Commonwealth v. DicksonCommonwealth v. Dickson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cappy
Lead
OPINION
Justice BAER.We are asked to consider whether the sentencing enhancement codified at
I. Background
The facts underlying Appellant’s conviction are neither complicated nor subject to material dispute. The afternoon of April 21, 2001, found Derek Cunningham, the victim, speaking with Tiara Van Leer. Cunningham recently had sold Van Leer a car; presently, she was asking Cunningham to take back the car and refund the sales price. Cunningham agreed to take back the car, but offered to refund only $250 of the $300 sales price.
Van Leer’s cousin Ravah Dickson (Appellant), who stood nearby, expressed the view that Cunningham should refund Van Leer more than $250 of the sales price. Appellant then left the scene and returned a few minutes later with co-defendant William Brown and one Bruce Veney, also Van Leer’s cousin.2 Soon after their return, Appellant restrained Ruffin in a bear hug while Brown pulled a gun, placed it against Cunningham’s head, and demanded all of Cunningham’s money and the keys to the car. Cunningham surrendered $256 and the keys. Appellant warned Cunningham not to call the police, then he and the others left the scene.
Appellant and Brown were arrested and tried together before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Brown was convicted of robbery and criminal conspiracy; 3 Appellant was convicted of conspiracy but acquitted of robbery.
On March 25, 2002, the trial court convened a sentencing hearing. There, Appellant, noting that the original indictment was couched in terms of theft, robbery, and conspiracy to commit same, and further pointing out that he was convicted of conspiracy but acquitted of robbery, argued
Appellant next called the court’s attention to an Apprendi motion then pending.5 He argued that because the Commonwealth need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the mandatory minimum sentence applies, § 9712 violates Apprendi’‘s requirement that all substantive elements of an offense be proved before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before the trial court could interject, Appellant then argued that application of the mandatory minimum “takes away the discretion of the court to impose a lesser sentence.” N.T., 3/25/02, at 4. Appellant proceeded to argue, based on the differences between Appellant’s and co-defendant’s conduct, that Appellant’s case warranted precisely the lesser sentence precluded by application of the § 9712 mandatory minimum. The court cut Appellant’s counsel off, however, foreclosing further argument:
I think case law is supportive of the Commonwealth’s position. I have no discretion.
Mr. Dixon, on bill of information 0022, January Term 2002, where the jury found you guilty of Conspiracy to Rob, this court sentences you to five to ten years in a state correctional institution, [and] 207 dollars cost[s] of court.
N.T., 3/25/02, at 5. Appellant’s judgment of sentence, therefore, was precisely the minimum sentence permissible given the trial court’s reading of the law to require imposition of the § 9712(a) mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
On direct appeal, Appellant contested the validity of the application of § 9712(a) to an unarmed co-conspirator. The Superior Court, noting that it repeatedly has rejected this argument, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chiari, 741 A.2d 770 (Pa.Super.1999), and that this Court has denied allowance of appeal of these rulings, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 886 Pa.Super. 100, 562 A.2d 378 (1989), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 618, 577 A.2d 889 (1990), declined Appellant’s invitation to overturn its prior precedent and affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. This appeal followed.
II. Waiver
Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant failed in the trial court to raise his challenge to the application of
The Commonwealth contends that Appellant failed to preserve the argument raised before this Court — -that
Appellant, who did not anticipate the waiver argument in its principal brief to this Court, responds in his Reply Brief that the Commonwealth has misconstrued the record. Specifically, he argues that while he initially allowed that he “would certainly have to concede the mandatory issue,” Reply Brief for Appellant at 2 (quoting N.T., 3/25/02, at 2), he did so only after submitting three specific challenges to the trial court— “one directed to verdict; one directed to Apprendi ...; and one directed to the concern raised in this appeal.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 3. He then quotes an exchange in which he argued that “applying the mandatory minimum takes away the discretion of the court to impose a lesser sentence” and that his case called for precisely the sort of downward deviation precluded by a mandatory sentence. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3 (quoting N.T., 3/25/02, at 3-4). The court, however, cut off Appellant’s argument, observing, “I think case law is supportive of the Commonwealth’s position. I have no discretion.” N.T., 3/25/02, at 4. Focusing on the trial court’s statement precluding further argument on the application of the mandatory minimum sentence, Appellant argues that “[w]here, as here, the trial court correctly recognized [A]ppellant’s claim in its nascency [sic ], but cut [A]ppellant off before it could be fully articulated based upon a clear line of extant appellate authority, it would be unreasonable and unfair to hold the claim waived.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 4.
While the Commonwealth raises a colorable claim that Appellant did not expressly preserve the application of
The Commonwealth is correct insofar as Appellant never explicitly argued that
III. The Mandatory Minimum Sentence
This brings us to the question that lies at the heart of this case: Whether the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in
The instant question requires us to interpret
(a) Mandatory Sentence.— ... [AJny person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as defined in section 9714(g) ... shall, if ike person visibly possessed a fireann or a, replica of a firearm, whether or not the firearm or replica was loaded or functional, that placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, during the commission of the offense,be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Such persons shall not be eligible for parole, probation, work release or furlough.
(c) Authority of court in sentencing. — There shall be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend sentence.
[T]he term “crime of violence” means murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault ..., rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, incest, sexual assault, arson ..., kidnapping, burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodation in which at the time of the offense any person is present, robbery as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(l)(i) , (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), or robbery of a motor vehicle, or criminal attempt, criminal conspiracy or criminal solicitation to commit murder or any of the offenses listed above, or an equivalent crime under the laws of this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission of that offense or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction.
The question before us lies not in the validity of
Appellant insists that the language of
Viewed in isolation,
We begin by reviewing the Superior Court decision from which the instant challenge derives. In Commonwealth v. Williams, two young men robbed a man, with Williams’ co-conspirator threatening their victim with a pellet gun. 509 A.2d at 1292-93. The trial court declined to impose the five-year minimum sentence on Williams in part because Williams never visibly possessed the gun during the commission of the cilme. Id. at 1293. The Commonwealth appealed the court’s more lenient sentence, and the Superior Court ruled that the trial court should have applied the
Nor are we the first to express reservations regarding the court’s approach in Williams. Following close on the heels of that case, another panel of the Superior Court applied Williams under similar circumstances but expressed grave doubts about the correctness of that decision. In Commonwealth v. Grimmitt, 354 Pa.Super. 463, 512 A.2d 43 (1986), decided fewer than two months after Williams, the two judges in the panel majority10 applied Williams but included a lengthy footnote highlighting problems with the Williams analysis. The court began by acknowledging that, under
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of the offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.
512 A.2d at 44 n. 1 (citing Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425 A.2d 387 (1981)). Thus, the court noted, substantial participation in any element of the offense, as such, is sufficient to implicate an accomplice in the entire substantive criminal offense committed by his cohort(s). See Coccioletti, 425 A.2d at 390 (“The least degree of collusion is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice.”). Conversely, the court went on, § 9712 expressly provides that “visible possession of a firearm during the commission of one of the specified offenses is not an element of the underlying crime, nor does it constitute a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.” Id. (quoting
The court then observed that, while
is produced by the person wielding the firearm. It is that person who places the victim in greatest fear, and who can, with the slight pull of the trigger, kill or gravely injure the victim. To subject the armed felon to more severe punishment than the unarmed felon because of the immediate danger that the former presents to the victim would seem reasonable.
Id. Finally, the court noted that the courts are bound to construe penal provisions strictly in favor of life and liberty, see Wooten, 545 A.2d at 879-80, and returned to the clear language of
The Commonwealth, like the Superior Court in Williams and its progeny, avoids the plain language of
The Commonwealth’s representation of the 1995 amendments, while not inaccurate, partially misinterprets the effect of those amendments in ways that call into doubt the wisdom of construing the amendments as a ratification of Superior Court precedent. In 1995, the legislature overhauled several aspects of Titles 18 (Crimes and Offenses) and 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure), including
[a]ny person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1) ®, (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), aggravated assault as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (relating to aggravated assault) or kidnapping, or who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes.
The 1995 amendment excised this language in favor of a cross-reference to “a crime of violence as defined in section 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses),” which then provided13 as follows:
(g) Definition. — As used in this section, the term “crime of violence” means murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) or (2) (relating to aggravated assault), rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, arson as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a) (relating to arson and related offenses), kidnapping, burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodation in which at the time of the offense any person is present, robbery as defined in18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1) ®, (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), or robbery of a motor vehicle, or criminal attempt, criminal conspiracy or criminal solicitation to commit murder or any of the above offenses listed above, or an equivalent crime under the laws of this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission of that offense, or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction.
The Commonwealth argues, in principal, that the legislature’s addition of “solicitation” to the applicable definition of “crime of violence” signifies the legislature’s intent to accept the Superior Court’s interpretation of
Further supporting these observations, Appellant notes that the legislature, in enacting § 9712.1, signaled its ability expressly to distinguish an armed party to a crime from his unarmed co-conspirator as follows:
(a) Mandatory sentence. — Any person who is convicted of a [predicate drug-related offense], when at the time of the offense the person or the person’s accomplice is in physical possession or control of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about the person or the person’s accomplice or within the actor’s or accomplice’s reach or in close proximity to the controlled substance, shall likewise be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement.
The Commonwealth responds:
Unlike§ 9712 , ...§ 9712.1 does not apply to persons convicted of conspiracy or solicitation. Moreover, it is absurd to contend that the inclusion of language in a statute enacted in 2004, more than twodecades after § 9712 was first enacted and ten years after the General assembly amended§ 9712 without choosing to “correct” what [Appellant] deems a longstanding “incorrect” determination of legislative intent, is more instructive of legislative intent than subsequent legislative action on the statute in question.
Brief for Commonwealth at 12 n. 5. The Commonwealth, however, indulges a certain degree of sophistry when it rejects as absurd the utility of looking to
There is, to be clear, a colorable argument that the legislature’s failure to amend
It has been held, and rightly so, that where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a similar statute dealing with the same subject matter, the legislature intended the same construction to be placed on the language of the subsequent statute.
In re Estate of Lock, 431 Pa. 251, 244 A.2d 677, 682-83 (1968).14 As noted, the Superior Court has spoken often, and with increasing unanimity, to the application of
The question thus becomes whether our mandate to find legislative intent in the language of the statute must yield to the Lock presumption that the legislature declined to modify the statute in relevant ways in reliance on the then-prevailing body of law in the intermediate appellate court. It is true that in 1995, the legislature moved the description of to whom the
That we have declined, until now, to address the Superior Court’s decisions on this issue, while perhaps regrettable, cannot be used as a brickbat to prevent us from bringing the decisional law of this Commonwealth into line with the plain language of
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, and in light of the unambiguous language of
Notes
.
(a) Mandatory Sentence.— ... [A]ny person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as defined insection 9714(g) ... shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm or a replica of a firearm, whether or not the firearm or replica was loaded or functional, that placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Such persons shall not be eligible for parole, probation, work release or furlough.
* * * *
(c) Authority of court in sentencing. — There shall be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend sentence.
. Also present was Ms. Angel Ruffin, who is Van Leer’s sister, Appellant’s and Veney’s cousin, and also was, it turns out, Cunningham’s girlfriend.
. See
. Indeed, it is difficult to read the transcript in any other way. Although he originally was charged with theft, Appellant was arraigned only for robbery and criminal conspiracy, and therefore presumptively was tried for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Notes of Testimony, 2/12/02, at 4-5.
. Plainly, Appellant referred to the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The certified record does not contain the motion in question, but this deficiency is immaterial because Appellant has not pursued this argument on appeal.
. The parties do not dispute that robbery is a crime of violence pursuant to
. We upheld a predecessor version of
. Mr. Justice Castille finds fault in our refusal to ratify twenty years of Superior Court precedent. No passage of time, however, can diminish this Court’s mandate to glean legislative intent from the language chosen by the legislature where that language is clear and free from ambiguity, the guiding principle of statutory interpretation we find dispositive in this case. See Bowser, 807 A.2d at 835. Indeed, in proposing alternative legislative language to remedy the error perceived in our Opinion, Diss. Op. of Justice Castille at 392 n. 3, 918 A.2d at 112 n. 3, the dissent in effect buttresses our point — that the construction offered by the Superior Court does not comport with the statute’s plain language. Notably, Mr. Justice Castille does not argue that
. The language of
. Judge Hoffman concurred in the result.
. The same provision in the current statute provides: “Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime,” and goes on to establish a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for application of the mandatory minimum sentence to be assessed by the trial court.
. The deadly weapons enhancement now is found at
.
. This extension of
By contrast, Mr. Justice Castillo would find meaning in the “dozens of additional cases” it posits in which “Superior Court panels rejected
. Mr. Chief Justice Cappy raises valid concerns regarding the soundness of our decision in Lock. That we acknowledge those concerns as valid, however, does not mean, as Mr. Justice Castille assumes, that we believe Lock was wrongly decided. Our disposition of this case, rather, does not depend on resolving these concerns, as it hinges solely on the plain language of
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, save for its analysis of
The rule of statutory construction found at
The Majority attempts to surmount the presumption by suggesting that the Court’s “mandate to find legislative intent” must not yield to the Estate of Lock presumption. Majority Opinion at 385, 918 A.2d at 108. The Majority continues upon a plain language approach to statutory interpretation and concludes that the Superior Court’s prior decisions “cannot be used as a brickbat to prevent us from bringing the decisional law of this Commonwealth into line with the plain language of
Instead of engaging in the exercise of what our Court would require of itself by way of a burden to rebut the presumption created by the Superior Court’s interpretation of a statute, I believe that the presumption based upon Superior Court case law as articulated in Estate of Lock is itself what is faulty and should be repudiated.
First, Estate of Lock is in direct contravention of the plain language of the Statutory Construction Act.
Second, Estate of Lock’s presumption regarding legislative intent hinges on the existence of an intermediate court decision which has not been modified by our Court. As noted by the Majority, this approach fails to appreciate that our denial of allocatur of an intermediate court decision is not an endorsement of or rejection of the intermediate appellate court’s decision. Majority Opinion at 384-85 fn.14, 918 A.2d at 108 fn.14; see also Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 426 A.2d 569, 574 (1981) (opining that the denial of allocatur is not a ruling on the merits). Yet, under Estate of Lock, our denial of allocatur gives birth to the presumption, thereby giving our denial of allocatur unintended significance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the continued use of Estate of Lock as a guide to statutory interpretation would diminish, at least to some extent, this Court’s power to interpret a legislative enactment and to freely reject an intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of a statute. This limitation on review is inconsistent not only with the structure of our Unitary Judicial System, which places the Supreme Court at its head, but also with our long-established standard of review concerning .matters of statutory interpretation — de novo review. To give the intermediate appellate court’s prior interpretation presumptive value, would be to give greater deference to that lower intermediate
For the reasons stated above, I would overrule Estate of Lock, and conform again our statutory construction jurisprudence to the clear terms of
. See, e.g., Parish v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 458, 143 A.2d 360, 363 (1958); Salvation Army Case, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A.2d 479, 481 (1944); Buhl’s Estate, 300 Pa. 29, 150 A. 86, 87 (1930); Bell v. Bell, 287 Pa. 269, 135 A. 219, 220 (1926). Although DuPuy‘s Estate, 373 Pa. 423, 96 A.2d 318, 320 (1953), implicitly suggests a presumption based upon Superior Court precedent, it was not until our decision in Estate of Lock that a presumption based upon intermediate appellate court case law was made clear.
. While I do not lightly condone the overruling of our prior precedent, see, e.g., Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 581 Pa. 398, 865 A.2d 835, 849 n. 2 (2005) (Cappy, J. dissenting), when a decision of considerable vintage is shown through the consequences of application to be wrongly decided, such that the reason for the rule no longer exists, I see no basis on which to perpetuate such decisional law.
. The Majority offers that while it is deciding this appeal “solely on the plain language” of the relevant statutes, it nevertheless believes itself compelled to address other arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and in doing so, speaks to import of Estate of Lock. In seemingly contradictory fashion, the Majority characterizes its discussion regarding Estate of Lock as obiter dicta, “we need not reach questions concerning ... the meaning and validity of our decision in Lock ...,” Majority Opinion at 386 fn. 15, 918 A.2d at 108 fn. 15, yet on the other hand, continues to believe it to be necessary to the resolution of the appeal-“[t]he question thus becomes whether our mandate to find legislative intent in the language of the statute must yield to the Lock presumption....” Majority Opinion at 385, 918 A.2d at 108. Yet, if the presumption of
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I join the Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Eakin, as I agree that the issue upon which the Majority grants relief obviously was waived.1 I dissent separately to address the merits of the issue the Majority reaches out to decide.
The Court today disapproves twenty years of Superior Court precedent construing
I recognize that this Court, in recent years, has undertaken to modify traditional notions of vicarious liability, thereby narrowing the exposure a criminal defendant faces when charged as an accomplice or conspirator. See generally Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 562 Pa. 132, 753 A.2d 1265, 1273-76 (2000) (Castille, J., concurring). When the Superior Court first encountered the statute at issue here in 1986, however, I believe that the decision rendered was fully in accord with then-settled notions of the extent of vicarious liability. Indeed, I would not be at all surprised if that fact played a part in this Court’s decision not to review the Superior Court’s construction in the ensuing score of years.2 While I certainly do not deem this Court’s repeated denial of review dispositive of the question of statutory interpretation, neither would I deem it insignificant.
In addition to the fact that I am not convinced that the reading of the statute by the panel in Commonwealth v. Williams, 353 Pa.Super. 312, 509 A.2d 1292 (1986) was clearly erroneous in light of then-prevailing principles of vicarious liability, there is the fact, ably detailed in the Majority Opinion, that the General Assembly, which has since revisited the statute, has not undertaken to modify it in response to the then prevailing interpretation. This development is significant for two reasons. First, as both the Majority Opinion and the Concurring Opinion of the Chief Justice note, this Court’s decision in In re Estate of Lock, 431 Pa. 251, 244 A.2d 677 (1968), supports the proposition that a presumption arises in such circumstances that the General Assembly is satisfied with the construction.3
Second, irrespective of any principle of construction or presumption, in the Lock era, the General Assembly has shown itself quite capable of responding to what it believes is a judicial misinterpretation of a statute by an intermediate appellate court. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Eddings, 565 Pa. 256, 772 A.2d 956 (2001) (Castille, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting from per curiam affirmance) (noting that General Assembly had already responded to and addressed and corrected the Superior Court decision at issue, which involved a statutory construction question of first impression under the “three strikes” provision of the Sentencing Code).
. Furthermore, I note that “declining to resist” a “trial court‘s unequivocal effort to cut off conversation” is not a valid reason for failure to press, or to make clear, the specific contours of an objection. Majority Op. at 372, 918 A.2d at 100. As I recently noted in Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 887 A.2d 220, 227 n. 1 (2005) (Castille, J., concurring in the result), “I respectfully disagree with [any] suggestion ... that a repeated objection risks ‘alienating’ the trial judge. It should not alienate a trial judge that a lawyer seeks to protect his client’s interest; and I trust in the professionalism of our trial judges to recognize what is an exercise of prudent caution and not to react adversely thereto.” In this case, the failure was not one of non-repetition; rather, appellant simply never forwarded the relevant objection. A proper objection could easily and candidly have been phrased thus: “Your Honor, I concede (as is my duty) that the law at the Superior Court level (which binds you), is settled, is against me, and affords you no discretion but to impose the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. Respectfully, however, I wish to register an objection to the application of the mandatory minimum against my client, who was but an unarmed co-conspirator, so as to preserve that issue in the hope that, upon further review, I can convince our Supreme Court to rule upon the issue, which it has not expressly done to date.”
. The Majority notes two instances where this Court denied allocatur in cases where published decisions of the Superior Court applied Commonwealth v. Williams, 353 Pa.Super. 312, 509 A.2d 1292 (1986). See Commonwealth v. Walker, 525 Pa. 618, 577 A.2d 889 (1990) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Matos, 575 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1990) (per curiam). Given the frequency with which
. I am inclined to agree with both the Majority Opinion and the Chief Justice that Lock was wrongly decided, since the Superior Court most certainly is not a court of last resort. But, whether Lock was right or wrong in some absolute sense, it was the law during the ascendancy of the (unreviewed) Williams rule and its holding triggers the presumption of legislative agreement/acquiescence.
. As it is, of course, the General Assembly can corred the Court‘s interpretation today by amending the Section to read, “shall, if the person, or the person‘s conspirator or accomplice, visibly possessed, etc.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Appellant waived his challenge to the application of
“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Furthermore, your honor, applying the mandatory minimum takes away the discretion of the court to impose a lesser sentence. If there is any case that cries out for a lesser sentence, it would be this particular case. You heard the codefendant testify in this matter and the court was aware of the discusting [sic] behavior of the codefendant throughout the trial. The jury clearly found my client not guilty of robbery. They found him guilty of conspiracy and I would submit that we have an inconsistency argument for a motion for acquittal.
[Appellant] is not a threat to society, your honor. This is not a gentleman who needs the mandatory minimum applied to him. As I said, when you apply the mandatory, you take away the court’s discretion and you, yourself, recognize the clear difference of my client’s behavior throughout the trial process, as well as the abhorrent behavior of the codefendant. That, itself, would deviate from applying the mandatory and sentencing my client to a—
Id., at 3-4. The court interrupted Appellant’s argument, stating, “I think case law is supportive of the Commonwealth’s position. I have no discretion.” Id., at 5.
Appellant failed to argue
“[CJlaims concerning the illegality of the sentence are not waivable.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 560 Pa. 381, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (2000) (citations omitted). Generally, an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the statutory limits. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 575 Pa. 141, 834 A.2d 1127, 1131 (2003) (“An illegal sentence is one that exceeds the statutory limits.”); Vasquez, at 1284 (“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, it is legal.”). Appellant’s sentence is within the statutory limits — Appellant was sentenced to five to 10 years imprisonment, which is well within the 20-year statutory maximum for his first degree felony conviction for conspiracy to rob.
I, like the majority, recognize the uncertainty regarding what challenges implicate sentence legality. Majority Op., at 370-71, 918 A.2d at 98-99 (citing McCray v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 582 Pa. 440, 872 A.2d 1127, 1138 (2005) (Saylor, J., concurring)). Since Appellant’s claim does not implicate the legality of his sentence, and he failed to raise it before the trial court, I would hold Appellant’s claim waived and would not reach a discussion of its merits.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.. The majority suggests finding Appellant‘s challenge to the application of