City of Toledo v. Corrections Commission of Northwest Ohio, et al.
Court of Appeals No. L-16-1155
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
December 20, 2017
2017-Ohio-9149
Trial Court No. CI0201505017
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: December 20, 2017
Andy Douglas, Adam W. Loukx, Law Director, and John T. Madigan, Senior Attorney, for appellee.
Marc A. Fishel and Melanie Williamson, for appellants Corrections Commission of Northwest Ohio and the Boards of Commissioners of Defiance County, Fulton County, Henry County, and Williams County.
Fritz Byers, for appellant Lucas County Board of Commissioners.
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, John A. Borell, Kevin A. Pituch, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant Lucas County Sheriff John Tharp.
Melissa M. Purpura, Director of Law, City of Oregon, for amicus curiae city of Oregon.
Beth A. Tischler, Director of Law, City of Maumee,
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer, Co., LPA, and John M. Roca, for amici curae International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO, CCNO Supervisors Association Local 53, CCNO Corrections Officers Association Local 64 and CCNO Case Managers Association Local 79.
* * * * *
KLATT, J.
{1} Defendants-appellants, the Corrections Commission of Northwest Ohio (“Commission“), the Lucas County Board of Commissioners (“Board“), the Lucas County Sheriff (“Sheriff“), and the Boards of Commissioners of Defiance County, Fulton County, Henry County, and Williams County, appeal a judgment entered by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiff-appellee, the City of Toledo. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
{2} Toledo is the largest municipal corporation within Lucas County, Ohio. Toledo does not own or operate any type of detention facility. Individuals arrested in Toledo, who are denied bail or who are unable to make bail, are confined to the Lucas County Corrections Center (“LCCC“).1 The Sheriff operates the LCCC and has charge of all individuals confined in it. See
{3} Generally, if an individual is convicted of a misdemeanor offense by a court located in Toledo,2 that individual serves any jail sentence imposed at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio (“CCNO“). CCNO is the product of agreements between Defiance County, Fulton County, Henry County, Lucas County, Williams County, and the City of Toledo to construct and operate a multicounty-municipal correctional center. CCNO has operated under successive organizational and operational agreements since 1988. In 2011, the five member counties and Toledo entered into the Fourth Amended and Restated Organizational and Operational Agreement for the Corrections Commission of Northwest Ohio‘s Multicounty-Municipal Correctional Center (“Fourth Agreement“).
{4} Under the Fourth Agreement, the Commission was tasked with the management, maintenance, operation, occupation, repair, and administration of CCNO. The Commission consisted of the sheriff and one member of the board of commissioners from each member county, and the Toledo chief of police and mayor. The Fourth Agreement required the Commission to appoint an executive director, who was in charge of CCNO.
{5} As mandated by the Fourth Agreement and CCNO‘s fiscal agent, each member had to remit its share of CCNO‘s annual operating and capital costs on a quarterly basis. The amount owed by each member depended on the number of beds reserved by the member. Toledo reserved 228 beds, or 35.65 percent of the available beds. Thus, Toledo owed 35.65 percent of CCNO‘s annual operating and capital costs. Lucas County, which reserved 203 beds, owed 31.84 percent of the annual operating and capital
{6} The Fourth Agreement permitted the Commission to rent unused beds to members and non-members. The Commission charged a per diem rate for the rental of beds. If a member‘s unused beds were rented, that member received a credit based on its percentage of total unused bed space available on a monthly basis. The Commission entered that credit on the member‘s quarterly invoices as an off-set against the member‘s proportional share of the operating and capital costs.
{7} Finally, the Fourth Agreement provided that it could be “modified, amended or supplemented in any respect not prohibited by law upon the approval of the modification, amendment or supplement by a two-thirds roll call vote of the Commission representatives and by the governing bodies of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Members.” (Commission‘s Ex. F, Fourth Agreement, Section 10.) Once approved, the modification, amendment, or supplement would become binding on the Commission and all members.
{8} In 1998, CCNO‘s executive director codified the billing rules CCNO used. However, neither the billing rules nor the successive organizational and operational agreements addressed how to divide between Lucas County and Toledo the cost of housing prisoners sentenced to a jail term by a court located in Toledo. In practice, offenders convicted in the Toledo Municipal Court filled beds Toledo paid for, while offenders convicted in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas filled beds Lucas County paid for.3 Toledo challenged this practice in 2014.
{9} Toledo‘s challenge began because, on October 15, 2014, Toledo‘s mayor directed the Toledo Police Department to stop charging alleged offenders under the Toledo ordinances if a comparable Revised Code offense existed. This directive constituted a sea change, as the Toledo Police Department had previously charged misdemeanors mostly under Toledo‘s ordinances. After mandating this change, Toledo‘s mayor initiated a campaign to alter CCNO‘s billing practices. Toledo‘s mayor urged CCNO‘s executive director to charge Lucas County with the cost of housing all prisoners convicted of a violation of the Revised Code, regardless of which Toledo-based court sentenced the prisoner. Under the rule proposed by Toledo‘s mayor, Toledo would only have the responsibility of providing for those few prisoners convicted of violating ordinances for which there was no Revised Code equivalent.
{10} The executive director capitulated. On October 27, 2014, the executive director adopted the rule that, “[i]f the City of Toledo issues a criminal complaint under the Ohio Revised Code versus [the] Toledo Municipal Code[,] that charge is billed to Lucas County.” (Commission‘s Ex. K, CCNO Ohio Billing Rules, Rule 13.) CCNO then began assigning beds based on the type of offense (i.e., an ordinance violation versus a state law violation), instead of the sentencing court (i.e., Toledo Municipal Court versus Lucas County Court of Common Pleas).
{11} As a result of the rule change, offenders who had once filled Toledo beds began occupying Lucas County beds instead. Lucas County soon developed a need for more beds than the 203 beds that it had reserved. Toledo, on the other hand, had numerous empty beds. CCNO began billing Lucas County thousands of dollars, in addition to its proportional share of
{12} Lucas County resisted this cost transfer. At that time, an ad hoc committee was drafting the Fifth Amended and Restated Organizational and Operational Agreement for the Corrections Commission of Northwest Ohio‘s Multicounty-Municipal Correction Center (“Fifth Agreement“). As a result of Lucas County‘s efforts, the committee added to the draft a section stating:
All Members which are a municipal corporation and operate a municipal court established in Section 1901.02 of the Ohio Revised Code bear the fiscal responsibility for the costs of incarceration of inmates/prisoners originating out of the jurisdiction of their municipal court, regardless of the criminal code for which the prisoner is held or sentenced.
(Commission‘s Ex. S, Fifth Agreement, Section 7(L).) This section was intended to reimpose on Toledo the obligation to pay the costs for all prisoners sentenced by the Toledo Municipal Court, no matter what the nature of the offense charged.
{13} At the Commission‘s May 27, 2015 meeting, the Commission adopted the Fifth Agreement. With the exception of one abstention, all of the five counties’ representatives voted in favor of the Fifth Agreement. Toledo‘s mayor and chief of police cast the only dissenting votes. Subsequently, the boards of commissioners of the five member counties approved the Fifth Agreement. Toledo refused to approve the Fifth Agreement, and its director of finance did not certify that Toledo possessed, or was in the process of collecting, the amount required to meet Toledo‘s financial obligations under the Fifth Agreement.
{14} On December 7, 2015, Toledo filed an action against the Commission; the Boards of Commissioners of Defiance County, Fulton County, Henry County, Lucas County, and Williams County; and the Sheriff. Along with other claims, Toledo sought declaratory judgments stating that: (1) Lucas County was responsible for the costs of housing state prisoners,4 regardless of what authority committed the arrest and what Toledo-based court imposed the sentence, and (2) the Fifth Agreement was not binding on Toledo. The Commission and each of the named Boards of Commissioners filed counterclaims against Toledo.
{15} The trial court ordered the parties to brief the issues raised by Toledo‘s claims for declaratory judgment. In its briefing, Toledo argued that it only had a statutory obligation to pay for housing individuals charged and convicted of violations of Toledo‘s ordinances. Toledo maintained that Lucas County was responsible for the costs of incarcerating those charged and convicted of state law misdemeanors. In response, the Board and Sheriff asserted that the statutory duty to pay for housing prisoners turned on the court that adjudicated the prisoners’ cases, not the type of offense. The Board and Sheriff thus contended that Toledo had to pay to house those prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Toledo Municipal Court, while Lucas County had the responsibility to pay for housing prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.
{16} As to its second claim, Toledo argued that it was bound by the Fourth Agreement, but not the Fifth Agreement.
{17} In a judgment issued June 27, 2016, the trial court granted Toledo summary judgment on each of its claims. The trial court declared that, “where a municipal police department arrests, detains and charges an individual pursuant to a violation of state law, it is the county who is financially responsible for the incarceration of that individual and the accompanying costs associated therewith.” (June 27, 2016 Order at 5.) The trial court also declared that the Fifth Agreement did not bind Toledo, and instead, the Fourth Agreement delineated Toledo‘s contractual rights and responsibilities.6
{18} The Commission, Board, and Sheriff appealed the June 27, 2016 judgment. On appeal, the Commission assigns the following errors:
- [1.] The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas erred when it granted Partial Summary Judgment to the City and determined the City was not bound to the Fifth Amended Agreement.
- [2.] The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas erred when it granted Partial Summary Judgment to the City and determined that
Ohio Revised Code § 307.93 requires unanimous consent of CCNO members to amend its Operating Agreement.
{19} The Board assigns the following error:
The trial court erred in entering partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee and against Defendant-Appellant.
{20} The Sheriff assigns the following error:
The Common Pleas Court committed prejudicial error when it granted the City of Toledo‘s motion for summary judgment and when it denied the Sheriff‘s motion for summary judgment.
{21} We will begin our review with the Board‘s and Sheriff‘s assignments of error. Both of these assignments of error challenge the trial court‘s conclusion that, under Ohio law, Lucas County must pay the cost of incarcerating individuals charged with or convicted of state law misdemeanors, regardless of the court that adjudicates those individuals’ cases. The Board and Sheriff argue that the trial court‘s conclusion is wrong because the court ignored
{22} To resolve the parties’ dispute, we must construe the language of
{23} In its entirety,
The legislative authority of a municipal corporation shall provide by ordinance for sustaining all persons sentenced to or confined in a prison or station house at the expense of the municipal corporation, and in counties where prisons or station houses are in quarters leased from the board of county commissioners, may contract with the board for the care and maintenance of those persons by the sheriff or other person charged with the care and maintenance of county prisoners. On the presentation of bills for food, sustenance, and necessary supplies, to the proper officer, certified by the person whom the legislative authority designates, the officer shall audit the bills under the rules prescribed by the legislative authority, and draw the officer‘s order on the treasurer of the municipal corporation in favor of the person presenting the bill.7
{24} Initially, we see nothing in the plain language of
{25} Moreover,
{26} Given the plain language of
{27} Indisputably, by the first clause of the first sentence of
{28} In order to ascertain the meaning of
Sec. 215. The council of any city or incorporated village shall have power to erect, establish and maintain a prison and one or more watch or station houses, as shall be necessary; and such prison, watch or station houses shall be under the control of the marshal, or chief of police, under such rules and regulations as the council may prescribe.
Sec. 216. It shall be the duty of the marshal or chief of police to provide all persons confined to such prison, watch or station houses, with necessary food during such confinement, and to see that such places of confinement are kept clean and made comfortable for the inmates thereof. Sec. 217. The council shall provide, by ordinance, for sustaining all persons sentenced to or confined in such prison at the expense of the corporation; and on the presentation of bills for food, sustenance and necessary supplies to the proper officer, certified to by such person or persons as the council may designate, not exceeding forty cents a day, such officer shall audit the same under such rules and regulations as the council may prescribe, and draw his order on the treasurer of the corporation in favor of the officer presenting such bill.
66 Ohio Laws 185-86.
{29} This historical context elucidates the meaning of
{30} Although much of the context that surrounded the 1869 statute has fallen away, the language of present-day
{31} Our conclusion is strengthened by the two cases that have reviewed
{32} Because
{33} The Board and Sheriff cite multiple cases that they characterize as supporting their argument that Toledo must pay for the care and sustenance of all prisoners charged with or convicted of misdemeanors
{34} In Shatzer, a prisoner held in the Norwalk City Jail deliberately set a fire, which seriously burned him. The prisoner received medical treatment at St. Vincent Hospital, and the hospital sued the city seeking payment for the medical services it rendered to the prisoner. After quoting
{35} Under our interpretation of
{36} Finally, the rules of statutory interpretation preclude us from adopting the Board‘s and Sheriff‘s interpretation of
{37} In sum, we conclude that
{38} Pursuant to
Imprisonment under the ordinances of a municipal corporation shall be in the workhouse or other jail of the municipal corporation. Any municipal corporation not provided with a workhouse, or other jail, may, for the purpose of imprisonment, use the county jail, at the expense of the municipal corporation, until the municipal corporation is provided with a prison, house of correction, or workhouse. Persons so imprisoned in the county jail are under the charge of the sheriff. Such sheriff shall receive and hold such persons in the manner prescribed by the ordinances of the municipal corporation, until such persons are legally discharged.
“Imprisonment,” as used in
{39} Under the plain language of
{40} As applied to the case at bar,
{41} In arguing to the contrary, the Board and Sheriff assert that
{42} If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court must apply, not interpret, that statute. Jacobson, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, at ¶ 8. Courts ” ‘do not have the authority’ to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute ‘under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.’ ” Id., quoting Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347 (1994). In other words, courts cannot look beyond the language of an unambiguous statute to determine its meaning. See Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12 (“When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.“). Thus, while the location of a statute
in the Revised Code framework may influence the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, such a consideration has no place in the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.{43} Here,
{44}
{46} As a final matter, we acknowledge that the Board and Sheriff argue that allocating the imprisonment costs as the trial court did contradicts sound public policy. We, however, must leave that argument to the General Assembly to decide. The General Assembly, not the judiciary, resolves public policy issues. Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 2005-Ohio-278, ¶ 14; accord Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, ¶ 71 (“[T]he General Assembly is charged with making the difficult policy decisions * * * and codifying them into law.“). Courts do not second-guess the General Assembly‘s policy choices. Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, ¶ 93. Rather, where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts must follow and apply the legislature‘s expression of public policy. Yoder v. Thorpe, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-225, 2007-Ohio-5866, ¶ 38.
{47} In this case, we have followed and applied the relevant statutes to determine which governmental subdivision must pay the cost of imprisoning individuals charged with or convicted of misdemeanors in the Toledo Municipal Court. If the General Assembly wishes to change the law, it is free to do so.
{48} In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in declaring that Lucas County must bear the cost of housing individuals charged with or convicted of state
{49} We next turn to the second issue presented in this appeal. By the Commission‘s first assignment of error and the Sheriff‘s assignment of error, the Commission and Sheriff argue that the trial court erred in declaring that the Fifth Agreement was not binding on Toledo. We disagree.
{50} Toledo argues that the Fifth Agreement does not bind it because its director of finance did not certify the availability of funds as required in
(D) (1) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(2) of this section and section 5705.44 of the Revised Code, make any contract or give any order involving the expenditure of money unless there is attached thereto a certificate of the fiscal officer of the subdivision that the amount required to meet the obligation or, in the case of a continuing contract to be performed in whole or in part in an ensuing fiscal year, the amount required to meet the obligation in the fiscal year in which the contract is made, has been lawfully apportioned for such purpose and is in the treasury or in process of collection to the credit of an appropriate fund free from any previous encumbrances. * * * Every such contract made without such a certificate shall be void, and no warrant shall be issued in payment of any amount due thereon.
The definition of “subdivision,” as used in
{51} Under the plain language of
{52} The Commission
{53} In support of their argument, the Commission and Sheriff cite Bd. of Cty. Commrs. v. Bd. of Twp. Trustees, 3 Ohio App.3d 336 (7th Dist.1981), and two cases following it.12 In Bd. of Cty. Commrs., the Board of Trustees of Island Creek Township entered into a contract with the Board of Commissioners of Jefferson County for Jefferson County to service and supply water to Island Creek‘s fire hydrants. The contract did not include an
{54}
{55} “When a statutory provision imposing a mandatory obligation has specifically enumerated exceptions, a court does not have discretion to create additional exceptions.” State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, ¶ 15; accord State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Ct. of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, ¶ 26 (when the plain language of a statute does not recognize the exception sought, the court could not add it); State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, ¶ 39 (“But the statute contains no exception, and we cannot add one to its
{56} Next, the Sheriff argues that
Sections 307.14 to 307.19, inclusive, of the Revised Code, do not repeal or abrogate other sections of the Revised Code authorizing contracts or agreements among particular classes of subdivisions, or modify or impair the force of such sections in respect of contracts or agreements entered into under such sections. Nor shall such other sections control or limit the making of agreements under sections 307.14 to 307.19, inclusive, of the Revised Code; it being intended that such sections shall be applied as fully as though such other sections did not exist.
{57} Relying on the second sentence of
{58} The Sheriff misreads
{59} However, in interpreting a statute, courts cannot delete language used in the statute. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus (“In matters of construction, it is the duty of [a] court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to insert words not used.“). Read in its entirety,
{60}
{61} In sum, we reject all the reasons the Commission and Sheriff offer for exempting the Fifth Agreement from
{62} As a final matter, we must address the Sheriff‘s argument that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the interplay between Sections 6 and 8 of the Fourth Agreement. After reviewing the
{63} Having concluded that the Fifth Agreement does not bind Toledo, we find no error in the trial court‘s declaration. Accordingly, we overrule the Commission‘s first assignment of error and the remainder of the Sheriff‘s assignment of error.
{64} By the Commission‘s second assignment of error, it argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Fifth Agreement was not binding because the parties did not unanimously consent to it. We have concluded that the Fifth Agreement does not bind Toledo for a separate, unrelated reason. The Commission‘s second assignment of error, therefore, is moot.
{65} Finally, we turn to Toledo‘s cross-assignment of error, by which Toledo argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Toledo was not entitled to reimbursement of the payment it made to the Commission at the end of the second quarter of 2016. This cross-assignment of error is not properly before this court.
{66} Pursuant to
(1) Cross appeal required. A person who intends to defend a judgment or order against an appeal by an appellant and who also seeks to change the judgment or order or, in the event the judgment or order may be reversed or modified, an interlocutory ruling merged into the judgment or order, shall file a notice of cross appeal within the time allowed by
App.R. 4 .(2) Cross appeal and cross-assignment of error not required. A person who intends to defend a judgment or order appealed by an appellant on a ground other than that relied on by the trial court but who does not seek to change the judgment or order is not required to file a notice of cross appeal or to raise a cross-assignment of error.
{67} Here, by its cross-assignment of error, Toledo seeks to reverse the trial court‘s ruling that denied it reimbursement. Thus,
{68} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the Commission‘s first assignment of error, and the Board‘s and Sheriff‘s assignments of error. Our ruling on the Commission‘s first assignment of error renders the Commission‘s second assignment of error moot, and consequently, we do not rule on it. We affirm the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
William A. Klatt, J.
Lisa L. Sadler, J.
Julia L. Dorrian, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE
Judges William A. Klatt, Lisa L. Sadler and Julia L. Dorrian, Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Notes
The certificate required by section 5705.41 of the Revised Code as to money in the treasury shall not be required for contracts on which payments are to be made from the earnings of a publicly operated water works or public utility, but in the case of any such contract made without such certification, no payment shall be made on account thereof, and no claim or demand thereon shall be recoverable, except out of such earnings. That certificate also shall not be required if requiring the certificate makes it impossible for a county board of developmental disabilities to pay the nonfederal share of medicaid expenditures that the county board of is required by sections 5126.059 and 5126.0510 of the Revised Code to pay.
Additionally, we note that