DARLENE FAYE LANCASTER, wife, heir and executor of the estate of her late husband, Commander Allen Lee Lancaster, CHC, USN (ret), Intervenor/Plaintiff - Appellant, and ALLEN L. LANCASTER, Plaintiff, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL; THE NAVY CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 23-1578
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
July 26, 2024
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PUBLISHED.
ARGUED: Arthur A. Schulcz, LAW OFFICE OF ARTHUR A. SCHULCZ, SR., CHAPLAINS’ COUNCIL, PLLC, Leesburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Garry Daniel Hartlieb, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Lauren A. Wetzler, Civil Chief, Alexandria, Virginia, Joel E. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:
Lawsuits have lifespans, sometimes coinciding with those of the parties. This lawsuit began when a retired Navy chaplain sued several Navy officials in their official capacity, alleging discrimination in the Navy‘s promotion practices. It should have ended when the ex-chaplain died—after the Navy moved to dismiss the case but before the district court ruled on that motion. But neither the Navy nor the district court addressed how the plaintiff‘s death affected the district court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the district court dismissed
But we cannot reach the merits of the widow‘s post-dismissal motion since her husband‘s death mooted his claims for prospective relief and sovereign immunity would preclude retrospective relief, to the extent the ex-chaplain even sought it. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case on any other grounds or to rule on the widow‘s post-dismissal motion.
I.
This appeal stems from a longstanding dispute over the Navy‘s methods for promoting its chaplains. In this particular episode, an ex-chaplain, Allen Lancaster, sued the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander of the Naval Personnel Command and the Navy Chief of Chaplains, all in their official capacities. According to his amended complaint, which he filed on September 25, 2019, Mr. Lancaster served as a Navy chaplain for twenty-one years before retiring in 2001 as a Commander, earlier than he would have retired had he been promoted to Captain. Mr. Lancaster alleged that he was not promoted due to “retaliation based on personal hostility and denominational prejudice.” J.A. 33. For those reasons, he challenged the Navy‘s “personnel systems’ procedures and practices.” J.A. 35.
More specifically, the amended complaint raised four “counts.” To begin, Mr. Lancaster claimed that the Navy‘s procedures permitted “illegal retaliation” against him by stymying his promotion for denominational reasons, but he specified no legal framework. J.A. 43–46. And lastly, he claimed that the Navy‘s promotion procedures and the retaliation they allegedly allowed violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
The Navy officials moved to dismiss Mr. Lancaster‘s amended complaint on October 29, 2020. To discuss that motion and set a trial date, the district court held a status conference on July 20, 2021. Mr. Lancaster‘s lawyer notified the court on August 8 that he had presented a proposed second amended complaint to the defendants and was awaiting a response. On August 20, Mr. Lancaster‘s lawyer followed up with a second notice, reporting that the Navy officials planned to oppose his motion for leave to amend, which he planned to file on or about September 8.
But Mr. Lancaster had passed away seven days earlier, on August 13. In light of that development, the Navy officials filed a suggestion of death on August 24, explaining that Mr. Lancaster‘s counsel had informed defendants of Mr. Lancaster‘s death one day prior. Acknowledging the death, the district court granted the Navy officials’ long-pending and fully briefed motion to dismiss. Based on res judicata, the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice on August 30, referring to several prior decisions in this
Though that dismissal was not appealed, on March 4, 2022, Mr. Lancaster‘s widow and the executor of his estate, Darlene Lancaster, tried to revive the case by filing a multifaceted motion. She moved the district court to reopen the case under
II.
To reach the merits of this appeal, we must first address—even if the parties do not—whether federal courts, including the district court, could properly exercise jurisdiction. See Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 344–45 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))). We have the authority to discharge this duty since “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” Appalachian Voices v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Interior, 78 F.4th 71, 76 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)).
Until oral argument in this appeal, neither party nor the district court questioned whether Mr. Lancaster‘s death affected the district court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. No motion or memorandum was offered to the district court after Mr. Lancaster‘s death. And the issue was not discussed in the parties’ initial appellate briefs. After raising jurisdictional concerns sua sponte at oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing on whether Mr. Lancaster‘s death deprived federal courts of jurisdiction based on the interplay of mootness and sovereign immunity. As those issues dispose of this appeal, we address them in turn.
A.
Federal courts “have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender, 475 U.S. at 541.
To determine the sort of relief sought, we rely on the operative complaint. See Johnson v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs. Bd. of Educ., 20 F.4th 835, 844–45 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that a parent of a student “ordinarily must include in her federal complaint a request for compensatory education to avoid dismissal for mootness when the student no longer is enrolled in the defendant school system“); Nestler v. Bd. of L. Exam‘rs of N.C., 611 F.2d 1380, 1382 (4th Cir. 1980) (affirming the denial of leave to amend a complaint to add a damages claim after the district court dismissed as moot the operative complaint, which sought only declaratory and injunctive relief). As the “master of [his] complaint,” Mr. Lancaster chose which remedies to pursue. Johnson, 20 F.4th at 844 (quoting Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 728 (4th Cir. 2021)). So our mootness analysis “is predicated on the contents of [his] federal complaint.” Id. at 846.
In his first amended complaint, the operative one here, Mr. Lancaster sought several forms of prospective relief. Under the moniker “Declaratory Relief and Judgement,” Mr. Lancaster requested a “declaration” that the Navy officials’ actions “were illegal retaliation and denominational prejudice” and that the “promotion procedures are improper and unconstitutional tools and means of retaliation.” J.A. 50–51. He also sought an “order” requiring the officials to “address and remove the penalties to [Mr.] Lancaster‘s career” and to “hold new promotion boards” using new procedures. J.A. 50–51. In addition, he requested an order “[e]njoin[ing] the defendants to remedy the harms to [Mr.] Lancaster‘s records” and to consider his performance as exemplary. J.A. 51. Pivoting from his retaliation claims, Mr. Lancaster also sought “declarations” and “orders” relating to his challenges to the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States and to the statutory privilege for selection board proceedings. J.A. 51–52.
But Mr. Lancaster‘s death mooted his claims for prospective relief,
(3d ed. 2023).3 Following that principle, when Mr. Lancaster died, he no longer stood to benefit from the various prospective “declarations” and “orders” he sought. See Wicomico Nursing Home, 910 F.3d at 749.
Though the mootness doctrine is tempered by some exceptions, none apply here. Conduct that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” can save some matters from mootness. Lux v. Judd, 651 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)). This constraint on
Wisc. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462). Plainly, this exception does not apply to Mr. Lancaster‘s claims. Now deceased, Mr. Lancaster will never again be subject to the promotion practices he challenged.
Another exception to the mootness doctrine holds that a defendant‘s “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice” does not “deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice” if there is a reasonable chance the practice will resume. Porter v. Clarke, 852 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin‘s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)). But here, there is no chance the challenged conduct will resume, at least as to Mr. Lancaster. So his claims are moot regardless of whether the Navy stopped engaging in the practices Mr. Lancaster challenged.
To sum up our analysis so far, Mr. Lancaster cannot benefit from the prospective relief he sought now that he has passed away. And for that same reason, this case cannot be revived by the mootness exception for conduct that is capable of repetition yet evading review or the exception for voluntary cessation. Therefore, Mr. Lancaster‘s claims for prospective relief are moot.
However, the specter of retrospective relief remains. “While the death of a party generally moots any claim for injunctive relief, death usually does not moot a claim for monetary compensation.” Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015); cf. Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg‘l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248–49 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Slade‘s complaint . . . requested both injunctive and monetary relief. The request for monetary relief is not moot even though Slade has been released from Jail because Slade retains a ‘legally cognizable interest’ in the outcome of the case, i.e., the return of money the Jail deducted from his inmate account. . . . Slade‘s claim for injunctive relief, however, is moot because he is no longer in pretrial detention.“). Monetary compensation is less vulnerable to mootness because “[t]ypically, a substituted plaintiff, such as a decedent‘s personal representative, has a legally cognizable interest in the recovery of money damages owed to the decedent‘s estate.” Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2006). This damages distinction encompasses claims for backpay. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984) (determining that the plaintiff‘s death did not moot a case when the relevant statute authorized “an equitable action for backpay“); Fraternal Ord. of Metro Transit Police Lab. Comm., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 780 F.3d 238, 241 n.2 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the retirement of a plaintiff did not moot the claims brought on his behalf since “the disposition of this case could affect the district court‘s award of back pay“).
But did Mr. Lancaster seek retrospective relief? The operative complaint asked for unspecified “[o]ther remedies as appropriate to compensate for the damage done.” J.A. 51. In a broader catchall, the complaint requested “other such relief as may become apparent in the course of litigation.” J.A. 52.4 Later, in response to
officials to reconvene a promotion board, the board would be likely to posthumously promote Mr. Lancaster, then allowing his estate to seek backpay. However, to ascertain whether Mr. Lancaster pursued retrospective relief, we question whether we can rely on the arguments of his lawyer on appeal about a backpay claim his estate might later seek to bring rather than his operative complaint. See Johnson, 20 F.4th at 844–45; Nestler, 611 F.2d at 1382. But even assuming the operative complaint‘s oblique reference to compensation could steer Mr. Lancaster‘s claims clear of the Scylla that is mootness, the claims would then run headlong into the Charybdis of sovereign immunity. In more modern parlance, Mr. Lancaster‘s claims are stuck between a rock and a hard place, both jurisdictional.
B.
Sovereign immunity would bar any residual requests for retrospective relief. “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Randall, 95 F.3d at 345 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Even if the United States is not named as a defendant, “[a]n action against a federal agency or official will be treated as an action against the sovereign if ‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or compel it to act.‘” Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471, 473 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)). Consequently, sovereign immunity bars monetary claims against officers in their official capacity since such suits effectively operate against the sovereign itself.5 See Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 (2017) (“In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against the official and in fact is against the official‘s office and thus the sovereign itself.“); Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 549 (4th Cir. 2014) (“State officials sued in their official capacities for retrospective money damages have the same sovereign immunity accorded to the State.“); Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 461 (2d Cir. 2018) (“A plaintiff may not sue a federal officer in her official capacity for money damages, because such suit seeks money from the federal government, and sovereign immunity would bar recovery
But sovereign immunity can be waived. To that effect, “Congress has enacted certain statutes that both create a cause of action against the federal government and expressly waive the government‘s immunity from suit for those actions.” Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 363 (4th Cir. 2022). However, such a waiver “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Randall, 95 F.3d at 345 (quoting United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). It also must be “strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign.” Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650–51 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Therefore, “it is the plaintiff‘s burden to show that an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity exists and that none of the statute‘s waiver exceptions apply to his particular claim.” Id. at 651. The Lancasters have failed to meet that burden.
The amended complaint does not refer to a single damages cause of action for which the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity. In its jurisdictional statement, the pleading cites to an immunity waiver contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“). See
The complaint‘s first count, concerning “illegal retaliation,” points to no cause of action at all, much less one that waives sovereign immunity. J.A. 43–46. It cites no statute, and only in passing does it assert that the challenged promotion procedures “are unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.” J.A. 46. But even there, the amended complaint points to no cause of action that serves to waive sovereign immunity.6
In its last count, the amended complaint refers to a statute, RFRA. If an actor of the federal government burdens a person‘s religious exercise in a manner that violates RFRA, that statute enables the aggrieved person to “assert that violation
held that RFRA permits damages claims against federal officers in their individual capacity. See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 51–52 (2020). But “[t]he obvious difference” is that individual capacity claims do not implicate sovereign immunity. Id. With respect to official capacity claims, RFRA‘s use of the phrase “appropriate remedies” is too equivocal to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. And so, RFRA does not authorize damages against Navy officials in their official capacity.
The other two “counts” recited in the amended complaint fail to support a damages remedy at all. In what is styled “Count 2,” the amended complaint argues that the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States, provided in
Though never mentioned in Mr. Lancaster‘s operative complaint, Mrs. Lancaster now invokes
Therefore, to the extent the operative complaint even sought retrospective relief against federal officers in their official capacity, the Lancasters have not met their burden of showing “an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” Welch, 409 F.3d at 651. That leaves only the requests for prospective relief, which, as previously discussed, became moot when Mr. Lancaster passed away.
III.
Some lawsuits die with the person bringing them. When Mr. Lancaster died, the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction over his lawsuit. Mr. Lancaster‘s death mooted his requests for injunctive or declaratory relief. To the extent any claims for retrospective relief can be read into the operative complaint, sovereign immunity would bar them since the Lancasters have not demonstrated a waiver of that immunity. Consequently, the district court should have dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not with prejudice on res judicata grounds. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner‘s Ass‘n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for . . . [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction . . . must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.“). Likewise, the district court continued to lack subject matter jurisdiction when it denied Mrs. Lancaster‘s request for relief from that res judicata dismissal under Rule 60(b).
Therefore, the district court‘s judgment of dismissal and its subsequent judgment denying relief under Rule 60(b) are both vacated, and the matter is remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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