COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EDWARD YALE
No. 178 EDA 2014
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered on January 8, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Criminal Division, No. CP-45-CR-0001540-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting Edward Yale’s (“Yale”) Motion In Limine precluding the introduction of statements and writings of the victim, Joan Yale (“Joan”), and potentially limiting the photographs of the crime scene. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On March 22, 2001, Joan died in the residence she shared with her husband, Yale. Yale called the police and told them that Joan had fallen down the steps. The police observed that Joan had received deep lacerations, bruising, and scrapes to her face. Yale told the police that only he and Joan were present in the residence at the time of her death.
In April 2013, a Monroe County Investigating Grand Jury recommended that criminal charges be filed against Yale. Yale was
The Commonwealth filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Statement in
compliance with
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following questions for our review:
- Did the lower court abuse its discretion when it precluded from evidence [Joan’s] expressions of fear of [Yale], her intention to end their relationship, [and] expressions manifesting the deterioration of the relationship, where that evidence shows the presence of ill-will, a possible motive for the killing, an escalation of discord, and rebuts the defense of accident?
- Did the lower court commit error in disregarding a stipulation of counsel concerning the introduction of photographs of [Joan] and [the] crime scene in a homicide trial by deciding that it may still sua sponte preclude photographs if it determines that they are inflammatory or cumulative?
Brief for the Commonwealth at 11.
In its first claim, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court should have denied Yale’s Motion In Limine as the statements at issue demоnstrate the course of events leading to Joan’s death. Id. at 14, 28. The Commonwealth points out that the statements were relevant to its theory of the case because Yale denied he killed Joan, claimed that Joan died
by an accident and denied the existence of marital discord between the
(arguing that the statements “allow the Commonwealth to point to a
Our standard of review is as follows:
When ruling on a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
(3) Then–Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.
Pursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant’s out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception. Out-of court declarations that fall within the state of mind hearsay exception are still subject to general evidentiary rules governing competency and relevancy. Accordingly, whatever purpose the statement is offered for, be it to show the declarant’s intention, familiarity, or sanity, that purpose must be a “factor in issue,” that is, relevant. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, if it tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or if it supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact.
Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1070 (Pa. 2007) (stating that state of mind evidence is relevant where an issue of self-
defense, suicide or accidental death is raised by the defendant);
This Court recently recognized and addressed the conflict between the decisions in Thornton and Sneeringer as follows:
In Thornton, the [appellant], charged with homicide, admitted that he shot and killed the victim but claimed self-defense and asserted that he had been provoked by the victim. Thornton, 431 A.2d at 249. The night before the killing, the police arrested the victim and found that he was in possession of a gun. When asked why he was carrying a gun, the victim responded that he was carrying it for protection because “the Thornton brothers were after him.” Id. at 251. Over the defendant’s hearsay objection, the trial court permitted the officer’s testimony. Our Supreme Court ultimately held that the trial court erroneously admitted the victim’s statement under the “state of mind” exception:
The Commonwealth argues that [the victim’s] declaration that he wanted protection because “the Thorntоn brothers were after him” was admissible to establish fear on the part of [the victim] and thus comes within the “state of mind” exception to the rule against hearsay. It is true that the declaration perhaps tends to establish that the victim ... was fearful of the Thorntons. However, the victim’s state of mind was not a matter in issue in the case. It was appellant’s state of mind, not that of the victim, which was material to establish the degree of guilt, if any, on the charge of criminal homicide.
Only when the declaration is considered for the truth of the matter asserted, that appellant and his brother “were after” the victim, does the declaration become relevant, that is,
both material to and probative of appellant’s intent to kill. However, when considered for its substantive truth, the declaration, although relevant, is incompetent and hence inadmissible because it is hearsay not within any exception. Thus appellant’s objection to admission of the declaration should hаve been sustained and the testimony excluded. Id. (internal citation omitted).
However, in [Sneeringer,] this Court held that a lower court did not err when it admitted hearsay testimony concerning a victim’s statement that she intended to end her relationship with the defendant accused of killing her. Applying the “state of mind” exception, this Court reasoned as follows:
The fact that the victim intended to end her relationship with appellant made it more probable that she did end the relationship, than if she had no such intention. Moreover, if the victim did end her relationship with appellant, then such a factor is probative of appellant’s motive. The mere fact that the victim expressed an intent to end her relationship with appellant does not establish that she did in fact do so. It does, however, allow the jury to infer appellant’s motive from such a revelation, and is properly considered in resolving the question of whether appellant killed the victim.
Sneeringer, 668 A.2d at 1171–72.
In Levanduski, an en banc panel of this Court recognized an apparеnt conflict between our Supreme Court’s ruling in Thornton and the panel decision of this Court in Sneeringer in their application of the “state of mind” exception. The “state of mind” exception at issue in Levanduski involved a letter, written by the victim, [Mr.] Sandt, describing several letters he found in which the appellant (the victim’s common law wife) had written and received from a man ([Mr.] Fransen) that he suspected of being his wife’s lover. [Mr.] Sandt’s letter described that in one of the appellant’s letters, she discussed getting “rid of [Sandt] so [the appellant and her lover] could be together.” Levanduski, 907 A.2d at 9. Furthermore,
[i]n his letter, Mr. Sandt wrote about the relationship between [a]ppellant and Mr. Fransen and referred to: [a]ppellant’s allegations of spousal abuse; [a]ppellant’s
desire to further her relationship with Mr. Fransen; Mr. Sandt’s own demand for his share of the marital property; and[] the possible nexus between [a]ppellant and Mr. Fransen, and Mr. Sandt’s missing .22 caliber revolver. Id. at 18.
... [T]he Levanduski Court did not reject the Sneeringer approach outright, but instead distinguished itself on the facts and, consequently, applied the general rule of Thornton. In fact, the Levanduski Court noted an approach similar to that applied in Sneeringer had been applied by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349, 781 A.2d 110, 118 (2001).6 However, the Levanduski [C]ourt refused to apply the Sneeringer standard because:
The letter in the instant case does not generate the same probative value as the victims’ statements in the cited cases [(Sneeringer and Stallworth)]. Here, Mr. Sandt’s letter is mostly his commentary on the relationship between the co[-]defendants. In fact, the trial court admitted the letter as evidence of the relationship between [a]ppellant and Mr. Fransen. On the other hand, the letter conveys a very mixed message regarding the state of the relationship between [a]ppellant and Mr. Sandt, vacillating between possible separation and promises of reconciliation. Significantly, the letter does not contain any threats made
on Mr. Sandt’s life, by either [a]ppellant or Mr. Fransen. At most, the letter represents pure conjecture well-seasoned with romantic hyperbole.
***
To the extent Sneeringer is still viable, Levanduski suggests a case-by-case approach whereby Thornton stands as the general rule under which a limited exception may exist when the inference generated by admission of the hearsay statement is strong and highly probative.
Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575, 579-81 (Pa. Super. 2013)
In Green, the trial cоurt admitted statements by a shooting victim to two witnesses under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 579. According to the testimony of the witnesses, the victim stated that she “needed to get away” from the appellant, that she was afraid of the appellant, and that she did not want to “go with him” anymore. Id. This Court ruled as follows:
Considering the statements as evidence of [a]ppellant’s motive, it appears impossible to demonstrate such an inference without accepting the statements for the truth of the matter asserted. To be relevant as to [a]ppellant’s motive, we would have to accept that the [v]ictim was fearful of [a]ppellant and that she was attempting to end their relationship. To accept those conclusions as the basis for [a]ppellant’s motive is to accept the literal “truth” of the hearsay statements. If the [v]ictim was not, in fact, fearful of [a]ppellant and in the process of ending their relationship, then there was nothing about the hearsay statements that provided evidence of motive. Put more succinctly, it is only when the admitted hearsay statements are taken as truthful that they provide competent evidence of motive. Thornton rejected the admission of such statements
under the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule. Either these statements were relevant but inadmissible as hearsay without an applicable exception, or they were not hearsay, in which case they were irrelevant.
However, we note that in reaching its decision, the Green Court did not consider the other decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court that address the state of mind exception. In Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1997), the trial court permitted out-of-court statements made by the homicide victim that she intended to meet with the defendant and that she was concerned that the defendant would harm her if she hindered his illegal activities. Collins, 703 A.2d at 425. The Supreme Court held that the statements were properly admitted as they provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant and permitted the jury to conclude that the defendant had the opportunity to kill the victim. Id.
In Commonwealth v. Chandler, 721 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1998), the trial court admitted into evidence “eyewitness observations of [the victim’s] family and co-workers, which were not hearsay, and ... statements [the victim] made concerning her negative feelings about [the defendant] and
Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 750 A.2d 261 (Pa. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385, 400 (Pa. 2003), the Supreme Court addressed, in the context of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a homicide victim’s out-of-court statement that he had smoked drugs belonging to the defendant. Fletcher, 750 A.2d at 275-76. The Supreme Court held that the victim’s statement established his state of mind regarding his relationship with defendant and was thus admissible under the state of mind heаrsay exception to establish the presence of ill-will, malice, or motive for the killing. Id. at 276.
In Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219 (Pa. 1999), the disputed evidence involved two conversations that had taken place between the defendant and his brother, who was one of the deceased victims of the homicides. Puksar, 740 A.2d at 224. In each instance, a witness overheard the conversations, one of which was a dispute over model trains8
and the other consisted of the parties yelling at each other about an
In Luster, supra, statements by a murder victim to her friends that she was afraid of appellant, that appellant “was going to do something real bad to her,” and that appellаnt was “trying to kill” her were introduced at trial. Luster, 71 A.3d at 1041. This Court, sitting en banc, recognized that a victim’s state of mind is only admissible where the victim’s state of mind is a factor at issue in the case. Id. This Court concluded that the statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule because the appellant had denied responsibility of the murder and thus, the statements evidenced appellant’s ill-will and malice toward the victim. Id. at 1042; see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (concluding that the admission of hearsay statements by the decedent that he was scared of appellant and that appellant would be to blame if decedent died was proper under
In Moore, a capital case, the Commonwealth sought to introduce a homicide victim’s statements to his father, sister, and friend regarding the
While we acknowledge apparent conflicting decisions applying the state of mind exception,10 the case law confirms that an out-of court statement by a homicide victim is admissible under the state of mind exception of the hearsay rule as long as it is relevant and probative of some
to be admissible under this exception, the statement must reflect the declarant’s state of mind or emotional, sensory, or physical condition that existed at the time of the statement.
Out-of-court statements that look backward, or describe a declarant’s past memory or belief about another’s conduct, are inadmissible under this exception. See
Here, the Commonwealth asserts that because Yale will utilize a defense of accidental death, and denies the existence of marital discord between the parties, Joan’s out-of-court statements are admissible to demonstrate Yale’s motive in killing Joan. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 14, 15, 25; see also Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/14, at 1 (stating that “it is almost certain that an accidental fall will be the crux of the defense[.]”). However, “the general fact that the defense argues ‘accident’ does not open the gates of hearsay through the state-of-mind exception. The Commonwealth must still show why the decedent’s state of mind is relevant.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/14, at 3. Indeed, the out-of-court statement must be probative on the question of the victim’s “then-existing” state of mind and must not include “a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”
First, the Commonwealth asserts that Yvette, Joan‘s daughter-in-law, will testify as to Joan‘s statements that Yale called her names and threw things around the house when he became upset; that she and Yale argued over putting Yale‘s name on Joan‘s house; that Yale was mentally abusing Joan by calling her names; that Yale was “acting up again;” that her marriage was one of convenience and not of love; that Yale wanted her to put his name on a CD; that Joan gave Ronald two safety deposit boxes with financial information and told Ronald to go through the boxes “if anything happened to her;” that Joan called to talk to her son and sounded depressed; and that Yale called the day before Joan‘s death about having Joan‘s son call him. See Interview (Yvette), 3/23/01, at 1-6 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C. Yvette would also testify to her belief that Joan was considering a divorce. See Interview (Yvette),
These statements are inadmissible under the state of mind exception. Indeed, many of the statements involve past events, and do not include Joan‘s then-existing state of mind. See
Yvette would also testify that Joan called her on March 20, 2001, stating that she was upset because Yale would not allow her to use the cars or give her money. See Interview (Yvette), 3/23/01, at 2 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C. Yvette‘s testimony that Joan was upset evidenced Joan‘s state of mind at that time and is therefore admissible. See Schmalz, 67 A.3d at 805 (stating that testimony as to out-of-court statements that deсlarant was upset was admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule). However, the statements regarding
Next, Ronald would testify that Joan told him that Yale was mentally abusive; that Joan went to East Stroudsburg Savings Association to change the name on a CD; that he received calls from Yale and Joan on March 19, 2001; that Joan calculated how much it cost for Yale to live in her house and that Joan stated that Yale became angry when informed of this calculation; that Joan stated that Yale was mean and nasty; that Joan found out that she could have money frоm her father‘s social security; that Joan and Yale could not agree on her will that would allow Yale to get 50% of the house; that Joan asked Ronald whether Yale was going to leave after Yale had called Ronald; that Ronald thought that Yale and Joan fought over every little thing and the fighting was escalating; and in response to Ronald‘s statement regarding her safety, Joan stated that it was “in the back of her mind, but she thought that she could get to the phone and call 911 if he did anything.” See Interview (Ronald), 3/22/01, at 1-5 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C.
Ronald would also testify about a message left by Joan on March 22, 2001, the day of her death. According to the Commonwealth, Ronald would state that Joan declared her intent to stay at Ronald‘s home. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 20; accord Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/14, at 5 (wherein the trial court states that based upon the Commonwealth‘s description of the statement, it would be admissible). However, our review of Ronald‘s
Finally, Ronald would testify that on March 21, 2001, Joan gave him nine envelopes of financial information “in case something happened to her;” that on March 20, 2001, Joan gave him two lockboxes containing paper and money; and that Joan wantеd to get the boxes out of the house “in case something happened to her.” Interview (Ronald), 3/22/01, at 1 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C. Ronald
Ronald‘s statements that Joan gave him the envelopes and lockboxes of financial information are admissible, as he observed this interaction. Further, Joan‘s statement that she provided this information “in case something happened to her” is also admissible, as it demonstrates her then-existing intent as to the reason for providing the financial information to Ronald. Moreover, Joan‘s statement that she was upset is admissible; however, the statements as to her reasons for being upset are inadmissible. See Schmalz, 67 A.3d at 805. Thus, Ronald could testify regarding these statements, and the trial court improperly found this testimony to be inadmissible at trial.
Next, the Commonwealth sought to introduce testimony of Joan‘s other son, Randall Litts (“Randall“), who would testify that Joan and Yale argued over ownership of the house for four years; that Yale called Randall a Nazi and a vulture and that Joan told Randall not to get upset; that Joan‘s main concern was that Randall not be upset over the phone call; and that Yale sounded calm when he called to inform Randall about Joan‘s fall. See Interview (Randall), 3/22/01, at 1-4 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C.
The Commonwealth also sought to introduce the testimony of Lorraine Litts (“Lorraine“), Randall‘s wife and Joan‘s daughter-in-law. Lorraine would testify that Joan brought envelopes of financial information to her home in case something happened; that Joan was nervous when bringing the financial information to her home; that Joan told Lorraine that she assured Yale that she was not filing for divorce yet; and that Lorraine told Joan not to be afraid of calling 911, and Joan replied she would call 911 if needed. See Interview (Lorraine), 3/22/01, at 1-4 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C.
As noted above, Joan‘s action of bringing financial information and her statement is admissible. However, Lorraine‘s belief that Joan was nervous does not implicate Joan‘s state of mind. Moreover, Joan‘s statements to Lorraine regarding past events, i.e., whether she would file a divorce complaint, are inadmissible under the state of mind exception. Further,
The Commonwealth also sought to introduce the testimony of Harold Myers (“Myers“), Joan‘s brother. Myers would testify that Joan was scared to death of Yale; that Joan was scared of Yale doing physical harm to her; and that Joan was concerned about keeping her home for her children. See Interview (Myers), 6/6/12, at 1 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C.
While Myers‘s statements indicated Joan was scared, there is no indication in the record to show that she actually made such statements. Thus, we conclude that these statements are inadmissible. Further, Joan‘s statement as to the ownership of the home relates to past events and does not signal her state of mind. Thus, these statements were properly found to be inadmissible.
The Commonwealth also seeks to introduce notes, written by Joan, that were found in her purse. The notes set forth various statements, purportedly made by Yale, including telling Joan to “move it now elephant, fat pig;” telling Joan that he was going to commit her to the “crazy house;” calling Joan‘s grandchildren names; telling Joan that she would not be allowed to give anything to her grandchildren; and screaming at Joan.
Next, the Commonwealth seeks to admit the testimony of Joan‘s neighbor, Agnes Diehl (“Diehl“). Diehl would testify Joan would come to her house and declare that Yale treated her poorly; that Yale called her names; аnd that Yale wanted his name on the deed of the house. See Interview (Diehl), 7/3/13, at 1-2 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C. Diehl stated that Joan appeared to be suffering from significant mental stress. See Interview (Diehl), 7/3/13, at 1 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C. Diehl would also testify that she would hear Yale screaming at Joan and that Ronald would subsequently come to Joan‘s house. See Interview (Diehl), 7/3/13, at 1 (unnumbered); see also Brief for the Commonwealth, Exhibit C.
With regard to Joan‘s statements to Diehl detailing Yale‘s prior behavior, these statements are inadmissible under the state of mind exception. Further, Diehl‘s observations about Joan‘s mental health are not admissible to demonstrate Joan was actually feeling mental stress under the exception. Indeed, there is no indication that Joan made any statement with
Finally, the Commonwealth seeks to admit the testimony of Robert Vandercar (“Vandercar“), a former neighbor of Joan. According to the Commonwealth, Vandercar would testify regarding Joan‘s statements that she was afraid that Yale would kill her “within a year of the murder.” Commonwealth Brief in Opposition of Yale‘s Motion In Limine, 2/26/14, at 15 n.7. However, aside from this mention in the Commonwealth‘s Brief in Opposition to Yale‘s Motion In Limine, there is no indication that Vandercar would testify to these facts or that Joan made these statements to Vandercar. Thus, this statement is inadmissible.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Joan‘s act of bringing financial documents and her statements in connection with this act, are admissible at trial. Statements evidencing Joan‘s then-existing state of mind, i.e., she was upset, are admissible at trial under the state of mind exception of the hearsay rule. Further, any arguments between Yale and Joan, actually heard by the witnesses, are also admissible. See Trial Court
In its second claim, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court improperly reserved the right to disallow cumulative or inflammatory photographs of victim and the crime scene, where the parties had stipulated as to the admissibility of the photographs. Brief for the Commonwealth at 29-31. The Commonwealth argues that since neither party was challenging the admissibility of the photographs, the trial court has no discretion in deciding admissibility. Id. at 30-31.19
Here, the trial court acknowledges that the parties entered into a stipulation over the admissibility of photographs of Joan‘s body and the crime scene. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/14, at 5; Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/14, at 21. However, the trial court further stated that despite the stipulation, it could, in its discretion, exclude cumulative or inflammatory photographs. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/14, at 5-6; Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/14, at 21. The trial court relied on our Supreme Court‘s decision in Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 156 (Pa. 2013), for the proposition that when the Commonwealth proffers photographs of a homicide victim for admission into evidence, the trial court must determine whether the photographs are inflammatory and if so, whether the prejudicial
In Murray, the appellant argued that the trial court utilized an improper standard of review in admitting photographs of the homicide victim. Murray, 83 A.3d at 155. The Supreme Court set forth a two-part analysis to be applied by a trial court where the Commonwealth proffers photographs of a homicide victim for admission into evidence:
First a [trial] court must determine whether the photograph is inflammatory. If not, it may be admitted if it has relevance and can assist the jury‘s understanding of the facts. If the photograph is inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.
Id. at 156 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its process of admitting the photographs. Id.
Unlike Murray, in this case, Yale stipulated to the admissibility of the photographs. It is well-settled that “[a] valid stipulation must be enforced according to its terms.” Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Pa. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Freeman, 827 A.2d at 400. “Parties may by stipulation resolve questions of fact or limit the issues, and, if the stipulations do not affect the jurisdiction of the court or the due order of the business and convenience of the court they become the law of the case.” Rizzuto, 777 A.2d at 1088; see also Commonwealth v. Mathis, 463 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. 1983).
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2014
Notes
Id. at 190. However, the Ulatoski Court further stated that “[t]estimony concerning the marital relationship between a defendant and decedent, like any other evidence, is subject to the general evidentiary rules governing competency and relevancy.” Id. at 191. “Hence, Ulatoski did not create an exception to the hearsay rule; nor did it contemplate that testimony regarding marital relationships in cases such as this would be subject to a relaxed standard of admissibility.” Commonwealth v. Myers, 609 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1992). Thus, despite the holding in Ulatoski, we must determine whether the out-of-court statements in this case are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.[E]vidence concerning the previous relations between a defendant and a homicide victim is relevant and admissible for the purpose of proving ill[-]will, motive or malice. Evidence of prior occurrences in which the accused threatened, assaulted, or quarrelled with the decedent may be admissible for this purpose. This principle applies when the decedent was the spouse of the accused. Thus, evidence concerning the nature of the marital relationship is admissible for the purpose of proving ill[-]will, motive or malice. This includes, in particular, evidence that the accused physically abused his or her spouse.