Paul Richard MCGANN, Appellant v. CINEMARK USA, INC.
No. 16-2160
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued: November 10, 2016 (Opinion Filed: October 6, 2017)
873 F.3d 218
I am certainly mindful of the theory of interdependence and the presence of an oligopoly. With that said, from the very start, Valspar presented a theory that makes perfect economic sense. It supported this theory with strong evidence of parallel conduct in the form of 31 (an unprecedented amount) of parallel price increase announcements. Recognizing conscious parallelism to be insufficient on its own to survive summary judgment, Valspar also presented viable evidence in support of the plus factors: (i) price signaling, (ii) exchanges of confidential information, (iii) relatively static market shares, (iv) intercompany sales of TiO2 at below market price, (v) abrupt departure from preconspiracy conduct, and (vi) a market susceptible to conspiracy. Although the TiO2 market is an oligopoly, Valspar also presented evidence that did not simply restate interdependence: non-price acts against self-interest. Finally, it presented traditional conspiracy evidence. Viewed together, and not compartmentalized, all this evidence was more than sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
(same). The use of that phrase in Chocolate simply reflected the Court‘s conclusion that the plaintiffs, in that particular case, had not been able to point to any reasonable inferences of a conspiracy. Even assuming arguendo this alleged “standard” were actually the measuring stick, the plaintiffs in this case have certainly met it.
[ARGUED] M. Brett Burns, Hunton & Williams, 575 Market Street, Suite 3700, San Francisco, CA 94105, Bridget J. Daley, Brian H. Simmons, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, One Oxford Center, 20th Floor, 301 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Counsel for Appellee Cinemark USA, Inc.
[ARGUED] Vanita Gupta, Tovah R. Calderon, Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, P.O. Box 14403, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044, Counsel for Amicus Curiae United States of America
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, MCKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“),
After a bench trial in which the parties stipulated to all relevant facts, the District Court entered Judgment in favor of Cinemark. It reasoned that McGann‘s requested tactile interpreter was not an auxiliary aid or service under the ADA and that the ADA did not require movie theaters to change the content of their services or offer “special” services for disabled patrons. For the following reasons, we will vacate the Judgment and remand for consideration of Cinemark‘s available defense.
I.
A.
McGann has Usher‘s Syndrome Type 1, a sensory disorder. He was born deaf and began losing his sight at age five. He has been completely blind for approximately fifteen years, and he is now considered deaf-blind. There is no single universally accepted method of communication for people who are deaf-blind. McGann generally uses ASL to communicate with others. ASL is a unique language that has its own idioms, grammar, and syntax.
McGann can expressively communicate by signing in ASL himself. He receptively communicates with the assistance of ASL tactile interpreters. There are numerous methods of ASL tactile interpretation. McGann most commonly uses the hand-over-hand method. The hand-over-hand method involves the recipient placing his hands lightly upon the hands of an interpreter, who is signing in ASL, and reading those ASL signs through touch and movement.
ASL tactile interpretation of a movie includes every possible element of that movie‘s content, including visual, aural, and oral components. In addition, because tactile interpretation in almost any venue includes a descriptive component, interpretation of a movie screening will include environmental elements, such as other viewers’ contemporaneous reactions. Given practical limitations, tactile interpreters cannot communicate all elements of a movie verbatim; they must, at times, make judgment calls about what content to skip. But tactile interpretation of a movie does not require any changes to the video or audio content of the movie, the auditorium screens or sound systems, or the physical environment—including the lighting—in or around the theater.
McGann has experienced movies in theaters for many years. He enjoys attending movies in person for a number of reasons; among others, it affords him the opportunity to participate in discussions about the movies with his friends and family. Before his wife passed away in 2001, she would provide him with tactile interpretation during movies in the theater. Since then, McGann has attended movies at a local Carmike Cinema. Carmike provided him with tactile interpretation services for movie presentations at his request.
In November 2014, McGann became interested in experiencing the movie Gone Girl (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2014), after hearing about it from his family and reading about it online using Braille. After he contacted his customary Carmike Cinema to inquire about attending a presentation of the movie, he learned it was no longer playing there. So he sought another theater in which to experience it.
Cinemark owned another theater in McGann‘s local area, Cinemark Robinson Township and XD Theater (“Cinemark Robinson“). As of December 2014, Cinemark was the most geographically diverse, worldwide exhibitor of movies, with 335 theaters and 4,499 movie screens in the
Having learned that Cinemark Robinson still offered Gone Girl, McGann e-mailed the theater directly to request tactile interpretation services that would allow him to experience the movie during one of its regular presentations. After receiving no response to his initial inquiry, McGann contacted Cinemark Robinson again and was directed to senior paralegal Leslie Petengill, who worked in Cinemark‘s national headquarters in Texas. He reached out to Petengill that same day.
Cinemark had never received a request for tactile interpretation services for a patron who was deaf-blind before McGann‘s request. Petengill and Cinemark investigated McGann‘s request by contacting the Center for Hearing and Deaf Services (“HDS“), which provided Cinemark with quotes for tactile interpretation services. Rates ranged between $50 and $65 per hour, for a minimum of two hours. Because HDS considered tactile interpretation of Gone Girl a complex assignment, with a duration of over two hours, it would have required two interpreters.
Petengill denied McGann‘s request for tactile interpretation services on December 15, 2014, via e-mail, on her own authority. The e-mail explained that Cinemark did not believe that the ADA required Cinemark to provide McGann with tactile interpretation services for the purpose of “describ[ing] the movie [McGann] [would] [be] attending.” As of January 2016, Cinemark had not received any other requests to provide tactile interpretation services to any patron who is deaf-blind.
McGann filed suit against Cinemark in March 2015, alleging that the theater violated Title III of the ADA when it denied his request for tactile interpreting services. In his suit, he sought declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. After discovery, the parties did not file dispositive motions. They agreed to a non-jury trial before the District Court presented through pretrial briefs, amended joint stipulations of fact, joint exhibits, and oral argument. Oral argument was held in January 2016. The District Court entered Judgment for Cinemark in April 2016. This timely appeal followed.1
B.
With an understanding of the factual and procedural background of McGann‘s claim, we turn to the statutory and regulatory framework under which his claim arises. Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as a “clear and comprehensive national mandate” designed to eliminate discrimination against individuals with physical and mental disabilities across the United States.
Title III begins with a “[g]eneral rule” that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation,”
Congress supplemented the general prohibitions against discrimination in Title III with several “specific prohibitions,” which also constitute discrimination “for purposes of the general rule announced in
Section
In addition to the text of the statute itself, the Department of Justice (“DOJ“) issued a specific regulation implementing Title III‘s auxiliary aid and service requirement.3 This regulation,
The ADA supplies a definition for “auxiliary aids and services.” The term includes, in relevant part: (1) “qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments“; (2) “qualified readers, taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual impairments“; and (3) “other similar services and actions.”
The DOJ also issued a Technical Assistance Publication in 2014 that provided guidance on communicating effectively with individuals who have vision, hearing, or speech disabilities. See Dep‘t of Justice, ADA Requirements: Effective Communication (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ada.gov/effective-comm.htm. This publication specifically mentions tactile interpreters as auxiliary aids or services that may be used to communicate with individuals who are deaf-blind. Id.
DOJ regulations caution that public accommodations cannot expect a one-size-fits-all approach to satisfy their obligations under the ADA. “The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place.”
Consistent with the text of Title III, the regulations provide that a public accommodation may avoid ADA liability for failure to provide an auxiliary aid or service only if it shows that the aid or service in question “fundamentally alter[s] the nature” of its goods or services, or “would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.”
This appeal centers on the meaning of Title III‘s auxiliary aids and services requirement. With an understanding of the statutory and regulatory context surrounding that requirement, we turn to the merits of McGann‘s claim.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to
There is no dispute that McGann is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. There is also no dispute that Cinemark is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. The issue we must resolve in this appeal is whether Cinemark‘s failure to provide McGann with a tactile interpreter,4 so that he could experience the film Gone Girl in one of its theaters, constitutes a Title III “special prohibition” regarding auxiliary aids and services and thus violates Title III‘s “general rule” that no individual shall be denied the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods [and] services” of “a place of public accommodation.”
A.
We begin by considering whether, in the context of this case, McGann‘s requested ASL tactile interpreter is an “auxiliary aid or service.” As detailed above, the ADA defines the term to include (1) “qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments“; (2) “qualified readers, taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual impairments“; and (3) “other similar services and actions.”
Cinemark did not dispute that the ASL tactile interpreter requested by McGann was a “qualified interpreter.” Nor did it dispute that the tactile interpretation provided by this “qualified interpreter” would “make aurally delivered material[ ]” and “visually delivered material[ ]” available to McGann, who has both hearing and visual impairments.
Despite the District Court‘s acknowledgement that ” ‘qualified interpreters’ are specifically listed in the ADA and the Fed
There are several problems with how the District Court interpreted “auxiliary aids and services” in this case. Most broadly, applying the District Court‘s definition would render the auxiliary aids and services requirement of Title III meaningless. All of the products, technologies, and services explicitly listed in the statute and regulations as examples of auxiliary aids and services would constitute “new” goods or services escaping Title III‘s mandate unless they were already provided by a public accommodation voluntarily. In effect, no public accommodation would need to provide them in the first place. We decline to interpret Title III and the DOJ regulations in such a manner. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe‘s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that courts should “interpret statutes to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word” rather than render some of them meaningless); see also United States v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940) (cautioning courts against construing statutes in a way that would produce “absurd” results).
Second, the District Court need not have resorted to dictionary definitions of the word “auxiliary” to understand the meaning of “auxiliary aids and services” in Title III, since the statute and DOJ regulations specifically define the term. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term‘s ordinary meaning.“); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term.“). The statute contains no ambiguity as to whether a qualified interpreter fell within those definitions; it was specifically listed as an example of an “auxiliary aid or service.”
Third, even if there had been a reason to consult a dictionary, the District Court overlooked another definition provided for “auxiliary.” The primary dictionary definition provided for the term “auxiliary” in the very same dictionary cited by the District Court is “offering or providing help, assistance, or support.” Webster‘s Third New Dictionary, Unabridged, s.v. “auxiliary,” http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com; see also Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “auxiliary,” http://www.oed.com (offering as the primary definition for “auxiliary“: “helpful, assistant, affording aid, rendering assistance, giving support or succor“). The relevance of this primary definition—“offering help“—in this context is self-evident. The relevance of a secondary definition—“supplementary“—is not.
Finally, if we were to embrace the “supplementary” definition of “auxiliary,” McGann‘s requested tactile interpreter would still satisfy this definition. As the
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the tactile interpreter McGann requested is an “auxiliary aid or service” that satisfies Title III.
B.
Having determined that a tactile interpreter meets the definition of “auxiliary aid or service” laid out in the ADA and DOJ implementing regulations, we consider whether Cinemark‘s failure to provide tactile interpretation of the movie Gone Girl excluded McGann from or denied him Cinemark‘s services. The District Court found that it did not. We disagree.
In finding in favor of Cinemark, the District Court adopted Cinemark‘s argument that “Title III only ensures that people with disabilities are not denied access to places of public accommodation” and the services offered at those places, but it does not “require a ... public accommodation to provide ... goods and services specially designed for disabled persons.” App. 10. Since Cinemark did not provide tactile interpretation services for its movies in its normal course of business, the District Court reasoned, tactile interpretation was a “special” service not required under the law. This “special goods and services” rule may have a foundation in Circuit precedent and DOJ regulations, but those authorities do not support the District Court‘s extension of the rule to the auxiliary aids and services requirement.
The District Court distilled the “special goods and services” rule primarily from a line of circuit authority in which disabled individuals claimed that Title III required insurance companies to alter or modify their insurance policy products in some way. For instance, in McNeil v. Time Insurance Company, 205 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff had purchased a health insurance policy that capped AIDS-related benefits. 205 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2000). Not long after acquiring the policy, the plaintiff was diagnosed with AIDS and incurred related medical bills that exceeded the policy‘s cap. Id. The plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the insurer‘s failure to cover his excess medical expenses constituted prohibited discrimination under Title III of the ADA. Id. at 182-83.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court‘s dismissal of the plaintiff‘s Title III claim, holding that Title III did not reach the terms of the policies sold by the insurer since “a business is not required to alter or modify the goods or services it offers to satisfy Title III.” Id. at 186. The Court explained that “[t]he provisions in
Numerous other Circuits, including ours, have applied this reasoning in similar insurance benefits cases.5 Several of these
cases cited to the DOJ regulation,
The District Court extended the reasoning of this line of authority to the auxiliary aids and services requirement, finding that because Cinemark does not normally offer tactile interpretation of movies for any of its patrons during regular screenings, tactile interpretation would be a “special” service that is not required under these cases. The District Court‘s conclusion, in the context of the statutory scheme, meant that the “special goods and services” rule served as a limitation on Title III‘s mandate that public accommodations provide auxiliary aids and services.
Critically, however, none of the cases in the McNeil, Doe and Weyer line of authority turned on—or even touched on—the auxiliary aids and services requirement. So even if this line of authority were to stand for the general proposition that public accommodations do not have to provide different products or services for their patrons with disabilities, those cases say nothing about how the auxiliary aid and service requirement relates to this general proposition. Those circuits had no reason to consider the question. Likewise,
The Ninth Circuit, in Harkins, did have occasion to examine the relationship between the “special goods and services” rule and the auxiliary aids and services requirement. The Harkins plaintiffs challenged under Title III the defendant‘s failure to provide closed captioning and descriptive narration to individuals with disabilities who sought to screen films in its movie theaters. 603 F.3d at 668-69. The district court, relying on McNeil and Weyer, had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the ADA did not require movie theaters to alter the content of the services provided. Id. at 670-71.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that closed captioning and descriptive narration constituted “auxiliary aids and services” under the statute, which a movie theater must provide to patrons with disabilities under the ADA, subject to available defenses. Id. at 675. In doing so, the Court rejected the defendant‘s and the district court‘s extension of the reasoning in Weyer to limit the auxiliary aid and service requirement,
In arguing that the ADA‘s requirement of auxiliary aids and services is limited by Weyer, [Defendant] puts the cart before the horse: Weyer does not limit subsection
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) ‘s requirement that a public accommodation provide auxiliary aids and services; the requirement that establishments provide auxiliary aids and services limits Weyer‘s general rule that public accommodations do nothave to provide different services for the disabled. Although Weyer may be controlling in the provision of goods and services generally, here Plaintiffs are seeking an auxiliary aid, which is specifically mandated by the ADA to prevent discrimination of the disabled.
Harkins, 603 F.3d at 671-72. We agree.
For the reasons pointed out in Harkins and already discussed here, the auxiliary aids and services requirement would be “effectively eliminate[d]” if limited by the “special goods and services” rule. Id. at 672. Unless already provided voluntarily, auxiliary aids and services would never be required, because “[b]y its very definition, an auxiliary aid or service is an additional or different service that establishments must offer the disabled.” Id. at 672 (emphasis added). We, like the Ninth Circuit, reject this interpretation of Title III. See Starbucks Corp., 736 F.3d at 209; Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 310 U.S. at 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059.
At a more fundamental level, the District Court‘s analogy to these insurance policy cases failed to account for the context-specific nature of the auxiliary aids and services requirement. Insurance companies and retail stores, such as bookstores, generally offer goods and services that are different in type and in character from those offered by entertainment venues like movie theaters. What constitutes a denial of or exclusion from those goods or services will differ accordingly. Therefore, a court cannot simply assume that what satisfies Title III‘s auxiliary aids and services requirement in one context will necessarily satisfy it in another. Cf.
A bookstore offers customers the ability to select and purchase books from the store‘s shelves and inventory. Our case law and
Likewise, insurance companies offer customers a number of standardized insurance contracts available for purchase. An insurance company—that otherwise meets the definition of “public accommodation“—may not need to offer an insurance product tailored to disabled individuals, under McNeil, Doe, and similar cases. But it may need to provide an auxiliary aid and service that will communicate the contents of a written policy to a customer who is blind so that he or she can make an informed purchase.
The District Court seemed to assume, based on this line of authority, that a public accommodation‘s obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services does not extend beyond a patron or customer‘s selection of and payment for the good or service of interest. So as it pivoted in its opinion from bookstores and insurance companies to the entertainment context, the District Court stated as a legal premise that Title III does not require art galleries to provide verbal descriptions of paintings, or concert halls to provide de
As the DOJ pointed out in its amicus brief, it has regularly taken the position in litigating and enforcing the ADA that entertainment venues must provide auxiliary aids and services to make the content of their performances accessible to persons with vision and hearing impairments. Consistent with this position, the DOJ amended
services during the movie presentation itself, that reliance was misguided.
Entertainment venues, such as concert halls and movie theaters, offer to the public something different than stores offering goods or products for purchase. They offer an entertainment service. As Cinemark acknowledged, customers do not pay these entertainment venues for tickets to sit in an empty auditorium. They pay to experience the entertainment being offered. App. 49 (“According to Petengill, people ‘come to the theatre to watch a movie, not just sit in a seat.’ “); see also Ball v. AMC Entm‘t, Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 17, 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting the same “special goods and services” argument advanced by defendant movie theaters and highlighting that the defendants had “fail[ed] to recognize that they are not similarly-situated to bookstores and video stores that provide goods because [they] provide the service of screening first run movies“). The provision of this entertainment service continues after a patron selects a movie of interest, purchases a ticket to that movie, and walks into the auditorium. So, too, does the obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services.
The District Court‘s interpretation of movie theaters’ obligations under the auxiliary aids and services requirement is also inimical to the purposes of Title III, as reflected explicitly in the ADA itself, as well as in the legislative history of the statute. Among those problems Congress sought to address by enacting the ADA was the “serious and pervasive social problem” of “discrimination against individuals
Indeed, data and testimony collected by Congress as it developed the ADA “painted a sobering picture of an isolated and secluded population of individuals with disabilities” who “d[id] not frequent places of public accommodation.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 10-11 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34-35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316. Due to communication barriers, among other reasons, the “large majority of people with disabilities d[id] not go to movies, d[id] not go to the theater, d[id] not go to see musical performances, and d[id] not go to sports events.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 10-11; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 34-35. “The extent of non-participation ... in social and recreational activities [was] alarming.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 10-11; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 at 34-35. So, after its thorough and fact-intensive investigation, “Congress concluded that there was a ‘compelling need’ ... to integrate [individuals with disabilities] ‘into the economic and social mainstream of American life,’ ” PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485); see also
This legislative history reflects Congress’ recognition that presenting movies in the theater is a component of the “social mainstream of American life.” PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485). Indeed, our Supreme Court has commented on the importance of movies in American culture:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952). If we interpret the auxiliary aids and services requirement to facilitate only the process of directing an individual with hearing or vision impairments to the right auditorium, which is showing a movie they cannot hear or see (or both), the requirement does little, if anything, to remediate the very problem Congress designed it to address.
For these reasons, we conclude that Cinemark‘s failure to provide McGann with a tactile interpreter for a presentation of the movie Gone Girl excluded him from or denied him Cinemark‘s services.
C.
Having established that Title III‘s auxiliary aids and service requirement applies to McGann‘s request for a tactile interpreter to allow him to experience a movie in Cinemark‘s theater, we turn to Cinemark‘s available defenses. As discussed, Title III does not obligate a public accommodation to furnish a requested auxiliary aid or service if doing so would “fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered” or “would result in an undue burden.”
Cinemark has asserted in this litigation its fundamental alteration defense. In its answer to McGann‘s complaint, it stated that providing McGann with his requested interpreter “would result in a fundamental alteration of the goods and services provided by Cinemark, as Cinemark does not provide sign language or tactile interpreters for any of its exhibitions in the normal course of business.” App. 46. In its briefing to this Court, Cinemark describes its defense as “consistent with the ‘accessible and special goods’ rule articulated in
Moreover, Cinemark does not dispute that tactile interpretation of a movie does not require any changes to the video or audio content of the movie, the screens or sound systems that present the movie, or the physical environment—including the lighting—in or around the theater. We thus do not see how it constitutes “a modification that is so significant that it alters the essential nature of the ... services,” see Dep‘t of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, at III-4.3600 (1993), that Cinemark provides, or alters the “fundamental character” of those services, see PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683, 121 S.Ct. 1879. As the DOJ points out, “[f]or every patron in the theater who does not have a sensory disability and does not request an auxiliary aid, the ‘fundamental character’ of the movie remains unchanged.” DOJ Amicus Br. 31.
Cinemark also asserted an undue burden defense. However, the District
- The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
- The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site;
- The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity;
- If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
- If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court‘s entry of Judgment for the Defendant and remand the case for consideration of Cinemark‘s undue burden defense.
IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. VI)
Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. Devries, Deceased, and Widow in her own right, Appellant in 16-2602
In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI) Shirley Mcafee, Executrix of the Estate of Kenneth McAfee, Deceased, and Widow in her own right, Appellant in 16-2669
No. 16-2602, No. 16-2669
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 29, 2017 Opinion Filed: October 3, 2017