COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID SIMMONS
No. 2461 EDA 2018
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AUGUST 18, 2021
2021 PA Super 166
OPINION BY OLSON, J.
J-E02004-20
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004160-2017
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2021
Appellant, David Simmons, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 18, 2018. We vacate Appellant‘s judgment of sentence and remand.
Appellant pleaded guilty to firearms not to be carried without a license and carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia.1 On December 18, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of six to 23 months in jail, followed by three years of probation, for his convictions. Sentencing Order, 12/18/17, at 1.
On February 19, 2018, Appellant was arrested and charged, at a separate docket number, with firearms not to be carried without a license and possession of a controlled substance.2 See Docket Number:
On July 18, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty to firearms not to be carried without a license and possession of a controlled substance at docket number 3561-2018 and the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve six to 23 months in jail, followed by three years of probation, for those convictions. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/18/18, at 24.
As a result of Appellant‘s convictions at docket number 3561-2018, the trial court in the case at bar revoked Appellant‘s parole, anticipatorily revoked Appellant‘s probation, and resentenced Appellant to serve a term of two and one-half to five years in prison. N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 7/18/18, at 27 and 35; Sentencing Order, 7/18/18, at 1. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, after we initially affirmed Appellant‘s judgment of sentence, Appellant filed an application for reargument en banc. We granted Appellant‘s application, withdrew the prior panel decision, and listed the case for en banc consideration. Appellant now raises the following claim to this Court:
When the [trial] court revoked parole for a violation [resulting from new convictions,] did not the court lack authority under Pennsylvania law to also revoke a consecutive sentence of probation that [Appellant] had not yet begun to serve?
Appellant‘s Brief at 4.
“[I]n an appeal from a sentence imposed after the court has revoked probation, we can review the validity of the revocation proceedings, the
Our task is guided by the sound and settled principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, including the primary maxim that the object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) . In pursuing that end, we are mindful that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) . Indeed, as a general rule, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute. In reading the plain language, “[w]ords and phrasesshall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” while any words or phrases that have acquired a “peculiar and appropriate meaning” must be construed according to that meaning. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a) . However, when interpreting non-explicit statutory text, legislative intent may be gleaned from a variety of factors, including, inter alia: the occasion and necessity for the statute; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and the contemporaneous legislative history.1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) . Moreover, while statutes generally should be construed liberally, penal statutes are always to be construed strictly,1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1) , and any ambiguity in a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.Notwithstanding the primacy of the plain meaning doctrine as best [representation] of legislative intent, the rules of construction offer several important qualifying precepts. For instance, the Statutory Construction Act also states that, in ascertaining legislative intent, courts may apply, inter alia, the following presumptions: that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable; and that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) ,(2) . Most importantly, the General Assembly has made clear that the rules of construction are not to be applied where they would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly.1 Pa.C.S. § 1901 .
Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189-190 (Pa. 2005) (some quotations, citations, and corrections omitted).
The statutes that govern the imposition and revocation of an order of probation are penal in nature and, as such, “must be strictly construed.”
As our Supreme Court has explained, the principle of strict construction “does not require that [we] give the words of a statute their ‘narrowest possible meaning,’ nor does it override the general principle that the words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved usage.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (some quotations and citations omitted). “Rather, where doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal statute, it is the accused who should receive the benefit of such doubt.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
We initially set forth the statutes governing the imposition and revocation of an order of probation, as those statutes existed at the time Appellant‘s probation was imposed and revoked. To this end, we recite the relevant portions of Sections 9721, 9754, and 9771 of the Sentencing Code, prior to their amendments in December 2019.
Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code is entitled “[s]entencing generally.” Section 9721(a) declares:
(a) General rule.--In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall . . . consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concurrently:
- An order of probation.
- A determination of guilt without further penalty.
- Partial confinement.
- Total confinement.
- A fine. . . .
Section 9754, entitled “[o]rder of probation,” goes on to declare that, “[i]n imposing an order of probation the court shall specify at the time of sentencing the length of any term during which the defendant is to be supervised, which term may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined, and the authority that shall conduct the supervision.”
(b) Conditions generally.--The court shall attach such of the reasonable conditions authorized by subsection (c) of this section as it deems necessary to insure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.
(c) Specific conditions.--The court may as a condition of its order require the defendant:
- To meet his family responsibilities.
- To devote himself to a specific occupation or employment.
(2.1) To participate in a public or nonprofit community service program unless the defendant was convicted of murder, rape, aggravated assault, arson, theft by extortion, terroristic threats, robbery or kidnapping. - To undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and to enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose.
- To pursue a prescribed secular course of study or vocational training.
- To attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction, recreation, or residence of persons on probation.
- To refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable places or consorting with disreputable persons.
- To have in his possession no firearm or other dangerous weapon unless granted written permission.
- To make restitution of the fruits of his crime or to make reparations, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused thereby.
- To remain within the jurisdiction of the court and to notify the court or the probation officer of any change in his address or his employment.
- To report as directed to the court or the probation officer and to permit the probation officer to visit his home.
- To pay such fine as has been imposed.
- To participate in drug or alcohol treatment programs.
- To satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.
To remain within the premises of his residence during the hours designated by the court.
Finally, Section 9771 sets forth the rules for “[m]odification or revocation of [an] order of probation.” It declares:
(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed.
(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.
(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:
- the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
- the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or
- such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.
(d) Hearing required.--There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased without a hearing.
Second, the trial court “may as a condition of its order” require the defendant to comply with certain, specific conditions of probation.
Third, the trial court “may at any time terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed.”
[o]nly upon the violation of any of the ‘specified conditions’ in the probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant‘s probation. In other words, a court may find a defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has violated one of the ‘specific conditions’ of
probation included in the probation order or has committed a new crime.
Foster, 214 A.3d at 1250.
The question in this case concerns when “the ‘specified conditions’ in the probation order” become active and enforceable against the defendant. For over forty years, three-judge panels of this Court have held that a defendant may prospectively violate the conditions of a probationary order by committing a new crime after sentencing, but before the commencement of their probationary period. This line of precedent began with Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. 1980).
In Wendowski, Mr. Wendowski was convicted of a variety of crimes and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment, followed by a term of probation. When Mr. Wendowski was on parole, he pleaded guilty to a new offense. As a result, the trial court revoked Mr. Wendowski‘s probation, even though his probationary term had not yet begun. Id. at 629. Mr. Wendowski appealed to this Court and claimed that, “since he was not actually serving the probation . . . on the day it was revoked, the revocation was an unconstitutional augmentation of [his] sentence.” Id. We held that Mr. Wendowski‘s claim failed.
In analyzing Mr. Wendowski‘s claim, we held that, “for revocation purposes,” the phrase “term of probation” must “include[e] the term beginning at the time probation is granted.” Id. at 630, quoting Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839, 841-842 (D.C.App. 1974). The Wendowski Court did not cite any statutory language to support this proposition. Instead,
The Wendowski Court then quoted a concurring opinion from Judge Curtis Waller, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and held:
If, at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum period of probation, or before he has begun service of his probation, he should commit offenses of such nature as to demonstrate to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, or the defendant, the court could revoke or change the order of probation. A defendant on probation has no contract with the court. He is still a person convicted of crime, and the expressed intent of the Court to have him under probation beginning at a future time does not change his position from the possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.
Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630, quoting James v. United States, 140 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1944) (Waller, J., concurring) (quotations and citations omitted).
The Wendowski Court thus held that the trial court properly revoked Mr. Wendowski‘s probation for committing a new crime, even though Mr.
To the extent any of the above cases cited to the relevant statutes, the statutory discussion and interpretation was minimal - which is, obviously, understandable, given that Wendowski constituted clear, binding precedent for all of the petite panels adjudicating the foregoing appeals. Commonwealth v. Taggert, 997 A.2d 1189, 1201 n.16 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“one three-judge panel of [the Superior] Court cannot overrule another” three-judge panel).
We further note that, in Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321 (Pa. Super. 2006), this Court expanded Wendowski‘s holding to cover a situation
[a]lthough [the defendant] herein did not, strictly speaking, violate the law by becoming intoxicated, he clearly violated the terms of his work release and “demonstrate[d] to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice [or] the best interests of the public.”
Id.;5 see also Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000) (declaring: “we note that [the defendant] does not dispute that the sentencing court had the authority to revoke her probation despite the fact that she was on parole at the time [she committed the alleged technical probation violations] and had not yet begun her probationary term. Indeed, it is clear that the court has this power“); Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31, 39 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that the trial court was authorized to prospectively revoke the defendant‘s probation for “a technical violation” 5
On appeal, Appellant asks this Court to overrule Wendowski and its progeny, as those cases “cannot bear scrutiny when examined in light of the relevant statutes that are controlling on the issue of whether a consecutively imposed term of probation may be revoked for conduct while the defendant is not on probation.” Appellant‘s Brief at 11. Of note, Appellant argues that, at sentencing,
In this case, the trial court specifically imposed Appellant‘s order of probation consecutive to a term of imprisonment. Further, Appellant committed new criminal offenses, and was convicted of the new criminal charges, while he was on parole in this case and before his term of probation commenced. Appellant argues that, under the plain language of our statutes, he could not have violated a “specified condition” of his probation before his probationary period actually began. For this reason, Appellant asserts that the trial court lacked statutory authority to revoke his probation. Appellant also argues that, to the extent the trial court amended his original order of
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that Wendowski was properly decided. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues, Wendowski correctly concluded that the term “probation,” as used in the revocation statute, was ambiguous and that, “for revocation purposes, ‘probation’ had been defined through practice and persuasive authority as beginning when the probationary term is imposed, not when it begins to run.” Commonwealth‘s Brief at 12.
The Commonwealth also argues that the doctrine of stare decisis and the presumption of legislative acquiescence support upholding Wendowski. With respect to the doctrine of stare decisis, the Commonwealth notes that this Court has followed Wendowski for over forty years and we should, obviously, “hesitate to overturn forty years of settled case law.” Id. at 18. Further, as to the presumption of legislative acquiescence, the Commonwealth notes that, during the forty years following Wendowski, the General Assembly has amended the probation revocation statute twice, “with no rejection of [Wendowski‘s] interpretation” of the statute. Thus, the Commonwealth claims, there is a statutory presumption that Wendowski‘s interpretation “was in accordance with the legislative intent; otherwise the General Assembly would have changed the law in a subsequent amendment.” Id. at 16 (quotations and citations omitted).
As noted above, when sentencing a defendant, Section 9721(a) authorizes a trial court to enter an “order of probation;” the section declares that the court may impose this order of probation “consecutively or concurrently.”
Section 9771(b) permits revocation of an order of probation “upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.”
With respect to the conditions of probation, Section 9754 declares that the trial court “may as a condition of its order” of probation require the defendant to comply with certain, specific conditions of probation.
First, it cannot be argued that the “specified conditions” in an order of probation attach to a term of imprisonment. To be sure, the plain terms of Section 9754 only permit the trial court to attach “conditions of probation” to an “order of probation.” See
Second, under our statutes, no part of the trial court‘s order of probation could have commenced during Appellant‘s term of imprisonment or parole. Certainly, Section 9721(a) declares that a trial court may enter an “order of probation” at sentencing and may impose this “order of probation” “consecutively or concurrently.”
Simply stated, Wendowski was incorrect in holding that a trial court may anticipatorily revoke an order of probation and in reasoning that “a term of probation may and should be construed for revocation purposes as including the term beginning at the time probation is granted.” Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630 (quotations omitted). No statutory authority exists to support this understanding. Rather, the plain language of the relevant statutes provides that: a trial court may only revoke an order of probation “upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation;” the “specified conditions” of an order of probation are attached to, or are a part of, the order of probation; and, when the trial court imposes an “order of probation” consecutively to another term, the entirety of the “order of probation” – including the “specified conditions” – do not begin to commence until the prior term ends.8
“Violation.” A finding by a court of record, following a hearing, that the offender failed to comply with terms and conditions of an order of probation.
“Technical violation.” Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of an order of probation, other than by the commission of a new offense of which the offender is convicted in a court of record.
“Conviction violation.” Commission of a new offense during the period of probation, resulting in a conviction for a misdemeanor or felony in a court of record, whether or not [judgment] of sentence has been imposed.
The Resentencing Guidelines were adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (“the Commission“) and were “not enacted as part of” the Judicial Code. See id. at cmt. Nevertheless, the General Assembly mandated that the Commission adopt guidelines for resentencing and the General Assembly further declared that the Resentencing Guidelines “shall be considered by the [trial] court when resentencing an offender following revocation of probation.”
The General Assembly has been on notice of this Court‘s interpretation of § 9771 for decades and, despite amending the statute twice in that time, has never changed the operative language of the statute. It is well-established that “[t]he failure of the General Assembly to change the law which has been interpreted by the courts creates a presumption that the interpretation was in accordance with the legislative intent; otherwise the General Assembly would have changed the law in a subsequent amendment.” Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. 1999).
Commonwealth‘s Brief at 16.
The Commonwealth‘s argument fails. As explained above, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used:
. . .
(4) That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.
Wendowski was issued by a three-judge panel of this Court – not “a court of last resort.” Nevertheless, in In re Estate of Lock, 244 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the presumption of legislative acquiescence to certain opinions from this Court. The Supreme Court declared:
where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a similar statute dealing with the same subject matter, the legislature intended the same construction to be placed on the language of the subsequent statute.
In re Estate of Lock, 244 A.2d at 683.
Even though the presumption of legislative acquiescence extends to Superior Court opinions, “[a]pplication of [the] presumption is discretionary, not mandatory.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1285 (Pa. 2020);
This extension of § 1922(4) beyond its terms to encompass lines of Superior Court precedent [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has yet to disturb would seem to hinge at least in part on the idea that [the Supreme Court‘s] decision not to review such cases is, itself, a form of acquiescence. But as [the Supreme Court‘s] then-Justice Samuel J. Roberts once observed, “A denial [of allocatur] may merely reflect that the particular controversy was not the proper vehicle for deciding a question of law or that it was not presented in the proper posture.” Hon. Samuel J. Roberts, Foreword, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1980, 54 TEMPLE L.Q. 403, 407 (1981); cf. Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1996) (“[A] dismissal [of a petition for allowance of appeal] as being improvidently granted has the exact same effect as if [the Supreme Court] had denied the petition for allowance of appeal (allocatur) in the first place. Where [the Supreme Court dismisses] an appeal as improvidently granted, the lower tribunal‘s opinion and order stand as a decision of that court and [the Supreme Court‘s] order has no precedential value“).
Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 107 n.14 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis and explanatory phrase omitted); see also Dickson, 918 A.2d at 110 (Cappy, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with footnote 14 from the opinion and explaining: ”Estate of Lock‘s presumption regarding legislative intent hinges on the existence of an intermediate court decision which has not been modified by [the Supreme] Court. As noted by the Majority, this approach fails to appreciate that [the Supreme Court‘s] denial of allocatur of an intermediate court decision is not an endorsement of or rejection of the intermediate appellate court‘s decision“).
Wendowski held that a court may anticipatorily revoke an order of probation when the defendant commits a new crime after sentencing, but before the period of probation has begun. As explained above, this holding
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions to reinstate the original order of probation and for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge Lazarus, Judge Dubow and Judge McCaffery join this Opinion.
Judge Kunselman files a Concurring Opinion in which Judge Lazarus, Judge Dubow and Judge McCaffery join.
Judge Bowes files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in which Judge Murray joins.
Judge Shogan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2021
Notes
Aggregation of sentences is:
the combining of multiple consecutive sentences of total confinement and treating them as if they were a single sentence. The minimum sentences are added together to arrive at an aggregated minimum sentence while the maximum sentences are added together to arrive at an aggregated maximum sentence.
12 West‘s Pa. Prac., Law of Probation & Parole § 4:9 (3d ed.).
Whenever the court determines that a sentence should be served consecutively to one being then imposed by the court, or to one previously imposed, the court shall indicate the minimum sentence to be served for the total of all offenses with respect to which sentence is imposed. Such minimum sentence shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.
Our plain reading of the statute is bolstered by the definitions of “violation,” “technical violation,” and “conviction violation” in the Resentencing Guidelines. The Resentencing Guidelines define these terms as follows:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
For like reasons, the Commonwealth‘s appeal to the doctrine of stare decisis must fail. We again paraphrase our Supreme Court in holding:
As for our precedent, we do not take lightly the decision to depart therefrom. But stare decisis has its limits. While ”stare decisis serves invaluable and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly when such adherence leads to perpetuating error.” Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 967 (Pa. 2006). Indeed, particularly when this Court‘s prior cases have “distorted the clear intention of the legislative enactment and by that erroneous interpretation permitted the policy of that legislation to be effectively frustrated,” this Court has “no alternative but to rectify our earlier pronouncements and may not blindly adhere to the past rulings out of a deference to antiquity.” Mayhugh v. Coon, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (Pa. 1975).
The learned concurring and dissenting opinion declares that we have engaged in an “overly-strict interpretation” of
At the outset, as explained above, the plain statutory language of Section 9771(b) only permits revocation of an order of probation upon “proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.” See
To clarify, there is a difference between “specified conditions” of probation and “specific conditions” of probation. As explained in Foster, the “specified conditions” of probation are composed of: 1) the “general condition . . . that the defendant refrain from committing another crime” and 2) the “specific conditions” that the court imposes “from the list enumerated in section 9754(c).” Foster, 214 A.3d at 1250. And, under the plain statutory language of Section 9771(b), “[o]nly upon the violation of any of the ‘specified conditions’ in the probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant‘s probation.” Id. Moreover, as we have explained, since the “specified conditions” of an order of probation are attached to, or are a part of, the order of probation, when the trial court imposes an “order of probation” consecutively to another term, the entirety of the “order of probation” – including the “specified conditions” – cannot begin to commence until the prior term ends. See supra at **22-23.