CITY OF CANTON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2000-2130
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted November 13, 2001—Decided May 8, 2002.
95 Ohio St.3d 149 | 2002-Ohio-2005
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2000CA0076.
Municipal corporations—Home rule—Requirements for statute to constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis—Federal manufactured home construction and safety standards—Application of zoning laws—
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
To constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.
{¶1} For many years, the city of Canton has prohibited the placement or use of mobile homes as principal or accessory structures for residential use. Canton Codified Ordinances 1129.11. On March 16, 1998, the city of Canton amended its code to include “manufactured homes” within the definition of “mobile homes.” Ordinance No. 49/98, amending Canton Codified Ordinances 1123.57(b). As a result, manufactured homes became prohibited within the city limits as principal or accessory structures for residential use.
{¶2} In 1998, the Ohio General Assembly enacted
{¶3} On March 29, 1999, the city of Canton filed an action in the Stark County Common Pleas Court, seeking a declaration that
{¶4} The trial court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, granting Canton‘s motion and denying the state‘s motion, and finding that
{¶5} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶6} As a threshold matter, we note that although the trial and appellate courts referred to
{¶8} “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” See, also, W. Jefferson v. Robinson (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 30 O.O.2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 382, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶9} The court of appeals correctly set forth the three-part test to determine whether a provision of a state statute takes precedence over a municipal ordinance. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law. See Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244-245, 602 N.E.2d 1147, citing Auxter v. Toledo (1962), 173 Ohio St. 444, 20 O.O.2d 71, 183 N.E.2d 920.
{¶10} The parties in this matter acknowledge that the first two prongs of the three-part test are met, i.e., that the statute and the ordinance are in conflict, and that the ordinance is an exercise of police power rather than local self-government. Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether
{¶11} Because we hold that
{¶12} The court of appeals noted that this court has not set forth a bright-line test for determining whether a law is a general law. However, we have enunciated some steadfast parameters in making this determination.
{¶13} In 1929, we held that general laws are enacted by the General Assembly “to safeguard the peace, health, morals, and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the state.” Schneiderman v. Sesanstein (1929), 121 Ohio St. 80, 82-83, 167 N.E. 158. Moreover, general laws “apply to all parts of the state alike.” Id. at 83, 167 N.E. 158. In Schneiderman, this court held that a statute setting speed limits throughout Ohio was a general law.
{¶15} As a rule of law, we held that “[t]he words ‘general laws’ as set forth in
{¶16} In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Assn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369, this court considered whether a state statute regulating licensing of residential facilities for mentally retarded individuals was a general law. In concluding that it was not, we repeated the W. Jefferson definition and added that “[t]hese ‘general laws’ are laws operating uniformly throughout the state, * * * which prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate with general uniform application throughout the state under the same circumstances and conditions.” Id., 63 Ohio St.2d at 271, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369.
{¶17} Then, in Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278, this court began to examine statutes in pari materia with other sections of the same chapter rather than in isolation to determine whether they were general laws. Id. at 48, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278. We held that a statute that was a part of a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the state‘s control of the disposal of hazardous wastes was a general law. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
{¶18} In Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 602 N.E.2d 1147, the court struck down an ordinance attempting to exact a fee for the registration or licensure of private investigators because it conflicted with a statewide regulatory program,
{¶19} Finally, in Linndale v. State (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 52, 706 N.E.2d 1227, this court summarized the above definitions of “general law” and looked to whether the statute in question was part of a system of uniform statewide regulation on the subject matter, and whether the legislative enactment prescribed a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Id. at 54-55, 706 N.E.2d 1227. The statute in Linndale,
{¶20} Against this backdrop of definitions, the court of appeals held that in construing
{¶21} We disagree with the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that to constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Because
Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment
{¶22} The court in Clermont, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278, and Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 602 N.E.2d 1147, considered whether the respective statutes at issue in those cases were part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative scheme. In Clermont, the court answered in the affirmative because the statute was part of a statewide comprehensive
{¶23} In contrast,
{¶24} Moreover, the state does not have a statewide zoning scheme, nor does the state have a comprehensive plan or scheme for the licensing, regulation, or registration of manufactured homes. Instead,
Uniform Operation Throughout the State
{¶25} In Schneiderman, we held that general laws must “apply to all parts of the state alike.” Id., 121 Ohio St. at 83, 167 N.E. 158. Moreover, the Garcia court set forth a similar requirement that general laws are “laws operating uniformly throughout the state.” Id., 63 Ohio St.2d at 271, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369.
{¶26} Although the state maintains that the goal of the statute is to foster more affordable housing across the state, the statute contains an exception that wholly defeats the stated purpose.
{¶27} “This section does not prohibit a private landowner from incorporating a restrictive covenant in a deed, prohibiting the inclusion on the conveyed land of manufactured homes.”
{¶28} A “restrictive covenant” is a “private agreement, usu. in a deed or lease, that restricts the use or occupancy of real property, esp. by specifying lot sizes, building lines, architectural styles, and the uses to which the property may be put.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.1999) 371. This exception provides suburban portions of the state with newer housing developments the opportunity to opt out of
{¶29} The state argues that the restrictive covenant language of
{¶30} “The requirement of uniform operation throughout the state of laws of a general nature does not forbid different treatment of various classes or types of citizens, but does prohibit nonuniform classification if such be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.” Garcia, 63 Ohio St.2d at 272, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369, citing Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773. Because of the exception contained in
Police, Sanitary, or Similar Regulation
{¶31} In W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 30 O.O.2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 382, we held that “[t]he words ‘general laws’ as set forth in
{¶33} In this case,
Prescribing a Rule of Conduct on Citizens Generally
{¶34} In Youngstown v. Evans (1929), 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844, this court considered an ordinance prohibiting transportation of intoxicating beverages that provided different penalties than a state statute for the same offense. We held that the statute in question was “not a general law in the sense of prescribing a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. It is a limitation upon law making by municipal legislative bodies.” Id. at 345, 168 N.E. 844.
{¶35} Later, in W. Jefferson, we reiterated the standard set forth in Youngstown. See W. Jefferson, 1 Ohio St.2d at 117, 30 O.O.2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 382. This court again affirmed the requirement in Garcia, 63 Ohio St.2d at 271, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369, and most recently in Linndale, 85 Ohio St.3d at 55, 706 N.E.2d 1227, where we held that the statute in question, prohibiting local law enforcement officers from certain localities issuing speeding and excess weight citations on interstate freeways did not prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.
{¶36} Similarly, in this case, we hold that
Conclusion
{¶37} Accordingly, because
{¶39} Therefore, as an attempt to limit the powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or to enforce police regulations,
{¶40} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court as to (C) and (D).
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs separately.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
COOK, J., concurring.
{¶41} I concur with the judgment to reverse the court of appeals. Canton Codified Ordinance 1129.11 may be enforced because those divisions of
{¶42} The majority opinion concludes that
Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment
{¶43} The majority appears to state that
{¶44} According to the majority, the standards cover only construction and safety, not zoning, and therefore “do not provide for uniform, statewide regulation of manufactured housing.” However, the General Assembly‘s intention that the statute be uniform and apply statewide is manifested by its decision to deny political subdivisions the ability to establish standards of their own. Further, the General Assembly did not ignore zoning, as the federal standards do, because it stated in
Uniform Operation Throughout the State
{¶45} The majority concludes that
{¶46} Laws are uniform when they apply to all similarly situated people; they need not apply to every single person in every circumstance no matter what. Our tax laws treat taxpayers differently depending on whether they are married or have children and depending on whether they are businesses or individuals or nonprofit organizations. The tax laws do not violate the uniformity requirement based on these distinctions because all similarly situated taxpayers are treated the same.
Police, Sanitary, or Similar Regulation
{¶47} The majority concludes that the statewide interest of “providing more affordable housing options across the state” is defeated because people can incorporate restrictive covenants into their deeds. Deeds can restrict the use of manufactured homes, and some people will undoubtedly use deeds of that sort. This does not defeat the purpose of the statute. Even if half of all deeds contained restrictive covenants, and they won‘t, the remaining property would still be available for manufactured homes and would increase affordable housing options. The General Assembly‘s stated purpose is a valid exercise of its legislative power.
Prescribing a Rule of Conduct on Citizens Generally
{¶48} The General Assembly has enacted laws that govern streets and public grounds,
{¶49} In an attempt to increase the stock of affordable housing in the state, the General Assembly enacted a regulatory scheme,
Joseph Martuccio, Canton Law Director, Craig E. Chessler and Robert G. Rubin, Assistant Law Directors, for appellants.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Michael R. Gladman and Elizabeth Luper Schuster, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Municipal League.