BRIAN H. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. ROB COLEMAN, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 4:17-cv-00045
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA DANVILLE DIVISION
March 23, 2020
Hоn. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief United States District Judge
CLERKS OFFICE U.S. DIST. COURT AT DANVILLE, VA FILED MAR 24 2020 JULIA C. DUDLEY, CLERK BY: s/H. MCDONALD DEPUTY CLERK
“Fits of rudeness or lack of gratitude may violate the Golden Rule. But that doesn‘t make them illegal or for that matter punishable or for that matter grounds for a seizure.” Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard, 918 F.3d 494, 495 (6th Cir. 2019).
This case concerns whether an officer may stop a vehicle because a passenger displayed an offensive gesture towards the officer, a gesture that anyone must concede “was crude, [but] not criminal.” Wilson v. Martin, 549 F. App‘x 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2013). A jury was empaneled, and they determined that the officer‘s actions did not violate the passenger‘s rights. The question before the court is whether that verdict can stand. After a review of the applicable law and relevant evidence, the court GRANTS Plaintiff Brian Clark‘s motion to set aside the jury verdict and enter judgment for the plaintiff. ECF No. 141. The law plainly prohibits that which occurred here, and the jury‘s verdict cannot stand. However, the court DENIES Clark‘s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, finding, as a matter of law, that Clark has not carried his burden of demonstrating compensable or punitive dаmages sufficient to warrant a new trial. Id.
On the morning of July 25, 2016, Clark appeared in court in Patrick County, Virginia, on a civil matter unrelated to the present action. Previously, he had been banned from the courthouse, except under certain circumstances, by Circuit Court Judge Martin Clark. Because of that prior order, sheriff‘s deputies in Patrick County, who were responsible for courtroom security, were keenly aware of Clark. Defendant Lieutenant Rob Coleman was one of those deputies who was in the courtroom for Clark‘s hearing.1 Coleman was stationed in the back of the courtroom and, according to his testimony, he was in the courtroom “for quite a while.” Trial Tr. 205:11, July 15, 2019, ECF No. 146 (hereinafter “Tr.“). Nothing “untoward” happened during Clark‘s hearing, and Clark did not act intoxicated. Id. at 203:25–204:1; 232:11-16.
After the hearing was over,2 Coleman left the courthouse and drove his cruiser to a grocery store parking lot near the courthouse. Because he had been in court for some time, he pulled over to check messages and emails on his work cell phone. While Coleman sat in his cruiser, Clark and his sister, Beth Richardson, drove by. (Clark was the passenger, and his sister was driving.) As they did so, Clark “flipped [Coleman] off.” Tr. 206:18.3
It took me by surprise. In 20 years of doing this job in uniform, I‘ve never had anybody that would flip me off that was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol or not suffering from some sort of mental illness.
Id. at 206:21-25. Coleman believed “[t]hat he had something going on for him to flip a uniformed police officer off, that I needed to make contact with him.” Id. at 207:14-16.
Coleman testified that he did not charge Clark with a crime:
No, I did not. After speaking to him, he didn‘t act intoxicated. He didn‘t act like he had any type of mental illness. I was just stopping him because it‘s very out of the norm for a normal citizen to flip off a police officer. . . . I thought it was quite possible that he either needed assistance for or that he had mistook me for somebody else or he was needing help.
Id. at 215:4-14. Coleman quickly made the assessment that none of this applied to Clark.
After speaking with him and questioning him about him flipping me off, and his answer, I wasn‘t angry. He wasn‘t angry. We didn‘t get in to a heated discussion on the side of the road. I didn‘t pull him out of the car. I didn‘t ask him to step on [sic] the car. He stayed seated. I checked to make sure that he didn‘t have any other outstanding papers. Once that civil paper was brought to the scene and given a copy to him, he was free to go.
Id. at 215:16-23.
When asked on cross-examination whether a police officer may conduct a traffic stop when a passenger in a vehicle insults an officer, Coleman responded that testified that “it depends.” Id. at 231:4-8. Coleman explained the grounds under which such a stop may occur:
If that person is doing something that would endanger himself or others, if he is or she is acting in a mentally ill way or where they could be a danger to someone еlse or themselves or someone else, then yes, it would be – it wouldn‘t be probable cause, but it would be enough for me to have reasonable suspicion that something is not normal with the passenger in that vehicle and I need to investigate further.
Once he pulled the car over, Coleman approached the passenger‘s side of the car. At no point did Coleman approach, or even speak to, the driver. See Tr. 120:10–11. Coleman asked Clark for his identification, which Clark readily produced. Coleman testified that he asked Clark: “What made you flip me off? Are you okay?” Id. at 210:12–13. Clark said he was waving and disagreed that he flipped Coleman off. Although Coleman testified that he realized at that point that Clark was neither intoxicated nor deranged, he did not send Clark on his way. Rather, Coleman walked back to his police car and called dispatch to run a check on Clark.
During the stop, several other patrol cars arrived to support Coleman as needed. See, e.g., Tr. 146:1–13 (testimony of Dustin Dillon); 152:14–24 (testimony of Shawn Keffer); 161:7-162:5 (testimony of Ronald Williams). At some point, Coleman noticed Denise Freeman, a friend of Clark‘s, videoing the scene with a cellular phone or iPad from some distance away. For his own safety, Coleman approached Freeman and explained that, while she was free to video him, for officer safety she needed to be in front of him. Ultimately, Coleman issued her a citation for impeding traffic.
Upon calling in Clark‘s information to dispatch, Coleman was alerted that there were civil papers to be served on Clark. Although the papers in question had been served on Clark
Clark filed suit against Coleman (and others) on July 10, 2017, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, and this matter was tried by a jury on July 15–16, 2019. At trial, the jury was instructed as follows:
To succeed on this claim [that Coleman violated Clark‘s
Fourth Amendment rights], the plaintiff must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:First: That the defendant intentionally committed acts that violated the plaintiff‘s federal constitutional right not to be seized without reasonable suspicion;
Second: That the defendant acted under color of law; and
Third: That the defendant‘s conduct caused the plaintiff‘s injuries.
As regards the first element, the plaintiff claims that the defendant seized him under unreasonable circumstances. In general, a seizure of a person in a traffic stop without a warrant is reasonable if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the plaintiff had committed or was committing a crime. In order to prove the seizure in this case was unreasonable, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was arrested without reasonable suspicion. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. . . .
Government officials in general, and police officers in particular, may not exercise their authority for personal motives, particularly in response to real or perceived slights to their dignity. The
Constitution requires that, in the face of verbal challenges to police action, officers and municipalities must respond with restraint. TheConstitution protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. Speech, including expressive gestures, is often provocative and challenging. But it is nevertheless protected against censorship and punishment, unless shown likely to produсe a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. If you find that the traffic stop was solely in response to constitutionally protected speech or gestures, you must find that the traffic stop was unreasonable.As regards the second element, the parties have agreed that the defendant acted under color of law.
As regards the third element, the defendant‘s conduct caused the plaintiff‘s injuries if the plaintiff would not have been injured without the defendant‘s conduct, and the injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant‘s conduct.
Jury Instruction No. 15, ECF No. 137. Neither party objected to the instruction. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Coleman, as set forth in the verdict form:
(1) Was defendant Rob Coleman‘s traffic stop of plaintiff Brian H. Clark unreasonable, i.e., did the defendant lack reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and detain the plaintiff?
a. Yes ____ No v
If you answered Yes to this question, go to Question 2. If you answered No, skip the remaining questions, go to the Signature Section at the end of the form, and have your foreperson sign it.
Verdict Form, ECF No. 138.
II.
Under
“The burden falls heavily upon a party seeking to set aside a jury verdict, for it is well established that the court must view the jury verdict in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor it is found, and such a party is entitled to the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports, even though contrary inferences might be drawn.” Hackett v. Stuckey‘s, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 172, 173 (W.D. Va. 1987) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). “Issues of fact are left to the determination of the jury, whose duty it is to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury in disputed cases.” Id. (citing Jacobs v. The College of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 794 (E.D. Va. 1980)). “Only in those rare situations where the jury‘s verdict is wholly contrary to the law or the evidence, or without evidence to support it, is it proper for the court to grant judgment non obstante verdicto. The applicable standard permits the court to grant the judgment n.o.v. only when ‘the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.‘” Id. (quoting Brady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479–80 (1943)).
III.
The issue here is a discrete one: may an officer, consistent with the
A.
The law is this area is well-settled. The
At trial, the jury was instructed that a traffic stop was a seizure under the
In his briefing on the
Of crucial significance to the court‘s view of this case is the fact that Coleman had just seen Clark minutes before in court where Clark displayed no “untoward” behavior and did not appear intoxicаted. Tr. 203:25-204:1; 232:11-16. Under these circumstances, Coleman‘s expressed concern over safety cannot ring true.4
Notes
Perhaps there is a police officer somewhere who would interpret an automobile passenger‘s giving him the finger as a signal of distress, creating a suspicion that something occurring in the automobile warranted investigation. And perhaps that interpretation is what prompted Insogna to act, as he claims. But the nearly universal recognition that this gesture is an insult deprives such an interpretation of reasonableness. This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity. Surely no passenger planning somе wrongful conduct toward another occupant of an automobile would call attention to himself by giving the finger to a police officer. And if there might be an automobile passenger somewhere who will give the finger to a police officer as an ill-advised signal for help, it is far more consistent with all citizens’ protection against improper police apprehension to leave that highly unlikely signal without a response than to lend judicial approval to the stopping of every vehicle from which a passenger makes that gesture.
On the Plaintiff‘s version of the facts, the stop was not lawful. . . .
Id. The same is true here. Even if the jury accepted Coleman‘s proffered reason for the stop, the basis was not reasonable as a matter of law. And even if it had accepted the argument he raises now—that he believed Clark was intoxicated or mentally ill—that basis is not reasonable as a matter of law.
B.
Even if an officer did not have reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot, a traffic stop can be justified if one of the limited exceptions to the
The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement can, under limited circumstances, justify a search or seizure when there is no reasonable basis to believe criminal activity is underway. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Community caretaking functions include established procedures or routine activities such as impoundment of a vehicle that impedes the safе flow of traffic, entry into a car after a traffic accident to assess occupants’ medical conditions, or opening a truck compartment to identify the owner. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 145 (4th Cir. 2005); Durney v. Doss, 106 F. App‘x 166, 169 (4th Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit has held that the community caretaking doctrine also extends to activities “protecting the safety of persons or property.” United States v. Gillespie, 332 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929 (W.D. Va. 2004); see Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App‘x 175, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). However, there are two limits to this exception. First, the doctrine can only apply to police activities “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” United States v. Ramage, No. 1:09CR61, 2009 WL 10677237, at *6 (N.D. W. Va. July 13, 2009) (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 441). Second, there cannot be anything on the record to suggest assertion of this exception is pretextual or in bad faith. United States v.
In addition to the community caretaking exception to the
The emergency doctrine is similar to, but distinct from, the community caretaker doctrine. Both exceptions to the
The Fourth Circuit has indicated that the community caretaking doctrine is more applicable when officers are engaged in “a routine police procedure, such as the policy of locating weapons in towed cars” and that “thе court should examine the programmatic purpose of the policy—whether it was animated by community caretaking considerations or by law enforcement concerns.” Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 554. Under a community caretaking doctrine, the court may also inquire as to the subjective motivations of the officer, in determining whether his public safety concerns were mere pretext. Gillespie, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 929. Alternatively, when an officer is “responding to an emergency, and not as part of a standardized procedure, the exigent circumstances analysis and its accompanying objective standard should apply.” Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 554. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that this “emergency exigency” exception to the warrant requirement justifies “immediate entry as an incident to the service and protective functions of the police as
The community caretaker doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case. First, Coleman‘s traffic stop is not “totally divorced” from investigative functions, based on his own representations. A court in this district chose not to apply the community caretaking exception because the warrantless home entry at issue felt closely related to a potential investigation, even though officers testified a search was not conducted until a warrant was obtained. United States v. Davis, No. 4:07CR00014, 2007 WL 2301583, at *4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2007) (“Nonetheless, I am reluctant to ground this decision solely on the community caretaker exception because looking for a shooting suspect or his potential victims is a situation in which law enforcement‘s community caretaker functions coincide with their investigative functions.“). Similarly, Coleman argued that there existed reasonable suspicion to believe Clark was violating Virginia‘s public intoxicatiоn statute, which forecloses reliance on the community caretaker doctrine to justify his actions. See Johnson, 410 F.3d at 145 (“The exception applies only to conduct that is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,’ and not when community-caretaking functions are used as ‘a subterfuge from criminal investigations.‘“) (quoting Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441). Because Coleman contends he was investigating a potential violation of
Second, Officer Coleman‘s alleged public safety concern seems questionable, at best. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (“We begin with the familiar proposition that reasonableness is the ultimate touchstone of the
Third, there is evidence in the record that suggests Coleman‘s assertion of concern for Clark‘s safety and that of the public was pretextual. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 145 (4th Cir. 2005) (“If Officer Bentivegna‘s stated reasons for the search were pretextual, the community-caretaking exception would not apply.“). The fact that Coleman did not permit Clark to leave after confirming he was okay casts doubt on his intentions. See United States v. Taylor, No. 3:09CR249, 2009 WL 3334654, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2009), affd, 624 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying the community caretaker doctrine to a warrantless entry when an officer terminated the interactiоn as soon as his concern for a lost child abated). While, “[t]he maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be stated with mathematical precision,” the detention should not last “longer than was necessary, given its purpose.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008); See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). “Thus, once the driver has demonstrated that he is entitled to operate his vehicle, and the police officer has issued the requisite warning or ticket, the driver ‘must be allowed to proceed on his way.‘” Id. (quoting United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir.1992)). In Gillespie, the court found a community caretaking claim insufficient, in part because the officers “called for backup, requested a K–9 unit to assist him, and started to interview neighbors,” which made their community caretaking claim seem pretextual. Gillespie, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 930. Similarly, Coleman never approached the driver of the
The facts of this case also fall short of justifying the emergency aid doctrine. The Fourth Circuit has not yet held whether this doctrine can apply to searches and seizures of a vehicle, but the Fifth Circuit has. See United States v. Toussaint, 838 F.3d 503, 507–08 (5th Cir. 2016) (“No federal court of appeals has yet approved (nor has any rejected) the extension of this doctrine to a vehicular stop. But there is no logical difficulty with extending the exception to those particular situations.“). Assuming it is applicable, the circumstances at hand still fall short of those required by the emergency aid doctrine. First, Coleman did not possess an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed requiring immediate aid. Coleman‘s only basis for concern was that Clark had made an insulting gesture at an officer. There was no evidence of injury or any kind of weapon. United States v. Ramage, No. 1:09CR61, 2009 WL 10677237, at *8 (N.D. W.Va. July 13, 2009). There was no evidence of violence likely to continue. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. Even if there were sufficient evidence of an emergency, there was no evidence of a situation requiring immediate aid. See Yengel, 711 F.3d at 397-400 (refusing to apply the emergency aid doctrine when officers are informed there is a grenade in the house, because there was insufficient evidence that the grenade was an immediate threat); Gillespie, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 927-28 (refusing to apply the emergency aid doctrine when
Taking the evidence in total and giving Coleman and the jury‘s verdict every supportable inference, there is simply no basis in the law to justify the seizure of Clark on July 25, 2016. The evidence establishes Coleman effectuated a seizure of Clark without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and that his actions, under color of law, amount to a constitutional violation. Because the evidence does not reveal any reasonable basis for the seizure of Clark following his constitutionally protected speech, however crude, inappropriate, and unwarranted it may have been, the jury‘s verdict is contrary to law and must be set aside, and the court will direct judgment be entered for Clark.
IV.
Because Clark seeks money damages, he must overcome Coleman‘s qualified immunity. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 2009). “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
The crux of the second prong of this analysis is whether a reasonable officer would have known he cannot pull over a vehicle based on nothing morе than the passenger making an insulting gesture at him. The inquiry hinges on “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,” which requires the court to establish the contours of established law at the time. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Smith v. Ray, 855 F. Supp. 2d 569, 578 (E.D. Va. 2012), affd, 781 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 2015) (“This pure question of law turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.‘“) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). The established law must then be applied to the specific facts of the case, to assess the reasonableness of the officer‘s actions. While the test is an objective one, “the immunity inquiry must be filtered through the lens of the officer‘s
Although the Fourth Circuit has yet to rule on these specific facts, the court‘s review of the established law is not so limited. “In determining whether a right is clearly established, it is not necessary for a court to have previously considered the exact facts at issue, or that there be a case involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts, so long as in light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.” Garcia v. Montgomery Cty., Maryland, 145 F. Supp. 3d 492, 505–06 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); see also Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In order to determine whether a right is clearly established, it is not necessary that the Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue, nor does the precise action or omission in question need to have been held unlawful. In the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to all available decisional law, including decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district courts.“) (citations omitted). Indeed, “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,” as long as they had “fair warning” that their conduct was unconstitutional. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 740–41.
At summary judgment, the court held that Coleman‘s claim of qualified immunity did not withstand scrutiny and would be denied. It found that “even if Plaintiff did “gig”5 Coleman, [] the law clearly establishes that a traffic stop under those circumstances would not comport with the
It is axiomatic that officers are on abundant notice of stringent free speech protections. Gestures intended to communicate ideas are protected speech under the
Coleman cannot make a colorable claim that presenting the middle finger gives rise to a reasonable concern for public safety. Courts across the country have refused to find that offensive language or gestures rise to the level of fighting words that would cause a reasonable officer concern about public safety. Clark, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 828. In fact, many have refused to apply qualified immunity to parallel fact patterns. See, e.g., Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103 (W.D. Ark. 2000), affd, 19 F. App‘x 471 (8th Cir. 2001) (“This is far from the first case in which a private citizen has either by words or gesture communicated an offensive message to a law enforcement officer. Nor is much of this body of law of recent vintage.“); Minard, 918 F.3d at 497 (stating “no matter how he slices it, Cruise-Gulyas‘s crude gesture could not provide that new justification,” for plaintiffs seizure under any
Moreover, Coleman‘s claim for qualified immunity cannot rest on his concern for Clark‘s and the public‘s wellbeing. Critically, Coleman had just seen Clark in court minutes before where Clark appeared neither intoxicated nor dangerous. Moreover, as the vehicle‘s passenger, nothing about Clark‘s insulting display, however repugnant, objectively suggests any risk to public safety. Given the particular circumstances of this case, in which Coleman had just observed Clark‘s behavior in the courtroom minutes before the rude gesture, no reasonable officer could have maintained an objectively reasonable concern for public safety warranting a seizure under the
V.
Although the verdict cannot stand, the court declines Clark‘s motion for a partial new trial on the issue of damages. “The granting of a new trial is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his action is not reviewable upon appeal except in the most exceptional circumstances.” Wadsworth v. Clindon, 846 F.2d 265, 266 (4th Cir. 1988).
Based on the evidence submit at trial, the court finds that Clark has not presented any evidence from which a jury could find the existence of compensable damages. From the outset, Clark did not plead with any specificity an amount of compensable damages sought. At trial,
In the absence of a compensable injury, the court is free to award nominal damages. See Carey v. Phiphus, 425 U.S. 247, 248 (1978); Farrar v. Hobby 506 U.S. 103, 121 (1992) (”Carey obligates a court to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes the violation of [a constitutional right] but cannot prove actual injury“). Under common law, courts can vindicate absolute rights through the award of a nominal sum of money, even without proof of actual injury. Carey, 425 U.S. at 266. In doing so, “the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed.” Id. The right against unreasonable stops is such a right in that its existence “does not depend upon the merits of a
Punitive damages are not an issue in this case. Punitive damages under
Likewise, the evidence does not establish that Coleman‘s actions amounted to “reckless or callous indifference” to Clark‘s federally protected rights. Id. The only evidence regarding Coleman‘s motives for his actions was his professed concern for Clark‘s wellbeing, and the evidence of a conspiracy to “take down” Clark simply does not implicate Coleman.6 Absent any competent evidence that Coleman‘s actions were motivated by anything other than a
The court may grant Clark attorney‘s fees. To qualify for attorney‘s fees, a party must meet the definition of “prevailing party” under the civil rights attorney‘s fees provision.
However, the Fourth Circuit has held “[b]ecause the Court in Farrar held that plaintiffs recovering only nominal damages usually or often will not be entitled to an award of attorney‘s fees, it is clear that such plaintiffs will at least sometimes be entitled to a fee award.” Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424-25 (4th Cir. 1994) (remanding for district court to consider attorney‘s fee request by plaintiff who was awarded only nominal damаges). In discerning nominal damage cases that do not warrant attorney‘s fees from the ones that do, the Fourth Circuit looks at factors identified by Justice O‘Connor in Farrar, including “the extent of relief, the significance of the legal issue on which
Upon balancing the factors, the court finds plaintiff is eligible for attorney‘s fees. The first factor instructs the court to compare the amount of compensable damages sought to the amount awarded. Id. at 206. While an award of nominal damages may appear limited relief, Clark never specified the damages he sought, primarily seeking a liability finding, condemnation of the officer‘s behavior, and punitive damages. Tr. 12:12-24 (conceding that compensable damages were limited but that a right was violated, requesting punitive damages). The second factor “is concerned with the general legal impоrtance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.” Mercer, 401 F.3d at 206 (holding that discrimination against woman is an important legal issue). See, e.g., Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e understand the second Farrar factor to address the legal import of the constitutional claim on which plaintiff prevailed.“); Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the plaintiff‘s “right to be free from illegal detention was a significant one“). An unreasonable stop based on an insluting gesture implicates not one, but two constitutional violations, and so this case is plainly of legal significance. The third factor evaluates the public purpose served by the litigation, “as opposed to simply vindicating the plaintiff‘s individual rights.” Mercer, 401 F.3d at 207. In Mercer, although the court found that the plaintiff “ultimately obtained only limited success in her claim against Duke,” the precedential value of the case could extend beyond the suit at hand. Id. at 208-09. Similarly, courts in this circuit have not had the opportunity to determine the outer bounds of how the
VI.
The jury‘s verdict lacks a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis . . . .”
The clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order to all counsel of record.
ENTERED: March 23, 2020
Michael F. Urbanski
Hon. Michael F. Urbanski
Chief United States District Judge