LASCELLES A. CLUE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(SC 21002)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued April 10—officially released August 26, 2025
Mullins, C. J., аnd McDonald, D‘Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Clue v. Commissioner of Correction
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Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (
The petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2018, challenging an earlier conviction. In 2020, the petitioner was deported. Subsequеntly, the petitioner‘s habeas counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact both the petitioner and certain of the petitioner‘s family members. In 2021, after a hearing, the habeas petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had failed to appear and prosecute the petition with due diligence. In 2022, approximately fifteen months later, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment dismissing his habeas petition, claiming, inter alia, that he had not received notice of the hearing that led to the dismissal and that his counsel had failed to make reasonable efforts to notify him and to communicate with him effectively. The habeas court denied the petitioner‘s motion to open, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish a recognized basis for opening the judgment of dismissal beyond the four month period prescribed by
The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that ineffective assistance of habeas counsel could provide a common-law basis for a habeas court to open a judgment beyond the four month period prescribed by
This court concluded that the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” in
Moreover, allowing the opening of a habeas judgment outside the four month deadline on the basis of the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would undermine the statutory scheme governing habeas corpus, including the legislature‘s goal of ensuring expedient resolution of habeas cases.
Furthermore, permitting the opening of a habeas judgment beyond the four month deadline on the basis of the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would, in many cases, and in the present case, bypass the legislative requirement that a petitioner be in custody when he files a habeas petition.
(One justice dissenting)
Argued April 10—officially released August 26, 2025
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, geographical area number nineteen, where the court, Oliver, J., rendered judgment dismissing the petition; thereafter, the court, Oliver, J., denied the petitioner‘s motion to open the judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Pellegrino, Js., which reversed the habeas court‘s denial of the petitioner‘s motion to open the judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for a new hearing on the petitioner‘s motion to open, from which the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David Applegate, state‘s attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellant (respondent).
James E. Mortimer, assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to determine the scope of a habeas court‘s authority to open a judgment outside of the four month period set forth in
The petitioner, Lascelles A. Clue, filed the underlying habeas petition in 2018, challenging his conviction for robbery in the first degree that resulted from a 2011 guilty plea. The basis of the habeas petition was the allegedly ineffective assistance of his trial attorneys. The petitioner requested that counsel be appointed to represent him in the habeas action, and Attorney Patrick White filed an appearance with the court as the petitioner‘s counsel. In 2020, the petitioner was deported to Jamaica. Prior to being deported, the petitioner successfully obtained relief in another habeas case challenging a different conviction. See Clue v. Warden, Docket No. TSR-CV-15-4007334-S, 2019 WL 5549400 (Conn. Super. October 3, 2019). In that case, the petitioner was represented by Attorney Daniel Lage.
In January, 2021, White filed a caseflow request for a video status conference. In that request, White represented that the petitioner had been deported and that
The habeas court thereafter issued an order that the matter would be scheduled for a hearing on the court‘s own motion to dismiss based on the petitioner‘s failure to contact and cooperate with White in prosecuting the habeas petition with due diligenсe. Following a hearing on February 11, 2021, the court dismissed the petition because of the petitioner‘s failure to appear and prosecute the petition with due diligence.
Approximately fifteen months later, on May 18, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment of dismissal and a supporting memorandum of law. The petitioner claimed: “[He] did not receive notice of [White‘s] caseflow request” and the ensuing hearing, he “did not waive his right to be present at the [dismissal hearing],” White “failed to make reasonable efforts to apprise [him] of the status of [the] matter,” and White failed to communicate effectively with him, his family contacts, or attorneys who represented him in other cases. The respondent objected to the motion to open on the grounds that it was untimely, the petitioner had failed to keep White apprised of his whereabouts and contact infоrmation, and the petitioner did not act with diligence in seeking to open the judgment. The respondent also submitted an affidavit from White, which detailed White‘s efforts to communicate with the petitioner and the petitioner‘s family members after his deportation.
The habeas court held a hearing on the petitioner‘s motion to open in June and July, 2022, during which it heard testimony from the petitioner, White, Lage, the petitioner‘s mother, Fay Ellis, and the petitioner‘s wife, Kelly Clue. On the basis of the testimony at the hearing, the habeas court set forth the following additional facts in its memorandum of decision. “[The petitioner] was at a federal detention center for approximately three months prior to his deportation. [The petitioner] and White corresponded with each other and spoke once while [the petitioner] was at the federal detention center. White knew that [the petitioner] would be deported.” Accordingly, “White told [the petitioner] that, if [the petitioner] were deported, then [the petitioner] would need to provide contact information, and [White] instructed [the petitioner] to contact him.”
Following the petitioner‘s deportation, “[b]ecause [White] did not have any contact information for [the petitioner] in Jamaica, [he] tried calling Kelly Clue and Ellis, who were listed on the contact sheet provided by [the petitioner], but he did not write to them. White did not have any specific, independent recollection of leaving messages for Kelly Clue and Ellis, but it is his practice to leave such messages. White did not receive any [callbacks].” Ellis testified, however, “that she ha[d] never been contacted by White . . . whether [predeportation] or postdeportation.” Similarly,
The рetitioner testified that “he had White‘s phone number in an address book . . . [and had] tried calling White two or three times after he was deported, once in August of 2020 and twice in October of 2020 . . . [and that he had] left voicemail messages, which included his cell phone number, on White‘s extension but did not receive any [callbacks]. . . . In early 2021, [the petitioner‘s] cell phone was disconnected, and he obtained [a new phone number]. [The petitioner] did not provide his new number to [White].” Ellis, however, testified that she “had daily contact [with the petitioner] via phone calls” since his deportation and that “she has had contact with him via . . . video calls, emails, and text messages.” Kelly Clue also “had contact with [the petitioner] via phone calls and emails, beginning a few days after his deportation” to Jamaica. Moreover, the petitioner spoke with Lage, the attorney who represented him in his оther habeas proceeding, “numerous times between the summer of 2020 and spring of 2022.”
The habeas court found that the petitioner “had no notice of the January 27, 2021 scheduling order,” which would have informed him “that there would be a hearing on the court‘s own motion to dismiss based on [his] failure to prosecute this case with due diligence, as well as that the matter might be dismissed if [he] failed to appear. In either January or February of 2022, [the petitioner] found out about the dismissal from Kelly Clue, who was checking on the case status before the originally scheduled trial date. . . . Although [the petitioner] was unable to access the Judicial [Branch] website from Jamaica, he was able to look up information for the Office of the Chief Public Defender (OCPD) and [to] seek [its] assistance in opening this case. [The petitioner] contacted OCPD about one month after he found out that this case had been dismissed. [The petitioner] searched for White [on the Internet], never asked Lage to contact White, did not write a letter to White, and did not complain to OCPD about White, even though he had given up on White.”
At the hearing on the petitioner‘s motion to open, counsel for the petitioner argued that there should be “a quasi-fraud equitable exception to the [four month] rule . . . predicated . . . on ineffective assistance of counsel or attorney negligence.” The petitioner‘s counsel claimed that White failed to communicate with the petitioner about the status of his case, “failed to notify [the petitioner] of the filing of [the] notice [with the court] . . . the status conference . . . and the hearing that [the] court had . . . on the notice,” and, following the court‘s dismissal of the habeas petition, “made no further . . . efforts to contact [the petitioner] within [the four month] window.” Accordingly, the petitionеr‘s counsel argued that the notice that White had filed with the court, “when fairly read . . . [was] misleading . . . as to the diligence . . . exhibited by . . . White . . . in his efforts to reach the petitioner” following his deportation. The petitioner‘s counsel asserted that, but for White‘s failures, the petitioner‘s habeas petition would not have been dismissed. In response, counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner had not established good cause to open the judgment fifteen months after his petition was dismissed because he had failed to pursue his case diligently and to contact White.
The habeas court subsequently denied the petitioner‘s motion to open “because the petitioner ha[d] failed to establish a recognized basis to open the judgment beyond the four month period established by . . .
The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that the habeas court had improperly limited the scope of its authority to open a judgment of dismissal after the passage of the four month limitation period in
We granted the respondent‘s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that, in the absence of fraud, duress or mistake, a habeas court has equitable authority, after the four month period set forth in
On appeal, the respondent claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly interpretеd
The petitioner agrees with the Appellate Court that ineffective assistance of habeas counsel is a proper basis to open a habeas judgment. Specifically, he contends that
“[W]hether the trial court had authority to [exercise its discretion to open the judgment] under the circum-stances of this case . . . presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review.” (Citation omitted.) Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 166, 75 A.3d 651 (2013). This question, in turn, depends on whether the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” in
It is well established that “[h]abeas corpus is a civil proсeeding.” Collins v. York, 159 Conn. 150, 153, 267 A.2d 668 (1970). Consequently, “[a] habeas corpus action, as a variant of civil actions, is subject to the ordinary rules of civil procedure, unless superseded by the more specific rules pertaining to habeas actions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kendall v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn. App. 23, 45, 130 A.3d 268 (2015). A motion to open and set aside a judgment in a civil case is governed by
The four month statutory deadline is not, however, absolute. We have previously explained that, “[under
Here, the habeas court sent notice of the dismissal of the underlying habeas petition on February 11, 2021, and the petitioner filed his motion to open the judgment of dismissal fifteen months later, on May 18, 2022, well beyond the four month statutory deadline. There is no dispute that the respondent did not consent to the opening of the judgment or otherwise submit to the court‘s jurisdiction and that the petitioner fаiled to prove fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. The parties agree that the question, then, is whether the statutory phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” in
The Appellate Court has previously interpreted the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” phrase “as preserving the common-law authority of a [trial] court to open a judgment after the four month period.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Weiss, 176 Conn. App. 94, 99, 168 A.3d 617 (2017). In addition, this court has recognized that the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” provision in
This court, however, has also more broadly characterized the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” provision, explaining that it may refer to situations in which (1) “the legislature has provided the trial court with the statutory authority to modify its previous judgment even after the four month period,” (2) “the common law has provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction,” or (3) “a judgment rendered by the court may be opened even after the four month limitation if it is shown that the judgment was obtained by fraud, in the actual аbsence of consent, or because of mutual mistake.” O‘Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989). But, even under this broader formulation of the relevant statutory language, we conclude that courts are not permitted to4
create a new common-law exception to the four month statutory deadline for the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel.5 Indeed, neither this court nor the Appellate Court, until this case, has construed the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” provision in
In construing this statutory provision, we do not write on a blank slate. The legislature has enacted a statutory scheme that governs many aspects of the writ of habeas corpus. See
The statutes governing habeas actions require that the petitioner be in custody
“[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law“; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hartford/Windsor Health-care Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 288 Conn. 191, 198, 3 A.3d 56 (2010); and we must construe legislation found in separate statutes harmoniously whenever possible. Permitting the opening of a habeas judgment outside of the four month time frame provided by
claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct. 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999). This would undermine the legislature‘s goal of ensuring expedient resolutiоn of habeas cases. “It is well established that we presume the legislature‘s awareness of the common and statutory law governing the fields in which it acts. . . . We are especially confident as to this awareness with respect to habeas law in particular, as . . . the 2012 habeas reforms . . . were the product of collaboration and compromise by representatives [of] the various stakeholders in the habeas process . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 567. We decline to upset the carefully crafted habeas procedures adopted by the legislature with input from all interested parties, especially given that the legislature was aware of
Permitting, consistent with the petitioner‘s contention and the Appellate Court‘s decision, the opening of a judgment beyond the statutory four month deadline based on ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would, in many cases, byрass the legislative requirement that a petitioner be in custody when he files a habeas petition. See
Relevant to the present case, we have acknowledged that deportation as a collateral consequence of a conviction, “although severe, [is] insufficient to render the рetitioner in custody [for that conviction] and, therefore, to invoke the jurisdiction of the habeas court.” Id., 541. Collateral consequences may keep a pending habeas action, filed while the petitioner was in custody, from becoming moot; see, e.g., State v. Jerzy G., 326 Conn. 206, 214-24, 162 A.3d 692 (2017); but they do not overcome the jurisdictional requirement of present custody for filing a new habeas action for the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel. See, e.g., Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 280 Conn. 540–41. Moreover, from a practical perspective, permitting a petitioner who is no longer in custody to prevail on a motion to open a judgment dismissing a habeas petition would enable him to “jump the line” of pending habeas cases in which petitioners are in custody. Cf. Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 548, 562, 223 A.3d 368 (2020) (“[t]he rules of practice governing habeas corpus proceedings . . . clearly evince an order of operations, providing for procedurеs and motions in the sequence in which they generally occur in a typical habeas case” (citation omitted)).
Given the myriad conflicts that would arise between the legislative habeas scheme and an interpretation of
There is an additional reason that counsels against the petitioner‘s interpretation of the statute. Although this case arises from a habeas action, “[
The petitioner nevertheless contends that it is a “well settled policy of the law to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As a result, he argues, “[c]ourts should disfavor the termination of proceedings without a determination of the merits of the controversy . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner claims that, if we construe
The petitioner also contends that our decision in Kim v. Magnotta, supra, 249 Conn. 109, supports the proposition that a trial court‘s authority to open a judgment is not exclusively limited to cases in which the judgment is shown to have been the product of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. The petitioner correctly notes that, in Kim, we concluded that, even after the expiration of the four month period in
a legislatively enacted provision, not a common-law rule. In other words, Kim stands for the proposition that a remedy created by the legislature, in the case of Kim, for violations of CUTPA, is “otherwise provided by law” for purposes of the late opening or setting
Finally, the petitioner contends that Kaddah supports his position that this court can develop a common-law exception to the four month deadline in
dismissal, based on this newly created common-law exception to
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the decision of the habeas court denying the petitioner‘s motion to open the judgment of dismissal.
In this opinion MULLINS, C. J., and D‘AURIA, ALEXANDER and DANNEHY, Js., concurred.