*1
3
1925(a)
1925(a)
specific
that
opinion. Under
Rule
court should address
its Rule
circumstance,
my opinion,
appellate
our
ground
there is a middle
opinion. While
impeded. See Com-
has not been
having
review
that counsel must travel
avoid
McCandless,
counsel. It common sense.
¶ 1925(b) 6 The Rule statement must be enough judge
detailed so that can 1925(a) opinion, a Rule but not so
write
lengthy goal it does not meet the
narrowing previously the issues down likely
raised to the that are to be few presented appellate court without Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH giving judge plow the trial volumes Appellee, through. ¶ 7 specific Because issue as LEVANDUSKI, Lynn Appellant. Teri “person” whether SEPTA was a was not presented give Judge to the trial court to Pennsylvania. Superior Court Geroff a chance to it in his opin- address ion, 2005. Argued the issue has been Nov. waived. Aug. 2006. Filed Judgment of sentence affirmed.
¶ GANTMAN, J., joins and files a
Concurring Statement. BY
CONCURRING STATEMENT
GANTMAN, J.: wholeheartedly agree 1 I the ma
jority Appellant’s appeal issue on is a example
classic of an issue that was it
properly preserved for because review specified Rule
1925(b) only separately statement. I write single circumstance
to note where 1925(b) vague, arguably
Rule statement only appealable
but there is one obvious
issue, the trial court was on sufficient it in its
notice of issue and addressed *4 Tannersville, Love, appel- for
Mark S. lant. Mancuso, Atty., Strous-
Mike Asst. Dist. Com., burg, appellee.
BEFORE; P.J., JOYCE, SOLE, DEL TODD, LALLY-GREEN, MUSMANNO, BENDER, BOWES, KLEIN, GANTMAN, JJ. GANTMAN, J.:
OPINION BY
Levanduski,
Lynn
Teri
Appellant,
judgment of sentence
appeals from the
County
entered
the Monroe
Court
Pleas,
following
jury-trial
Common
*5
degree
in the first
conviction for murder
conspiracy to commit mur-
accomplice,1
degree,2 hindering appre-
in the first
der
hension,3
to commit mur-
and solicitation
Appellant asks us
degree.4
der in the first
(1) the trial court
to determine whether:
error
it admit-
committed reversible
when
victim,
letter,
identify-
ted a
written
suggesting
ing Appellant
suspect
as a
(2)
murder;
sup-
her motive for his
erred
it refused
pression court
when
state-
Appellant’s inculpatory
suppress
ments,
during
obtained
a cus-
which were
interrogation,
absent Miranda5
todial
(3)
court erred
it
warnings;
the trial
when
into
at trial the nude
admitted
Appellant
photographs
and semi-nude
Fransen.
paramour, Mr. Lennard
and her
erred
it
hold:
the trial court
when
We
trial,
at
be-
letter
admitted
victim’s
hearsay and
the letter constitutes
cause
at trial un-
for admission
qualify
does not
exception to the
recognized
der a
rule; nevertheless,
evidentiary ruling
this
error,
prop-
otherwise
harmless
where
overwhelmingly es-
erly admitted evidence
2501(a);
2501(a);
§
§
18 Pa.C.S.A.
902.
§
Pa.C.S.A.
§
18 Pa.C.S.A.
306.
4. 18
1. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
2501(a);
§
§
Pa.C.S.A.
903.
2. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
Arizona,
436, 86 S.Ct.
384 U.S.
5. Miranda
(1966).
1602,
from the and Mr. home may To it concern whom *6 Sandt. father exhaust Appellant’s saw I found a note On around November 1st Appellant’s from car in rising idling a from from a truck driver [Appellant] to thereafter, driveway. Shortly Appellant’s Bob Beaton on Newark NJ named dirty father a car with two oc- saw white together to get note he said he wanted cupants leaving home. Appellant’s I her about it. her. So [asked] with time gets notes all the She said that she Appel- to Appellant’s mother went So I [horny] truck drivers. from Mr. lant’s home to check on Sandt. She [Appellant’s] look started to around through entered the home the back door notes. So I things and found two more in Mr. face collapsed and saw Sandt down and I found pocket looked in her book a chair. blood on his face. There was guy named letter. The letter was to mother called who asked in I think he Lenny a truck driver lives Sandt had no pulse. her to take a [Hackettsown], for In- NJ. And works pulse.6 [County Paving] of [Hackettsown]. ter
¶ 4 Appellant’s mother called this [Appellant loved] It described how [feel,] Ap- death. and report man[,] at work to Mr. Sandt’s he made her how heart to pellant they my left to return home. When did. It things [broke] work home, I police I harder [and] she reached her were read. So looked even letter. It said that she already conducting an investi- found present [another] and me and said she wanted Appellant to wait to leave gation. asked wanted Lenny could be gone me so and [she] door. parents’ at her house next head, plus in back and one subsequent revealed shots to 6. A medical examination legs Mr. Sandt’s defensive wounds on arms; in the chest. one gun .22 Mr. Sandt suffered five caliber together and he should everything good have me off. She said that she made I have. And that I a lazy fuck and money working now that she was didn’t Saturday deserve to take another breath. on bridge. So Nov 28rd she She said I abused and beat her. I to see him and it off with [break] went have hit her any stay gone never other him and me. woman with She [was] my in I writing [o’clock;] life. am this letter [night] to from noon to six tell someone in the second pleaded letter she she said that he her to with they said that some had get how to rid leave me. She said that she told him they of me so could together. [everything] be I that she to didn’t want lose found the second letter day try and told him that she to to [she] wanted and her mother went to salvage got Lancaster to had. So she [what] we when play stayed [night]. Christmas over home she told me that it was over That was November 21st and going try wasn’t she to things work [out] coming home [until] late Nov 22nd. She I I try with me. said that would called about 9:50 PM the [night] try forgive things work out 21st. I went to bed about 11:00 PM. I think her. That I [night] with started to could not sleep thinking about her and it. She to go about had to work. So I guy. this So about 1:00 AM dogs [lay] in all thinking bed and was about crazy went looking and were out the I sleep [thought] this. couldn’t so I door and there big guy was this looking guy this about how knew we [where] in the window so I on light turned I if Appellant] lived. she told [asked and ask him who he He said was[.] his him we lived. She said she [where] Lenny name was and that he thinking wanted didn’t. So I about he how talk about [Appellant]. I let him just looking [in to] stood and was the door at talk he told me he [Appellant] wanted any- 1:00 [thought] A.M. and about how live him. We sat and body just talked till could walk from the road 3:45 AM about had been going my [what] on be porch front the middle that he had been fucking her for about of the [night]. [guy’s] This name is three I months. told him that I Lenny found he is about 6 tall and is [feet] *7 the letter I and all [knew] about him and pounds big about 300 has a brown and her I and would like to work it out grey [glasses] with and round beard [wears] [Appellant] try get to [things] back cap, jacket and skull black leather way to the we used to be. He jeans. pickup said that He Ford I [a drives 1982] he her wanted for his own. So we de- Saturday don’t color. So I [what] know cided let [to] her make the get my pistol gone, decision. He to and it went was left Friday about 8:45 AM morning. [thought] put On I I load it and it on would Friday [night] [Appellant] baek[;] and her mom my [night] table case he comes got I home said we to [protection.] have talk. She least I some at would have said ok so sat and I Appellant gun we down read the I was [asked where] letter to her. She said that she was she said she didn’t know. I said it [and] mad at me for not [taking] anywhere her on my was dresser. She said she didn’t or [doing] anything her just with and that take I said there [it.] [was] [she why was she fucking guy was this I I] here and didn’t take so [it] wanted to live him pay get guy but couldn’t did it told me [to?] [where] me half of the value of the house a felon also [and] [he] [convicted] [and he] was garage. thought That she it gloves that would had on so he didn’t leave [rubber] cost her 50 to 60 thousand pay finger prints anywhere. dollars to I am think- So However, gave gun to if left
ing maybe Appellant she him the that decision. Sandt, way me That expected kill no one would Mr. he reimbursement with. [me,] $50,000.00 $60,000.00 I to for think killed the amount of [someone] [com- mari- Seeing my gun[.] mitted it he considered his share of the suicide]. what letter[,] why property. I am this writing So tal [that’s] in case I should end up shot ¶ Mr. Appellant confessed she and pistol. nobody think it So would contemplating Fransen had been various I nothing going put a suicide. to but am get They to of Mr. options rid Sandt. So if the letter I found with this letter. overdose, staging drug discussed a hunt- anything happens you something to have accident, referred ing They or a suicide. the right people. show objective Appel- their “the as mission.” Signed Robert SANDT. placed lant’s statements also Mr. Fransen (Mr. 12/19/02; crime She Letter, explained at the scene. how Sandt’s transcribed 219a-228a). planned Mr. Fransen their actions on R.R. murder; night of the Mr. Fransen tele- briefly questioned Appellant Police Appellant say he be out- phoned would at appear at the scene and asked her to her around P.M. Mr. side home at 10:00 police the next for further day station Appellant Fransen instructed to exit questioning. Appellant stayed par- at her get home and in her car as if she were day. 1:30 the next ents’ house until P.M. in- headed work. Mr. Fransen further Then, to the parents she and her drove Appellant to car until structed wait to meet with members of station came out said Appellant he of the house. Regional Department. Stroud Police Area thought she Mr. Fransen wanted about Appellant spoke to detectives “straighten out” Mr. Sandt. She admitted (1:50 to 4:20 two and one half hours P.M. she followed Mr. Fransen’s instructions. P.M.). she Appellant The detectives told saw Mr. Fransen walk to the front She time, any could leave the interview as she to her heard porch walked car. She she not under arrest. gave she gunshots. a scuffle and Then interview, Appel- initial During Fransen road in her a ride main highly incriminating made ad- lant several Passat. fur- Volkswagen white Appel- missions. The detectives informed way ther that on her home from confessed her Miranda rights. Appellant lant call, Appellant after mother’s work voluntarily right to remain si- waived link- disposed photographs of letters and con- right attorney lent and the to an com- ing her Mr. Fransen. police. tinued to Essential- speak with of her version pleted written statement *8 past ly, Appellant admitted that for agreed taped of the events and later to having had been an af- three months she interview. fair with Mr. Fransen. wanted Appellant ¶ 9 Based on statements Fran- leave Mr. Sandt and live Mr. to with developed during other Appellant told the how on police sen. investigation, Appellant arrested 21, 2002, she went on an over- November charged and Mr. Fransen and them with night trip her mother. On the same with the murder of Mr. Sandt. made night, Mr. Fransen an unannounced Mr, ¶ trial, Appellant home filed a to marital and asked 10 Prior to visit po- to Appellant. to ties motion to her statements relinquish suppress Sandt with in limine According preclude Mr. Sandt re- lice and motion to Appellant, The court Appellant make admission Mr. Sandt’s letter. sponded only could denied Appellant’s suppress motion to of Appellant’s her missible as evidence extra- police. statements to in granted court marital affair Mr. Fransen as well as part part Appellant’s and denied motion Appellant’s will, ill malice or motive limine, ruling hearsay letter was murder Mr. Sandt. prove inadmissible to the truth of the ¶ 2005, 6, April 14 On the Common- However, matters asserted. the court de- en petition reargument filed a for wealth termined the letter admissible to banc. Principally, ar- prove as the relationship motive well gued the letter was admissible at trial Appellant Ap- between and Mr. Fransen. exception under the “state of mind” pellant and Mr. sepa- Fransen tried were hearsay By May rule. order dated rately. granted this Court the Common- ¶ 11 Appellant’s began January trial en banc petition reargument wealth’s for 13, 2004, 2004. On January jury panel decision. withdrew found guilty degree of first mur- ¶ In reargu- her substituted brief on accomplice, conspiracy der as an to commit ment, Appellant presents three issues murder in the first degree, hindering ap- our review: prehension, and solicitation to commit murder in the DID THE TRIAL degree. By first order dat- COURT COMMIT 25, 2004, ed March the court sentenced REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ALLOW- imprisonment to life on the first ING THE TO IN- COMMONWEALTH degree accomplice murder as an convic- TRODUCE INTO EVIDENCE AT tion, plus restitution, expenses, burial TIME OF TRIAL AN ADMITTEDLY costs prosecution related to other HEARSAY LETTER BY WRITTEN requirements of sentencing order. THE DECEDENT PREDICTING HIS The court declined impose any further DEATH AND STATING THAT IF sentence remaining on the OCCURRED, convictions. HIS DEATH IT WAS TO THE OF [APPEL- DUE ACTIONS 1, 2004, April On Appellant timely LANT], HIS COMMON LAW WIFE? filed a notice of appeal. On March 2005, this Court filed an opinion, which DID THE SUPPRESSION COURT judgment vacated the of sentence and re- ERR A MATTER AS OF LAW WHEN manded the matter for a trial on the IT new FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE ground Sandt’s letter constituted STATEMENTS AND THE FRUITS inadmissible hearsay, THEREOF, because it OBTAINED BY THE PO- presented fact for the truth of the matter LICE FROM WHILE [APPELLANT] asserted, but did qualify under the IN AT THE STA- CUSTODY POLICE recognized exceptions TION, rule. WHICH STATEMENTS WERE OBTAINED IN THE ABSENCE OF disagreed 13 The dissent with the ma- HER MIRANDA RIGHTS? jority’s hearsay question. resolution of the The dissent reasoned that the letter DID THE TRIAL ERR AS A JUDGE admissible, subject to the trial court’s lim- OF HE AL- MATTER LAW WHEN *9 instructions, iting as evidence of Mr. THE TO LOWED COMMONWEALTH Sandt’s opinion regarding relationship his AT TIME OF TRIAL INTRODUCE Appellant. expressed with The letter Mr. AND NUDE SEMI-NUDE PIC- Sandt’s state of regarding mind the break- OF AND HER [APPELLANT] TURES of relationship Appellant. his BOYFRIEND WHICH SERVED NO down The dissent the letter MERE- concluded was ad- RELEVANT PURPOSE BUT
12 away. it and the letter ripped up
LY INFLAMED THE PASSIONS threw (Id. 19). at AND OF THE JURY? PREJUDICES 7). ¶ (Appellant’s Substituted Brief at Appellant claims Additionally, 19 of narra- Pennsylvania ¶ law bars admission issue, argues In her first Appellant 16 utterances, where letters as excited tive a conviction the Commonwealth obtained utterance” justification the the “excited at trial. by introducing improper evidence shocking or necessitates a recent exception Mr. Specifically, Appellant contends experience makes the overpowering letter, his death and predicting Sandt’s likely to the utterance be truthful. Where hear- implicating Appellant, is inadmissible is form refers statement narrative say. Initially, Appellant avers Mr. Sandt’s events, it as an to is not admissible past nature; letter was “testimonial” (Id. 19-20). at excited utterance. Crawford, Washington, 541 U.S. under (2004), L.Ed.2d 177 S.Ct. ¶ “present the Appellant stresses of testimonial evidence must the declarant hearsay impression” exception sense by the accused. sit for cross-examination letter, apply not to Mr. Sandt’s rule does opportunity Without the to cross-examine “present impression” sense because Sandt, she lost her Appellant claims to see the exception requires the declarant accuser, to confront in violation right it to and to make about event observations the Con- right of her constitutional under present person at scene. another maintains Appellant frontation Clause. the time of must be made at observations was the cross-examination Mr. Sandt event, very after the event. shortly or veracity only way reliability to test the coin- Reliability virtually assured Because of his “testimonial” statements. the observations event and cidence Mr. Sandt was unavailable for cross-exami- fact were by the that the observations nation, should his “testimonial” statements Here, person. another Mr. Sandt made to at trial. been deemed inadmissible have unknown, persons his letter to addressed
¶ coincidence present, not without were contends Mr. who also (Id. 20). at observations. inadmissible events Sandt’s letter constituted hearsay analyzed under traditional when the “state of submits law, repre- the letter Pennsylvania because rule exception does mind” admitted sents out-of-court statement letter, because to Mr. Sandt’s apply not the truth of matters asserted. prove does refer to statements the letter not qualify Appellant posits the letter does the mental contemporaneously with made hearsay exceptions under the standard Thus, condition described. physical or declaration,” ut- “dying as “excited known or concerning conversations statements terance,” or “present impression,” sense before the occurred weeks events which 18). mind.” Brief at (Appellant’s “state of represent time to are too remote in writing Notably, Ap- state mind. “dying According Appellant, the victim’s state of emphasizes Mr. Sandt’s exception applies only pellant declaration” case and this made the declarant be- mind was issue statements when pre- be used dying. he is in fact This case cannot lieves mind, unless state- was motive or state no evidence that Mr. Sandt sented Appellant. wounded, an immediate ments communicated dying, facing were the letter some discus- Although the letter. describes threat of death when he wrote Sandt, Appellant and Mr. sions between one knows when Mr. Sandt wrote No In fears not discussed. private one who his were or whether he letter *10 short, (“forfeiture 804(b)(6) probative the letter lost its doing” value R.E. by wrong because it too remote time from hearsay exception). The Commonwealth death, Mr. Sandt’s his fears were not com- contends not benefit should from Appellant, municated to and the witness, Common- Mr. a unavailability Sandt’s wealth conceded Mr. Sandt was the one where his securing she was involved in ripped up who the letter and it threw unavailability. The also Commonwealth (Id. 21-22). away. at urges admissibility of the under the letter “complete story” doctrine, because Mr. ¶ 22 any event, In Appellant maintains story Appel- Sandt’s letter told the needlessly the letter was cumulative and lant, Fransen, Sandt, along Mr. and Mr. unnecessary Appellant’s to establish mo- with progression the natural of events tive or her relationship extramarital with murder, leading Mr. provid- Sandt’s Fransen, Mr. given properly the other ad- act”, ed “prior evidence a bad trial, mitted evidence at including letters gave a factual basis for their Fransen, from to Mr. professing investigative Briefly, decisions. the Com- her love for him. The court should have monwealth Mr. submits Sandt’s letter con- letter, excluded Mr. Sandt’s pursuant to its “complete story” tributed to the of the function, gate-keeping prejudi- where the case by giving context to certain events cial effect of the letter great was so that no near in place time and to Mr. limiting Sandt’s instruction could cure the undue death. prejudice caused admission of the letter trial. Appellant concludes the court ¶ Moreover, the Commonwealth tells committed reversible error when it allowed us provided carefully the court worded jury letter', consider Mr. Sandt’s limiting instruction ensure Mr. Sandt’s
Appellant deserves a trial new as a result. letter solely would be used to demonstrate Appellant’s relationship response, In motive the Commonwealth Fransen, with Mr. for truth observes that an out-of-court statement Significant- be matters asserted in the letter. may motive, admitted establish if the ly, any prejudice outweighed by statement unfair is not offered for the truth of ample, properly otherwise admitted the matter evi- asserted. The Commonwealth Appellant’s guilt, dence of offer, including Appel- claims it did not and the trial court lant’s admit, did not Mr. own admissions. The Common- prove Sandt’s letter to wealth concludes the letter was truth either of matters asserted in the letter. limiting properly admitted instruc- contrary, To the with the trial court admitted or, alternative, tion in the its admission the letter purpose for the limited of estab- error, in view of the lishing constituted harmless Appellant’s relationship overwhelming Appel- other evidence of Fransen and her motive to harm Mr. guilt. reasons, lant’s For following we Sandt. The trial court’s limiting instruc- improperly conclude the letter admit- tion to the jury emphasized the narrow trial, ted at but its admission evidentiary use the letter. error. constituted harmless ¶ 24 Even if Mr. Sandt’s letter is hear- ¶ 26 The standard review admis- say, the argues the letter sion of as follows: qualifies under the “state of excep- mind” rule, tion because the letter within the Admission evidence is jury informs the of Appellant’s intent and court and sound discretion of trial motive, through albeit only upon showing Mr. Sandt’s state of be will reversed mind. The clearly Commonwealth also cites Pa. trial abused its court
14 in re- Admissibility depends arguments
discretion.
on will address
P.J.S.,
probative
supra.
value. Evi- verse order. See
relevance
logically
dence is relevant if it
tends
801
Pennsylvania
28
Rule of Evidence
case,
fact in
establish a material
hearsay as
defines
follows:
tends to make a fact at issue more or
Rule 801. Definitions
probable
supports
or
a
less
reasonable
(a)
(1)
A “statement” is
an
Statement.
presumption regarding a
inference or
(2)
or
or
oral written assertion
nonverbal
material fact.
by
person,
if it
conduct
a
is intended
Drumheller,
Pa.
v.
570
Commonwealth
person
as an assertion.
(2002),
117, 135,
893,
808 A.2d
904
certiora
(b)
per-
A
is a
Declarant.
“declarant”
denied,
919,
2284,
123
156
ri
539
S.Ct.
U.S.
a
son who makes
statement.
(2003).
L.Ed.2d 137
See also Common
(c) Hearsay.
statement,
“Hearsay”
ais
Lewis,
(Pa.Su
51,
v.
A.2d
54
wealth
885
by the
other than one made
declarant
per.2005).
hearing,
or
testifying
while
at the trial
requires action in
Judicial discretion
prove
the truth of
offered
law,
conformity
upon facts
cir-
the matter asserted.
court,
judicially before the
cumstances
Evi-
Pennsylvania
Pa.R.E. 801.
Rule of
An
hearing and
consideration.
after
due
provides exceptions to the hear-
dence 803
merely
is
an
abuse
discretion
states,
say
pertinent part:
rule
judgment,
reaching
but if in
error
Hearsay exceptions; avail-
Rule 803.
conclusion the
is overridden or mis-
law
ability of
immaterial
declarant
is
applied
judgment
or the
exercised
statements,
hereinafter
following
as
unreasonable,
manifestly
or the result
defined,
by
not excluded
bias,
will,
are
or ill
as
partiality, prejudice,
rule,
avail-
though the declarant is
record,
even
by
the evidence or
shown
able as witness:
is abused.
discretion
(1)
impression. A
Present
sense
Hunt,
1234,
v.
858 A.2d
describing
explaining
or
statement
(en banc),
(Pa.Super.2004)
appeal
de-
de-
or condition made
event
while
nied,
(2005)
659,
583 Pa.
(applying “present sense impression” ex [*] * * ception hearsay only to rule if declarant A by wrongdoing. Forfeiture opportunity purpose had no to form against party that statement offered observation). misstating See Common wrong- engaged acquiesced has or (Pa.Su Hood, 175, wealth v. A.2d 181 872 to, did, doing that was intended denied, 695, per.2005), appeal 585 Pa. 889 procure unavailability de- (2005) (stating A.2d “excited utterance” 88 clarant as a witness. exception hearsay to rule admits state See v. Pa.R.E. 804. Commonwealth Grif ments made declarant while was under 657, 589, Pa.Super. 453 684 A.2d fin, 591- by stress or of excitement caused event (1996) (stating of “dying 92 use declara event); startling condition related to Com hearsay “depends to exception tion” rule Carmody, v. A.2d 143 monwealth 799 surrounding ap on all circumstances” and (Pa.Super.2002) (describing excited utter “if the declarant iden plies murder trial spontaneous by ance as “a declaration attacker, his the declarant believes tifies person suddenly mind has been whose die, imminent, going he is to death subject made to overpowering emotion results”). actually death See Common by unexpected shocking caused some 716, Santiago, 822 A.2d 729 wealth v. occurrence, person just which that had denied, (Pa.Super.2003), 577 appeal participated closely witnessed, denied, (2004), 679, 1237 542 cert. made phase in reference to some of that 124 S.Ct. 159 L.Ed.2d U.S. perceived, occurrence which he and this by (stating wrongdoing” “forfeiture declaration must be made so near the oc rule exception hearsay applies to when place currence both in time and to wrongdoing accused’s criminal was com being exclude likelihood of its emanat mitted intent to make un witness ined or in part whole from his reflective testify; exception does available faculties”). victim not apply when defendant murdered ¶ 29 Additionally, when the declarant is but because prevent testifying him from unavailable, provide: the rules of evidence personal animosity) (citing Common Hearsay exceptions; Rule 804. de- Laich, n. 566 Pa. wealth clarant unavailable (2001)). 1057, 1062n. A.2d Regarding
* * * the “state rule under exception hearsay mind” (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The follow- 803(3), has Supreme Rule our Court stat defined, ing statements, as hereinafter ed: if by hearsay are rule not excluded as a declarant is unavailable witness: of mind Pursuant state a declarant’s out-of-
exception, where
[the
demonstrate
de-
court statements
mind,
made in a
are
state of
impend-
clarant’s]
Statement under belief of
manner,
are material and
natural
ing
death. A statement made
relevant,
they are
pursuant
exception
admissible
mind”
to the rule
hear-
against
to the exception.
say,
Supreme
Out-of-court declara-
our
Court reasoned:
tions that fall
state
within the
of mind
It
that the
perhaps
is true
declaration
hearsay exception
subject
are still
to establish that
tends
[declarant-
*13
general
evidentiary
governing
rules
was fearful of the Thorntons.
victim]
competency and relevancy. According-
However, the
state
[declarant-victim’s]
ly, whatever purpose the statement
is
of mind was not a matter in
in this
issue
for,
offered
be it to
the declar-
show
mind,
appellant’s
case.
It was
state of
intention,
ant’s
familiarity, or sanity,
victim,
of the
that
which
materi-
that purpose
issue,”
must be a
“factor
degree
any,
al to
the
guilt,
establish
if
is,
that
relevant.
is
if
Evidence
relevant
charge
on the
of criminal homicide.
it logically tends to
establish material
Only when the declaration is considered
fact
case,
in the
if it
to make
tends
a fact
asserted,
for
truth of the
that
the
matter
at issue more or less
or if
probable,
it
appellant and his brother
after”
“were
supports a reasonable
or pre-
inference
[declarant-victim],
the
does the declara-
sumption regarding the existence of a
relevant,
is,
tion become
mate-
that
both
material fact.
probative
rial to and
of appellant’s intent
However,
to kill.
for
when considered
26,
at
Id.
(emphasis
were
and statements of vic
*14
“special
This list of
circumstances” is not
tim limited to
negative feelings
about
exclusive, and this Court has demon-
him);
marriage
accused
to
Com
recognize
strated it will
ex-
additional
monwealth v. Sneeringer
Pa.Super.
ceptions
general
to the
the
rule where
241,
denied,
(1995),
A.2d 1167
appeal
probative value of the evidence out-
(1996) (affirm
dence of victim’s intent to end relation may other crimes evidence of be rele- ship jurors allowed to infer accused’s mo vant is and admissible such evi- where victim). for killing tive part of sequence dence the chain or ¶ 32 Furthermore, our Supreme Court of part events became of the his- which interpreted has the “special common law tory case and the part of the formed of circumstance” applicable doctrine as under development natural of the facts. This very limited circumstances: circumstance, re- special sometimes Evidence of distinct is admis- crimes ” gestae ferred to as the “res exception against sible being prose- defendant general proscription against to the evi- cuted for solely another crime to show crimes, dence of other is also known his bad character and propensity his for i.e., story” rationale, “complete evi- committing However, criminal acts. evi- criminal dence of other acts is admissi- dence of other crimes violent acts and/or story on complete ble to of the crime may be admissible in special circum- by trial its of proving immediate context stances where the evidence is relevant near in happenings place. time and for some other legitimate purpose and Lark, Commonwealth. 518 Pa. 302- merely to prejudice the defendant (1988) (admitting him by showing person be a of bad threats, into trial interwoven character. As recently we stated...: intimidations, and criminal activities rele general prohibiting [T]he rule the ad motive, intent, identity; prove vant to mission of prior evidence of crimes logical because of connection between nevertheless allows evidence other crimes, proof naturally of one tended (1) crimes prove to be introduced to (internal another) ci proof demonstrate motive; intent; of mis absence omitted). tations accident; take or a common scheme, plan case, design embracing In instant the trial court commission of responded Appellant’s objection two or more crimes so related to each one proof other that of Mr. Sandt’s letter as admission follows: Puksar [Appellant] alleges following this letter for reasons. In his letter, qualify any fails to Mr. wrote about the relation- Sandt hearsay exceptions and Mr. pur ship Appellant the enumerated between Fransen Appellant’s allegations and referred Pennsylvania suant to the Rules of to: Evi abuse; spousal Appellant’s desire to Therefore, fur- We let agree. dence. this Fransen; relationship ther her with Mr. be ter will excluded from evidence for Mr. Sandt’s demand for his share of own proving of the mat purpose truth and, possible property; marital asserted, that. being ter Mr. Fran- nexus between participated in the murder victim. sen, missing and Mr. Sandt’s .22 caliber Hearsay statement, is a other than one extrajudicial revolver. Unlike the state- by testifying made the declarant while Puksar; evidentiary ment value of hearing, at the trial or offered in evi depended Mr. Sandt’s letter truth prove dence truth of matter Thornton, supra. See of its content. The letter written asserted. the vic mere existence of the letter itself was not tim, implicated [Appellant which enough prove Appellant’s relationship Fransen], meets definition. It this *15 Mr. or her to kill Mr. with Fransen motive by through not the victim the made Here, jurors the Sandt. the had to believe testimony hearing trial or it is at a letter, is, text of that the mat- actual the being prove [Appellant’s] to in offered it, the grasp ters asserted in to what letter in the of the victim. volvement murder id. See We prove. to was offered trial However, extrajudicial state “when Thornton hearsay, conclude the letter purpose ment is offered for a other than controls, and Puksar does not apply. contents, the it proving truth of its not is ¶ hearsay and is not excludable under the Therefore, hearsay, as Mr. supra at 225.] [Puksar, hearsay rule.” only if Sandt’s letter admissible it fell Extrajudicial statements are “admissible exception the recognized within a to hear they or rule. See say to establish ill-will motive where 804. The let Pa.R.E. - not offered for the truth the being are of ter not present does serve as a sense [Id.] matter contained therein.” impression, Mr. Sandt did not because Therefore, perceived conclude that the letter the the we write letter as he events by immediately in the the victim is admissible as related letter or there written fact, relationship In not when Mr. prior between after. we do know Fransen], Thus, he [Appellant might and Mr. Further Sandt wrote the letter. more, ample opportunity this letter to form the admissible as evi have had [Appellant’s] purpose motive to cause to misstate the facts contained dence 803(1); Gray, letter. See Pa.R.E. su to on her rela the harm the victim based pra. tionship with another man and her alle gations the victim’s abusive conduct ¶ Likewise, “excited utter the her. towards exception rule ance” to the does (Omnibus Opinion, Pre-trial Motion dated case, apply not this because Mr. Sandt’s 17-18) (some 16, 2003, at internal
June past events. letter recounts a series omitted). citations startling The letter does describe i Again, the trial court absent evidence of agree ¶ We event. when letter, constituted inadmissible that letter Mr. Sandt wrote we cannot however, hearsay. disagree, analyze We with the whether he the letter under wrote decision to admit the letter under stress excitement caused some court’s Only when in this case. at issue it “ema- matter occurrence or whether shocking for the letter is considered Mr. Sandt’s his faculties.” See nated from reflective asserted, it be- does of the matter Hood, truth 803(2); Carmody, supra; Pa.R.E. relevant, is material comes supra. intent or motive probative of ¶ Furthermore, dec “dying Thornton, supra. kill Mr. Sandt. See hearsay rule exception to the laration” However, for its substan- considered when Sandt’s letter does apply. does not Mr. truth, relevant, letter is although tive Instead, identify an “attacker.” inadmissible. and therefore incompetent if to the reader that some suggests letter the letter serves the extent See id. To Mr. happen untoward should event memory or belief under Mr. Sandt’s reveal Sandt, Mr. Fransen. might the doer be exception mind” to the hear- “state of suggest Mr. Sandt’s letter does not rule, letter must relate say simply letter his death is imminent. The identification, execution, revocation, suspects if his death should occur proposes will, the letter Sandt’s which terms Mr. possible weapon. murder See 803(3). Thus, Pa.R.E. not. See does 804(b)(2); supra. Griffin, R.E. under the “state of was inadmissible letter applied. traditionally exception mind” Additionally, is no evi there Chandler, recognize that 40 We suggest Appellant and Fran- dence to Sneeringer, appellate supra supra and procure his sen murdered Mr. Sandt to the trial court’s decision Courts affirmed unavailability as a at his own mur witness admit, excep- of mind” under the “state contrary, To the letter insin der trial. *16 tion, testimony about victim’s third-party Therefore, only animosity. personal uates relationship regarding with statements by of hearsay exception the “forfeiture accused, of as evidence the accused’s the wrongdoing” apply does not letter. intent, the victim. or ill toward motive will 804(b)(6); Santiago, supra. See Pa.R.E. Stallworth, also Commonwealth See fit Accordingly, Mr. Sandt’s letter does not (affirming A.2d 110 Pa. “present “ex impression,” within the sense Pro- to admit victim’s trial court’s decision utterance,” declaration,” “dying cited or made one application, Abuse tection From by wrongdoing” exceptions to “forfeiture killed; petition includ- day before she was hearsay the rule. involving threats allegations specific ed exception 39 The of mind” “state victim; Supreme by accused to made hearsay presents pro the a more rule of allegations probative held were Court analysis. observe that blematic We first motive to harm intent and vic- accused’s letter offered as evidence Mr. Sandt’s also indicative of tim; PFA evidence However, Appellant’s of of mind.” “state regarding accused of mind victim’s state exception traditionally the “state of mind” per- him as she relationship mind, of applies to the declarant’s state it; application in PFA allegations ceived emotion, by or condition of physical supported testimony sensation further were intent, motive, design, threats, plan, as mental as eyewitnesses such to accused’s eight ill victim feeling, bodily health. See accused’s will toward pain, and of evidence 803(3). relationship applica R.E. Under the common nature of between show victim). case, exception, Mi'. In each the tion of this Sandt’s accused and the vic- be his own statements demonstrated letter could used establish victim’s relationship with mind, intent to end a Appellant’s state of tim’s state of but not to infer accused, jury not a allowed mind. Sandt’s state of mind was which Mr. the accused’s kill the motive to victim. See admission the letter at trial as evidence Chandler, supra; Sneeringer, supra. “complete story” of the the case. In Given Chandler, letter, Stallworth and there was tentative nature of the its ad- also independent eyewitness mission trial testimony any at does not serve of the on the Lark, legitimate purposes nature of the identified relationship between the su- vic- Instead, pra. Mr. generates tims and the Sandt’s letter defendants. prediction only possible of his weak mur- ¶ 41 The letter in the instant case does motive, Appellant’s intent, der and com- not generate the probative same value as mon or plan. portions scheme some While the victims’ statements in the cited cases. might the letter be as a possible read Here, Mr. Sandt’s mostly letter is his com- Sandt, motive harm Mr. the uncon- mentary relationship on the between the prohibits firmed nature the letter its use fact, In codefendants. trial court ad- proof Appellant actually as intended mitted letter evidence rela- Further, to murder Mr. Sandt. Id. Mr. tionship between Appellant and Mr. Fran- specific pri- Sandt’s letter fails to describe hand, sen. On other the letter conveys acts or to as a complete criminal serve a very message regarding mixed the state story Therefore, of the crime on trial. of the relationship between “complete story” letter not meet does Sandt, vacillating possible between Lark, concept supra, described in where separation and promises of reconciliation. may other crimes be relevant Significantly, the letter does not contain part admissible as of the chain or any life, threats made on Mr. Sandt’s sequence of events which became the his- either Appellant or Mr. Fransen. At tory of case and formed the natural most, pure the letter represents conjecture Thus, See development the facts. id. hyperbole. well-seasoned with romantic Pennsylvania Evidence, under the Rules of ¶ Moreover, reject we at Com letter should have been excluded gestae Thornton, Lark, res argument justify monwealth’s supra; supra.7 trial. See 7. Sixth Amendment Confrontation L.Ed.2d 203. The Court declined Crawford *17 argument Crawford, supra, Clause under im- to define the term "testimonial” but stated: plicates constitutional concerns. The United covers, applies else the it at "Whatever term Supreme States Court in stated: testimony Crawford prior prelimi- to at a minimum sure, "To goal be the Clause’s ultimate is to nary hearing, grand jury, before a or at evidence, reliability ensure but it pro- is a trial; police interrogations.” former and to guarantee. cedural than rather a substantive suggests might Id. The Court there Crawford commands, reliable, It not that evidence be give be other which also to situations rise reliability but particular be in a assessed See, e.g., "testimonial” statements. Common- by testing manner: in the crucible of cross- 496, Dargan, wealth v. 897 A.2d 502-03 61, 1370, examination.” Id. at S.Ct. 124 at (Pa.Super.2006) (observing crucial distinction Thus, 158 at 199. L.Ed.2d when "testimonial testimonial and non-testimonial between issue, are at statements" the Confrontation purposes to statements "seems Crawford Clause of Constitution of the United they product lie in whether were the of inter- precludes hearsay States except the use of in rogation specific inquiry any or of almost sort the most limited of circumstances. The voluntary”; or were what is critical is wheth- rule, however, apply does to Crawford deliberately er declarant made statements "non-testimonial” statements. "Where non- use). prosecutorial with view later to Never- issue, hearsay wholly testimonial is at it is theless, need we not decide whether Mr. design with the consistent Framers’ to afford Sandt’s letter is or whether it non-testimonial flexibility development in States their amorphous gray some falls within area [exempt] law.. .and such statements statements, Appellant from as scrutiny altogeth- Confrontation "testimonial" con- Clause 68, 1374, er.” Id. at 124 S.Ct. at tends. we have decided the letter 158 Because
21
(2005)
673,
(quoting
Despite
43
the decided inad Pa.
The Commonwealth bears the burden of “scuffling,” by gunshots; followed several establishing the harmlessness of the er- she drove Mr. Fransen from the murder ror. This burden is driveway; satisfied when the scene the end of her she Commonwealth is able show that: Fran- disposed letters Mr. written the error did not prejudice sen, the defen- harming Mr. Sandt. discussed which minimis; Detectives, dant or the prejudice was de (Transcript of Interview with 118a-132a). 11/28/02, the erroneously admitted evidence free- R.R. merely ly why cumulative other untaint- confessed to how and Fransen *18 ed evidence sim- Mr. Sandt. confes- substantially Appellant’s which was murdered erroneously unequivocally implicated ilar to the sion her admitted evi- dence; or death Mr. properly Sandt. admitted and uncontradicted evidence of so guilt was trial, pre- At the Commonwealth overwhelming and the prejudicial effect ample properly ad- sented otherwise insignificant by compari- error so regarding the matters as- mitted evidence con- son that the error could not have The following serted in Mr. letter. Sandt’s tributed to the verdict. the matters asserted chart identifies where Passmore, presented Commonwealth v. at trial A.2d the letter were denied, (Pa.Super.2004), competent appeal through independent evidence: was state claim inadmissible non-constitutional lant's constitutional under Crawford. P.J.S., grounds, supra. Appel- law we decline to address See presented Matters at trial asserted in Mr. Sandt’s letter
Matters (N.T. (N.T. Trial, 1/8/04, Trial, 95); Fransen, 1/7/04,at at Mr. Appellant wrote letters to (N.T. 86, 88, 90-91); Trial, 13-16, 82, 47-49) plans Mr. at discussing to harm Sandt. 1/9/04. regarding testimony (independent trial Appellant’s letters to and admissions love Fransen, dump- from from Mr. retrieved trash direction). ster, Appellant’s at 130) (N.T. 96-07, Trial, 1/7/04, (independent at Appellant and Fransen mur- Mr. discussed testimony regarding Appellant’s Mr. dering trial Mr. Sandt. options to murder Mr. plans Fransen’s murder). being suspected of Sandt without 98-99) (Id. 21, 2002, testimony on (independent at trial On Mr. Fransen visit- November Fransen’s, unannounced, A.M., late subject house 1:00 while Mr. ed Mr. Sandt’s at their night her to Mr. Sandt and an account of Appellant was out of town with mother. visit conversation). 50-51) (Id. (N.T. 1/12/04, Trial, 136-138); at at suspicious Mr. Sandt became about how testimony map (independent concerning of his home. trial Mr. Fransen knew the location help Appellant for Fransen to by drawn Mr. Appellant’s being seen him home without find by neighbors). 143-44) (N.T. Trial, 1/7/04, (independent .22 Mr. Sandt could find his testimony Appellant taking Mr. regarding trial caliber revolver. giving it to Mr. Sandt’s .22 caliber revolver and Fransen). warning cannot cure the defect of presented The also randa notes, map, detailed hand-drawn with interrogation. Specifically, Ap- the initial prepared for Mr. Fran- Appellant had be- pellant contends the Commonwealth map advised Mr. sen. and notes interrogation Appellant gan a custodial Fransen to locate and access how Area as at the Stroud soon she arrived avoiding neigh- residence Sandt’s while Headquar- Regional Department Police fences, devices, bors, security dogs, and inculpatory ters. maintains lights. Even as motion activated such suppressed have been admissions should letter, confession Appellant’s without em- interrogation technique because the Appellant’s proved and other trial evidence first, Mi- ployed police questions — In other guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. her con- warnings second—violated randa cu- words, merely letter Mr. Sandt’s identifies rights. stitutional See of other untainted evidence. mulative her conten- support multiple factors to Passmore, Given the overwhelm- supra. interaction that her initial tions guilt, ing custodial, including: when police was let- evidentiary ruling admit the court’s home, Appellant West, she first arrived at sivpra. error. See ter was harmless Thus, told jury’s permitted ver- to enter decline disturb we door; dict on this basis. parents’ home next to remain at her *19 (2) home, police en- parents’ at her while ¶ issue, Appel 47 In her second Appellant, questioned and freely tered the elicited lant contends Commonwealth her cloth- was told to surrender she during statements Appellant’s inculpatory police at the ing police; upon arrival to interrogation police at the a “custodial” station, an in- the focus of Appellant was station, her police before the administered at the interrogation the subsequent vestigation; Mi- warnings. Miranda findings are mining the factual armed detec- whether police station occurred with locked, room; by the record and whether supported in a tives windowless those leave, legal to drawn from not allow her the conclusions police the would of is thereby Appel- the duration Our of review extending scope facts are correct. her causing sleep lant’s detention and de- limited: circumstances,
privation. Under
these
only the
may consider
[W]e
insists
the
Appellant
her statements and
and much of the
so
prosecution
the
in
thereof
violation
results
were obtained
as remains
evidence for
defense
constitutionally protected right
of her
con-
in the
uncontradicted when read
self-incrimination,
expressed by
against
a
text
record as
Where
of the
whole.
Amendment V of the
of the
Constitution
findings
of the
supports
the record
sup-
States.
claims the
Appellant
United
court,
by
suppression
we are bound
pression court committed reversible error
may
only if
those facts and
reverse
suppress Appellant’s
it refused to
when
legal
in reaching
erred
its
court
and the evidence
inculpatory statements
upon the facts.
conclusions based
a
Appellant
obtained as
result.
concludes
Jones,
108, 115
v.
874 A.2d
Commonwealth
rights
the violation
her Constitutional
(internal
(Pa.Super.2005)
citations
a new trial.
warrants
omitted).
quotation marks
In response
to
second
during
made
50 Statements
issue,
argues
sup-
are
interrogation
presumptively
custodial
pression
properly
Appel-
court
admitted
is first ad
involuntary, unless
accused
police. Appellant
lant’s statements
rights.
Miranda
Common
vised
her
voluntarily; po-
station
went
574, 579
DiStefano,
wealth
lice
her
not
advised
that she was
under
denied,
(Pa.Super.2001), appeal
any time;
arrest and could leave at
she
(2002).
inter
Custodial
A.2d
searched;
room door
interview
by
rogation
“questioning initiated
law
is
interview;
ajar during
Ap-
remained
after
has
person
officers
a
enforcement
did not
to leave.
pellant
ask
custody or
de
been taken into
otherwise
made the
after she
in-
statements
any
in
prived of his freedom
action
that she
Appel-
formed
was free
leave.
Miranda,
significant way.”
supra
warnings
lant received Miranda
after she
1612,
Commonwealth v. morning 28, 539 Pa. hours November 74, (1994) (internal 420, 650 A.2d cita until taped the time her interview was omitted). tions Day concluded at the Sta- Street Police P.M., tion after day. 6:00 on the same Said way, police another detentions be- [Appellant] alleges further that because when, come custodial totality under the given she was Miranda warn- circumstances, of the the conditions P.M., 28, ings until 4:20 on November duration of the detention become and/or 2002, her improperly statements were so as to coercive constitute the function- elicited and suppressed should be at tri- equivalent al of arrest. al. The factors determine, a court utilizes to totality circumstances,
under the
police
The fact that a
investigation has
whether a detention has become so coer-
particular
focused on a
does
individual
cive as to
equiv-
constitute the functional
automatically trigger “custody”
thus
alent of arrest include: the basis for the
requiring
warnings.
Miranda
In order
detention;
location;
length;
its
its
custody,” person
to be “in
must believe
whether
the suspect
transported
was
that he is not free to leave. Where a
against
will,
far,
his or her
why;
how
defendant does not feel free to
leave
used;
whether restraints were
whether
during questioning, any
interview room
showed,
law enforcement officer
confession elicited is done
so with
force;
threatened or used
and the inves-
defendant
in
In
custody.
Common-
tigative
employed
methods
to confirm or
[,
Rodriguez
295,
wealth v.
330 Pa.Super.
dispel suspicions. The fact
a police
that
],
(Pa.Super.1984)
regard Mannion, for the facts involved. conflicting testimony There is between supra at 202. [Appellant] and Detective Schmidt as to case, 51 In the instant the trial court whether the door to the interview room explained deny Appellant’s its decision to [Appellant] was locked. testified suppress motion to po- her admissions to she was locked in the room the whole lice as follows: time. Schmidt Detective testified
[Appellant] alleges that she in police the door was never even closed. When custody early from sometime in the she asked cross-examination whether *21 complained ever the that interview room defendant would have confessed without locked, door the interro- [Appellant] interrogation, stated that but whether gation manipulative she did not was so or coercive because she assumed the deprived that it the defendant of police [her] locked it deliberately. [Appellant] ability to make a free and unconstrained admitted that she was told that she was totality the decision to confess. The free to any leave at time. We conclude in circumstances to be evaluated de- [is] that there is insufficient evidence for a termining whether a statement is volun- holding [Appellant] that felt she was not tary. The relevant factors include the free to leave the interview room on No- interrogation; duration and means of the 28, vember 2002. physical psychological the state of support In argument, of her [Appellant] accused; the the conditions attendant to provided the court copy with a of Com- detention; the the attitude of the inter- McCarthy, monwealth v. A.2d 757 [820 rogator; any and all other factors (Pa.Super.2003) ]. We find that person’s ability that could drain a facts of McCarthy substantially are dif- suggestion and coercion. withstand ferent and are distinguishable from the The first issue is [Appellant] whether instant matter. defendant had been sleep deprived police. McCarthy, [Appellant] unlike in the in- [Appellant] on went work November matter, stant specifically speak asked to 26, P.M., 2002 at 10:00 left at 7:00 attorney any before answering A.M., on slept November 2002. She questions. The defendant that testified A.M., from 8:00 to 12:00 noon No- [on the detective interviewing responded [Appellant] sleep vember did not 27]. “no, my this is opportunity; window of again police interview, until after the and if I walked through that door he P.M., which commenced at 1:50 on No- would make sure that all the charges Thus, vember 2002. [Appellant] had stuck and he would embarrass me in slept not in approximately twenty-six my front of friends. That’s when I sat given hours when she the Miranda down.” In matter, the instant there However, warning. [Ap- the fact that were no such threats [Appel- made to pellant] slept long had not for a period lant]. sleep of time is not determinative [Appellant] alleges also following deprivation issue. must also We deter- her Omnibus Pre-Trial regard Motion in mine whether conduct was to the duration of what she terms [Appellant’s] inability sleep. cause of detention: testified at omni- Detective Schmidt 9. [Appellant’s] statements were hearing [Appellant] ap- bus that did not product of unconstitutional and coer- pear time of tired or confused procedures cive including sleep depri- [Ap- 2002. interview November promises vation and of future treat- pellant] only testified that she four slept ment. forty-three prior hours hours 10. At the time of [Appellant’s] However, [Appellant] did interview. statements, deprived she so give any testimony that she was sleep and food that her statement was during tired Further- interview. knowing and voluntary. more, [Appellant] testify did not that (Omnibus Motion, Pre-Trial March she ever informed the detectives inter- 3). 2003, at In determining viewing voluntari- It ap- she was tired. ness, question is not parent [Appellant’s] job puts whether the her on *22 [Appellant]
an the factors set sleep unusual schedule. We will now address six in in sup forth overnight sleeps [Appellant] an shift and dur- her brief works port argument custodial not her that a ing day. the It has been made clear interrogation first place. did take The long normally goes be- [Appellant] how factor is for the We the basis detention. sleep. [Appellant] simply has tween agree clearly [Appellant] with that she failed this court that she convince investigation the of the from was focus in- sleep deprived at the time of the was early point. However, by itself an this [Appellant] sleep if terview. Even was not of a cus assumption does create the interview, deprived the time of the at Mannion, supra. todial interrogation. [Appellant] the has failed show that The is the second factor duration police prevented sleeping her from while [Appellant] argues detention. that Furthermore, parents’ at her house. morning in the began early detention [Appellant] allege not does that she ever 28, 2002, on hours based November expressed police to the she needed that effectively prevent the fact that she was Therefore, sleep. her can- statements leaving ed from We crime scene. suppressed ground. not be on that disagree. This a situation which was [Appellant] alleges that there were person a reasonable would [she] believe “promises treatment” made to of future pres “at liberty ignore police was any [Appellant] give her. has failed to and go ence about business.” [her] that specific promises information Witherspoon, Additionally, her. Detec- were made to [Appel (Pa.Super.2000). A.2d tive Schmidt testified at omnibus parents’ in her house and lant] was hearing any promises that no one made [Appel police investigation focused [Appellant]. or threats to house, parents’] not her house. lant’s] [Appellant] alleges was also that she police prevent [Appellant] The not did deprived at the inter- of food time of the At no going from about her business. It undisputed [Appellant] view. time did to leave [Appellant] attempt given hoagie sometime was soda if she parent[s’] her house or ask even P.M., after 5:00 on November 2002. merely prevented could leave. She car, This occurred after hours part several accessing from her as it was [Appellant] after questioning and that the investigation. We conclude However, [Appellant] [Ap has time Mirandized. interview commenced brought interview alleged gone pellant] not that she had a substan- into the P.M. room at the station at 1:50 police The tial amount of time without food. [Appellant] at 4:20 P.M. was Mirandized 1:50 interview did not commence until Thus, [Appellant] was interviewed [Appellant] parents’ P.M. was at her to be only prior two-and-one-half hours in the got house from the time she home ing given warnings. the Miranda early hours of morning November The third factor concerns the location police left they until the time for the agree [Appel- the interview. We P.M. does [Appellant] station at 1:30 that the interview was conducted lant] allege ample did that she not have a police room at station. interview opportunity prior to eat to the interview. [Appel- conclude that detectives were fourth We factor concerns how required [Appellant] police to offer food to the sta- transported lant] was argues had no during [Appellant] hours of No- tion. that she the mid-afternoon go police choice but station vember 2002. Furthermore, police no to think that ed to the area. had reason leave [Appel- no formal parents help her flee. It is there was interview would time she remained police requested during undisputed lant] it is true [Appellant’s] presence parent[s’] at the sta- house. While *23 the the entered and exited police vicinity police tion and that the left the that times, many [Appellant] of house nev- making the crime scene after such was formally er as to the events request. prevented [Appellant] No one interviewed 27, 2002 until she arrived staying parents’] from at her house or of November going police police other than at the station November somewhere the Therefore, fact, In testi- station. we conclude that 2002. Detective Wolbert go free to [Appellant] going [Appellant] not coerced into fied that was was at the time police station on about wherever she wanted November the crime scene. investigation 2002. of Therefore, custody that did we conclude show, The fifth factor deals with threat during the in- begin not until sometime or [Appellant] argues use of force. that [Appellant] police of at the sta- terview large police the presence at the crime tion. prevented leaving scene her from
parents’ into the meth- police presence inquires house. Mere The sixth factor investigation [Appellant] insufficient to conclude that coercion ods of used. place. argues interrogation took “In order to determine the was confrontational, particular lengthy with Detec- whether encounter consti- seizure, using police tutes a Miller and Schmidt court must consider all tives inculpatory tactics to elicit evidence surrounding the circumstances the en- [Appellant]. [Appellant] from does police counter to determine the whether any specific reference... incidences of conduct would have communicated to a police conduct or such conduct vio- how person reasonable person the was any right. lated constitutional not free requests to decline the officers’ or otherwise terminate the encounter.” the Finally, agree with Common we Bostick, 429, 439, v. if police Florida 501 U.S. that even the should wealth 2382, 2389[, [Appellant] at the be S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d Mirandized have (1991). interview, subsequent the following ginning We find the 401-02] issuing warnings[,] coupled of Miranda supportive [Appellant’s] facts to be (1) no the fact that there is argument: [Appellant’s] car taetics[,] police al improper coercive or by police boxed in cars such that she [Appellant’s] state the admission of leave; low would been unable to have DeJesus, ments. [567 Commonwealth [Appellant] open allowed (2001). 415,] The De car to a pack cigarettes; retrieve Jesus Court held: police [Appel- entered and exited parents’ constantly through Appellant’s pres- no merit in house find lant’s] [W]e conduct, they investigating the time claim that the were ent detectives’ Miranda, scene; tainted and [Appellant] violated crime which subsequent waiver of invalidated his requested to turn her clothes over rights and statement. However, police. [Appellant] neither parents cooper- nor her ever refused police police,
ate with ever asked house, made an suspect their The fact that a has leave ever asked admission does not warrant vehicles, unwarned attempt- their move ever properly admissible. photographs A sub- were presumption compulsion. Instead, suggests the trial court Miranda sequent administration of photographs because simply admitted warnings ordinarily should suffice to (Appellant’s like [Appellant].” it “didn’t precluded remove the conditions that 40). Brief at concludes statement. admission of the earlier admitting photographs, court erred [435-36, Id. A.2d 405-06. at] therefore entitled to a new trial. and she is Thus, pre-Miranda if state- even by [Appellant] ments made were response, 53 In they product interrogation, depicting Appel- of a custodial photographs claims the are admissible due to the states nonetheless lant and Mr. Fransen various *24 admitted, because properly absence of coercion. undress were Appellant’s they constituted evidence (Omnibus at 6- Opinion Pre-trial Motion Appellant dis- guilty Specifically, mind. 14) (some quotation internal citations and along with the photographs, these carded omitted). accept marks the trial We letters, way on her home to couple’s love analysis court’s and see no reason to dis- scene, a call from receiving after the crime voluntarily: turb its decision. Appellant asserts her mother. The Commonwealth (1) (2) home; parents’ remained at her items disposal of these Appellant’s speak police station went mind and constitut- guilty evidence officers; confessed her relation- cover-up any connection an effort to ed ship with Mr. Fransen and her involve- and Mr. Appellant Fransen. between murder; ment Mr. Sandt’s waived the trial court concludes Commonwealth right her constitutional to remain silent into ev- photographs admitted the properly right attorney; provided to an trial. idence at (6) sup- police; statement written ¶ Pennsylvania of the Rules 54 Rule 402 plied audiotape police. At statement “All relevant evidence of Evidence states: to her Miranda warnings, prior all times admissible, provided except as otherwise is enjoyed freedom of action and Appellant is not relevant by Evidence is law. in a she placed was not situation which Pa.R.E. 402. Neverthe- not admissible.” that her reasonably could have believed less, provides: 403 Rule re- freedom of action or movement was relevant evi- See Exclusion of Rule 403. by police interrogation. stricted Williams, grounds prejudice, confu- Moreover, if Ap- supra. dence even sion, or violation, subject to a Miranda of time waste pellant relevant, from inevitably may she was not disabled waiv- be Although evidence confessing after she out- ing rights probative if its value is excluded There- requisite warnings. preju- received the unfair by danger weighed issues, fore, confession or mis- dice, we conclude confusion admitted at trial. considerations properly jury, by or leading time, or delay, of undue waste ¶ issue, ar- Appellant 52 In her third of cumulative ev- presentation needless photographs the nude and semi-nude gues idence. (of Fransen) irrel- Appellant and Mr. were test for balancing In this the Pa.R.E. 403. in this case. insists evant admissibility question is whether just photographs used the unfairly prejudi- challenged evidence is so jury’s passions. Appellant to inflame the inflammatory nature substan- its any cial that engage claims the trial court did Com- tially outweighs probative its value. legal analysis to determine whether
29
Peer,
has the burden
Pa.Super.
appellant
monwealth v.
454
684
It is the
who
(1996).
relief
entitlement
establishing
A.2d
[her]
1077
of the trial
showing
ruling
that the
employ
two-part
test
We
under the evidence
court is erroneous
inflammatory
if allegedly
to determine
the law.
photographic
admissible.
(Pa.Su-
Jones,
86, 91
v.
878 A.2d
Jones
Hetzel,
Commonwealth v.
per.2005). See also Commonwealth
denied,
(Pa.Super.2003), appeal
(Pa.Su-
Franklin,
A.2d
(2003).
First,
Rule 2119 contains
provisions
¶
foregoing,
we hold:
regarding
upon
the contents of briefs.
58 Based
We
it admitted
the trial court erred when
consistently, “arguments
have held
trial,
at
because the
appropriately
developed
are not
are
the victim’s letter
hearsay and does
letter constitutes
waived.”
denied,
394,
(Pa.Super.2004), appeal
Appellate
apply
400 n. 6
8. The Rules of
Procedure
678,
(2005), cert. de
Lineberger
Pa.
qualify First, may be used to estab rule; exception exception ognized of mind lish the declarant’s state when nevertheless, evidentiary ruling was this mind at issue. Id. at declarant’s state of error, properly harmless where otherwise 803(3)-(1)(a)(1); § v. Auk Commonwealth overwhelmingly estab- admitted evidence er, 1305, 521, 547, 1319 Pa. 681 A.2d 545 beyond a reason- Appellant’s guilt lished (1996); Pa. Riggins, v. 478 doubt; confession was Appellant’s able (1978). 234, 520, A 526 386 A.2d subject she was not the admissible because if it is of mind is at issue declarant’s state ini- interrogation when she of a custodial or defense. charge, element of a claim confessed; and, tially receiving after 803(3)-(1)(a)(1). Poulin, § For & at Packel waiving right warnings Miranda of mind a murder victim’s state example, counsel, right remain silent and she rebut a defendant’s might be relevant to her confes- freely willingly repeated suicide, self-defense, accident or claim police; third issue is sion Brown, 490 F.2d see U.S. v. develop cognizable for failure to waived establish, (1973), the crime of or to where argument appeal. appropriate legal or charged, kidnapping or is also burglary Accordingly, we affirm. given that the not have victim would ¶ affirmed. Judgment of sentence permission defendant to enter would willingly. the defendant gone not have Judge Concurring files a JOYCE Stallworth, See Commonwealth Opinion. Auker, (2001); 349, 363, 781 A.2d Judge MUSMANNO files 1319; Riggins, at supra *26 Opinion, Concurring Dissenting and which Second, at a supra at 386 A.2d 526. judge joins. KLEIN that he declarant’s out-of-court statement act in the perform particular to intends JOYCE, BY OPINION CONCURRING excep may admissible under this future be J.: in that the declarant acted tion to establish ¶ review, my agree I with Upon inten expressed conformity with his/her thoughtful dispo- distinguished Majority’s 803(3)- Poulin, § & at tion. Packel issues, particu- of Appellant’s sition of each (l)(a)(2); Sneeringer, larly the conclusion with 241, 1171-72 Pa.Super. of inadmissible under the state letter was (1995) (holding that murder victim’s state hearsay to the rule. exception mind her intention parties ments to third about ¶ 2 are admissi- Out-of-court statements relationship to end her with the defendant to exception of mind ble under the state him out of the house was and to throw primary rule for reasons: hearsay two excep mind under the state of admissible is often state of mind conformity declarant’s that she acted tion show in the absence of these impossible prove intention; her the fact that the victim with of the de- statements relationship statements with defendant ended motive). Third, of are viewed to be clarant’s state mind of his probative reliable, impressions present are sense statement of a declarant’s as out-of-court utterances, spon- due to their admitted to memory may excited or belief be Poulin, Pennsylva- only or believed taneity. See Packel & a fact remembered prove execution, 803(3) 1(a). Evidence, of § The state if the statement relates nia — revocation, or terms of the identification against to the rule exception mind Poulin, at Packel & of out-of-court declarant’s will. the introduction permits if Brown, probative no value 803(3) 1(a)(3); 490 he authored —has generally § see — just that he did general, solely prove where (stating F.2d at 763 offered “[i]n memory or sought that, to be the statements of testimony state of mind attempt in an to demonstrate in the letter cannot be used contained belief underlying facts rather than matter truth of the the truth of the prove offered to mind, solely to of the evidence show state Len- asserted, namely, excluded”). be If the state of mind must kill and a motive to ny relationship had a exception permitted the introduction the victim. in, indicating a or memo statements belief ¶ this, I conclude that Beyond cannot fact, exception ry of a the state of mind contained the victim’s the declarations hearsay. against the rule
would swallow
spontaneous,
letter could be classified
803(3)-(1)(a)(3),
§
Poulin,
Packel &
at
cit
degree
them with
thereby engendering
U.S.,
96, 105-106,
ing Shepard v.
290 U.S.
reliability and trustworthiness.
(1933).
tive for
Common-
sonable
Chandler,
401,
Majority’s disposition.
wealth v.
554 Pa.
721 A.2d
(1998) (finding
1040
that
the trial court
AND
CONCURRING
DISSENTING
properly permitted the
Commonwealth
MUSMANNO, J.:
OPINION BY
that the murder
introduce evidence
victim
negative
had
about her
party
excellent,
told
third
majority presents
1 The
her relation-
feelings
appellant
for the
cogent analysis of
well-reasoned and
ship
him under the state of mind
with
to the
against hearsay,
applied
rule
exception
opinion
because the
decedent,
victim’s
Mr. Sandt.
letter
written
marriage
and her
to him
appellant
my esteemed
wholeheartedly agree
I
with
ill-will,
malice or
presence
went
letter constitut-
colleague that Mr. Sandt’s
killing);
motive for the
v.
exception
Commonwealth
no
hearsay and
ed inadmissible
(2000)
Fletcher,
266,
A.2d 261
561 Pa.
750
However,
I am constrained
applied.
that
(finding
the murder victim’s state-
improper
that
admission
conclude
had
party
error,
ment to a third
that the victim
at trial
not harmless
the letter
appellant’s
smoked the
crack cocaine was beyond a reasonable doubt.
excep-
admissible under the state of mind
¶ 2 An error
be deemed harmless
will
pres-
tion to the
rule to
show
court concludes be-
appellate
where
ill-will, malice,
ence of
for the
motive
that
the error
yond a reasonable doubt
occasions,
killing). Conversely, on other
contributed to
verdict.
could
have
our
has held that the mur-
Court
Supreme
Chmiel,
547,
Pa.
v.
regarding
der victim’s statements
his/her
(2005).
501,
a reason-
“If there is
A.2d
relationship
appellant
with the
are not ad-
may
possibility that
the error
have
able
perception
missible because the victim’s
verdict, it is not harm-
contributed to the
not rele-
relationship
state of the
Id.;
Story,
less.”
see Commonwealth
Laich,
See Commonwealth v.
vant.
(1978)
A.2d
164-66
476 Pa.
(2001)
(finding
was insignifi- effect of error was prejudicial in the tim’s of mind was not at issue state cant). case). opine I that the Su- respectfully trial, present- 3 At the Commonwealth prece- clarification of this preme Court’s involve- strong ed the bench and bar of this dent would aid However, the death. ment in Mr. Sandt’s Commonwealth. letter impact of Sandt’s prejudicial was, view, my insurmountable. the trial Having concluded clearly is letter, damning that there letter so admitted the but improperly court improper that its possibility a reasonable beyond error harmless rea- contributed to the On admission verdict. basis, I
this would conclude that the error harmless, I accordingly, would judgment of sentence and re-
reverse
mand for a trial. new KIDD-PARKER,
Donna Petitioner AP
WORKERS' COMPENSATION (PHILADELPHIA
PEAL BOARD DISTRICT), Respondent.
SCHOOL Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth Court of
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 2006. April
Decided 2006. Sept.
Publication Ordered 2006.