History
  • No items yet
midpage
Commonwealth v. Collins
703 A.2d 418
Pa.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH of COLLINS, Appellant. Ronald Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued Jan. 1997.

Decided Nov. 1997. Reargument Denied March *3 Belli, Drost, for Collins. Philadelphia, John T. John R. Marshall, Dolgenos, Philadelphia, Thomas Catherine Commonwealth. Graci, Harrisburg, Atty. A. for Office of the Gen.

Robert ZAPPALA, CAPPY, FLAHERTY, C.J., Before CASTILLE, NEWMAN, JJ. NIGRO and

OPINION NEWMAN, Justice. jury Ronald Appellant

On October found murder,1 of two counts of first and one count guilty assault,2 aggravated possession each of of an instrument of crime,3 and recklessly endangering person.4 another These from aggravated convictions stem an on Lisa assault the murders of David Sisco and Dawn Anderson. After a penalty hearing, aggravating concluded *4 outweighed circumstances the mitigating circumstances death each of penalty degree set the at for count first murder.5 2502(a). § 1. 18 Pa.C.S. 2702(a)(1).

2. 18 Pa.C.S. § §

3. 18 907. Pa.C.S.

4. 18 Pa.C.S. §

5. The aggravating concerning found of David circumstances murder prosecution a a or Sisco were that Collins killed witness to murder felony purpose preventing the other that he committed for the of

50 Philadelphia the Court of Common Pleas of April

On (trial court) formally the sentence of death. County imposed prison ninety court also concurrent sentences of imposed The assault, months for hundred-eighty aggravated to one twelve twenty-four possession to months of an instrument of crime, twenty-four recklessly months for endan- and twelve motions, gering person. post-sentence another Collins filed appealed directly which the trial court denied. He then to this 722(4) § pursuant Court Pa.C.S. Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(1). follow, § For the reasons that we affirm his of judgments convictions and sentence.

Sufficiency the Evidence penalty imposed, In all cases where the death has been this an performs independent sufficiency Court review of the evidence of whether such re regardless appellant seeks Zettlemoyer, 16, 3, view. 26 n. denied, 937, (1982), cert. A.2d 942 n. 3 461 U.S. 103 S.Ct. (1983). reviewing sufficiency 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 When claim, the evidence we view all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner if to determine the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that all the elements the offenses were Commonwealth v. beyond a reasonable established doubt. Burgos, To sustain a convic murder, prove tion for first the Commonwealth must killed; being unlawfully that a human was that the accused killing did was done malice afore killing; with willful, thought; killing pre- and that was deliberate and him, 9711(d)(5), testifying against § witness from 42 Pa.C.S. and that Collins had been convicted of another murder either before or at the issue, l(d)(l 1). mitigating § time of the offense at 42 Pa.C.S. The circumstance found was the character of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(e)(8). § aggravating concerning The circumstances found the murder of Dawn Anderson were that Collins killed Anderson in furtherance of his business, 9711(d)(14), § 42 Pa.C.S. and that Collins had been convicted of another murder either before or at the time of the offense issue, 9711(d)(ll). mitigating § at 42 Pa.C.S. circumstance found 9711(e)(8). § was the character of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. *5 meditated, i.e., to kill. specific the defendant had a intent (1991). Mitchell, 546, 599 A.2d 624 Commonwealth v. may proven by intent to kill be circumstantial evi Specific dence, on using deadly weapon such as the accused a a vital Rivers, part body. of the victim’s — denied, U.S. -, (1994), A.2d 710 cert. 116 S.Ct. 1270, 134 L.Ed.2d mind, with these standards in the evidence

Viewed for first clearly support was sufficient Collins’ convictions in a degree murder. The events this case revolve around in second floor at 643 North 60th Street West apartment Philadelphia, drugs regularly where were sold and consumed. apartment managed drug Marc Sisco maintained the and brother, premises. trade that occurred on the Marc’s David Sisco, also in the a apartment. regular lived Collins was visitor to the and from that apartment often sold cocaine associates, location. Collins’ and Dawn Shawn Wilson Anderson, frequented also the apartment. in

Early morning of March Collins and Marc apartment began arguing. Sisco were Collins a pointed gun at Marc Sisco and shot him five times. When police apartment, they arrived at the found Marc Sisco lying on the bathroom floor. Medical him to personnel transported hospital where he from recovered his wounds. Police recov- one ered bullet from the bathroom floor apartment body hospital. two bullets from Marc Sisco’s at the Two bullets remain inside him. After shooting, David Sisco assisted the police investigation. their He discussed the police accompanied incident with a detective at the station and apartment, the detective to the where he described how the shooting occurred. days shooting, nearby

A few after the was at the Collins talking group residence Annie “Mom” Holloman to a people anyone spoke when he threatened to shoot who to the about the incident. He mentioned David police specifically potential target. Sisco as a confronted a woman named Lisa April

On her of porch on the of Holloman’s house and accused Tyler him. denied the accusation stealing drug money from that Dawn Anderson had stolen the and informed Collins *6 recently spending large had been amounts money. Anderson money, Despite Tyler’s professed was unusual. which innocence, a in gun fired a at her. The bullet tore hole Collins body. not strike her her coat but did 5, 1992, on approximately p.m. April At 8:00 Anderson was told Tyler. at Holloman’s house with Holloman and She corner”, “around the going Holloman that she was to work going to mean that Anderson was which understood apartment. at Marc Sisco’s Before assist with sales left, bring she told Holloman that she would some Anderson they “if don’t loll me.” She also told Holloman drugs back they they in the one time and said “they shot her elbow in understood going were to shoot her the head.” Holloman “they” reference to to mean Collins and Wilson. Anderson’s Collins evening, Gwendolyn accompanied Later that Oliver apartment. talking and to Marc Sisco’s After Shawn Wilson Oliver, drinking apartment, and beer for a short time go decided to to a hotel. Oliver left the Collins Wilson going call from a apartment telephone to make a booth before booth, phone approxi- to the hotel. at the Oliver heard While mately gun apartment. five shots come from the Collins then Oliver, a apartment, ran out of the called to and haüed cab. joined apartment exited the a few moments later and Wilson and Oliver in the cab. Collins cab, that he had riding

While Collins boasted someone, he “served” which Oliver understood to mean that responded had harmed someone. Wilson that Collins had deserved, they exchanged them and the two men a given what then asked if he had seen “the “high-five”. Collins Wilson on his shirt squirting blood out” and showed blood stains at stopped sleeve to The trio a delicatessen Wilson. of a man named beer and then went to the house purchase house, they Lonnie Boo. arrived at Lonnie Boo’s Collins When just told Lonnie Boo that “we had some drama”. Collins then gave gun safekeeping. drinking his to Lonnie Boo After cards, gave cab playing beer and Wilson Oliver fare, leaving, told her to wait a few minutes before and then left Lonnie Boo’s house. April arrived at Marc morning police

On apartment Sisco’s and discovered David Sisco unconscious and covered with blood on a bed. He had been shot approximately seven times and at a In hospital died few hours later. room, police another found Dawn Anderson unconscious and covered with blood on a bed. She had been shot once in the following day. head and died the Police recovered two bullets body, from David Sisco’s one bullet from Anderson’s head and several bullets from apartment. single

Ballistics evidence showed that a firearm had fired body, the two bullets recovered from David Sisco’s the bullet head, recovered from Anderson’s the bullets found *7 shot, apartment after David Sisco and Anderson were the bullet found in the bathroom after Marc Sisco was shot on March and at least one of the two bullets recovered body. from Marc Sisco’s The other bullet recovered from body may Marc Sisco’s have from gun, come the same but not positive possible identification was because the bullet became deformed after it was fired.

Based on foregoing, there was sufficient evidence for a beyond to conclude a that reasonable doubt Collins murdered David as a reprisal cooperating Sisco with the and that police Collins murdered Dawn Anderson because she Burgos. stole from allegedly money him. We now turn to the issues that Collins raises.

Severance pre-trial At a an oral motion hearing, Collins made to Sisco, charges relating shooting sever the to the of Marc aggravated Tyler, assault on Lisa and the murders of David and granted Sisco Dawn Anderson. The trial court the mo part. tion in It ruled that shooting Marc Sisco was a criminal separate episode individually. should be tried on and the Tyler court also ruled that the assault Lisa could tried of David and Dawn Anderson be murders Sisco Further, held that the evidence of the together. the court at the trial on the latter shooting Marc was admissible Sisco Sisco, of David a motive for the murder charges establish the same identity of the murderer because and establish Sisco, and Dawn used to Marc David Sisco gun was shoot. Anderson. denying in his argues that the trial court erred concerning charge aggravated

motion to sever the assault of first charges the shot fired at Lisa from the of David and Dawn concerning shootings murder Sisco The decision to sever offenses is disagree. Anderson. We and sound discretion of the trial court will be within the for manifest of that discretion. Com only reversed a abuse Paolello, 47, (1995); 665 A.2d 439 monwealth v. (1994), Carter, cert. denied, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 514 U.S. S.Ct. govern joinder and 1128 Rules of Criminal Procedure 1127 defendants, provide and severance offenses part relevant as follows: Separate Indictments or

Rule 1127. Joinder—Trial Informations

A. Standards

(1) indictments or informa- charged separate Offenses if: may together tions be tried (a) of each of the offenses would be admis- the evidence capable trial for the other and is separate sible *8 by jury danger so that there is no of separation confusion; or

(b) or charged the offenses are based on the same act transaction. of or Defendants

Rule Severance Offenses order trials of offenses or defen- may separate The court relief, other if it that provide appropriate appears dants or any party may prejudiced by be offenses or defendants being together. tried 1127;

Pa.R.Crim.P. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1128. Reading these two Rules this together, Court set following forth the for three-part deciding test a motion to sever:

Where the defendant moves to sever offenses not based on the same act or transaction that have been consolidated in a information, single indictment or opposes joinder or of informations, separate indictments or the court must there- fore determine: [1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial other; [2] whether such evidence is capable separation by of confusion; and, so as to danger avoid if the answers to these inquiries are in the affirmative, [3] wheth- er the unduly defendant will be prejudiced by the consolida- tion of offenses. Lark, 491, 496-97

Commonwealth v. 543 A.2d test, Pursuant to the Lark a court must first deter ifmine evidence each of the offenses would be admissi in separate ble trial for the other. Evidence of crimes other than the in question one is not solely admissible show defendant’s bad propensity character or to commit crime. Newman, Commonwealth v. (1991); However, Lark. evidence of other crimes is admissible to (1) (2) (3) motive; intent; demonstrate absence of mistake or (4) accident; scheme, a common plan design or embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related each other (5) others; proof one tends to prove the or the identity person of the charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Id. Additionally, may evidence of other crimes be admitted where such part evidence is history of the case part and forms of the development natural of the facts. Lark. Here, the evidence of the offenses aggravated assault first murder would have been admissible in separate trials for each other. aggravated assault on Lisa would have been admissible in a separate trial for the first

56 because, immediately preced- motive murders to show

degree assault, that Dawn Anderson had told Collins the ing a motive him, Collins with provided from which money stolen would have assault also aggravated Anderson. The to murder of the development natural part as of the been admissible demonstrated Col- and the murders facts because the assault the two incidents his trade and protect efforts to lins’ v. LaCa- See Commonwealth only days apart. three occurred (evidence (1995) va, 160, 221 of assaults 666 A.2d in murder trial to show separate admissible a would have been murdered case where defendant history of the motive and assaults). scene of the fleeing officer police while degree murders evidence of first Reciprocally, aggravated separate in a trial have been admissible would or accident. and absence of mistake intent prove assault usually offense is less subsequent of a Although evidence offense, a evidence prior than evidence of probative of intent at show the defendant’s intent offense can still subsequent of a Ritter, v. 419 Commonwealth prior time of the offense. denied, 656, (1992), 442 appeal 615 A.2d Pa.Super. Green, (1993); Pa.Super. 634 A.2d 220 denied, (1986), Pa. 520 A.2d appeal Anderson, of Dawn shooting subsequent Collins’ him, that his money from demonstrates allegedly who stole whom he accused firing gun Tyler, his at Lisa prior act him, rather than acciden from was intentional stealing money Thus, the Lark test is satisfied. prong the first tal. Next, aggravated if of the must decide the evidence we separation degree capable first murders was assault and the criminal offenses a trial concerns distinct by jury. Where time, and the characters distinguishable space that are Lark. involved, separating the evidence. jury capable is first murders Here, assault and the aggravated locations and involved days apart different occurred three Thus, danger no that the victims. there was different would confuse the offenses. preju unduly if Collins was we must decide

Lastly, trial. Pa. of the offenses at consolidation by diced Lark, explained As we R.Crim.P. not speaks simply Rule 1128 is of which “prejudice”

[t]he *10 linked to the appellant in that will be the sense prejudice for that sort being prosecuted, he is crimes for which purpose the of all ostensibly is prejudice is, speaks of which Rule 1128 prejudice evidence. to rather, occur if the evidence tended that which would showing his to commit only by propensity appellant convict crimes, jury incapable separating the or because the was evidence. cumulating not avoid evidence or could Lark, Additionally, at at 543 A.2d a defendant to the connecting evidence admission of relevant trial, a criminal consequence a natural charged crimes is Here, by severance itself. Paolello. grounds and it is not to criminal offenses engaged separate a series Collins permitting no drug prejudice his trade. There was protect interrelated, distinct, yet to convict him based on the Accordingly, proper- the trial evidence of those crimes. court Lark; Paolello. motion to sever. ly denied Collins’ Hearsay by next that the trial court erred argues concern testify and Annie Holloman to permitting Lisa Dawn Anderson hearsay statements that ing inadmissible evening Spe on of the murders. presence made their objects emphasized portions to the cifically, Collins following exchanges: What, say to anything, if did Miss Anderson

[Prosecutor]: you? [Holloman], said, going Pll be back Pm

[Tyler]: She “Mom bring you something to work around the comer. Pll ”me. they back don’t kill if that conversa- present So who else was when [Prosecutor]: place? tion took Mom.

[Tyler]: yourself? And [Prosecutor]: Yes. [Tyler]: “Mom,” Annie Hollo- again, being And

[Prosecutor]: man?

[Tyler]: Holloman. Anderson you Did know where Miss worked? [Prosecutor]: [Tyler]: answering She worked around at Dave’s the door. door,” you say “answering When what do [Prosecutor]: mean? you drugs, For the let the sellers in—I mean

[Tyler]: in. buyers Holloman, Now, before Miss Anderson

[Prosecutor]: Miss what, your Edgewood left residence or home on Street if anything, say you going did she about where she was going and what she was do? *11 package drugs. She had a of

[Holloman]: you Hów do know that? [Prosecutor]: looking Because I was at them. [Holloman]: Well, they how did come out that you [Prosecutor]: looked at them? She took them out of her sock.

[Holloman]: sock, When she took them out of her what [Prosecutor]: happened? she had go

[Holloman]: She said to back around the comer they they because needed her and couldn’t do without her. I Then she asked me did want some I told drugs, of no—no, her she told me that she messed thewp pack if what was to her. going happen say going happen? [Prosecutor]: What did she was they She said shot her in elbow one time [Holloman]: said they they going and were to shoot her in the head. 18, added); Testimony, Notes of October 1994 at 85 (emphasis added). 19,1994 Testimony, Notes of October at 107 (emphasis contends, hand, The Commonwealth on the other that these pursuant statements were admissible to the state of mind exception against hearsay. to the rule agree. We

59 for the offered out-of-court statement Hearsay is an in the statement. Common matter asserted truth of the (1992). 591, The rule Jones, A.2d 931 Pa. 610 v. 530 wealth from its assumed evidence stems admitting hearsay against the trier declarant is not before unreliability because accuracy of the challenged regarding be fact and cannot Rush, 498, 505, 605 529 Pa. v. Commonwealth statement. defen (1992). violates the Hearsay testimony also 792 A.2d Id. of confrontation. right dant’s exceptions Nonetheless, are several recognized there Wright, v. rule. See Commonwealth hearsay to the here, (1974). state of at issue 480, exception 317 A.2d 271 Auker, 545 Pa. v. mind, Commonwealth is well-established. 481 (1996); Lowenberg, v. Commonwealth 521, A.2d 1305 681 (1978); Riggins, v. 244, Commonwealth 392 A.2d 1274 Pa. Marshall, 287 (1978); Pa. Ickes, 582, A. (1926); Ickes v. 135 A. 301 Pa. the state of mind rationale for explained the We as follows: exception fact, mind, is a

Intention, as a state viewed through itself is a fact to evince way for such commonest because It is therefore or written declarations. spoken cases, apart intention proving many impossibility, declarations, admitted. The they are personal from then, admission, necessity, because of is of their true basis recognized.... rule is hearsay to the exception which an Marshall, the declar Pa. at 135 A. at 304. Where his or her state statements demonstrate ant’s out-of-court manner, are material and mind, in a natural are made *12 relevant, may be has held that the statements this Court Thomas, 160, v. Riggins; admitted. 118, denied, 856, 11 255, 84 S.Ct. 375 U.S. 189 A.2d cert. (1963). state of whether such 83 The determination L.Ed.2d trial discretion of the is within the sound ments are admissible an of that discre only upon reversed abuse court and will be 2, Pa. 645 A.2d 811 Ragan, 538 tion. Commonwealth 60 occasions,

On several we have held that a deceased victim’s evincing out-of-court statements an intent to meet the defen- shortly killing dant before the were pursuant admissible to the state of mind because such an exception provided intent circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the (victim defendant. told Lowenberg person third that she concerning wanted to see the defendant a serious financial (victim matter); Riggins party told third that she expected (victim home); defendant to visit her Marshall told third party going that she was to meet defendant and would disclose man); her affair with another see also Commonwealth v. (1995), Sneeringer, Pa.Super. 447 668 A.2d 1167 appeal denied, (1996) (victim A.2d told third parties that she intended to end her relationship with the defendant); Henderson, Commonwealth v. Pa.Super. (1984) (victim told parties third that he intended automobile). case, to meet with defendant to sell his In each the victim’s intent to meet the defendant was relevant to the case because permitted jury it to conclude that the defen- opportunity dant had the to commit in question. the crime Additionally, the victim’s intent to confront the defendant about financial matter in Lowenberg and the victim’s intent to disclose her affair Marshall were relevant supply jury potential with a motive for killing those cases. case,

In the present expressed Anderson an intent to meet with shortly before her death and was concerned that Collins would harm her if she hindered his trade. These out-of-court appear statements to have been made a natural Further, during manner casual conversation. the statements permitted jury to conclude that Anderson met with Col- lins, giving him opportunity to kill Lowenberg; her. Riggins; They Marshall. supplied also with a motive Thus, for Collins to kill Anderson. Lowenberg; Marshall. the trial properly court admitted the statements under the exception state of mind to the hearsay rule.

Statutory Review claims, Having addressed each of Collins’ we now conduct by § the review mandated 42 Pa.C.S. Section

61 we of death unless this to affirm the sentence Court requires that: determine

(i) passion, preju- of product the of death was the sentence factor; any arbitrary dice or other (ii) one finding to at least support the fails the evidence (d); or in subsection specified circumstance aggravating (iii) to disproportionate is or the sentence of death excessive cases, the considering both penalty imposed similar the crime character and record of the and the circumstances the defendant. 9711(h)(3).6 §

42 Pa.C.S. sen- record indicates that Collins’ death review of the Our or other passion, any product prejudice was not the tence to Additionally, was sufficient evidence arbitrary factor. there regard- the found the circumstances support aggravating have con- Lastly, murders. we ing each the first sentencing compiled review of data an the independent ducted of Pennsylvania the Office Courts. Consid- by Administrative of the crime and the character ering both the circumstances defendant, that the sentence and record of the we find imposed to in similar penalty is not the disproportionate death cases.

Accordingly, and sentences of death.7 we affirm verdicts NIGRO, J., concurring opinion. files a NIGRO, Justice, concurring. to join Majority’s separately only

I decision. I write involving of Dawn clarify point hearsay statements Anderson. repealed Assembly proportionali

6. Effective June the General penalty by deleting ty all of subsection review from the death statute (h)(3)(iii) (h)(4) portion proportion and a of subsection that references (Act 28), ality § review. effective Act of June No. However, imposed immediately. because Collins' death sentence was act, proportionality of the he is entitled to before effective date Gribble, - Pa. -, review. Commonwealth v. A.2d 426 complete Prothonotary this We direct record of transmit l(i). § Pennsylvania. 42 case to the Governor of Pa.C.S. Annie Holloman and Lisa testify did not Anderson Appellant by mentioned in any name of the state- ments prior leaving she made Holloman’s residence. Both Holloman and Tyler indicated that Anderson used the word *14 N.T., “they.” 10/18/94, 85; 10/19/94, See at at 107. The statements in question were therefore vague rather and did not completely constitute reliable evidence of Appellant’s guilt. statements, vagueness however, of the simply goes to weight. their recognized Defense counsel this at trial and used it to his advantage by highlighting the indefinite nature of the cross-examination, statements. For on example, Lisa Tyler admitted that she did not know to whom Anderson was referring when she stated that “they” might kill her. See N.T., 10/18/94, Holloman, turn, at 96-98. testified on cross that she had understood Anderson to referring be to Appellant Shawn Wilson when she “they” stated that had and/or shot N.T., her in 10/19/94, the elbow. See at 109-10. this,

Given and the fact that the state-of-mind exception to case, the hearsay rule applies this it is clear that the trial court did not err in admitting the question. statements in Pennsylvania, Appellee,

COMMONWEALTH of GRIBBLE, Appellant. William R.

Supreme Pennsylvania. Court

Argued Jan. 1996.

Decided Nov. 1997. Reargument Denied March

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Collins
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Nov 20, 1997
Citation: 703 A.2d 418
Docket Number: 123 Capital Appeal Docket
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.