S19A0784. COWEN v. CLAYTON COUNTY et al.
S19A0784
Supreme Court of Georgia
SEPTEMBER 3, 2019
306 Ga. 698
FINAL COPY
Linda S. Cowen, a Clayton County State Court judge since December 1995, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, in which she sought, among other things, over $120,000 in back pay from Clayton County and several of its county commissioners1 for allegedly violating
The trial court rejected all of Cowen’s claims, concluding in part that: (1) Cowen’s mandamus action was barred by gross laches; (2) еven if the mandamus action was not barred, it was subject to dismissal because mandamus was not an appropriate vehicle through which Cowen could seek her back pay; and (3) even if mandamus were an appropriate vehicle, the mandamus action was without merit.
Cowen appeals, and, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1) somе, but not all, of Cowen’s claims for back pay were time barred; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that mandamus was not an appropriate vehicle here; but (3) the trial court properly denied the claim for mandamus. Accordingly, we affirm.
1. Cowen claims that the trial court erred when it determined that her mandamus action was barred by gross laches. In its order, the triаl court concluded that, because Cowen waited until 2017 to file her mandamus action, which included some claims for back pay dating as far back as 2007, then all of her claims for back pay were barred by gross laches. As explained more fully below, this broad conclusion by the trial court was incorrect.
Because mandamus is a quasi-equitable remedy, such an action “can be barred by gross laches.” (Citation omitted.) Marsh v. Clarke County School Dist., 292 Ga. 28, 30 (732 SE2d 443) (2012);
[A]ll actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and ovеrtime shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued.
See City of Atlanta v. Adams, 256 Ga. 620, 620-621 (351 SE2d 444) (1987) (two-year statute of limitation of
Because it is undisputed that Cowen’s compensation as a state court judge is determined by state law,3 the Local Law, and the Supplemental Ordinance, and that her claims for back pay are rooted in the interpretation of these laws, Cowen’s claims are subject to the two-year limitations period contained in
That
2. Cowen next claims that the trial court erred by concluding that she could not petition the court for a writ of mandamus because she was improperly attempting to undo the County’s already completed acts of allegedly underpaying her. See, e.g., Hilton Constr. Co., Inc. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Ed., 245 Ga. 533, 540 (4) (266 SE2d 157) (1980) (“Mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel the undoing of acts already done or the correction of wrongs already perpetrated . . . . [E]ven [where] the aсtion taken [by the county] was clearly illegal,” mandamus “is the remedy for inaction of a public official.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). We agree with Cowen that the trial court was once again incorrect.
This Court has held that actions for the recovery of compensation that, by law, one public official is required to pay to another, may bе pursued through mandamus. See, e.g., Lee v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 269 Ga. 380 (497 SE2d 562) (1998); Best v. Maddox, 185 Ga. 78 (194 SE 578) (1937). See also Chatham County v. Massey, 299 Ga. 595 (791 SE2d 85) (2016); Inagawa v. Fayette County, 291 Ga. 715 (732 SE2d 421) (2012);
3. Because Cowen was able to pursue her timely claims for back pay through mandamus, we must address the propriety of the trial court’s decision to deny the writ of mandamus with respect to those claims. In analyzing the trial court’s decision, we bear in mind that
[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only where a litigant seeks to require a public official to perform an act or fulfill a duty that is required by law and where there is no other specific legal remedy.
OCGA § 9-6-20 . A writ of mandamus should only be granted where there is a clear legal right to the relief being sought . . . [or where] [t]here may . . . have been a gross abuse of the public official’s discretion.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fein v. Bessen, 300 Ga. 25, 29 (793 SE2d 76) (2016). Further, “[t]he duty which a mandamus complainant seeks to have enforced must be a duty arising by law, either expressly or by necessary implication; and the law must not
(a) Proper Calculation of Cowen’s Compensation
Pursuant to
we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonаble way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). If the statutory text is “‘clear and unambiguous,’ we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” Id. at 173.
(Punctuation omitted.) Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 149-150 (1) (800 SE2d 348) (2017). See also Sliney v. State, 260 Ga. 167 (391 SE2d 114) (1990) (applying rules of statutory construction to county ordinance). With these principles in mind, we examine in turn each of the applicable rulеs that govern Cowen’s compensation.
i. The Local Law
The relevant Local Law here provides:
Each judge of the State Court of Clayton County shall receive a salary in the amount of $134,018.00, plus 1½ percent of such base salary and any supplement received pursuant to state law or county ordinance multiplied by the number of complete years of service as judge served by such person since January 1, 2006.
Ga. L. 2006, р. 4654, § 1. By its plain terms, Cowen’s base salary under the Local Law would consist of the base salary plus 1½ percent of that base salary multiplied by her number of years of service. If the initial base salary were specifically supplemented by a state law or county ordinance, that supplement would be included as part of the base salary for purposes оf the 1½ percent multiplier to determine the judge’s salary each year under the Local Law.
ii. The Supplemental Ordinance
Prior to its repeal on December 20, 2016, the Supplemental Ordinance stated in subsection (a):
On the first day of July after taking office, the supplemental compensation [for state court judges in Clayton County] shall be such an amount so as to render the total comрensation for the judges equal to a multiplier of 89 percent times the total compensation (base salary and supplement) of judges of the superior court of the county. On the first day of July and subsequent years of service, the judges’ total compensation shall rise by an annual one-percent increase in the above-described multiplier to a maximum рroportion of 95 percent.
(Emphasis supplied.) Clayton County Ordinance 30-4 (a). Cowen contends that the Supplemental Ordinance served as a “supplement” that adds to her base salary under the Local Law for purposes of applying the multiplier that increased her salary each year. However, a plain reading of the text shows that the Supрlemental Ordinance does not serve as a “supplement” to a judge’s base salary as provided by the Local Law. Instead, it acts as an alternative means for calculating her total compensation. For a
This construction of the Supplemental Ordinance as an alternative means of calculating Cowen’s total compensation is underscored in Subsection (c) of the Supplemental Ordinance, which provides:
In thе event the base salary for state court judges is established by general or local Georgia law, and such salary exceeds the total compensation for judges as provided herein, the base salary as established by general or local Georgia law shall control. Any supplemental compensation, as heretofore provided, shall therеafter be adjusted or eliminated, as the case may be, to meet the level of compensation as established herein or the base salary as established by general or local Georgia law, whichever amount is greater.
(Emphasis supplied.) Clayton County Ordinance 30-4 (c). In other words, once Cowen’s total compensation was calculated undеr both the Local Law and the Supplemental Ordinance, she would be paid the greater of the two as her total compensation. In no event do the calculations under the Supplemental Ordinance feed into the separate calculations made under the Local Law. Under the Local Law, a Clayton County state court judge’s salary was calculated by starting with a base of $134,018 and increasing that amount each year by adding 1½ percent of that base salary multiplied by years of service. Under the Supplemental Ordinance, total compensation could be equal to 95 percent of the total compensation paid to superior court judges in the County. While the Supplemental Ordinancе potentially capped total compensation at 95 percent of the compensation paid to superior court judges in the County, the Local Law contained no such cap, and a state court judge would be paid the greater of the two amounts each year.6
iii. 2015 and 2016 Compensation
As of October 6, 2015, Cowen’s 2015 salary calculated pursuant to the Loсal Law was $152,110.43, which was greater than the $149,390.32 that she would have been paid under the terms of the Supplemental Ordinance.7 So she was properly paid the greater amount between the Local Law and the Supplemental Ordinance.
In 2016, Cowen was paid $160,801.75, which was 95 percent of the total compensation paid to superior court judges in Clayton County at that time, and which was greater than the $154,120.70 that she would have been paid as calculated under the Local Law.8 Accordingly, Cowen was, once again, compensated properly.
iv. 2017 Compensation
The County repealed the Supplemental Ordinance on December 20, 2016, meaning that, as of January 1, 2017, Cowen would be paid under the terms of the Local Law only. Under the terms of the Local Law, she was properly paid $156,130.97 in 2017.
(b) Cowen Has No Clear Legal Right to Relief
Cowen claims that she had a clear legal right to relief in this case because the manner in which the County paid her violated
Again,
All judges shall receive compensation and allowances as provided by law. . . . An incumbent’s salary, allowance, or supplement shall not be decreased during the incumbent’s term of office.
With respect to 2017, even though Cowen’s overall compensation decreasеd after the Supplemental Ordinance was repealed, there was still no violation of the constitutional provision at issue because the decrease did not occur “during [Cowen’s] term of office.”
Consequently, Cowen has not shown a clear legal right to the mandamus relief that she sought, and the trial court correctly denied the petition for mandamus.9
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Blackwell and Ellington, JJ., who concur in judgment only in Divisions 1 and 2.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 3, 2019.
Mandamus. Clayton Superior Court. Before Judge Brantley, Senior Judge.
Lindsey & Lacy, Richard P. Lindsey, for appellant.
Freeman Mathis & Gary, Jack R. Hancock, Arash A. Sabzevari, for appellees.