Case Information
*1 [J-8-2017]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ. THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY : No. 30 EAP 2016 HOSPITALS, INC.,
: Appeal from the Order Appellant : Commonwealth Court entered on : 01/06/2016 at No. CD 2014 : affirming Order entered on : 11/17/2014 Department Labor, v. : No. 2014-02 the 02/17/2016 : Order Denying the Application for PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF : Reargument.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY, BUREAU OF
LABOR LAW COMPLIANCE, : ARGUED: March 7,
Appellee
ELIZABETH HAUBRICH,
Intervenor
OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: June this appeal, we consider whether recently terminated employee an "employee" and, thus, entitled inspect personnel file, according the Inspection Employment Records Law (hereinafter "the Personnel Files Act" or "the Act"), 43 P.S. §§ 1321-24. Because we conclude that Act's definition of "employee" excludes former employees, we hold terminated employee precluded from inspecting her file. We reverse contrary holding Court.
At the heart of this case the Personnel Files Act's definition of "employee," which is follows:
Any person currently employed, laid off reemployment rights or on leave absence. The term 'employee' shall not include applicants for employment or any other person.
43 P.S. § 1321. The Act further provides:
An employer shall, reasonable times, upon request an employee, permit that employee or an agent designated by employee inspect his or her own personnel files used determine his or her own qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, termination or disciplinary action . .
43 P.S. § 1322.
In Beitman Dep't Labor & Indus., 675 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, considered whether Personnel Files Act allowed former employee to access her file. case, employee who had been terminated over two years earlier requested access to her personnel file pursuant The employer denied her request, citing the Act's definition employee. The Department Labor and Industry's Bureau Labor Law Compliance ("Department") upheld that decision.
The employee appealed Court, arguing that, because section 1322 permits inspection by employee "to determine or her own termination disciplinary action," 43 P.S. 1322, qualifications for General Assembly must have intended for terminated employees to be covered the Act. The employee further asserted that interpret the Act any other way would render phrase "termination or disciplinary action" mere surplusage. Commonwealth Court majority ultimately agreed with the Department and
held that the former employee permitted access file. However, majority confined its holding specific facts of the case, explaining that did "not interpret phrase 'currently employed' [s]ection [1321] so stringently as to prohibit *3 an individual from obtaining or her personnel file when such request made contemporaneously with termination or within reasonable time immediately following termination." Beitman, 675 A.2d 1302 (emphasis added).
Three judges dissented, opining that the Act did not clearly unambiguously exclude former employees from the definition employee. See Beitman, 675 A.2d at 1303 (Friedman, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that exclusion of "any other person" under section more likely was intended exclude individuals who had never been employees rather than those that had at one time been employed, especially considering the use of the word "termination" section The dissent concluded that section ambiguous when read along with section 1322, because section allows employees view their personnel files ascertain reason for their termination. In dissent's view, if "employee" excluded terminated employees, would meaningless. The dissent rejected the majority's suggestion that employees could obtain their files contemporaneously termination immediately thereafter. Such reading, the dissent opined, was at odds with what majority stated was the plain and unambiguous language of the Act. dissent suggested that majority could not have both ways. See Beitman, at 1304 n.4 (Friedman, J., dissenting) ("Following Majority's rationale, if section [1321] defines "employee" exclude former employees, then section [1322], which defines the rights "employees" under the Act, cannot, definition, afford any protection to former employees, matter how recent their termination."). dissent's view, the point time at which employee's rights are most in
jeopardy at termination, most terminations do not come with advance notice. The dissent found unreasonable conclude that the General Assembly would have intended exclude terminated employees from the protections the Act. Accordingly, dissent would have held that Act's definition of employee includes former employees who were terminated prior to requesting to view their files.
Following Beitman, the Department developed a policy that allows former employees access their files if they make the request within a reasonable time. The Department generally has defined a reasonable time approximately thirty days after termination. See Appellant's Br. ("In at least thirty cases . . since the Beitman . Department [has] held that 'currently employed' could encompass decision persons who requested their personnel files seventeen, nineteen, twenty-three, and twenty-four days after their employment ended[,] but not persons who requested their files thirty-two, thirty-four, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-five days after termination.") (emphasis original).
The Beitman decision, and the Department's application that decision, form backdrop for present controversy. facts this case are straightforward undisputed. Elizabeth Haubrich worked for Thomas Jefferson University Hospital ("Hospital") a nurse -anesthetist. The Hospital terminated Haubrich on August 9, A week later, on August 16, 2013, Haubrich filed request with the Hospital view her personnel file pursuant the Personnel Files Act. Believing that Haubrich was not entitled view her files because she was longer employee, Hospital denied request.
On January 2014, Haubrich filed complaint with the Department seeking access to her records under the Act. The parties agreed forgo evidentiary hearing and filed joint stipulation facts. Haubrich conceded that she was employed by the Hospital at the time she made the request. She also stipulated that she did not have reemployment rights and on a leave absence. The parties submitted briefs Department held oral argument on the sole issue whether Haubrich "employee" under the Act. Relying upon the Beitman court's statement that former employees who request their files within reasonable time following their termination covered the Act, the Department determined that Haubrich had requested her file within reasonable time after her termination. Thus, on November 2014, the Department granted Haubrich's request to inspect personnel file.
The Hospital appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing the plain the Act clearly excludes former employees from the definition employee. Specifically, the Hospital emphasized that Act uses the term "currently employed" excludes "any other person." 43 P.S. The Hospital further argued that legislative history the Act indicates that the General Assembly did intend to allow former employees access their personnel files, directing court various failed attempts General Assembly amend the Act include terminated employees. Finally, the Hospital argued that the qualifying language from Beitman was mere dicta, therefore was controlling. Commonwealth Court defined "current" mean "'presently elapsing,' `occurring or existing at present time' or 'most recent." Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep't Labor & Indus., A.3d 567, 570 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Pickens v. Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Bd., 890 1117, 1119-20 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)).1 Applying that definition, the court found that In Commonwealth Court addressed whether Pickens, the landowner was entitled receive payments from Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund pursuant the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act ("Tank Act"), 35 P.S. §§ 6021.101-6021.2104. order to be eligible receive payments under Tank Act, a claimant must meet certain eligibility requirements, including payment of the "current fee" for underground storage tank. The parties disputed what was included "current fee" and, settling that dispute, the Court observed that "'current' means 'presently elapsing,' occurring existing the present time' or `most recent." Pickens Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Bd., 890 A.2d (continued...)
"Haubrich's employment, having terminated one week prior to her request, clearly qualifies 'presently elapsed' employment and/or 'most recent' employment, thereby, falling within the statute." Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., A.3d at 570. The court also opined that it was necessary to construe the Act to include recently terminated employees because, pursuant to 1322 of the Act, "an employee expressly permitted inspect one's personnel file to determine the basis for his [or] her employment termination, [and] would not possible for one inspect his or her file regarding or her employment termination while one currently employed." Id.; see 43 P.S. § Therefore, the Commonwealth Court concluded, reading "recently terminated employees" into the Act was necessary avoid absurd result.
The Commonwealth Court was persuaded by the Hospital's legislative history argument, explaining that only legislative history that relevant discern the meaning of a statute the "contemporaneous legislative history," Pa.C.S. 1921(c), is, the history the statute prior its enactment and not subsequent attempts by legislature amend the statute. The court explained that could "discern the legislative intent General Assembly that passed the relevant statute by examining the intent the General Assembly that subsequently failed amend that statute[.]" Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., (quoting v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 827 (Pa. 2015)).
Finally, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the qualifying language in Beitman was more than dicta. court opined that was, fact, part the holding and was included majority response dissent's position that (... continued) 1119-20 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Webster's Eleventh Collegiate
Dictionary 306 (2004)). *7 the statute encompasses all former employees. The court concluded that it would be disingenuous read Beitman holding that former employee can qualify under Act. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court held that Haubrich was an employee under the Act, and it affirmed the Department's order.
The Hospital filed petition for allowance of appeal with this Court. We granted allocatur on the following issue of first impression, as framed by the Hospital:
Whether Pennsylvania Personnel File Act [43 P.S. §§ 1321-241's definition of "current employee" means former employee, held by Commonwealth Court this case when it erroneously relied on nonprecedential dicta earlier Commonwealth Court decision (Beitman v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 675 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996))? Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., Bureau of Labor Law Compliance, 143 A.3d 889 (Pa. 2016) (emphasis original).
We are called upon to interpret the Act's definition of "employee." This requires us to perform the familiar task of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which our standard of review de novo, and our scope of review plenary. v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 921 (Pa. 2016). "In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, [1] Pa.C.S. §§ 1501, et seq., which directs us to ascertain and effectuate intent of the General Assembly. Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)." Kingston, 143 A.3d at 922. discerning that intent, the court first resorts language
statute itself. If the statute clearly unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, is the duty of court apply that intent the case at hand and not look beyond the statutory language ascertain its meaning. See Pa.C.S. 1921(b) ("When the words of a statute clear free from all ambiguity, the letter not to be disregarded under pretext pursuing its spirit."). "Relatedly, it is well established that resort the rules statutory construction made only when there ambiguity the provision." Oliver v. City Pittsburgh, (Pa. 2011).
Mohamed Commonwealth, Dep't Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 40 A.3d 1186, 1192-93 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations modified).
The Hospital expands upon arguments that raised before it Court. The Hospital urges that the language section 1321 unambiguously defines "employee" to include only individuals "currently employed, laid off with reemployment rights or on leave of absence," that it expressly excludes "any other person," which necessarily encompasses person who was recently terminated.
The Hospital criticizes the Commonwealth Court's reliance upon the section arguing that unnecessary look beyond definition section 1321 because the language that section clear. Moreover, the Hospital disputes Commonwealth Court's conclusion that the portion referring to termination rendered meaningless when former employees excluded from the Act. The Hospital explains that some employed individuals may notified their termination advance and could access their personnel file while still employed. Additionally, the Hospital notes section 1322 does allow individual view his or personnel file ascertain the reasons for their termination; rather, allows them view the file order assess, inter alia, their "qualifications for termination." 43 P.S. (emphasis added). Thus, the Hospital suggests, current employees may wish view their files order evaluate whether their conduct constitutes grounds for termination based upon their employer's policies.2 Hospital also challenges the Commonwealth Court's definition of "current." It argues that Commonwealth Court employed inapplicable definition, i.e., "most recent," and shifted the tense another definition, changing "presently elapsing" Additionally, the Hospital notes that former employees who believe they have been wrongfully terminated may gain access their files filing lawsuit seeking the files discovery.
"presently elapsed." The Hospital explains that the definition of "most recent" applied in Pickens was applicable in that case because the court was interpreting the term "current fee." Conversely, in the context of whether someone currently employed, Hospital maintains, the plain meaning of "currently" cannot mean "most recently." The Hospital observes that one who recently lost or her job would say that he or she is currently employed.
The Hospital revives its argument that language from Beitman, in which the Commonwealth Court stated that was deciding whether recently terminated *10 their personnel files within a "reasonable time" perpetuates uncertainty because employers will be unsure about precisely what constitutes a reasonable time and, thus, will not know whether to allow particular former employees to view their files. The Hospital also claims that it cannot be left up to the Department to define what constitutes reasonable time because the Department lacks rulemaking authority under Act. Finally, the Hospital asserts that, because the likelihood acrimony between terminated employees and their former employers, prudent to exclude former employees from the Act so that they cannot use the information in their files harass employers or their former co-workers or to otherwise disrupt the workplace. response, the Department argues that Act ambiguous because, although section 1321 seems to exclude former employees from coverage, section 1322 allows employee "to inspect or her own personnel files used determine his or her own qualifications for termination." 43 P.S. 1322 (emphasis added). The Department asserts that would be impossible for employee inspect files related to his or termination prior being terminated. The Department invokes the rule statutory construction requiring this Court consider meaning each part of a statute context of its whole. See A.S. v. Pa. State Police, A.3d (Pa. 2016) ("[i]n construing giving effect text [of statute], we should interpret statutory words isolation, but must read them with reference the context which they appear.") (internal quotation omitted); Giulian, 1262, 1267 (Pa. 2016) ("in ascertaining legislative intent, every portion [of statute] to be read together with the remaining language construed reference the statute a whole."). Applying this principle, Department argues that the definition "employee" contained must read the context what permitted under section When read together, according Department, the two *11 sections irreconcilable based upon their plain language, rendering the Act ambiguous.
The Department suggests that this ambiguity was resolved by the Commonwealth Court over twenty years ago when decided Beitman, and the Commonwealth Court present case correctly applied the rules of statutory construction essentially ratifying Beitman. The Department explains that, construing the Act exclude recently terminated employees produces "a result that absurd, impossible of execution [and] unreasonable," see [1] Pa.C.S. § 1922(1): one would ever be able view personnel files that served the basis for termination despite fact that section 1322 provides for such. The Department further argues that reading portions of section out of the Act also violates rule of statutory construction "that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective certain." Pa.C.S. § 1922(2). The Department posits that Commonwealth Court avoided violation these rules of statutory construction Beitman concluding that the Act must allow some former employees access their files, but restricting that group employees who were concurrently terminated who requested their files within a reasonable time following termination. The Department stresses that this caveat was more than mere dicta because specifically provided parameters Commonwealth Court's interpretation which was the exact issue before the court. Department criticizes Hospital's attempt use post -enactment
legislative history support for Hospital's proffered interpretation Act, arguing that only "contemporaneous legislative history" may used discern legislative intent. See Pa.C.S. 1921(c)(7); Lynn, ("Legislative history generally understood encompass retrospective review the legislative *12 consideration of a statute, a review of the oxymoronic subsequent legislative history."). Moreover, the Department argues that the Commonwealth Court's interpretation of the Act in Beitman has been controlling precedent for over two decades. Thus, the General Assembly's failure amend (or choice amend) Act could interpreted as validation the Beitman standard. Department also challenges the Hospital's characterization
Department's role in adjudicating disputes under the Act. The Department points to section of the Act, which authorizes "make and enforce such orders [it] shall deem appropriate provide access [personnel files.]" P.S. The Department explains that has not engaged unauthorized rulemaking, but has applied the Beitman standard consistently over the past twenty years, which has resulted a consistent cut-off around one month from the date termination, after which former employee may longer access their file.
Finally, the Department argues that the Hospital's assertion that the Beitman standard unworkable policy argument that should be directed toward the General Assembly rather than this Court. The Department explains that, by enacting the statute, General Assembly made the policy decision that employee access personnel files was worth the cost any hardship experienced employers and any *13 does not encompass former employees because must be read in context of words that immediately precede it, which refer applicants. Accordingly, Haubrich argues that "any other person" only refers other people who, like applicants, have never been employees. Thus, she claims that section does clearly exclude former employees. Haubrich also adds that public policy favors a broad interpretation Act, which is remedial legislation designed protect employees. most other respects, her argument mirrors that Department.
The Personnel Files Act defines "employee" as "[a]ny person currently employed, laid off reemployment rights on leave of absence," provides that, "[t]he term `employee' shall not include applicants for employment or any other person." P.S. § Because parties have agreed that Haubrich was not laid off with reemployment rights and was on a leave absence, our inquiry centers on meaning of "currently employed" as used in statutory definition.
The dictionary one tool this Court uses apprehend term's plain meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "employed" ". (another's) employ." The Compact Oxford English Dictionary, (2d ed. 2007); see also id. at 509 (defining "employ" as "to use services (a person) professional capacity, or in transaction some special business; to have or maintain (person's) one's service."). "Currently" defined as, inter alia, "now, at the present moment." Id. at 377. Thus, the commonly accepted understanding being currently employed requires that person maintained another's service now, at the present time. Commonwealth Court's reasoning that "current" can also mean "most recent" or "presently elapsed" strained.3 It true that "current" can mean "most Thomas "presently elapsed." See the definition of "current" "presently elapsing'' the tense Commonwealth Court shifted the Hospital, the identified Notably, Jefferson Univ. Hosps., at 570 ("[A]ccording Webster's 11th Collegiate (continued...)
recent" in certain contexts, such as in Pickens, 890 A.2d at 1119-20, where Commonwealth Court held the term "current fee" meant the most recent fee, or when talking about current issue of periodical. It does not follow that "current" or "currently" always includes that sense of recentness. More commonly, "currently" is understood mean "right now" or "at the present time." term "currently employed" cannot mean both presently employed formerly employed. By this definition "currently employed," former employees are not employees, and, therefore, not covered by the Act. As the Hospital argues, such conclusion arises from common sense approach the plain meaning "currently," bolstered by the fact that expressly excludes "any other person" from its definition of employee.
The only potential ambiguity Act, as asserted Department and Haubrich, arises when section 1321 is read conjunction with section which allows employees inspect their personnel files order "determine," inter alia, their "qualifications for . . termination . . ." Although this language appears at first blush . . peculiar insofar we do not ordinarily consider people to hold "qualifications . . for . termination," nonetheless sufficiently unambiguous context. As the Hospital points out, there are indeed situations which currently employed individuals receive advance notice that they will be terminated from employment. See, e.g., Lafayette College Dep't Labor and Indust., Bureau of Labor Standards, 546 A.2d 126 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), (holding that college professor was permitted access personnel file while still employed although he had been denied tenure, which meant that he would discharged the end of his employment contract). Moreover, the Act permits an (... continued) Dictionary, 'current' means 'presently elapsing,' Haubrich's employment, having
terminated one week prior to her request, clearly qualifies "presently elapsed') (emphasis added).
employee "to inspect or her own personnel files used to determine his or her own qualifications for . . termination." 43 P.S. § 1322 (emphasis added). This language . does not require, contemplate, or even allow that the inspecting employee be terminated. Instead, it guarantees inspection access for current employees to files that employer uses to determine whether employee "qualif[ies] for . . termination." . Id.
To be sure, it is likely that a terminated employee will have cause to inspect his or her file order to understand why he or she was terminated.4 However, in interpreting statute, we generally are not concerned that the General Assembly has chosen remedy small subset possible harms; this is legislative prerogative. Our only concern is that the word "termination" section 1322 has some meaning such that not mere surplusage. See Pa.C.S. 1921(a) ("Every statute shall be construed, if possible, give effect to all its provisions"); Driscoll, 312, (Pa. 1979) ("We must assume that the legislature intends every word of the statute have effect"). Because the phrase "files used determine . qualifications for . . termination" has meaning, even when former employees excluded from coverage, it superfluous. Thus, reading the Act exclude terminated employees does not violate the rules statutory construction. Accordingly, the plain meaning of "currently employed" set forth controls.5
[4] It possible, the Hospital suggests, the General Assembly did not believe was necessary provide terminated employees inspection rights because those individuals who perceive that their termination was unlawful may gain access to their personnel files discovery after they file lawsuit. Because we conclude that Act's ambiguous, we need not
consider legislative history policy arguments forwarded the parties. To the extent that "public policy" favors expansion the Personnel Files Act's protections, we emphasize that policy arguments must addressed the General Assembly, not this Court. (continued...)
Regarding Beitman, strictly speaking, language that qualifies the the Commonwealth Court's holding is dicta. It was not essential that court's holding, and the factual scenario that it discussed not before the court. "General expressions in opinion must be considered the light of and cannot be dissevered from the facts that case; what is actually decided and controlling is law applicable particular facts that particular case while all other statements conclusions therein are entitled great consideration they are not controlling." In re Pew's Trust Estate, 191 A.2d (Pa. 1963), (collecting cases), overruled part by Estate of Tyler, A.2d 157 (Pa. 1977); Stellwagon v. Pyle, A.2d 819, 823 (Pa. 1957) ("[L]anguage employed [judicial] opinions must be related the issue decided; when it goes beyond that, it must considered dictum"). Moreover, although the Commonwealth Court generally must adhere the binding language of its own opinions, we, as Supreme Court, are not so bound. Commonwealth Cook, 735 673, 678 n.7 (Pa. 1999) ("[T]his [C]ourt is not bound by rulings of a lower court this Commonwealth."). Beitman Court's caveat is based upon plain reading Personnel Files Act. Whether caveat is part the holding is dicta, it is erroneous. Thus, although the Commonwealth Court's holding Beitman-that a former employee is covered the Personnel Files Act-is consistent with our interpretation statutory language, the extent that Beitman contains language inconsistent with today's decision, it overruled. (... continued)
Additionally, it of no consequence that Department, following Beitman, has developed what deems consistent body of decisions regarding what constitutes "a reasonable time immediately following termination." The rules statutory construction do not allow us to deviate from the plain meaning of a statute simply because the body charged enforcing capable applying different interpretation.
[J-8-2017] *17 Reading the Personnel Files Act according to its plain terms, we conclude that former employees, who were not laid off with re-employment rights and who are not on leave absence, have right access their personnel files pursuant the Act, regardless how quickly following termination they request to do so. Thus, we hold that Haubrich permitted access her file. The order Commonwealth Court reversed, and, extent that Beitman inconsistent today's decision, is disapproved.
Chief Justice Saylor Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty Mundy join the opinion. employees are covered by the Act, was dicta. The Hospital notes that Beitman majority actually held former employee not entitled to view file pursuant to the Act. The Hospital quotes Beitman majority's statement that "had the legislature intended encompass ex -employees the definition 'employee,' would have specifically included them definition." Appellant's Br. at 26 (quoting Beitman, 675 A.2d 1302.). The Hospital also notes that the Beitman dissent interpreted the majority's holding exclude all ex -employees. See Beitman, 675 A.2d only those three at 1303 (Friedman, J., dissenting) ("[A]ccording the Majority categories persons enumerated
[1] are permitted access their personnel files; all other persons not within one those three specific categories denied such access."). The Hospital emphasizes that the former employee Beitman had been terminated over two years prior requesting her file, and, thus, the issue of whether a recently terminated employee covered the Act was before the court. Accordingly, the Hospital asserts, the Beitman majority's further explanation its interpretation the Act was not essential its holding dicta. Finally, the Hospital argues that the Beitman comment recent terminations unworkable practice. The Hospital claims that allowing former employees seek
disruptions workplace. Moreover, Department notes Act already has place several measures meant balance employer employee interests, that the Hospital exaggerates many employer concerns. Haubrich, intervenor, also filed brief responding Hospital's arguments. The majority Haubrich's argument duplicative Department's position. She reiterates the ambiguities Act that result when section and 1322 are read together, but adds that the phrase "any other person"