ROBERT C. DALTON v. SAINT BARNABAS MEDICAL CENTER, а corporate entity, RWJBARNABAS HEALTH, a corporate entity, NICOLE CENTRELLA, an individual, and DR. LAUREN J. CURATO, individual
Civil Action No. 21-5354 (JXN) (ESK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
November 6, 2023
NEALS, District Judge
CaseID: 541
NEALS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Robert C. Dalton‘s (“Plaintiff“) amended complaint (ECF No. 5) (the “Amended Complaint“) filed pursuant to
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument under
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Plaintiff states that his “civil rights” were “violated” because the Barnabas Defendants and Curato “denied [Plaintiff‘s] . . . preferred method of effective communication[,]” requested due to Plaintiff‘s “TBI-disab[ility][.]” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 18). The Barnabas Defendants and Curato were aware of Plaintiff‘s disability yet “repeatedly denied” his accommodation requests and “discriminated against” him “on the [b]asis of” his disability. (Id. ¶ 21).
Plaintiff identifies four “preferred method[s] of communication” that the Barnabas Defendants and Curato denied as a “public accommodation” while he was treated at Barnabas Medical Center, a RWJBarnabas facility (see Id. ¶¶ 1, 17, 20, 28):
Centrella “to record the verbal information that” she “was providing” to Plaintiff; - Centrella to “tape what” she “was informing [Plaintiff] regarding the state of his injuries[;]”
- Centrella to “move [Plaintiff] to a quieter location” and to provide “imaging of his neck and mid-back[;]” and
- Plaintiff “to use his phone to record the audio of the medical information and answers being spoken by” Centrella and Curato.
(Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 31-32, 35-36).
Plaintiff alleges causes of action under Titles II and III of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Aсt, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To determine whether a complaint is sufficient under these standards, the Third Circuit requires a three-part inquiry: (1) the court must first recite the elements that must be pled in order to state a claim; (2) the court must then determine which allegations in the complaint are merely conclusory and therefore need not be given an assumption of truth; and (3) the court must “assume the[] veracity” of well-pleaded factual allegations and ascertain whether they plausibly “give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint Provides Specific Allegations Against RWJBarnabas and Plaintiff Noticed Curato of this Litigation
Initially, the Court rejects the Barnabas Defendants’ assertion that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed against RWJBarnabas because Plaintiff failed to state allegations against it and provide noticе to Curato. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. (ECF No. 16-1) at 292).
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff‘s allegations RWJBarnabas are sufficient. Plaintiff alleges that Barnabas Medical Center “is part of” RWJBarnabas‘s “healthcare system” and that RWJBarnabas “denied” Plaintiff‘s “preferred method of communication . . . .” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 48). Plaintiff further alleges that due to his accident, he drove himself to Barnabas Medical Center in Livingston, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26, 28). These allegations, while limited, provide “sufficient notice of the claims asserted” against RWJBarnabаs. Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep‘t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 n.13 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court does not dismiss the claims against RWJBarnabas.
Moreover, the Court disagrees that Curato “has not been served in this matter . . . .” (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 13 n.1). In addition to Curato not arguing such in her papers (see, gen., Curato‘s Mem. of Law and Reply (ECF Nos. 19-4, 28)), a Notice of Appearance was entered on behalf of Curato (ECF No. 18). Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is not dismissed under
Plaintiff‘s oppositions (ECF Nos. 24, 29) contain general and blanket objectiоns to the motions to dismiss. Plaintiff also did not cite any supporting authority and failed to respond to the Barnabas Defendants’ and Curato‘s arguments. Thus, the motions to dismiss were not substantively opposed. The Court, however, addresses Plaintiff‘s newly raised arguments.
First, Plaintiff cites an unrelated case—2:13-cv-06363—that Plaintiff was not a party to, and a “consent order[,]” allegedly violated by the Barnabas Defendants and Curato (see ECF No. 24 at ¶¶ 5-9), to which Plaintiff was not a signatory. Because neither the case nor the “consent order” have any bearing here, the Court does not apply either.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the Barnabas Defendants and Curato violated
Third, and finally, the Court does not analyze the
C. The 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.2 and 482.24 Claims
The Court agrees that Plaintiff‘s claims under
Since
D. The Due Process and Equal Protection Claims
The Barnabas Defendants and Curato argue that because they are not state actors, Plaintiff‘s due process and equal protection claims should be dismissed. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 22-23; Curato‘s Mem. of Law at 11). The Court agrees.
The Fourteenth Amendment “applies to acts of the states, not to acts of private persons or entities.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well established that the substantive component of due process, embodied in . . . the Fifth ... Amendment[], provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.“) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis removed).
E. The Title II and III ADA Claims
1. The Title II Claims Are Dismissed against the Barnabas Defendants and Curato for Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff‘s Title II claims (see Am. Compl. ¶ 68) are dismissed because the Barnabas Defendants and Curato are not government entities. See Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The ADA is divided into three titles of regulation—Title I (employers), Title II (governments), and Title III (public accommodations).“). As Title II does not apply to the Barnabas Defendants or Curato, the claims are dismissed as to both.
2. The Title III Claims against the Barnabas Defendants and Curato
a) The Title III Claims Against Centrella and Curato Are Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
Title III of the ADA “prohibits public accommodations[,]” including hospitals and healthcare providers, “from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability.” McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotations omitted);
[A] failure to take such steps as mаy be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden[.]
To state a Title III claim, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) he was discriminated against on the basis of disability; (2) in the full and equal enjoymеnt of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
Plaintiff alleges that the Barnabas Defendants and Curato “discriminated against” him “on the [b]asis of” his “disability.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 21). Plaintiff also alleges that the Barnabas Dеfendants and Curato denied him a public accommodation. (Ibid.). While the Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff requested an auxiliary aid or service, by attaching Appendix A (see id. ¶ 14; ECF No. 5-1), Plaintiff alleges so here.
Appendix A is a July 31, 2014, publication by the U.S. Department of Justice entitled “Effective Communication[,]“which “is designed to help title II and title III entities . . . understand how the rules for effective communication . . . apply to them” (the “Publication“) (Publ‘n. at 2). In addition to a variety of available technologies, the Publication states that title II State (and locаl governments) and title III entities (businesses and nonprofit organizations that serve the public) are to provide certain “auxiliary aids and services” to persons with disabilities when appropriate. (Ibid). Specifically, a “qualified reader” for individuals having eye disabilities, a “qualified notetaker[,]” interpreters, “real-time captioning; written materials; or a printed script of a stock speech” to individuals having hearing disabilities, and a “qualified speech-to-speech transliterator” for individuals with speech disabilities. (Id. at 3). Examples of auxiliary aids and services are also found in
In citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2002), Centrella and Curato contend that Plaintiff did not state a Title III claim because he did not allege that either “own[ed],
“[T]he Third Circuit has held that individual defendants are not liable for violations of Title III . . . .” DeSantis v. N.J. Transit, 103 F.Supp.3d 583, 589 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Emerson, 296 F.3d at 188); see also Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F.Supp.3d 316, 331 (D.N.J. 2016) (“The ADA does not create private causes of action against individuals . . . .“) (сitations omitted).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Centrella and Curato owned, operated, or leased Barnabas Medical Center on the date Plaintiff was treated. Instead, that Centrella is “the nurse practitioner who provided medical attention to [] Plaintiff and who denied [P]laintiff‘s requested preferred method of effective communication” and Curato was the “doctor/head doctor of the ER” who also denied Plaintiff‘s requests. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19). Because Plaintiff does not allege that Centrella and Curato owned, operated, or leased Barnabas Medical Center, which is how liability attaches to individual defendants (see Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002)), Plaintiff failed to state a Title III claim.
b) The Title III Claims Against Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabas Are Dismissed for Lack of Standing
The Court finds that Plaintiff‘s Title III claim against Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabas are similarly dismissed because Title III does not provide monetary relief and Plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 16-21; Curato‘s Mem. of Law at 9-11).
“Title III defendants cannot be liable for money damages.” Bowers v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 346 F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). This is because “the ADA provides only prospective injunctive relief . . . .” Doe v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., 791
Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67-68). Because Title III does not provide monetary relief, Plaintiff may not seek damages here. The Court, however, disagrees that the claim should be dismissed for this reason. (Barnabas Dеfs.’ Br. at 16). Rather, the Court agrees with Curato that “[e]ven if Plaintiff had any basis to sue . . ., he could not recover [] compensatory or punitive damages . . . .” (Curato‘s Mem. of Law at 9) (citations omitted). Therefore, if Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief, the claim proceeds. The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff does not.
To seek prospective injunctive relief, as Plaintiff does (see Am. Compl. ¶ 69), he “must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of injury in order to satisfy the injury in fact requirement” of standing in Title III cases. Clark v. Burger King Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 334, 341-42 (D.N.J. 2003) (citations and internal quotаtions omitted). Standing is demonstrated by showing three elements: (1) “an injury-in-fact” that is, an injury that is “concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical[;]” (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of[;]” and “that it is likely, nor merely speculative, that his or her injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Doe v. Nat‘l Bd. of Med. Exam‘rs, 210 F.App‘x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff “must also meet the preconditions for asserting an injunctive claim in a federal forum.” Id. at 159 (citаtion and internal quotations and brackets omitted). Finally, Plaintiff must show that he “is likely to suffer future injury from the defendant‘s illegal conduct.” Id. at 159-60 (citation omitted).
Next, there are no allegations that suggest a “causal connection between” his alleged injuries and Barnabas Medical Center‘s and RWJBarnabas‘s conduct. Id. at 159 (citation omitted). Further, it is “merely speculative” that Plaintiff‘s injuries “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 159 (citation omitted). In addition, Plaintiff fails to show that he is “likely to suffer future injury” from Barnabas Medical Center‘s and RWJBarnabas‘s actions, or lack thereof. Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not suggest that Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabas are likely to harm Plaintiff in the future. In Clark, the Court fоund standing because plaintiff‘s “past patronage at certain Burger King restaurants support[ed] a reasonable likelihood of future injury at these locations.” 255 F.Supp.2d at 343. The Court also found that plaintiff‘s “intent[ion] to return to these restaurants,” further supported such a finding. Id. at 343. This is not the case here.
Plaintiff alleges that he visited Barnabas Medical Center only once after his accident (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26, 28), which he described as “the nearest hospital with the aid of GPS” from the location of the accident. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28). Plaintiff also alleges that the only other time he visited Barnаbas Medical Center was to obtain the name of Curato. (Id. ¶ 52). Such allegations do not suggest that Plaintiff is likely to visit Barnabas Medical Center in the future and be harmed or
Recognizing that his proximity to Barnabas Medical Center would be an issue, Plaintiff states in an Affidavit that he lives or is “in the middle of a transition” to his “new residency” in Bayonne, New Jersey, that RWJBarnabas in Bayonne is Plaintiff‘s “primary healthcare provider center that is less than two miles away” and, as a result, he is “very likely to visit this Healthcare facility for [his] primary care.” (ECF No. 24-2 at ¶¶ 2, 4). This alone is not sufficient to establish standing. Thus, Plaintiff‘s Title III claim is dismissed as to Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabas.
F. The Section 504 Rehabilitation Act Claims
1. The 504 Claims Against Centrella and Curato Are Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
The Court agrees that Section 504 does not provide a private cause of action against individual defendants unless they received federal funds. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 28; Curato‘s Mem. of Law at 13). Because Plaintiff does not allege that Centrella and Curato received federal funds, the Court dismisses the claim against Centrella and Curato.
“The Rehabilitation Act provides that no otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program that received federal funds.” Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
At the outset, the Court rejects the Barnabas Defendants’ assertion that “cell phone audio recording” is not “permitt[ed]” as an auxiliary aid or service as a public accommodation. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 27 n.5). See
To state a Section 504 claim, Plaintiff must show that “(1) he has a disability[,] (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in the services, programs, and activities . . . , (3) the program receives federal financial assistance, and (4) he was denied the benefits of or subject to discrimination under the program because оf his disability.” K.J. v. Greater Egg Harbor Reg‘l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 431 F.Supp.3d 488, 501 (D.N.J. 2019) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff pled the requisite elements, he stated plausible 504 claims.
Plaintiff alleges that he is “TBI-disabled” and that he has a variety of related issues. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). Accepting Plaintiff‘s allegations as true, Plaintiff is a “qualified individual” under
Plaintiff next alleges that Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabаs receive “[f]ederal [g]rant[s] and programs” under
Whether declining Plaintiff‘s requested accommodations was due to his alleged TBI disability, is not before the Court at this time. Rather, the Court must decide whether Plaintiff‘s allegations plausibly give rise to a claim for relief. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (citations omitted). The Court finds that such allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Barnabas Medical Center and RWJBarnabas. For similar reasons, the Court rejects the Barnabas Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff‘s Rehabilitation Claim should be denied because he is unable to obtain compensatory damages. (Barnabas Defs.’ Br. at 26-28).
To obtain compensatory damages, Plaintiff must “prove that the discrimination at issue was intentional.” K.J., 431 F.Supp.3d at 501 (citation and internal quotations omitted).3 This is demonstrated through “proof that, at a minimum, . . . deliberate indifference to the underlying act of discrimination” was exhibited. Id. at 501 (citatiоn and internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff “can establish deliberate indifference by showing (1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated[;] and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis removed). Such proof, however, is not required at the motion to dismiss stage. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (noting dismissal is not granted where “it
G. Plaintiff‘s Leave Request is Granted
Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 24 at ¶ 16; ECF No. 29 at ¶ 17). The Barnabas Defendants and Curato oppose because Plaintiff: (i) previously amended the complaint; (ii) did not provide a proposed Second Amended Complaint; and (iii) did not state why leаve should be given. (Barnabas Defs.’ Reply (ECF No. 32) at 6; Curato‘s Reply (ECF No. 28) at 4). The Court finds that leave is appropriate and, accordingly, permits Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, should he choose to do so.
The
Because Plaintiff raised claims for the first time in opposing the motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 24, 29), the Court did not consider the same here. The Court finds that Plаintiff should have an opportunity to allege any claims not raised that are supported by the facts. Additionally, Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint to in part obtain “Pro Bono assistance from an attorney . . . .” (Am. Compl. ¶ 16). Accordingly, and pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Curato‘s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) in its entirety is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Defendant Lauren J. Curato, D.O. The Barnabas Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) in its entirety is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Defendant Nicole Centrella. Plaintiff‘s claims under Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATED: 11/6/2023
s/ Julien Xavier Neals
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge