COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOHNNY J. MILLER
No. 1316 MDA 2020
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED: MAY 11, 2022
2022 PA Super 88
J-S05039-22
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:
Appellant, Johnny J. Miller, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence of 55 years to life imposed upon resentencing following the decisions rendered in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016). He challenges the legality of the sentence as de facto life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP“) and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
In January 1989, when he was 17 years old, Appellant killed Phyllis Morgan, his former girlfriend‘s mother.1 A jury found him guilty of, inter alia, First-Degree Murder and the сourt sentenced him on November 17, 1989, to
Following the decisions rendered in Miller and Montgomery, Appellant filed a petition рursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“) seeking resentencing. The PCRA court granted relief and ordered a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI“) report. Notably, the Commonwealth indicated that it would not seek a sentence of life without pаrole.
On August 11, 2020, the court held a resentencing hearing. Appellant and his expert on juvenile offender rehabilitation testified regarding Appellant‘s difficult childhood, his drug and alcohol addictions that began when he was a very young child, and his rehabilitаtive accomplishments obtained during his 30 years in prison, including obtaining a GED, participating in group therapy and Narcotics Anonymous, his clean record of prison behavior since 1999, his participation in vocational programs, and his mеntorship work with young offenders.
The Commonwealth presented victim impact statements from the victim‘s family.
After argument from counsel, the court acknowledged that it had reviewed the PSI report, Appellant‘s expert‘s report and testimony, аnd the sentencing memoranda submitted by counsel. The court also acknowledged Appellant‘s rehabilitative accomplishments and his ongoing work as a peer
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspect of his sentence, which the court denied.
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
- Was not the lower court‘s sentence of 55 years-to-life an illegаl de facto life sentence without proof of the factual/legal predicates for imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a person who was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense?
- Was not the imposition оf a 55 year-to-life sentence clearly unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion, and inconsistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and [Appellant‘s] rehabilitative needs?
Appellant‘s Br. at 6.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the imposition of a term of 55 years to life imprisonment is unconstitutional as a de facto term of LWOP. Id. at 29. He contends that the sentence is “illegal because the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
Appellant purports to challenge the legality of his sentence. However, as discussed infra, based on reсent U.S. Supreme and Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law, Appellant‘s challenge is properly characterized as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence, which garners him no relief.
In Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022), our Supremе Court addressed whether a lengthy term-of-years’ incarceration sentence imposed on a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted by the Miller court. The Court acknowledged thаt the U.S. Supreme Court, in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (U.S. 2021), abrogated the procedural requirement set forth in Batts, supra, that required a specific finding of incorrigibility before a sentence of LWOP could be imposed on a juvenile offender. The Felder Court, thus, held that: “when sentencing juvenile homicide offenders from this point forward, sentencing courts are required to consider only the relevant sentencing statutes, which will guarantee that sentencer considers the juvenile‘s youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller.” Felder,
Here, Appellant does not aver that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth and its attendant characteristics. Rather, he purports to challenge the constitutiоnality of his sentence with his contention that the court imposed an impermissible de facto LWOP sentence even though he “demonstrated a remarkable degree of rehabilitation[.]” Appellant‘s Br. at 30. In light of Jones and Felder, Appellant‘s sentence does not violаte the Eighth Amendment and, thus, Appellant‘s challenge does not implicate the legality of his sentence. Rather, Appellant‘s argument that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitation must be addressed as a challenge to the discrеtionary aspects of his sentence. Accordingly, we will address both of Appellant‘s issues as challenges to the discretionary aspects of this sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are nоt appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing court‘s discretion must invoke this Court‘s jurisdiction by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with
Here, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion and a timely notice of appeal, and he has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Within his Rule 2119(f) Statement, Appellant contends that the court “focused solely on the nature of the crimes” and “paid no more tha[n] lip service to [Aрpellant‘s] strides toward rehabilitation and reform.” Appellant‘s Br. at 23. He further contends that his sentence of 55 years’ to life imprisonment is manifestly excessive in violation of “both
“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge” and this Cоurt will not disturb a sentence on appeal “absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must
In sentencing a juvenile offender, “where the Commonwealth does not seek a LWOP sentence, the sentencing court should apply the traditional sentencing considerations under
Section 9721 provides in part that “the sentenсe imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defеndant.”
“In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620-21 (Pa. 2002). “The sentencing judge can satisfy the requiremеnt that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135 (citation omitted).
Appellant contends that the court imposed “a severe sentence—in excess of 35 years—based solely on the nature of the criminal acts.” Appellant‘s Br. at 38. He emphasizes that he “proved that he is rehabilitated,” as demonstrated by his “consistent efforts to obtain certificatiоns, counseling, and treatment in the prison setting.” Id. at 39. He also emphasizes his expert‘s positive report and his expressions of remorse. Id. Appellant avers
At the sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony from Appellant‘s expert as well as statements from the victim‘s daughter, the victim‘s brother, and Appellant. See N.T., 8/11/2020, at 5-25, 26-35, and 35-42, respectively. Appellant‘s counsel brought to the court‘s attention the fact that Appellant‘s sister and niece were there at the hearing to support Appеllant.
Immediately after counsel presented their arguments, the court acknowledged that it had reviewed the materials submitted by the parties. Id. at 47. While the court noted the nature of the crime and its impact on the victim‘s family, the court alsо acknowledged Appellant‘s efforts at rehabilitation and its review of the PSI report. See id. at 4, 47-48. See also Trial Ct. Op., dated 12/10/20, at 12-15 (acknowledging that it had the benefit of the reading the PSI report that outlined Appellant‘s childhood and substance abuse history, and detailing its consideration of the sentencing factors, including the protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses, and Appellant‘s rehabilitative needs).
Based on our review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in rendering its sentence. As noted above, it was solely within the province of the sentencing court to weigh the
Judgment of Sentence Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/11/2022