Lonzo Stanley v. United States

Jun 1, 2016
15-3728
Versions:827 F.3d 562
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12182
2016 WL 3514185

*1 Before  E ASTERBROOK ,  K ANNE ,  and  W ILLIAMS , Circuit  Judg-­‐‑ es .

E ASTERBROOK , Circuit   Judge .   More   than   a   decade   ago   Lonzo   Stanley   was   sentenced   to   200   months’   imprisonment   after  he  pleaded  guilty  to  distributing  crack  cocaine.  His  sen-­‐‑ tence  depended  in  part  on  the  district  court’s  conclusion  that   he  is  a  career  offender  under  U.S.S.G.  §4B1.1,  which  calls  for   extra   time   in   prison   if   the   defendant   has   two   or   more   prior   convictions   for   serious   drug   crimes   or   violent   felonies.   The   court   counted   three   qualifying   convictions:   one   for   a   con-­‐‑ trolled-­‐‑substance  offense,  another  for  unlawfully  possessing   a  firearm,  and  a  third  for  aggravated  battery.  Stanley  did  not   appeal   from   his   sentence   or   file   a   collateral   attack   under   28   U.S.C.  §2255  within  the  year  allowed  by  §2255(f).

After  the  Supreme  Court  decided Johnson  v.  United  States ,   135  S.  Ct.  2551  (2015),  Stanley  took  advantage  of  the  oppor-­‐‑ tunity  created  by  §2255(f)(3),  which  allows  a  fresh  year  from   “the   date   on   which   the   right   asserted   was   initially   recog-­‐‑ nized   by   the   Supreme   Court,   if   that   right   has   been   newly   recognized   by   the   Supreme   Court   and   made   retroactively   applicable  to  cases  on  collateral  review”.  We  held  in Price  v.   United  States ,  795  F.3d  731  (7th  Cir.  2015),  that  the  right  new-­‐‑ ly  identified  in  is  retroactive,  and  in Welch  v.  United   States ,  136  S.  Ct.  1257  (2016),  the  Supreme  Court  agreed.  But   the  district  judge  concluded  that  does  not  affect  Stan-­‐‑ ley’s   sentence   and   denied   his   petition   for   collateral   review.   2015  U.S.  Dist.  L EXIS  72909  (W.D.  Wis.  June  5,  2015).    holds  that  part  of  18  U.S.C.  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)  is  un-­‐‑ constitutional.   Subsection   924(e),   called   the   Armed   Career   Criminal  Act,  requires  longer  sentences  for  persons  convict-­‐‑ ed  of  three  or  more  violent  felonies  or  serious  drug  offenses.   The  statute  defines  some  of  these  categories  and  adds  a  kick-­‐‑ er  in  clause  (ii),  which  classifies  as  a  violent  felony  any  crime   that   “is   burglary,   arson,   or   extortion,   involves   use   of   explo-­‐‑ sives,   or   otherwise   involves   conduct   that   presents   a   serious   potential   risk   of   physical   injury   to   another”.   The   part   of   clause   (ii)   that   begins   “or   otherwise   involves”   is   known   as   the   residual   clause. Johnson holds   that   the   residual   clause   is   unconstitutionally   vague. Johnson does   not   otherwise   affect   the   operation   of   the   Armed   Career   Criminal   Act.   Nor   does Johnson discuss   how,   if   at   all,   its   holding   affects   the   career-­‐‑ offender   guideline.   For   the   purpose   of   this   appeal,   we   as-­‐‑ sume  that Johnson applies  to  the  Sentencing  Guidelines.  An-­‐‑ other  panel  has  that  question  under  advisement.  We  do  not   express  any  opinion  on  it.

A  flurry  of  filings  in  the  district  courts  after Price ,  which   became  a  blizzard  after Welch ,  depends  on  a  belief  that John-­‐‑ son reopens   all   questions   about   the   proper   classification   of   prior   convictions   under   the   Guidelines   and   the   Armed   Ca-­‐‑ reer  Criminal  Act.  But  the  sole  holding  of  is  that  the   residual   clause   is   invalid.     does   not   affect   the   first   portion  of  clause  (ii)  (“burglary,  arson,  or  extortion,  [or]  use   of   explosives”)   and   does   not   have   anything   to   do   with   the   proper   classification   of   drug   offenses   or   the   operation   of   §924(e)(2)(B)(i),  known  as  the  elements  clause,  which  classi-­‐‑ fies   as   a   violent   felony   any   crime   punishable   by   a   year   or   more   in   prison   that   “has   as   an   element   the   use,   attempted   use,  or  threatened  use  of  physical  force  against  the  person  of   another”.   The   Guidelines   contain   the   same   language.   U.S.S.G.  §4B1.2(a)(1).

Stanley  is  among  the  many  petitioners  who  have  misun-­‐‑ derstood  the  effect  of .  We  go  through  his  prior  felo-­‐‑ ny  convictions  one  at  a  time  to  show  why.

His  drug  conviction  counts  under  U.S.S.G.  §4B1.2(b),  and   it  would  have  counted  under  §924(e)(2)(A)  if  this  had  been  a   proceeding  under  the  Armed  Career  Criminal  Act.  He  does   not  argue  otherwise.

Stanley’s  conviction  for  illegal  possession  of  a  firearm,  by   contrast,   does   not   count—not   because   of Johnson ,   but   be-­‐‑ cause   it never qualified   as   a   violent   felony.   The   Sentencing   Commission  has  concluded  that  a  felon’s  possession  of  a  gun   that   could   be   possessed   lawfully   by   a   non-­‐‑felon   is   not   a   crime   of   violence   for   the   purpose   of   the   career-­‐‑offender   guideline.  See  Amendment  433  (Nov.  1991),  now  reflected  in   §4B1.2   Application   Note   1   ¶3.   See   also Stinson   v.   United   States ,   508   U.S.   36,   47   (1993).   The   district   court   should   not   have  counted  this  conviction  in  2004,  when  Stanley  was  sen-­‐‑ tenced.   Because   the   classification   of   this   conviction   is   unaf-­‐‑ fected   by Johnson ,   §2255(f)(3)   does   not   grant   Stanley   a   fresh   window   to   file   a   collateral   attack.   Indeed,   because   Stanley   could   have   appealed   his   sentence   based   on   the   application   note,  he  could  not  have  filed  a  collateral  attack  even  within   the   year   originally   allowed   by   §2255(f).   The   United   States   has  waived  its  timeliness  and  forfeiture  defenses  in  order  to   obtain  a  substantive  decision  on  this  appeal,  however,  so  the   validity   of   Stanley’s   sentence   depends   on   the   treatment   of   his  remaining  prior  conviction.

Stanley’s  conviction  for  aggravated  battery  of  a  peace  of-­‐‑ ficer,  in  violation  of  720  ILCS  5/12-­‐‑3,  5/12-­‐‑4(b)(6)  (1997),  also   is   outside   the   scope   of Johnson .   The   district   court   counted   this   conviction   under   the   elements   clause,   U.S.S.G.   §4B1.2(a)(1),   which   is   parallel   to   18   U.S.C.   §924(e)(2)(B)(i).     does   not   have   anything   to   do   with   the   elements   clause  of  either  the  Guidelines  or  the  Armed  Career  Criminal   Act,   and   §2255(f)(3)   therefore   does   not   afford   prisoners   a   new  one-­‐‑year  period  to  seek  collateral  relief  on  a  theory  that   the  elements  clause  does  not  apply  to  a  particular  conviction.

Perhaps   a   prisoner   could   argue   that   he   decided   not   to   press   an   argument   about   the   elements   clause   at   sentencing,   or  on  appeal,  when  the  only  consequence  would  have  been   to  move  a  conviction  from  the  elements  clause  to  the  residu-­‐‑ al  clause.  Then  it  would  be  possible  to  see  some  relation  be-­‐‑ tween Johnson and  a  contention  that  the  conviction  has  been   misclassified,   for   the   line   of   argument   could   have   been   pointless  before    but  dispositive  afterward.  But  this  is   not  the  sort  of  argument  that  Stanley  makes.

Hill  v.  Werlinger ,  695  F.3d  644,  649–50  (7th  Cir.  2012),  con-­‐‑ cludes   that   the   Illinois   offense   of   aggravated   battery   of   a   peace  officer  is  a  violent  felony  because  the  use  of  force  is  an   element  of  the  offense.  has  nothing  to  say  about  that   subject.   What   Stanley   now   contends   is   that   he   might   have   pleaded   guilty   to   aggravated   battery   under   a   different   part   of   the   battery   statute   that   penalizes   insulting   conduct.   That   would   not   be   a   crime   of   violence   under either the   elements   clause  or  the  residual  clause,  so  this  possibility,  too,  is  unaf-­‐‑ fected  by .

What   the   Supreme   Court   curiously   calls   the   “modified   categorical”   approach   determines   how   to   classify   a   prior   conviction   under   the   Armed   Career   Criminal   Act   and   simi-­‐‑ lar   provisions,   including   §4B1.2.   Under   this   approach   the   Court   asks   whether   the   elements   of   the   crime—rather   than   what  the  defendant  did  in  fact—bring  the  conviction  within   the   scope   of   the   recidivist   enhancement.   Usually   a   statute   will  be  wholly  in  or  wholly  out,  but  some  statutes  are  divisi-­‐‑ ble   into   discrete   theories   of   criminal   culpability.   See Descamps   v.   United   States ,   133   S.   Ct.   2276   (2013).     When   a   statute  is  divisible,  a  court  may  consider  the  charging  papers   and   judicial   findings,   or   concessions   made   at   a   plea   collo-­‐‑ quy,  to  determine  whether  the  conviction  qualifies.  See,  e.g., Shepard  v.  United  States ,  544  U.S.  13  (2005).  We  held  in United   States   v.   Rodriguez-­‐‑Gomez ,   608   F.3d   969,   973   (7th   Cir.   2010),   that  aggravated  battery  in  Illinois  is  a  divisible  statute.  Stan-­‐‑ ley  contends  that  he  might  have  been  convicted  under  a  part   of  this  statute  that  lacks  an  element  based  on  the  use  of  force.   Yet   this   contention   is   unrelated   to Johnson and   so   does   not   authorize  a  belated  collateral  attack.

Stanley’s   argument   fails   on   the   merits   in   addition   to   be-­‐‑ ing  untimely.  Illinois  charged  Stanley  with  a  violent  battery   that  satisfies  the  elements  clause.  See  720  ILCS  5/12-­‐‑3(a)(1).  It   is  always  possible  that  someone  charged  with  a  violent  felo-­‐‑ ny  may  plead  guilty  to  a  lesser  offense,  but  a  court  does  not   assume   this.   It   must   be   shown.   As   the   proponent   of   collat-­‐‑ eral  review,  Stanley  had  to  produce  evidence  demonstrating   entitlement   to   relief.   See Hawk   v.   Olson ,   326   U.S.   271,   279   (1945); Martin   v.   United   States ,   789   F.3d   703,   706   (7th   Cir.   2015).  For  Stanley  that  meant  showing  a  difference  between   the  charge  and  the  conviction.  A  notation  in  the  judgment  of   conviction   might   do   this.   Judicial   findings,   or   stipulations   during   a   plea   colloquy,   also   might   suffice.   But   Stanley   did   not  produce  any  of  this  potentially  relevant  evidence.  When   a   statute   is   divisible,   “a   silent   record   leaves   up   in   the   air   whether  an  error  has  occurred,  and  the  allocation  to  defend-­‐‑ ant   of   the   burdens   of   production   and   persuasion   makes   a   difference.” United   States   v.   Ramirez ,   606   F.3d   396,   398–99   (7th   Cir.   2010).   The   absence   of   any   evidence   to   undermine   the   indictment’s   description   of   a   violent   felony   means   that   Stanley  would  have  lost,  even  had  he  raised  this  contention   on  direct  appeal  or  by  a  timely  motion  under  §2255.  His  sen-­‐‑ tence  is  lawful.

A FFIRMED

Notes

[*]   This   appeal   initially   was   decided   by   a   nonprecedential   order.   The   court  has  revised  the  order  and  issued  it  as  an  opinion.

Read the detailed case summary