It held “that the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause,” id. at 890 (emphasis added), and referred repeatedly to the “advisory Guidelines” throughout the opinion, id. at 890, 892, 894, 895, 896, 897. Indeed, it expressly distinguished Johnson on the ground that Johnson dealt with a binding residual clause:
Unlike the ACCA ... the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the exercise of a court‘s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Accordingly, the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The residual clause in
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) therefore is not void for vagueness.
Id. at 892. We take the Court at its word: the Beckles opinion applies only to the guidelines as they have been since 2005, not to the pre-Booker mandatory regime.
Even more importantly, Beckles‘s logic for declining to apply the vagueness doctrine rests entirely on the advisory quality of the current guidelines. The vagueness doctrine ensures that a “law regulating private conduct by fixing permissible sentences provides notice and avoids arbitrary enforcement by clearly specifying the range of penalties available.” Id. at 895. Those purposes distinguish vagueness from the ex post facto clause, which Peugh tells us does apply to the advisory guidelines. The ex post facto clause bars a retroactive law if it “creates a significant risk of a higher sentence.” 137 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550). Lengthening advisory guidelines terms increases the likelihood of prolonged sentences-thereby raising ex post facto concerns-because the advisory guidelines exert a powerful anchoring influence on judges. Id. at 894; Peugh, 569 U.S. at 541-42. In contrast, advi-
[E]ven perfectly clear Guidelines could not provide notice to a person who seeks to regulate his conduct so as to avoid particular penalties within the statutory range. That is because even if a person behaves so as to avoid an enhanced sentence ... the sentencing court retains discretion to impose the enhanced sentence .... The advisory Guidelines also do not implicate ... arbitrary enforcement .... An unconstitutionally vague law invites arbitrary enforcement ... if it ‘leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case’ or permits them to prescribe the sentences or sentencing range available. The Guidelines, however, do not regulate the public by prohibiting any conduct or by ‘establishing minimum and maximum penalties for [any] crime.’ Rather, the Guidelines advise sentencing courts how to exercise their discretion within the bounds established by Congress.
Id. at 894-95 (quoting respectively Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Thus, the vagueness doctrine does not prohibit including the residual clause in the advisory guidelines.
The mandatory guidelines did, however, implicate the concerns of the vagueness doctrine. Beckles reaffirmed that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to “laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.” 137 S. Ct. at 892. As
The [mandatory] Guidelines ... are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges. While subsection (a) of [
18 U.S.C.] § 3553 of the sentencing statute lists the Sentencing Guidelines as one factor to be considered in imposing a sentence, subsection (b) directs that the court “shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range” established by the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases. ...The availability of a departure in specified circumstances does not avoid the constitutional issue .... The Guidelines permit departures from the prescribed sentencing range in cases in which the judge “finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). At first glance, one might believe that the ability of a district judge to depart from the Guidelines means that she is bound only by the statutory maximum. Importantly, however, departures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most. In most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range. ...Booker‘s case illustrates the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. ... Under these facts, the Guidelines
specified an offense level of 32 ... . Booker‘s is a run-of-the-mill drug case, and does not present any factors that were inadequately considered by the Commission. The sentencing judge would therefore have been reversed had he not imposed a sentence within the level 32 Guidelines range.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-34 (emphasis in original). In sum, as the Supreme Court understood in Booker, the residual clause of the mandatory guidelines did not merely guide judges’ discretion; rather, it mandated a specific sentencing range and permitted deviation only on narrow, statutorily fixed bases.
The Court thus addressed, and rejected, the argument that the possibility of departures from the mandatory guideline range was enough to make it advisory. We might add that even statutory minimum sentences are not exempt from departures, if, for instance, the government files a substantial-assistance motion,
We conclude that the mandatory guidelines’ incorporation of the vague residual clause impeded a person‘s efforts to “regulate his conduct so as to avoid particular penalties” and left it to the judge to “prescribe the ... sentencing range available.” Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894-95. Therefore, unlike the advisory guidelines, the mandatory guidelines implicated the “twin concerns” of the vagueness doctrine. Id. at 894. The mandatory guidelines are thus subject to attack on vagueness grounds.
C
The last question is whether Johnson applies retroactively to the residual clause of the career-offender guideline. A newly announced constitutional rule applies retroactively if it is either a substantive rule or a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure.” Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). A substantive rule “alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” whereas procedural rules “regulate only the manner of determining the defendant‘s culpability.” Id. at 1264-65 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)). In Welch, the Supreme Court held that Johnson qualifies as a substantive rule, because it narrowed the class to whom the ACCA‘s mandatory minimum applied, id. at 1265:
Before Johnson, the [ACCA] applied to any person who possessed a firearm after three violent felony convictions, even if one or more of those convictions fell under only the residual clause. An offender in that situation faced 15 years to life in prison. After Johnson, the same person engaging in the same conduct is no longer subject to the Act and faces at most 10 years in prison. The residual clause is invalid under Johnson, so it can no longer mandate or authorize any sentence. Johnson establishes, in other words, that “even the use of impeccable factfinding procedures could not legitimate” a sentence based on that clause. It follows that Johnson is a substantive decision.
Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971)).
The same logic justifies treating Johnson as substantive,
V
We hold that both Cross and Davis are entitled to relief from their career-offender classifications, based on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson. We thus REVERSE the district court and REMAND these cases with instructions to grant Cross‘s and Davis‘s section 2255 motions and to resentence them in accordance with this opinion.
Notes
Id. at 3-4. We will reserve for our reconsideration of Jenkins and Jackson whether that difference is enough to justify jettisoning the categorical approach for section 924(c)(3)(B). For the moment, it is enough for us to note that the guidelines, like sections 924(e) and 16(b), require courts to consider the defendant‘s prior offenses.A non-categorical approach ... may make particular sense in the context of Section 924(c)(3)(B). Unlike Section 16(b) of the ACCA‘s residual clause, Section 924(c)(3)(B)‘s definition of a “crime of violence” is never applied to a prior conviction, the specific facts of which may not be before the court. Section 924(c) instead employs the term “crime of violence” to describe the conduct involved in the present offense with which the defendant is charged.
